Tell Me How This Ends

by Eric Martin

There has been an increasing chorus of voices urging the US (acting with its allies in NATO, the UN or in tandem with some ad hoc coalition of the willing) to impose a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, with lawmakers from both parties, as well as foreign leaders, making appeals to implement some variation of such a policy in recent days.

To some extent, this impulse is understandable given the increasingly violent clashes in Libya, with government forces making gains on rebel positions and showing a willingness to use indiscriminate force in populated areas.  

On the other hand, when pondering the involvement of US forces, first and foremost, elected leaders must consider whether such an intervention is in our national interest, and, if so, what can realistically be accomplished and at what costs.  Along those lines, it is essential to establish what the objective of the intervention would be and what future actions will be necessitated/spurred on by the initial decision to intervene militarily. To paraphrase General Petraeus, "Tell me how this ends."

Despite legitimate concerns for civilian casualties, and the potential for atrocities, thus far Qaddafi has been primarily using air power to combat rebel forces within his nation's borders.  The effect of a no-fly zone, then, would be to prevent Qaddafi from being able to use air power in that fight (as well as to safeguard civilians from airborne assaults). 

Thus, even if justified on humanitarian grounds, the no-fly zone would serve the purpose of tilting the battlefield in favor of rebel forces - though some argue that supporting the rebels should be an explicit goal in itself, with the no-fly zone buttressed (or replaced) by arms and other aid provided directly to rebel forces.  Regardless, these outcomes raise several important questions about who we are supporting, to what ends, and to what extent we will be expected to participate in the process.

1. Do we know what the majority of Libyan rebels want and how they envision the future state of Libya in the post-Qaddafi era?  While there is a tendency to view these uprisings, and their participants, through Western-tinted lenses, those Libyans that are involved in the uprising are not monolithic in their outlook, nor are they uniformly pursuing a revolutionary democratic agenda.

For example, the epicenter of the rebellion, the city of Benghazi, is home to tribal groups and other factions with a long history of hostility to, and at times insurrection against, Qaddafi. In addition, there are hardcore Islamist factions involved in the opposition movement whose presence cannot be ignored.  Further, as Andrew Exum points out, the region contributed a disproportionately large number of foreign fighters in Iraq:

Benghazi had sent more foreign fighters to Iraq than any other city in the Arabic-speaking world. On a per capita basis, though, twice as many foreign fighters came to Iraq from Libya -- and specifically eastern Libya -- than from any other country in the Arabic-speaking world...And 84.1% of the 88 Libyan fighters in the Sinjar documents who listed their hometowns came from either Benghazi or Darnah in Libya's east.  This might explain why those rebels from Libya's eastern provinces are not too excited about U.S. military intervention. It might also give some pause to those in the United States so eager to arm Libya's rebels.

It is reasonable to conclude that at least some of the groups involved in the anti-government fight have limited democratic bona fides and are, instead, motivated by a desire to settle long standing grievances and/or to engage in an ancillary struggle for power with competing factions.  Since we could be getting in bed with these groups in the near future, shouldn't the various motives/worldviews be examined at greater length?

2.  What do US forces do if the imposition of a no-fly zone is not enough to enable rebel forces to topple Qaddafi? It is unlikely that limiting Qaddafi's use of fixed wing aircraft in the fight against rebels would be decisive on the battlefield, especially if he can retain the use of helicopters (targeting helicopters is a trickier endeavor, and thus their use might continue depending on the rules of engagement applicable to the eventual no-fly zone regime adopted, as well as other logistical factors).  Further, as in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, there is no guarantee that a no-fly zone would prevent Qaddafi's ground forces from committing civilian atrocities.

However, if you think the calls for US intervention are loud now, just imagine all the appeals to moral responsibility and the loss of US credibility/prestige if our jets are patrolling Libyan skies while civilians are being massacred by ground forces, or the rebels are being beaten back.

So what should our forces do if Qaddafi quashes the rebellion despite the no-fly zone?  Do we slink away quietly?  Or, as is perhaps more likely, do we escalate our military intervention with either more aggressive rules of engagement, or the introduction of ground forces, to rescue the routed rebels?  Shouldn't we consider whether we want to take on such a commitment before we head down a path of supposed limited intervention that could tilt steeply toward a much deeper involvement?

3. What do US forces do if the imposition of a no-fly zone is enough to enable rebel forces to topple Qaddafi?  In the "be careful what you wish for" category, we need to consider what role, if any, US military and non-military personnel would be expected to play in post-Qaddafi Libya should the no-fly zone and/or other measures succeed in taking Qaddafi down. 

Libya is a country with weak institutions, and an anemic civil society, to say the least.  Given that fact, do we expect a peaceful, stable democratic state to emerge soon after Qaddafi falls?  What if, as alluded to in #1 above, some of the rebel factions have a different vision - preferring to replace Qaddafi with a strongman more to their liking rather than opening up Libya to the uncertainty of the democratic process? What if civil strife erupts after Qaddafi's exit?

Is the US willing or able to pick winners and losers from amongst Libya's domestic political arena and back those parties militarily if need be? Would such an imposition generate armed resistance and, dare I say it, another insurgency?  Even under a best case scenario, would the US want to get involved in yet another open-ended nation building exercise? If not, would we have the nerve to just walk away and hope for the best after committing to the fight initially?

4. How are we going to pay for the no-fly zone/aftermath?  With municipal, state and federal budgets going through painful, GDP-shrinking contractions, where is the money to implement a no-fly zone supposed to come from?  According to a recent study, a robust no-fly zone could cost between $100-$300 million a week to operate. Given the unknown duration of the no-fly zone, the price tag could easily reach several billion dollars eventually - not to mention the price tag for any post-Qaddafi nation building/assistance or, possibly, more invasive military involvement. 

Would supporters of the no-fly zone on either side of the aisle support a tax increase to pay for it? If not, how do we justify adding the costs to the deficit/debt at a time when we are, supposedly, making exceedingly painful choices in pursuit of the reduction/stabilization of the deficit/debt?  Are the national interests involved in actively supporting the Libyan uprising so vital that they take precedence over other interests at home and abroad that are currently being neglected/underfunded?

Those are questions we must ask and answer before taking the next step.

(cross posted at Democracy Arsenal)

Comments

[Gary Farber]

I should have just written a post on what I think we should do, since that's basically what I did, but now I've got to go do other stuff instead.

[Eric Martin]

Excuse me while I go bang my head against the wall for a while, and then... whatever

I find this uncomfortably reminiscent of so much of my life.

[Carleton Wu]

And an article about the Nato Response Force, which would presumably be the central core to a NFZ.Which, accroding to the article, needs US technology.

First, this is a rapid-deployment combined arms force. Im not sure what you think it has to do with enforcing a NFZ. Let alone "the central core" of the effort.
Second, much of the concerns expressed over US technology were the lack of effective communications between US and other forces. There were also concerns about technology sharing between allies, but the 'needs US technology' part is 'needs US technology to be able to operate jointly in close proximity with the US, sharing sigint etc'.
Third, this force actually exists. It may or may not use some technology provided by the US. But if it does have some role in a NFZ operation, then it's there, ready to carry out that role afaict. If you're (dubiously) arguing that it couldn't exist wo US technology, that's a very different thing than claiming that the EU couldn't carry out the operation at all.

But let's go back to the first point- you just keep throwing stuff against the wall here hoping it'll stick. This rapid-reaction force- depending on mission requirements, the NRF will operate either as an Initial Entry Force to facilitate the arrival of Follow-on-Forces, or as a Stand-alone Force. Within the full spectrum of NATO missions, the NRF may conduct the following types of missions:
* Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
* Counter Terrorism Operations
* Embargo Operations
* Quick Response Operations to support diplomacy as required. cite

Again, you want to break out your military expertise and tell me how that has anything whatsoever to do with this conversation about a No-Fly-Zone?

[Gary Farber]

Okay. Take the phrases "humanitarian aid," "making diplomatic, political, and intelligence contacts and outreach with all relevant opposition forces in Libya, surrounding countries, national, subnational, ethnic, and otherwise," "attempt as generally consistent as possible approach to the Arab world, mideast, and Mediterranean area as possible," "avoid treating the issues as a giant game of Harpoon as possible, "quit talking so much about military solutions, and focus on the politics, diplomacy, and intelligence aspects," put in a bunch more about humanitarian steps we can talke, talk about how we shouldn't entirely exclude a very limited middle range of arguments for extremely limited military support steps that aren't insane arguments, and expand on that for a couple of thousand words, with a bunch of cites, and you've kind of got what I wrote. Just add hot water and air, stir, mix, and pretend I wrote that.

Useful, eh?

[Carleton Wu]

The idea that one Nato or more NATO countries has a ship or ships called an "air craft carrier," which might, in abstract theory, be "capable" of flying the same "sort" of airplane, (Harrier versus Rafale M, say, simply isn't relevant. These elements aren't interchangeable parts. A carrier equipped with one type of catapult and a crew, both sea and pilots, who have trained in communications and details of landing on one Navy's carrier can't just blithely land on another Navy's carrier save in the most dangerous and risk sort of circumstances, let alone be reequipped, let alone regularly deployed. It's just not the way real navies, as opposed to bath-tub toys, work.

I have no "idea" if the UK "air craft carrier" has or has not conducted "operations" with Harriers of other "nations". Or if eg the "Italians" have practiced such with the "Spanish". Real navies do joint exercises, so it certainly seems possible.
Perhaps you are aware if this is true or not. Sharing that information would actually "add" to the "conversation".

Also, it's deeply silly to be cite any sources at all you can find online as to numbers of craft, planes, missiles, ships, etc., unless you can find readiness figures on last week's supplies and effectiveness -- and you can't.

I want a ballpark idea of what's going on. Say, the UK has 200-odd 4th gen aircraft. It's *possible* that all but one of those isn't operational, but it's friggin *unlikely*. And I have better things to do than try to find out exactly how many are operational today (as if that wasn't classified info anyway).
What's deeply silly is rejecting rough data and claiming that it's all totally unknowable unless we've got access to classified information. I mean, *maybe* the US can't enforce a NFZ because all of our AWACS and carriers are offline. Not likely, but guess we can't have a conversation about that anymore either. We can't have *any* non-silly conversation about military capabilities. Or, *you* can't, apparently.

[Carleton Wu]

Ok, now I kind of regret that. The point about interoperability is a good one- Id assumed that joint ops would probably have occurred (and Id be surprised if they hadnt at least planned/trained for emergency diversions of aircraft to compatible platforms during joint ops- but not that surprised, Im not that well informed).
But couldn't it just have been delivered as "hey, you might have overlooked this point" rather than a digression into how you read a lot, followed by pedantic 'idiot quotes' and snark about bathtub toys?
This is why I rarely get into threads with you Gary- the intellectual pretensions and the sneering are not worth the content, and I get my dander up so easily that there's not much of a chance of a useful conversation anyway. Which is a shame bc sometimes there's some interesting content.

[Rob in CT]

I agree that I'd much rather have our government "leaning on" our Saudi allies (shoot protestors, lose our backing) than getting involved in the Libyan civil war.

[Gary Farber]

Carleton, how about a guest post?

[John Farnham]

"do you want a base in Libya instead of a tame puppet."

I don't think anyone here is seriously discussing either option, John. To whom are you addressing this question?

Actually, Slartiblastfast, I mean the ubiquitous 'you' of foreign policy. I don't even mean 'US' foreign policy since it is dictated all through NATO/UK/Commonwealth, etc. to be harmonized.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/4514938/Intelligence-sharing-between-Britain-and-the-United-States-dates-back-to-First-World-War.html

So to say that nobody is discussing that question is to evade the 'how do we leave' question again...when nobody should believe that will happen should the habit of force projection be done as reflex. If this isn't in the works, it was rather silly to promote destabilization of governments in the targeted areas of oil production by the same people who got Obama elected through internet marketing. Unless, of course, it was a total coincidence that everything fell to bits at once.

The Citizens: Remaking the Map of the Middle East
1 Feb 2011 ... What is happening in Egypt today is going to remake the map of the Middle East. Until a couple weeks ago, American policymakers had a ...
thecitizens.blogspot.com/2011/.../remaking-map-of-middle-east.html

Remaking the Middle East - Council on Foreign Relations
Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, offers his road map to the entire Middle East region. ...
www.cfr.org › Iraq

HOW THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST MAP CAME TO BE DRAWN
The map of the Arab Middle East was drawn by the victorious Allies when they took over .... to be involved in the remaking (& remapping) of the Middle East. ...
christianactionforisrael.org/isreport/midesmap.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_%E2%80%93_United_States_military_relations

The U.S. Army is getting rid of its "pen and paper" and "string and stick" method of tracking fuel use in Afghanistan after nearly a decade of mismanagement, theft and fraud resulting in what is likely hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars in lost fuel, some of which is sold on the black market and has ended up in Taliban hands.

http://www.vetvoice.com/showDiary.do;jsessionid=BC47E43E607F4BBF29F884D0F5E2114A?diaryId=4657

So yeah,nobody is discussing

U.S. military interventions since 1890 or http://www.motherjones.com/military-maps/

BTW You likely know me - if you do - as Opit.

[McKinneyTexas]

Turb at 12:47 minus the declaration of war part pretty much sums it up. Yes, in theory, NATO, or three or four of the larger members, could pull something off, but the unknowns are significant and staying power is an open question as well. Is there a groundswell of popular support in Europe for such an undertaking?

[jrudkis]

Embargo Operations
The NRF’s missions include traditional missions, such as deployment of air, maritime or ground forces as
a show of force; deployment as an initial entry force to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces; and
deployment as a stand-alone force for crisis response to perform missions that include peacekeeping,
support of counter-terrorism operations, consequence management—including chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks; humanitarian crises, embargo operations (maritime, initial land and
no-fly zone), and non-combatant evacuation operations (Mariano and Wilson, 2003).

[jrudkis]

Second, much of the concerns expressed over US technology were the lack of effective communications between US and other forces.

Plus the AWACS that are supplied by the US:
AWACS (SHAPE, AFNORTH, AIRNORTH HQ/E-3A Component)
page 16, table 1.1, page 16

http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/
DTP%2018%20NATO%20Response%20Force.pdf

[Slartibartfast]

According to an oft-quoted statement by former U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen, European NATO members spend 60 percent of what the United States spends on defense and get only 10 percent in return.

I'm not sure that's a good comparison, without knowing how LONG NATO members have been engaged in that level of spending. We've been investing in our own military for a very long time, now. 10 percent capability, also, by what metric?

I don't expect that you know the answer to that; just pointing out that it doesn't necessarily mean that the EU is collectively pissing away its defense spending on useless crap.

Actually, Slartiblastfast, I mean the ubiquitous 'you' of foreign policy.

You offered two alternatives, neither of which has been discussed in this thread. If you don't think those are the only two possibilities (a- base in Libya; b- tame puppet), why are you presenting them as if they are? Or maybe I've misunderstood; if so, please set me straight.

So to say that nobody is discussing that question is to evade the 'how do we leave' question again

There is no 'how do we leave' question that concerns us here. Because none of us is discussing ever setting foot on Libyan soil in the first place. Granted, if we're to be involved in any way in establishing an NFZ, exit strategy is important. But establishing an NFZ doesn't mean that we do either of establishing bases or installing a puppet government.

Establishing an NFZ might not even make any sense. Some of us are pretending it does. But we don't get to make the decisions, so no harm is done if we do some pretending. We can turn right around and pretend it doesn't, and look at what could happen then, with just as much ill consequences.

So yeah,nobody is discussing

I didn't say no one is discussing it; I said no one here is discussing it. Or wasn't, until you brought it up. The way that you brought it up seemed to imply that someone in our discussion, here, had taken one of the two positions you describe.

But again: maybe I'm failing to get something, here.

Hi, Opit!

[Carleton Wu]

Carleton, how about a guest post?

I have no idea what Id post on, honestly. My two biggest criticisms of my blog commentary are that
1)I spend far too much time arguing and not enough time discussing and
2)I spend too much time tearing other peoples' theses down rather than offering my own

The things I know enough about to have more opinions or facts than questions just aren't good fodder for a post anyway.

[Carleton Wu]

initial land and no-fly zone

The quote makes it clear that this is just for rapid-response setting up embargoes. It's not that the EU can't perform a NFZ mission without this unit (which, I add yet again, actually exists), just that they probably can't set one up in 72 hours or whatever the rapid-response for that kind of operation would be.

So it's not that they couldn't perform a NFZ mission, just that it would take longer to implement without their rapid-response team. Which they actually have, so it still doesn't help your argument that the EU needs to buy hw from the US in order to perform the mission.
That was your original point. Please try supporting it or stating some other point that you'd like to support. All this bluster, blockquoting, and distraction isn't getting you there.

Plus the AWACS that are supplied by the US:
AWACS (SHAPE, AFNORTH, AIRNORTH HQ/E-3A Component)
page 16, table 1.1, page 16

Those are just the contributions to the rapid-reaction force. Several EU nations have AWACS. This has already come up on the thread.

[McKinneyTexas]

Those are just the contributions to the rapid-reaction force. Several EU nations have AWACS. This has already come up on the thread.

A side note: saying Country X has an AWACS is like saying Country X has an aircraft carrier. It describes function, not capability. That said, I would expect any European AWACS to be able to control the battle space over Libya. My earlier suggestion that Europe could not perform this aspect of a NFZ without a US AWACS are withdrawn.

[jrudkis]

Which they actually have, so it still doesn't help your argument that the EU needs to buy hw from the US in order to perform the mission.

I am not arguing for a point, I am having a discussion about whether the EU can conduct a NFZ without US help. The NRF seems relevant to the discussion.

I'm not sure that's a good comparison, without knowing how LONG NATO members have been engaged in that level of spending. We've been investing in our own military for a very long time, now. 10 percent capability, also, by what metric?

I think it is fair to question how such a complicated system can be reduced to such a simple statement. I think the point of it is that our NATO allies were not capable of many modern warfare requirements, at least as of 10 years ago. The timeframe of the quote relates to Kosovo, and Bosnia and Kosovo kicked off a round of discussions regarding making the European contribution to NATO more effective. For example, In 1999, NATO launched the
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and then NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment.

The conflicts in the Balkans
highlighted the need for more mobile forces, for technological equality between the
United States and its allies, and for interoperability. In 1999, NATO launched the
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), an effort to enable the alliance to deploy troops
quickly to crisis regions, to supply and protect those forces, and to equip them to engage
an adversary effectively. The conflict in Afghanistan marked a new development in
modern warfare through the extensive use of precision-guided munitions, directed by
ground-based special forces; many believe that this step widened the capabilities breach
between the United States and its European allies. At its 2002 summit in Prague, NATO
approved a new initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), touted as a
slimmed-down, more focused DCI, with quantifiable goals. Analysts have cautioned
that the success of PCC will hinge upon increased spending and changed procurement
priorities — particularly by the European allies. At NATO’s 2004 Istanbul summit and
its 2006 Riga summit, the alliance reaffirmed the goals of PCC and, in light of NATO
missions, particularly in Afghanistan, stressed the urgency of acquiring specific
capabilities such as airlift. During the 110th Congress, lawmakers are likely to review
the alliance’s progress in boosting NATO capabilities, especially in the context of the
appropriations process.

...

NATO officials point out, however, that PCC differs from DCI in several important
ways: PCC is focused on a smaller number of goals, emphasizes multinational
cooperation and specialization, requires specific commitments from member states, and
was designed with a particular force in mind: the NATO Response Force (NRF.)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21659.pdf

[Carleton Wu]

A side note: saying Country X has an AWACS is like saying Country X has an aircraft carrier. It describes function, not capability. That said, I would expect any European AWACS to be able to control the battle space over Libya.

True. I expect that to be more often true of 3rd-world countries without good modern military traditions, like the Saudis.

I am not arguing for a point, I am having a discussion about whether the EU can conduct a NFZ without US help. The NRF seems relevant to the discussion.

Ok, but how? They have it. They want it to coordinate better with the US. You originally brought it up thusly: And an article about the Nato Response Force, which would presumably be the central core to a NFZ. Which, accroding to the article, needs US technology.
It isn't necessarily key to a NFZ, although it might be important to implementing one very quickly. That the NRF wants/needs US cooperation and sharing to be able to coordinate with US forces, Im not sure how that's relevant. And that, in the interests of long-term cooperation, the US and the EU should share tech more, not sure how that's relevant either in general.

So tell me, what is your point about the NRF? How does that point support the contention that the EU is not capable of performing the mission? What capabilities do they lack that they need to carry out the mission?

[jrudkis]

The NRF is the force that has been built since Kosovo to be the European mechanism for joint response. This is what they have to do things, like a NFZ.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a "coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package" of approximately 25,000 troops that is "technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable".[1] Its role is to act as a stand alone military force available for rapid deployment by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a collective defense, crisis management or stabilisation force, or to act as an initial entry force for a subsequent primary deployment. The NRF consists of land, air and sea components provided by NATO members. Contributed forces first train together and then become available for a 6-month period before being replaced by the new force.

The purpose of the NRF concept is to provide NATO with a robust and credible high readiness capability, which is fully trained and certified as a joint and combined armed force, able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions wherever required. The concept of NRF was first endorsed with a declaration of NATO's Heads of State at the Prague Summit on 22 November 2002, approved by NATO Defence Ministers in June 2003, and first headquarters created in October 2003 in Italy under command of NATO Joint Force Command in Brunssum, Netherlands, designated NRF 1. Its rotation replacement was designated NRF 2 (2004) at the same time.[1] Although NRF 1 included personnel from 15 nations,

wikipedia

[Carleton Wu]

The NRF is the force that has been built since Kosovo to be the European mechanism for joint response. This is what they have to do things, like a NFZ.

Yeah, I linked to the wikipedia article earlier I think. I didn't reproduce it, but then I didnt see much point in doing so.

This appears to me to be an incorrect assertion, one you've made several times but not backed up. the NRF is a rapid-reaction force- but that does not make it 'the thing they have do to things, like an NFZ'. It is the thing they have to do things like an NFZ really fast. Read the bit you quoted about "to act as an initial entry force for a subsequent primary deployment" again, see if it sinks in.

So now I've got two questions instead of just the one you didnt answer:
1)What does the NRF have to do with the assertion that the EU cannot enforce a NFZ over Libya?
2)Why do you think that the EU's other assets- planes, ships, etc- cannot be used for a NFZ operation, that they are limited to their rapid-reaction force to do this?

[wj]

For those who are interested, The Economist's Clausewitz blog has some information on the whole subject of the Libyan conflict:
http://www.economist.com/node/21016450

Their Charlemagne blog
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne
also has several bits on what the EU and its various components are thinking on the subject.

Check them out.
IMHO, The Economist counts as a reliable source. Not perfect, of course, but relatively reliable.

[Carleton Wu]

wj, nice links, thanks

[jrudkis]

So now I've got two questions instead of just the one you didnt answer:
1)What does the NRF have to do with the assertion that the EU cannot enforce a NFZ over Libya?
2)Why do you think that the EU's other assets- planes, ships, etc- cannot be used for a NFZ operation, that they are limited to their rapid-reaction force to do this?

I believe that the NRF is the height of European integration. It is the best they have, and I do not think it is adequate to the task. The other assets can be added to the NRF. It is designed to be modular, so that it can use available assets.

I would like it to be adequate, because I don't want the US dragged into the mess if they go. I just don't think it is, partly because they do not have political integration to support or sustain an operation, but also because they don't have the capacity to sustain and support an operation.

This article is on target for what I think the EU military reality is:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article
/0,8599,2057229,00.html

"Most European defense establishments have been overloaded, mistakenly procured and focus on Cold War scenarios," says Daniel Korski, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. "To say that defense cuts will jeopardize any intervention in Libya suggests that everything was fine in the first place."

...

But despite these reforms, European armies still lack the means to operate in difficult theaters. Clara Marina O'Donnell, a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, says European defense capabilities have actually been diminished since they took part in NATO's 1995 bombing campaign in Bosnia. "Europeans would be not be prepared for any intervention in Libya now. They cannot deliver on action. In fact, Europe could [probably] not do Bosnia again," she says.

And besides, says Daniel Keohane, defense expert at the Paris-based European Union Institute for Security Studies, any military intervention in Libya would have to depend on the U.S. "At the moment, Europe can barely deploy 100,000 troops, while the U.S. Marine Corps can deploy 200,000. Europe doesn't have anything approaching the structure and experiences to develop a military operation on its own," he says.

As I said, I want to be wrong. I want a strong ally with force projection capability that can take care of issues on the world stage. I don't think that is the ally we have.

[Carleton Wu]

I believe that the NRF is the height of European integration. It is the best they have, and I do not think it is adequate to the task.

It may be the most integrated EU force. It is not the best they have in terms of being some elite force (many, perhaps all EU countries have their own special forces etc that aren't part of the rapid response force). Alone, it is not adequate to the task because it was not designed to be adequate to this task- as your own quote pointed out, it was intended to serve as the rapid response force while the "subsequent primary development" was prepared for action.
You really seem to love these long blockquotes, but when they say the opposite of what you're saying, you just ignore then here and go with "your belief".
Would a larger EU mobilization run into communications problems? Sure, just as they have when they've operated in conjunction with US forces. Might that lead to losses? Sure.
Does that mean that a 3rd-world 5th-rate military can hold them off? Not sure why you'd think/hope that that follows.

At the moment, Europe can barely deploy 100,000 troops

The UK had about 60k troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. So that seems wrong, unless that's the UK's maximum total commitment *and* Italy, Spain, France, Germany etc can only muster 40k. Or there's something else unsaid here.

Here's the thing about quotes; I can probably find a bunch of quotes supporting returning the US to the gold standard. I think that's a foolish, unsupportable idea. But I can find quotes from people with nice-looking titles that will say that.
I can also find quotes from well-regarded people who think that this is nuts. There's no reason to regard either set of quotes as some irrefutable argument.
So if you want to make a convincing case, you'll need to do better than just arguing from authority over and over. You'd need to explain, for example, why the hundreds of modern EU fighters couldn't take part in such an operation successfully. So far, you havent even tried.

As I said, I want to be wrong.

I wish you as much success in all of your other endeavors as you've found in this one.

[jrudkis]

I can also find quotes from well-regarded people who think that this is nuts.

Great. Lets see some quotes from well regarded people who think that the EU can support a NFZ in Libya without US aid.

[Carleton Wu]

Great. Lets see some quotes from well regarded people who think that the EU can support a NFZ in Libya without US aid.

I have better things to do with my time- that's not a likely scenario, and I don't have any military experts on speed-dial. The point is that the argument from authority is limited and can often support multiple sides- ergo, it isn't reliable.
I ask you, one more last single time- you said that the EU would need to buy hw from the US to do this. What, specifically, would they need to buy from us to make it work?
Please, don't bother responding with another blockquote, your feelings, or other distractions. Im not asking for much here, considering how many elections you've used already: tell me what you think they need to buy.

[jrudkis]

I have better things to do with my time

Apparently you don't: you have spent an awful lot of time flushing this out with me. Give it a shot. You recognized up thread that it is an issue you have, shooting down other's thesis without offering your own. Your thesis is that the EU can perform a NFZ on Libya without US aid. Lets see it.

[liberal japonicus]

It's unlikely that the EU would support a NFZ without the US, because the political unity that would be demonstrated would immediately have the US want to participate. Sort of a chicken egg thing

[Carleton Wu]

Apparently you don't: you have spent an awful lot of time flushing this out with me. Give it a shot. You recognized up thread that it is an issue you have, shooting down other's thesis without offering your own. Your thesis is that the EU can perform a NFZ on Libya without US aid. Lets see it.

Think straight- you just accused me of not having a thesis and then stated my thesis. This isn't debate, it's a turkey shoot.
I've offered a lot of reasons for thinking that my thesis might be true: number and quality of aircraft including support aircraft, ships, locations of airbases, quality of support systems, pilots, etc. That Libya's AF strength is probably overestimated by merely looking at aircraft and SAM numbers (likely poor maintenance, training, morale). That the NFZ really only needs to be enforced over or near rebel forces to be mostly effective.
While I do often tear down without offering much, here I am in fact offering something.

As I explained already, Im unlikely to find a military expert quote on the subject, just as Im unlikely to find a military expert quote on whether the US could successfully invade Haiti. Because they have better things to do then offering opinions on unlikely events, and even if they did no one would publish them. Does that mean that the US cannot invade Haiti? Or can we look objectively at the military capabilities of the US and Haiti and make a semi-educated guess of our own?
And I totally might be wrong about this, I am no expert. Im not even a serious war nerd. If Slarti had said, contrary to my thinking, that Harrier IIs would get slaughtered by MIG-25s, Id have said "wow, I had no idea" and moved on, or maybe asked him to explain to I could understand better.

So now, I ask you again (is this embarrassing for you yet)- what hardware does the EU need to acquire from the US in order to carry out the mission? Once you tell us that, then we'll be able to move the argument down the road a bit more- we'll know exactly where you think the deficiencies lie, and I can either successfully or unsuccessfully attempt to address them. Or, even, be convinced by them. But you've given me no chance for that so far, since you won't show your hole card.
Or, you can say something else irrelevant and hope that (if anyone else is actually still reading!), they don't notice that you just can't seem to deliver on your claim. Either way, Im an insomniac, Ill be here all night, try the veal.

[Carleton Wu]

It's unlikely that the EU would support a NFZ without the US, because the political unity that would be demonstrated would immediately have the US want to participate.

I totally concur. The US is generally more interventionalist, the administration would look weak being preempted by Euro-weenies, it would help strengthen the alliance, its unlikely to suffer serious setbacks and so it's a source of good headlines. I don't see much downside for Obama unless some Desert One-type debacle.

[jrudkis]

As I explained already, Im unlikely to find a military expert quote on the subject, just as Im unlikely to find a military expert quote on whether the US could successfully invade Haiti.

And yet, we have an article from Time regarding whether the EU can support an operation in Libya. Which seems to say no. There must be someone, somewhere, that thinks as you do that the EU can handle Libya just fine.

[Carleton Wu]

And yet, we have an article from Time regarding whether the EU can support an operation in Libya. Which seems to say no. There must be someone, somewhere, that thinks as you do that the EU can handle Libya just fine.

Another miss. Do you want to share you wittle secret, or keep acting like you're participating in a debate without actually doing so?

[jrudkis]

Another miss. Do you want to share you wittle secret, or keep acting like you're participating in a debate without actually doing so?

So far as I can tell, I am the one who has provided ample evidence that the EU has questionable capacity. You have offered nothing to indicate that the EU can conduct a NFZ on its own.

[Carleton Wu]

You have offered nothing to indicate that the EU can conduct a NFZ on its own.

They appear to my novice eye to have adequate aircraft, naval forces, support forces etc. I completely admit to being a novice, altho I won't give up a position that makes sense to me without actual evidence.
Of course, you know what they don't have that they need in order to make this work- why don't you tell us what that is?

So far as I can tell, I am the one who has provided ample evidence that the EU has questionable capacity.

Only if you think that "argument from authority" is an instruction manual. It is, in fact, a type of fallacy.

You said that you knew what the EU needed to buy from the US in order to carry out a NFW operation over Libya. I havent seen that it your voluminous blockquotes, but perhaps Ive missed it. Could you repeat it for me?

[jrudkis]

You said that you knew what the EU needed to buy from the US in order to carry out a NFW operation over Libya.

I said this?

I really think it is your turn to provide something to support your novice position.

[Carleton Wu]

I really think it is your turn to provide something to support your novice position.

Hey, Ill play by my own rules. Ive said why I think the EU can do this. If there's something you think is missing from my analysis, for example some piece of hardware that the US could provide or sell to the EU that would make the mission possible, let me know what that is & Ill see if I can figure out if they've got it or have a substitute or if it's necessary etc.

You said that you knew what the EU needed to buy from the US in order to carry out a NFW operation over Libya.

I said this?

You said But I wouldn't be against selling some hardware to the EU if they find they don't have the capacity to perform anything useful.

So, this time for all the marbles, did you have anything in particular in mind? It sounds like you did. Yet you won't tell us what that something is.

[jrudkis]

For all the marbles, I am aware of the EU general incapacity to project force, as has been amply shown in this thread.

Can you show otherwise? I would like you to show that they can.

[Carleton Wu]

Three things:
1)Ive painted a scenario where they can. There are airbases within striking distance of Libya. The EU has tankers, AWACS, aircraft carriers, anti-aircraft ships, sub- and air-launched cruise missiles, anti-runway missiles, and anti-SAM missiles. I think they've got ship-launched cruise missiles, but not sure about that. They've got hundreds of 4th-gen fighters and hundreds more attack aircraft.
They shouldn't face any serious logistical obstacles- they don't have large numbers of troops to support or supply. The airbases are in Europe (altho at distance from UK, France, etc) and the ships will be close to friendly ports and under friendly land-based air cover.
They could have problems with maintaining sortie rate, but they also appear to have excess aircraft to throw around. Dont know about trained pilots and ground crews.
They could have problems with throughput at the couple of closest airbases. I dont know anything about that, but I do know that they cant buy closer airbases from the US...
I dont know how long it would take to make this happen. Maybe that's prohibitive.

Dispute with any or all of that, but for &$^#'s sake stop acting like a baby and saying I haven't offered anything for you to dispute. Don't just repeat that you "just know" the EU can't do it- pick part of that scenario and tell me why you think it can't be done.

2)You claim to be aware of something that you cannot demonstrate. This is called faith. Me, I've been up and down saying Im not an expert and that Im open to correction. You, otoh, have persisted in "just knowing" stuff and scoffing at the idea that providing evidence or even a theory is a useful exercise.

3)You *still* havent told us what the things are that the US could sell to the EU to make this operation possible. You claim to have this knowledge. This knowledge, if true, would really deflate my position.
I can't do anything here but conclude that you don't have this info, and are too embarrassed to admit it. If you had it you presumably would've revealed it by now.
Ill do you a favor and stop asking, I kinda feel like Im kicking a Chihuahua here. Kinda sounds like it, too.

[Carleton Wu]

Well, Ima get some sleep. If you think of a serious objection to my scenario or if you recall that thing that the EU needs to buy (arf arf), Ill check in tomorrow to see.
Just so you don't stay up later waiting for a reply, since it's been fast & furious here.

[Jacob Davies]

CW, I think the bigger problem is that while there might be an abstract belief among the European public that helping the Libyan rebels would be good, when it comes to the actual costs and risks of doing it, there isn't going to be a solid base of public support.

And I don't mean to seem callous, but I don't think they're wrong. Libya is a relatively poor country of 6 million people in North Africa, and Gaddifi has long since moved from "menace" through "nuisance" to "colorful eccentric". He appears to be in "brutal crackdown" mode rather than "genocide" mode, and we pretty much set an international standard that the former doesn't justify international interventions owing to the annoying habit of just about every government of engaging in said "brutal crackdowns" once in a while. Including ours.

I'm sure the rebels in Libya are better people than Gaddafi, but they seem to have started a war they can't win. (In large part because the sort of shame/honor non-violent protests that worked in countries where the broader leadership or military has any independence (and maybe a conscience) do not work in countries where a dictator holds control.)

I wish they could win. But I'm not at all convinced that it serves the cause of peace for the US or NATO to look like it is saying "If you say you're for democracy, we'll engage in multi-billion dollar military interventions on your behalf."

We're not International Rescue. It's not a very good idea to set the precedent that if you want US military assistance against your asshole dictator all you have to do is push this button.

[Slartibartfast]

If Slarti had said, contrary to my thinking, that Harrier IIs would get slaughtered by MIG-25s, Id have said "wow, I had no idea" and moved on, or maybe asked him to explain to I could understand better.

I'd advise caution in regarding me as any kind of authority in aerial warfare. My expertise is actually advanced algorithms, and any knowledge I might have about aircraft capabilities is either related to how they affect algorithm performance, or purely incidental. Understanding aircraft avionics is part of that. There's a whole area of avionics that I haven't even seen, because of the level of classification. I'd guess that area gives us even more of an edge over an opposing force whose equipment is decades out of date.

It's not just us that has this; it's also some NATO countries. Poland, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium together have over 200 F-16s, and quite a few of those have advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground targeting systems. Every one, of course, has GPS-aided navigation, which I rather doubt the Libyan Air Force equipment has.

And of course quite a lot of the rest of the EU has other, perfectly serviceable equipment, each of which offers certain performance advantages over the Libyan air fleet.

But again: I think that if we did anything at all, it would be to destroy as much of their aircraft on the ground as possible, as well as their ability to maintain and refuel said aircraft. They only have about a dozen military airfields, and I'd expect that their ability to maintain and repair their aging (mostly Soviet) fleet at non-military fields would be extremely limited.

But I don't have much in the way of preference over what (if any) involvement the US has, or NATO has, or the UN has. I doubt many longtime commenters have forgotten that I believed Iraq had WMDs (not necessarily, chem/bio weapons), or at least the ability to assemble WMDs on short notice. I myself have not forgotten that, and hope that I can learn some caution out of regard for how much of what I think I know is wrong.

Hypotheticals, on the other hand, are interesting and have little in the way of unpleasant consequences.

[McKinneyTexas]

"At the moment, Europe can barely deploy 100,000 troops, while the U.S. Marine Corps can deploy 200,000. Europe doesn't have anything approaching the structure and experiences to develop a military operation on its own,"

Others have alluded to Europe's military tradition and this quote implies other key missing ingredients: (1) unified command and control (who gets to direct the NFZ and what staffing/administrative apparatus is in place for the participating countries? Answers: who knows and they'd have to build it from scratch) (2) zero tradition/experience in European-only mass force projection--even if all of the elements are in place, who will bring it all together into a single, cohesive unit and conduct operations of a kind never before conducted? European armies, navies and air arms are built around a continental conflict in which air superiority over and on either side of the confrontation line(s) coupled with maintaining supply by sea (from the US) are the missions. That is, their structure, training, doctrine, etc are all geared to a mission that is the polar opposite of over-the-horizon force projection. The US, OTOH, doesn't do domestic continental defense with its army and Marines; rather, it is specifically designed to go to someone else's continent and perform a variety of missions, including continental defense. Within the US bag of tricks is quickly achieving air superiority over a much smaller and less equipped opponent. Even then, we do this with close proximity land bases, support in depth and, preferably, allies who bring something to the table.

Shorter version: even if many of the elements are present for a European-only NFZ, many more are missing.

There are airbases within striking distance of Libya. The EU has tankers, AWACS, aircraft carriers, anti-aircraft ships, sub- and air-launched cruise missiles, anti-runway missiles, and anti-SAM missiles. I think they've got ship-launched cruise missiles, but not sure about that. They've got hundreds of 4th-gen fighters and hundreds more attack aircraft.

If this is merely an NFZ being described here, it is one on heavy steroids. And it still leaves open the question of who will knit all of this together into a single, viable military endeavor.

[Carleton Wu]

CW, I think the bigger problem is that while there might be an abstract belief among the European public that helping the Libyan rebels would be good, when it comes to the actual costs and risks of doing it, there isn't going to be a solid base of public support.

That seems very likely to me. At this point Im just disputing whether they could, not whether they want to or are going to. I said before, I doubt that they would, and if they did the US would almost certainly want to get involved anyway.

[Slartibartfast]

it still leaves open the question of who will knit all of this together into a single, viable military endeavor.

Who is open to debate. Whether such cooperation has been done in practice before is just a matter of history.

[Carleton Wu]

I'd advise caution in regarding me as any kind of authority in aerial warfare.

Well, Id trust you to have a good idea of something that would be common knowledge among experts, to openly state the limits of your knowledge, and to differentiate your own opinions from more conclusive statements of general expert belief. You know a lot more about this than I do, so if you think Im wrong out of hand, my first thought is that I need to check my work. :)
(not that even experts are always good at stating the limits of their knowledge or differentiating their opinions from industry consensus, but I get the sense that you are- which, to circle back to an earlier point, is one of the reasons that arguing from authority is a bad idea).

[Carleton Wu]

unified command and control (who gets to direct the NFZ and what staffing/administrative apparatus is in place for the participating countries? Answers: who knows and they'd have to build it from scratch)

My understanding is that this is typically handled by dividing responsibilities eg spatially, and being extra-cautious where those responsibilities overlap. Yeah, I imagine that this would be a serious handicap. We could easily see some operational mishap where a destroyer takes out a couple of F-16s with friendly fire, or conflicts & confusion on the ground reducing sortie rate.
But does that degrade their effectiveness to the point of losing to old, badly-maintained, pooly-flown, poorly-supported MIG-25s? That seems like quite a stretch.

That is, their structure, training, doctrine, etc are all geared to a mission that is the polar opposite of over-the-horizon force projection.

The UK did a pretty good job in the Falklands projecting force. They lost some assets, but they didn't fall apart from incompetence.
At a low level, the mission is about controlling airspace several of hundred miles from an airbase- partrolling, destroying enemy assets. For the navy, it's about combat air ops, patrol, and maybe SAR. That is not such a foreign mission to their air forces or navies I think- sure they've trained a lot on ASW but ship-to-ship and ship-to-air have got to be pretty common training scenarios. Again, will they be perfect at it? Maybe not. Maybe lack of training with tankers will lead to a mid-air collision. Maybe lack of training with their AWACS will lead to an ambush or a failure to track some enemy craft. Will that turn the tide of the battle?

Don't get me wrong, those are all factors that would hamper effectiveness. Would they hamper effectiveness to the point that the EU couldn't maintain a NFZ over Libya? I still don't see the story that makes this happen. I see the story where they're not as effective as they could be, where their overwhelming advantage in numbers, quality of aircraft, and support is slightly less overwhelming.

I mean, what would it take for the mission to fail? Failure after multiple attempts to put down old SAM sites? Frequently failing to keep even a half-a-dozen modern aircraft at a time on patrol? Losing multiple dogfights to MIG-25s? All of those things?
That's where I see this diverging. It's a pro boxer- not the best pro boxer, but a pro boxer- with bronchitis and a sprained ankle, versus a 60-year-old grandma. You say "He can barely walk, let alone move around the ring" and I say "yeah, but it's someone's grandma!"
The way you tell it, they couldnt enforce a NFZ over Monaco, or over a Libya flying Spitfires and using WWII anti-aircraft guns. Until you can tell a story that includes the Libyan assets and how they're going to achieve victory rather than just a list of potential issues with the EU force, Im personally probably not going to find it convincing. Not that you have to convince me or anything.

[McKinneyTexas]

Whether such cooperation has been done in practice before is just a matter of history.

Slarti, Red Flag is neither a force projection exercise, which was the context of my comment, nor was it a European-only operation. And that kind of thing is planned out carefully months in advance by units that have worked together almost exclusively with the US as the major player.

I mean, what would it take for the mission to fail?

The loss or significant damage to one carrier.

The way you tell it, they couldnt enforce a NFZ over Monaco, or over a Libya flying Spitfires and using WWII anti-aircraft guns.

I think I've said they could do it, in theory, but a skilled execution is another thing entirely. And if they take 10% casualties, and if K hangs on, it will have been very counter productive. K gets to declare 'victory' over NATO.

[Carleton Wu]

I mean, what would it take for the mission to fail?

The loss or significant damage to one carrier.

And other than friendly fire or an accident, how is that going to happen? Once again, Libyan capabilities are important in the equation.

Furthermore, as unlikely as that seems to me, how would that prevent the EU from continuing to carry out the mission? Serious damage to a US carrier engaging in NFZ operations would be a blow, but would we stop the operation? Does the minuscule risk of such an incident mean that the US "couldn't" impose a NFZ on Libya?

And if they take 10% casualties, and if K hangs on, it will have been very counter productive. K gets to declare 'victory' over NATO.

Several probls with this:
1)You're bringing political questions back into it and going beyond the scope of the NFZ. If the EU successfully imposes a NFZ at the cost of some assets, and K still wins, then the EU will have successfully imposed a NFZ. That is what I am saying that they can do. Im not saying it's wise. Im not saying it will produce victory for the rebels, or how it will affect K's reputation.
2)How do they lose- what- 30 aircraft here? Friendly fire + dogfight losses to MIGs + SAMs? Tell me the story. I dont see more than a couple of losses to friendly fire or accident being plausible. I don't see more than a couple of losses to MIGs. So I guess you're predicting great success on the part of Libya's AA network?

Im asking how do they lose, not "what would you consider to be losses serious enough to call the entire operation into question." If you're not telling me how they lose aircraft carriers and dozens of modern fighters, then you're not convincing me that those events are likely or even more than hypothetically possible.

[McKinneyTexas]

And other than friendly fire or an accident, how is that going to happen?

Missile, nap of the earth suicide mission, bad luck.

how would that prevent the EU from continuing to carry out the mission?

Spain pulled out of Iraq after terrorist bombing of some trains. An individual country's staying power, particularly after a major hit of this nature, is a fair matter of concern. Plus, taking out a carrier AND staying in power would be huge for K. Not so much for Europe who would have accomplished nothing, other than losing a carrier.

Friendly fire + dogfight losses to MIGs + SAMs? Tell me the story.

Those and: operational error (e.g. mid air collision), mechanical breakdown, underestimating SAM and Libyan capability, mismatch between VTOL and Mig-25 turns out to be greater than anticipated, ground fire.

Im asking how do they lose,

Well, you are positing a massive effort by NATO and asking, if NATO does all of this, can they be militarily defeated? If that's the question, I turn over my king. No, Libya cannot defeat NATO under any set of circumstances imaginable. But, NATO could certainly fail in its efforts and, for many people, failure = defeat.

[Slartibartfast]

Red Flag is neither a force projection exercise, which was the context of my comment, nor was it a European-only operation. And that kind of thing is planned out carefully months in advance by units that have worked together almost exclusively with the US as the major player.

Sure. Here's the thing, though: the EU nations that have a great deal of experience working together are NATO, mostly, unless I'm completely misinformed. We're part of NATO. Conducting operations over Libya without strong NATO participation and coordination is probably unwise.

I think this last bit is related to the point you're trying to make in this thread.

Likewise, it's difficult to imagine pulling off a NATO NFZ-enforcement without some US participation. Not saying it couldn't be done, just that it would be oddly exclusive.

Lastly, Red Flag is conducted in the US, on US test ranges, to a large degree because we've got the elbow room. Edwards and Nellis are vast; apparently the JPARC range in Alaska is many times larger. Furthermore, our pilots and pilots from the rest of NATO frequently mix it up on these ranges even outside the auspices of Red Flag.

So, I'd propose that coordinated European attempts to police Libyan airspace, if such a thing were to happen, just might have to include and possibly even revolve around NATO.

[Carleton Wu]

Missile, nap of the earth suicide mission, bad luck.

This is why I enjoy these conversations. What kind of antiship missiles does Libya have? I had no idea- turns out, they've got some 1977 mk.1 Italian Otomats afaict. 60km range. Sayth Wikipedia: Weakness are the need for a helicopter for mid-course guidance and a quite difficult uplink in the TESEO system (at least in the original model), big dimensions (affecting radar cross section RCS and IR signature), the lack of complex manoeuvres (synchronization of attacks, re-engagement capabilities, ECCM capability not up to current standards and never publicized). It comes in straight. But packs a punch similar to modern antiship missles.
How dangerous are those to eg the British navy? Im not sure. Obviously they've got some anti-missile countermeasures, and if 40-year-old missiles have a good chance of getting through then something is seriously wrong. The short range of the older missiles is probably the biggest problem with this scenario though.

Suicide mission? Yeah, maybe. Id be more likely to buy that from a religious state such as Iran- K's pilots are defecting, not going on suicide missions. But possible.
Bad luck? That's not an attack vector, is it? Unless you mean that they're so incompetent that they run aground or accidentally blow up a bunch of munitions or fuel.

But then, any of those could damage a US carrier- lucky strike from a 40-year-old antiship missile, kamikaze pilot, operational accident. And that would be a win for K. So, again, by your logic, the US is also at serious risk of "losing" a NFZ engagement with Libya.

An individual country's staying power, particularly after a major hit of this nature, is a fair matter of concern...
Well, you are positing a massive effort by NATO and asking, if NATO does all of this, can they be militarily defeated? If that's the question, I turn over my king. No, Libya cannot defeat NATO under any set of circumstances imaginable. But, NATO could certainly fail in its efforts and, for many people, failure = defeat.

I know Ive said that the EU probably wouldn't do this, almost certainly wouldn't be alone if they did, and Ill add that if those two things were true it's entirely possible that they'd not commit the resources to get the job done or that they'd end the mission after the first setback or something.
All along here I've been trying to debate exactly the point you said, though- jrudkis said that the Europeans couldn't do it. Not that they wouldn't want to- that they couldn't do it if they tried, that they lack the military resources to make it happen.

Spain pulled out of Iraq after terrorist bombing of some trains.

That's misleading- the attack was blamed on ETA by the party in power, and they were subsequently discredited and lost the election. The incoming left-wing government withdrew from Iraq, but I believe that this was always their position. So the attack may have been causal, but you say it like they ran away because they suffered losses, which is- as I said- misleading. In an alternate reality where the conservative government didn't attempt to lie about and capitalize on a national tragedy, maybe things would've been different.

[Carleton Wu]

So, I'd propose that coordinated European attempts to police Libyan airspace, if such a thing were to happen, just might have to include and possibly even revolve around NATO.

Here is where I get unclear about some things. For example, there are like 18 AWACS technically in the Luxeomburg AF. Id been assuming that assets like that could be used for an operation like this one. But NATO is a defensive treaty, so could NATO assets be used in an offensive or peacekeeping mission? I don't even know the history here eg if NATO infrastructure was used in the Iraq wars or other peacekeeping missions.

This does address some other things eg Malta is in the EU, but not in NATO, and no one has discussed using their bases for this mission bc they are not likely to be available. So me saying "EU this" and "EU that" is not quite accurate.

[Slartibartfast]

Oh, that may be a good point, Carleton.

I'm not sure that there is any such thing as "NATO assets", though. I think each country owns its equipment outright. If NATO constrains members from doing something like NFZ enforcement over Libya, then most of EU could not participate, because most of EU are NATO members.

[Turbulence]

What kind of antiship missiles does Libya have? I had no idea- turns out, they've got some 1977 mk.1 Italian Otomats afaict.

This strikes me as very very wrong. One of the primary problems that the US Navy sees right now is the (relatively) easy availability of cheap anti-ship missiles that are enormously destructive. They're cheap enough that you won't necessarily find their purchase and transfer reported on Wikipedia. Missiles like the C-802 are just not comparable to some ancient thing from the 1970s.

To put it another way: during the 2006 Lebanon war when Hezbollah took out an Israeli corvette, there was no indication on Wikipedia that Hezbollah had missiles capable of doing such a thing. And yet they did. Because those missiles are cheap. Is there any reason to believe that Libya, which has much much more cash, will be less capable than Hezbollah in this regard?

This is precisely the sort of mistake that Gary tried to warn you away from in his (admittedly long) comments.

[Carleton Wu]

To put it another way: during the 2006 Lebanon war when Hezbollah took out an Israeli corvette, there was no indication on Wikipedia that Hezbollah had missiles capable of doing such a thing. And yet they did. Because those missiles are cheap. Is there any reason to believe that Libya, which has much much more cash, will be less capable than Hezbollah in this regard?

1)The Israeli ship reportedly had its antimissile equipment turned off, precisely because they didn't anticipate such an attack. Presumably EU (and US) ships would have their anti-missile systems online and at high readiness.
2)Sure, a missile strike is a possibility on either EU or US forces. They may have better missiles than they're known to have.

Are Chinese and Iranian antiship missiles the trump card that cannot be effectively countered by modern anti-missile systems? I hope not, if they are then our ability to project force in the face of even 3rd-world opposition would be constrained.

Missiles like the C-802 are just not comparable to some ancient thing from the 1970s.

Well, the C-802 was introduced in 1989. So maybe it's ten-odd years ahead. But it is also late-80s Chinese tech, as opposed to 70s European tech. Again, Im not able to weigh those, but I don't think it's a common sense call that that one is orders of magnitude more dangerous than the other.

[Carleton Wu]

This is precisely the sort of mistake that Gary tried to warn you away from in his (admittedly long) comments.

I'll gladly defer to (and ask a lot of questions of) anyone with real expertise. Im not going to defer to another armchair warrior. Sure, I might not know stuff, and Ive said about ten times that my conclusions are tentative and just based on speculation and readily available information.

Should I not speculate? If I shouldn't, should you speculate about what missiles Libya might or might not have acquired?

[Jacob Davies]

CW, first, I appreciate you making the argument here, because this argument is going to play out again as soon as we stop being distracted by reactors, and while I disagree with you, I suspect that the media consensus is going to look more like what you're saying. Newspapermen love their splendid little wars.

With that in mind:

CW: lucky strike from a 40-year-old antiship missile

HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile in 1982. New British destroyers are currently running $10bn apiece. (About the same unit cost as a US Ford-class carrier - speaking of how European countries pay more for less capable weapons systems.)

That is a rather expensive risk to take, and the embarrassment for the government that ordered the operation would be gigantic.

[Turbulence]

Presumably EU (and US) ships would have their anti-missile systems online and at high readiness.

Well, if we get to presume that the EU military won't be making any mistakes and will never suffer broken equipment, then yeah, they should have no problems.

Are Chinese and Iranian antiship missiles the trump card that cannot be effectively countered by modern anti-missile systems?

The US Navy is extremely worried about cheap anti-ship missiles. As Galrahn wrote in the post I linked to earlier:

The U.S. Navy cited before Congress in testimony that the anti-ship missile threat from Hezbollah was so credible that greater AAW capability in the U.S. Navy was needed, and the result at the time was the U.S. Navy truncating the DDG-1000. The same ASM threat by Hezbollah has been cited to suggest the U.S. Navy cannot get closer than 25 miles of shore to offload Marines.

Should I not speculate? If I shouldn't, should you speculate about what missiles Libya might or might not have acquired?

As long as the Navy is going before Congress and screaming that cheap missiles are an extremely serious threat, I'd say that my claims that cheap missiles are an extremely serious are not speculation. On the other hand, your claims that Libya's anti-ship missile capabilities are limited to 40 year old missiles because you read it on Wikipedia seems to have far less support. I think your arguments on this point make a lot of sense if we lived in a world where asymmetric warfare didn't exist.

[McKinneyTexas]

So, I'd propose that coordinated European attempts to police Libyan airspace, if such a thing were to happen, just might have to include and possibly even revolve around NATO.

With US support and participation, an NFZ becomes considerably more likely to succeed in its limited mission profile.

Bad luck? That's not an attack vector, is it?

Bad luck is 30 planes flying nap of the earth coming in from across 120 degrees of angle and one of them getting through and scoring a hit.

But then, any of those could damage a US carrier- lucky strike from a 40-year-old antiship missile, kamikaze pilot, operational accident.

And they have. There is somewhat famous footage of McCain as a young pilot barely getting out of his jet as his carrier was experiencing fairly extensive on deck multiple explosions. I can't remember what caused the problem, but it wasn't direct hostile fire.

That's misleading- the attack was blamed on ETA by the party in power, and they were subsequently discredited and lost the election. The incoming left-wing government withdrew from Iraq, but I believe that this was always their position.

Actually, I believe the sequence was: conservatives ahead in the polls, socialists campaigning on getting out of Iraq, trains explode, AQ declares attacks are punishment for Spanish involvement in Iraq, Socialists reiterate their intent to withdraw, Socialists pull ahead in the polls and win the election.

Are Chinese and Iranian antiship missiles the trump card that cannot be effectively countered by modern anti-missile systems? I hope not, if they are then our ability to project force in the face of even 3rd-world opposition would be constrained.

In a general conventional exchange with the PRC, we would end up with less carriers, planes, pilots, ships, etc. than we began with. Some carriers that survive would sustain significant damage. Our WWII and subsequent accident experience let's us build ships that can take multiple hits and continue to fight. Our carriers sail with multiple escorts, many of whose prime mission is to stop incoming missile attacks.

But, you concerns that in a general conventional exchange with a modern power, that we would take casualties are entirely valid.

should you speculate about what missiles Libya might or might not have acquired?

Absolutely. It would be the height of planning incompetence and irresponsibility to go into an operation not assuming your opponent has managed to acquire one or more spoiler type systems that you need to be very much on the lookout for.

[Jacob Davies]

if they are then our ability to project force in the face of even 3rd-world opposition would be constrained

Nobody, not even the US, has the ability to project force without taking casualties and risking costly losses. The Serbians shot down an F-117 when the US was bombing them. The Argentinians sank several British warships, shot down planes, and killed a lot of people fighting a force with clear technological superiority.

This stuff costs money, and lives, and not small amounts of money either, but billions and billions of dollars. I wish the Libyans the very best, but there are probably places I would rather spend several billion dollars than on beating up Gaddafi.

[Carleton Wu]

Well, if we get to presume that the EU military won't be making any mistakes and will never suffer broken equipment, then yeah, they should have no problems.

I didnt say a successful missile strike was impossible, or anything *remotely* like that. I was merely pointing out that, unlike the Israeli incident, the missile strike would not be a total surprise attack. So the anti-missile defenses come into play. How well do those defenses protect against these kinds of missile attacks?
Im not sure. But if it's really hard to protect against a few older missiles, then our force-projection model is in trouble. Unless our plan is to hit the launchers before they launch.
[btw, if the Israeli ship was hit by a Kowsar, from wikipedia that has a 15-20km range; again, that could be a serious limiting factor to anything other than a surprise attack or operations very close to shore].

The US Navy is extremely worried about cheap anti-ship missiles.

Ok, there's an assumption in my thesis that I havent really discussed, and it goes back to the original debate ie whether the EU could undertake this operation alone or if they'd need US help.
Ive been assuming that this would be relatively straightforward for the US to do, with perhaps a few losses (and, as always, the small chance of a bigger disaster). A lot of that assumption comes from my relatively ignorance of the details of this sort of thing- having a 'measuring stick' like the US lets me say "Ok, if the US can do this and the EU can't, what is the difference".

But Im not equipped to even speculate, really, about what threat level cheap anti-ship missiles pose to the current navy of the UK, France, the US, etc. (I do know that, at funding time, it's not beyond the military to point out how serious the threats that we face are and how they need much more stuff).

As long as the Navy is going before Congress and screaming that cheap missiles are an extremely serious threat, I'd say that my claims that cheap missiles are an extremely serious are not speculation.

It's a claim. It's not quantified- does "serious threat" mean "we can't operate in waters with this threat without high risk of loss" or "we need to take this seriously and get some money behind it before it starts to pose an operational threat".
If you want to make the case that the US can't implement a NFZ over Libya because of anti-ship missiles, go for it. I don't know enough to say that it's wrong. I hope it's wrong, and it would surprise me if it was correct.
I mean, IEDs are a serious threat. But there's a world of difference between that kind of serious threat and a "navies don't work anymore" trump card.
And yes, going from "the navy said they're a serious problem to Congress" to "the EU's navy can't operate off of Libya" is absolutely amateur speculation. Own it, buddy.

On the other hand, your claims that Libya's anti-ship missile capabilities are limited to 40 year old missiles because you read it on Wikipedia seems to have far less support.

I didn't claim that at all. I said- hey, I looked at Wikipedia, and this is what I found. I honestly can't get much further away from a absolute factual claim than that. I certainly didnt make anything remotely resembling a claim that this is the only missile Libya has or could have.
If you feel the need to continuously misunderstand what Im saying, step away and find something useful to do. Having to continually correct your misunderstandings is pretty dull work.

I think your arguments on this point make a lot of sense if we lived in a world where asymmetric warfare didn't exist.

Well, I say banana honeypot burgertime. Since we're engaging in complete non sequiturs.

[McKinneyTexas]

I say banana honeypot burgertime.

I say "early cocktail time". Adios.

[Carleton Wu]

Nobody, not even the US, has the ability to project force without taking casualties and risking costly losses.

Of course. That's part of what Im trying to say here: of course the EU would face the risk of losing assets, even the risk of a serious loss like a carrier. That's part and parcel of an operation such as this, for anyone.
So that, in and of itself, isn't a reason that they are operationally incapable of doing so. It might stop them (or us) politically; but Ive been debating whether the EU is capable of the mission, whether their armed forces are up to the job.
So I view the whole "it's possible they could lose a ship" position to be something of a red herring. otoh, if Libya can use cheap missiles to deny entry to their waters or make entering them extremely costly, that would be a big factor. But it wouldn't just be able the EU and Libya then, it'd be a larger statement about the survivability of modern naval forces in the face of even moderate 3rd-world missile inventories. If that's the case, then people ought to own up to that thesis. Or say why Libya can control their waters with these weapons but the general application of that thesis (3rd-world missile trumps modern naval craft) isn't the case.

[Carleton Wu]

But then, any of those could damage a US carrier- lucky strike from a 40-year-old antiship missile, kamikaze pilot, operational accident.

And they have. There is somewhat famous footage of McCain as a young pilot barely getting out of his jet as his carrier was experiencing fairly extensive on deck multiple explosions. I can't remember what caused the problem, but it wasn't direct hostile fire.

Sure. And the chances of an accident etc go up under combat conditions. Is the EU immune to accident? Not at all. Are they particularly accident-prone? Don't think so, but they don't have the operational experience of the US so maybe.

But if that's the risk that Libya poses- that there might be a serious accident under combat operational conditions- that's not the biggest threat in the world. They face a smaller, but similar, threat whenever they do intensive military exercises.

Actually, I believe the sequence was: conservatives ahead in the polls, socialists campaigning on getting out of Iraq, trains explode, AQ declares attacks are punishment for Spanish involvement in Iraq, Socialists reiterate their intent to withdraw, Socialists pull ahead in the polls and win the election.

If that's your understanding of the sequence of events, it is badly flawed. It does not include the accusation made against the ETA, which was a huge deal at the time. I don't believe that there was any claim of responsibility at the time- arrests were made the day before the election of suspects unconnected with ETA (but possibly connected with Islamic extremists), which appeared to exonerate the ETA.
link.

I hope not, if they are then our ability to project force in the face of even 3rd-world opposition would be constrained.

In a general conventional exchange with the PRC, we would end up with less carriers, planes, pilots, ships, etc. than we began with.... But, you concerns that in a general conventional exchange with a modern power, that we would take casualties are entirely valid.

I wasn't thinking about China here; obviously an exchange with China in Chinese waters would be very ugly. I mean, if cheap anti-ship missiles are a trump against our navy, can we effectively fight against Iran, which definitely has quite a few missiles?
I think that we could- perhaps with some losses- but that's based more on faith that our military has been spending and planning carefully than some expert-level insight into naval operations.

should you speculate about what missiles Libya might or might not have acquired?

Absolutely. It would be the height of planning incompetence and irresponsibility to go into an operation not assuming your opponent has managed to acquire one or more spoiler type systems that you need to be very much on the lookout for.

Well, yeah. First, Im not saying the US military shouldn't speculate. we were talking about whether Turb, Gary, or I should be speculating since we're amateurs working off of publicly-available info in our spare time.
Second, I do think that we should. It's interesting. I learn stuff. Turb thinks that we shouldn't. Or, rather, that I shouldn't. And Im wondering why I shouldn't, but he should.

[Donald Johnson]

Off topic, though it does involve bombing some Middle Eastern country and who was for it (the government of the country being bombed, apparently)--

another wikileaks revelation, this one about Lebanon

[Turbulence]

I didnt say a successful missile strike was impossible, or anything *remotely* like that.

No, but you did accept at face value the Israeli claim that the only reason they were vulnerable was because they didn't turn their anti-missile systems on. If we're going to uncritically accept Israeli military explanations for why they're vulnerable (because the Israeli military has no reason to lie and has an awesome record of truth telling), I don't think you can claim that US Navy testimony before Congress is full of lies.

Also, you neglected to mention the other reason that Israel claimed they turned off their anti-missile systems: because they knew that Israeli aircraft would be flying close by. If anti-missile systems can't be used in areas where there are lots of friendly air traffic (like, I don't know, maybe a NFZ), I think that's pretty relevant to the discussion, don't you?

(I do know that, at funding time, it's not beyond the military to point out how serious the threats that we face are and how they need much more stuff).

Do you realize how absurd this is? You're suggesting that the US Navy, in a desperate attempt to get more dollars from Congress, lied to Congress by trumping up a threat and then asked Congress to kill a new destroyer program because of the severity of that threat. I mean, the DDG-1000 project has been decades in the making and you think the Navy truncated that program to get more money? Because losing a new destroyer program that Congress was dying to fund gives them more money?

I'm sorry, but this is too absurd for me to deal with.

[Carleton Wu]

No, but you did accept at face value the Israeli claim that the only reason they were vulnerable was because they didn't turn their anti-missile systems on.

Did I? I said The Israeli ship reportedly had its antimissile equipment turned off. "Reportedly", as in that's a claim that's been made. It's plausibly true, but not in any way definitive.
Your reading comprehension skills are poor, though. Definitively so.

I don't think you can claim that US Navy testimony before Congress is full of lies

I said, not take at face value. Again, reading comprehension. You are seeing what you want to see, not what Im actually saying.

Also, you neglected to mention the other reason that Israel claimed they turned off their anti-missile systems: because they knew that Israeli aircraft would be flying close by. If anti-missile systems can't be used in areas where there are lots of friendly air traffic (like, I don't know, maybe a NFZ), I think that's pretty relevant to the discussion, don't you?

I 'neglected' that because I didnt know it, actually. But it makes a lot of sense- you might turn off an anti-missile system if you thought there was no missile threat to avoid an accident. Whereas if you thought or knew that there was a missile threat, you might choose to leave it on and take that risk.
That doesn't mean that anti-missile defences are useless around friendly air operations. You are making huge, unsupportable leaps of speculation. And if anti-missile systems are useless around friendly aircraft we have other problems- eg can the US impose a NFZ? Apparently not wo exposing their carriers to missile attacks while their defenses are down.

Do you realize how absurd this is? You're suggesting that the US Navy, in a desperate attempt to get more dollars from Congress, lied to Congress by trumping up a threat..

I didn't say that they lied, or even misled anyone. Talking up a real threat isn't a lie. Also, I pointed out that "serious threat" and "threat that makes naval operations very risky or impossible" are two entirely different things.

I'm sorry, but this is too absurd for me to deal with.

Then you can stop anytime. It wouldn't bother me to not have to refute another boatload of your poor reasoning and reading skills.

[Jacob Davies]

CW: "It wouldn't bother me to not have to refute another boatload of your poor reasoning and reading skills."

Please dial it back a bit, applies to all parties. This is an interesting discussion in itself. If you're too frustrated to keep it civil, take a break.

CW: "it'd be a larger statement about the survivability of modern naval forces in the face of even moderate 3rd-world missile inventories... people ought to own up to that thesis."

I've been saying that over and over again. And from what I have come across in recreational reading, the fear of cheap anti-shipping missiles is huge, just huge, among modern navies.

There are no guaranteed cheap, easy interventions against even moderately well-organized 3rd-world armies. There can certainly be successful ones if the will to persist is there. But whether the will actually is there is a whole other question - it wasn't in Beirut or Somalia, for instance.

There's no question (for me) about the ability of the US or NATO or EU nations to prevail in all plausible conflicts they might get involved in, if the need to do so exists. That is not at all the same as saying they have the ability to exercise their nominal capabilities at will, at no cost or risk, or that they will meet with immediate success when they do so. And so, for those and many other good reasons, they are very reluctant to do so.

[Carleton Wu]

I've been saying that over and over again. And from what I have come across in recreational reading, the fear of cheap anti-shipping missiles is huge, just huge, among modern navies.

If the US cannot (with risk and perhaps some losses) enforce a NFZ over Libya because of their anti-ship missiles, then the world is a different place than I thought that it was. Or open the Strait of Hormuz in the face of Iranian missiles.
It wouldnt be the first time changes in technology and/or doctrine caught major powers with their eggs in the old-doctrine basket though.

[Tony P.]

What drives me nuts is this: we Americans spend horrendous amounts of money on expensive ships and planes, and then keep worrying about how vulnerable they are to cheap missiles.

I'm not taking a position on Qaddafi (except that he should eat sh*t and die), or the Libyan rebels (except that if they win, I don't worry about them invading America next), or the NFZ.

I just want to know why we keep funding the Pentagon like we do.

--TP

[Jacob Davies]

CW: US cannot (with risk and perhaps some losses) enforce a NFZ over Libya

I don't think anyone's questioning whether it is technically possible for the US, although I think there are reasonable doubts as to whether EU forces could get it together.

I think they are questioning whether what is gained could even approach the potential costs of such an operation.

That doesn't mean it won't happen. (See also: Iraq.) But it's the way to bet.

When you say "some losses" you are talking about aircraft that cost 50-100 million dollars and ships that cost 5-10 billion dollars.

TP: we Americans spend horrendous amounts of money on expensive ships and planes, and then keep worrying about how vulnerable they are to cheap missiles

I'd be more concerned if we didn't worry about that. Believing that you have some kind of unstoppable naval superweapon has historically ended up with said superweapons lying in pieces on the ocean floor somewhere.

The main purpose of the large US standing force is to deter an attempt to attack the US or US allies by ensuring that in the event of such an attack, the US can immediately bring an overwhelming force to bear, even if it suffers potentially grave losses in doing so.

You may or may not think that's a good thing to aspire to, but it's not the same thing as being ready to casually commit US forces to combat over things of no particular consequence to the US without fear of casualties or losses.

[McKinneyTexas]

I just want to know why we keep funding the Pentagon like we do.

Eric is going to tell us. One of these days . . .

[Slartibartfast]

Hezbollah took out an Israeli corvette

For certain values of "took out", possibly. The vessel is still in service:

on the morning of Friday, July 14, 2006, one of the branch heads of naval intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Y. briefed the head of naval intelligence, Colonel Ram Rothberg, telling him that "ships enforcing Israel's naval blockade on Hezbollah should take into account the possibility of a C-802 missile being fired on them." The assessment, however, did not result in a warning. If such a warning had been issued, Israeli ships would have moved further away from the shore and activated their anti-missile systems.[7]

As a result of the incident, two navy officers, two junior officers and the commander of the ship have been formally reprimanded and repositioned to non-commanding positions on land. One of the junior officers had shut down the central radar and parts of the defence system without notifying the commander, in the belief that the ship was not under threat.[8]

Repairs occurred over many months and the ship was said to be "recently put back into operation" according to a late 2007 report.[9] The ship was repaired and returned to service.

[Turbulence]

For certain values of "took out", possibly. The vessel is still in service:

Yes, I know. if you can disable a vessel so seriously that it must cease military operations and spend months getting repaired, then it has been "taken out" of the conflict. I trust this phrasing is familiar to you.

[Slartibartfast]

Yes it is, as are other possible meanings of "took out". Thanks for clarifying.

[Countme--In]

"Tell me how it ends"

It never ends.

Three wars now?

I'm told, unrepresented me, by filth who don't represent me, that we're broke.

Domestically, the poor and the uninsured are going to be murdered because we're "broke".

But more of my money is going to be stolen from me by those who define taxes as theft.

Or, rather, more money is going to be borrowed so that I'm not given a choice about whether I'm taxed or not to pay for this new war, because we are not permitted to ever effing raise taxes again for the duration of the Republic.

Do you know what I do to people who steal from me? Or borrow money in my name without me co-signing? Or approving of the murder of poor Americans?

I end Republics. I burn them down.

[Ugh]

Well this is interesting. UN authorizes a "No fly" zone, Qaddafi declares a cease fire, which presumably means there will be no airplanes that need to be made non-flyable.

Assuming there is in fact a cease fire, now what? Mission accomplished? I'm particulary interested in how the MBFs running the republican party react.

[liberal japonicus]

I hope Eric can post. It reminds me of how I deal with students who I feel are taking advantage of other circumstances to try and pull a fast one, in that I come down a lot harder on them. Qaddifi seems to think he can take advantage of attention to the tsunami. That the UN statement of a NFZ has resulted in the regime declaring a ceasefire suggests that this post really should be updated and reconsidered.

[cleek]

I'm particulary interested in how the MBFs running the republican party react.

i'm betting on "...with breathtaking hypocrisy."

[sapient]

This is the way (fingers crossed, of course) things are supposed to work. Diplomacy, UN agreement, international resolve: this seems like such good news - I hope it continues to be so.

[Ugh]

i'm betting on "...with breathtaking hypocrisy."

I'm betting on just like the Bush Administration did when Saddam let the weapons inspectors back in and they didn't find anything: invade/bomb anyway.

[SadOldVet]

Atrocities against civilians...
- Libya yes
- Sudan yes

Major oil reserves...
- Libya yes
- Sudan no

U.S. Intervention...
- Libya yes
- Sudan no

Any correlation here?

Probably not! We just like to provide humanitarian assistance to people struggling for freedom when they have oil we want.

[sapient]

SadOldVet:

Major oil reserves...
- Libya yes
- Sudan no

Actually, Sudan has quite a lot of oil.

[CCDG]

"It never ends.

Three wars now?"

I am almost PO'd about this.

We are, of course already spending money moving people around, gearing up, positioning carriers, planes and troops. It would be such a waste not to be able to go ahead and fly a few missions now that they are there.

Holy crud, maybe a ceasefire announcement will save us from ourselves. Besides, it would look really bad if the French fought a war and we just let them.

Because I certainly believe that both sides of that conflict are determined to lay down their weapons and talk things out.

It does provide Moammar whats-his-name a few days to better position and resupply his troops though.

[Ugh]

Libya has 8 times as many proven oil reserves as Sudan, and twice as many as the U.S., which has four times as many as Sudan.

[hairshirthedonist]

Libya also produces a lot more oil than Sudan, which figures in as well as how much is in the ground.

[hairshirthedonist]

Ugh, are you suggesting we invade the U.S.?

[CCDG]

Or:

Tune in next week to Survivor:North Africa see if Moammar gets off Redemption Island or if somehow he can form a last minute alliance with Bahrain to get the Saudi's to pull their support for the banning, leaving Yemen needing to win the amnesty charm to stave off elimination. Text your vote to.....

Or, in not so crass and unempathetic terms, we just picked a side in a civil war because everyone agrees on which side is the bad guys?

Which means our real sin in Iraq was that we were ten years too late? Because I don't see a lot less tribal feuding in Libya after we free them from the tyrant, do you?

Whats the plan for when he is gone? The military seems to be tribally segregated, will they just form little countries?

Did I miss this discussion/decision?

[sapient]

This isn't a unilateral move by the United States. The security council vote was 10-0, with five countries abstaining. Nobody vetoed. This is how the world is supposed to behave. Obviously nations are motivated by their own interests, but where there is a despot was threatening to slaughter his own people and the world is behind the effort to stop it, I support it. I hope if military action is taken, it is well-executed and effective.

Sure, it would be great if the UN always did the right thing. But I believe that it is doing the right thing in this case.

And, yes, we still rely on oil.

[cleek]

Whats the plan for when he is gone?

democracy, followed by whisky, then sexy.

[Ugh]

Ugh, are you suggesting we invade the U.S.?

Of course. I mean, most of its military is focused on chasing ghosts around the world, leaving the homeland relatively undefended. It has hundreds if not thousands of miles of undefended coastlines and other borders, plenty of open land to seize, and a relatively well educated populace that could be put to good use.

The bombing begins in five minutes.

[sapient]

"Whats the plan for when he is gone?"

"democracy, followed by whisky, then sexy."

Who says he's going to be gone?

[Tony P.]

Whats the plan for when he is gone?

For that matter, what's the plan if he stays?

BTW, if Libya today is analogous to Iraq, it's analogous to 1991 Iraq, not 2003 Iraq. I have no definite position on whether it was a "sin" to interfere with Iraq's internal fights in 1991, or whether the "sin" was not interfering enough. But one thing is clear: of the three situations, 2003 Iraq was the one that wasn't like the other two, in terms of urgency.

--TP

[CCDG]

TP - Thus, "10 years too late"(so 12). I agree,2003 not like the others.

I think this:

"to take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory."

(bold mine)

probably authorizes enough to ensure he is gone, although it could also allow for some division of east and west under a permanent cease fire?

I don't know enough to understand if there is enough for him to settle for without Benghazi.

[Ugh]

Where is the UN resolution approving the imposition of a "no-fly" zone over Yemen? Or Bahrain?

[CCDG]

And now President Obama says it out loud, yes that was his out loud voice:

A cease-fire must be implemented immediately, and Gadhafi's troops must be pulled back from several cities, he said. Power and water must be restored to those cities, he declared.

"These terms are not negotiable," Obama said.

or what, we implement a no-fly zone? This sounds like war to me.

[Ugh]

"The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya and we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal, specifically the protection of civilians in Libya," Obama said.... "Our decisions have been driven by Gaddafi's refusal to respect the rights of his people and the potential for mass murder of innocent civilians."

IOW, the mass murder of innocent civilians is so bad that we're happy to bomb the sh!t out of your country as long as there's no real risk to Americans. But, hey, if it might require ground troops then, well, mass murder-away. Cheers.

Also AFAICT his statement is not limited to a "no-fly" zone (hence my use of scare quotes here and above).

We apologize to those innocent Libyan civilians killed in our attempt to protect innocent Libyan civilians.

Feh.

[Ugh]

And nevermind the CIA behind the curtain.

At least we have a chance to stop this when Obama asks Congress to declare war so he can commence this operation in accordance with the Constitution. There will be a congressional vote right? Right? Hellllllllooooooooooo? Bueller?

You know what, if we're going to do this let's do it right. Institute a draft, build up the U.S. army to a several million infantry members, land them on the northwest coast of Africa with orders to March east and not to stop until they reach India. The sh1t we got going on now is for pikers.

[liberal japonicus]

Ugh, I'm not sure if either Yemen and Bahrain have enough of an air force to think about a NFZ. The other thing is that the rulers of Yemen and Bahrain didn't do TV interviews. Moral of story, if you are going to murder your people, don't do the interview circuit.

[Charles S]

Another big difference is that Gadaffi is murdering his people by besieging cities, using tanks, heavy artillery and air craft, all of which are reasonable targets for a foreign air force to attack. The rulers of Yemen and Bahrain are murdering their people with foot soldiers firing into crowds, a situation in which it would be completely insane for a foreign air force to try to intervene.

There is actually a decent chance that an air attack by British, French and Qatari planes (with refueling and AWAK support from the US) will be able to prevent the Libyan government from conquering Benghazi (and a lesser chance that they will be able to prevent the destruction of Misrata). There is no way I can imagine that the anyone's air force could prevent Yemeni troops from firing into crowds of protesters (other than ways that would involve huge numbers of casualties among both troops and protesters).

It is true that the governments of Bahrain and Yemen, being US clients, could probably wage tank warfare against their own major cities and no UN resolutions would be forthcoming. I don't find that a particularly compelling argument against intervention in Libya.