by Doctor Science
'Cause we love peace and motherhood.
As you may recall, in early August The Atlantic published an article by Jeffrey Goldberg about how Israel and Iran are getting "to the point of no return" because of Iran's nuclear program. The article got a lot of online and other media attention, so much that The Atlantic put together an online debate that ran August 16-25.
I made an effort to be one of the people reading and commenting on the debate there. You can read my daily extracts here:
- Days 1-2: who's driving this bus, Israel or the US?.
- Day 3: would a strike work? realism at the White House?.
- Day 4: the Long Game and containment.
- Day 5: how threatening is the threat?.
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Days 6-7 (or so): If force is the answer, what is the question?.
- Day 8: Should we give peace a chance?.
Those links doubtless qualify as "tl;dr" for non-masochists. The highlights of the discussion, for me:
1. I emphasized repeatedly that Israel's saber-rattling is largely intended for a domestic audience. Iran is not, in any realistic way, an existential threat to Israel -- but Netanyahu has repeatedly compared Iran to "Amalek", an enemy against whom Israel in the Bible is commanded to use explicitly genocidal force. The Israeli and Iranian governments are both IMHO posturing for their countrymen, inflating their badassery to wow the locals. Elliot Abrams similarly argued that Obama might and should attack Iran to demonstrate his manly firmness for the midterm elections.
2. Gary Milhollin warned that
If Iran truly values its nuclear program, it would play the victim. The attack would give Iran a claim on the sympathy of countries that might otherwise be inclined to shun it, thereby invigorating its campaign to thwart U.S. and Western isolation efforts.Disgusted, I pointed out that countries that have been bombed do not have to "play" the victim -- the civilian casualties which Milhollin rightly calls "inevitable" do that for them.
And speaking of inevitable civilian casualties: Milhollin asked What would such bombing destroy? without ever mentioning that Iranians (civilian and military) would be killed. How many? Do they estimate casualties in the hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, or more? The American (and Israeli) people have proven tolerant of very high casualties on the part of other people, but the rest of the world won't necessarily see things the same way.
That was the only mention of civilian casualties in the Serious People's discussion, even from the comparative peaceniks. Apparently in US Policyland, war only involves "strikes" against infrastructure and (occasionally) armed forces -- anything else is at most regretable collateral damage. But then, though at least half the Serious People in this debate were wrong about the Iraq War, their careers seem to have suffered no collateral damage -- so perhaps they think it can't be an important issue overall.
3. Patrick Clawson said that disagreements between the US and Israel are due in part to
differing perception about military force. Americans tend to like and embrace the Powell Doctrine: the overwhelming use of force to achieve decisive results. The view of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is encapsulated in the unfortunate expression "mow the grass"I pointed out that Mr. Clawson mis-states the Powell Doctrine, even as he's linking to a Wikipedia article that exposes his mistatement.
IMHO what Americans like about the Powell Doctrine is the tests a proposed action must pass, including: Do we have a clear attainable objective? Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? Do we have genuine broad international support? These tests overlap with traditional "just war" jus ad bellum criteria, especially those specifying a just cause, probability of success, proportionality, and last resort.
It is painfully obvious that Powell's own promotion of the Iraq War violated the Powell Doctrine (not to mention Just War Doctrine, as the Pope pointed out at the time). Nonetheless, the Powell Doctrine -- as I at least understand it -- crucially depends on circumspection, reluctance to use force, and careful planning, before you get to the fun part bit about overwhelming force and decisive results.
I *really hope* that Mr. Clawson's limited understanding of the Powell Doctrine is his alone; I very much fear that he reflects the general consensus of the US policy/security community. It's curious, though, that Clawson cites the Powell Doctrine to support his position -- even though it doesn't.
4. Another commenter, democraticcore, asked "why would Iran want nuclear weapons?" Hir answer: for defense against the US.
Imagine that you are a decision maker in Tehran listening to [Bush's "Axis of Evil"] speech. You look at one side of the Axis, Iraq. Iraq has no nuclear weapons and indeed no WMD program of an kind. It gets invaded, its regime is overthrown, and the country is devastated.This is the kind of insight I would have expected to see from the Very Serious People, but didn't.Then you look at the other side of the Axis, North Korea. It has nuclear weapons. It doesn't get invaded or even threatened in any meaningful way. Its looney leader even gets gifts of the latest DVDs from the US.
So the Iranian decision maker asks himself: Do we want to end up like Iraq or North Korea?
5. Both Reuel Marc Gerecht (pro-war) and Marc Lynch (not-as-pro-war) agreed on
liberal democracies' tendency to avoid tough decisions and push decisions to go to war down the road.For a kinda-sorta peacenik (by the standards of this discussion), Lynch sure seems admiring of tough, firm, manly non-liberal non-democracies.
Less metaphorically, I do not see the Spanish-American War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or the Iraq War as ones the US was particularly reluctant to enter. On the contrary, in my experience the tough decision that our system tends to avoid is the one that *ends* a war, that admits failure. In a democracy, the sunk costs of war are so monstrous that once we start we *cannot* seem to finish, because admitting that it was a bad idea is intolerable to leaders and populace alike.
Not to mention that IMHO "pushing decisions to go to war down the road" is a *good* thing, because it buys years of peace that are worth living in. To Gerecht, peace seems always to be the twin of appeasement, a time-out at best between the wars where the real work of history takes place. To most human beings, though, peace is an active good: we little people may not get to make history, but at least we get to *live*.
The summary of my summary: The Important, Very Serious People performed the dance of Tough Decisions and Firm Resolve. The Little People in the comments wondered who the VSPs are dancing for.
Is there anything that Tom Lehrer got wrong? The man was a freaking genius.
Posted by: Emma | September 13, 2010 at 05:18 AM
No, Lehrer got it all right, and still does:
"And he gave US foreign policy one serve after another in songs such as Send the Marines.
Sadly, though, Lehrer is of the opinion that while satire may attract attention to an issue, it doesn't achieve a lot else.
"The audience usually has to be with you, I'm afraid. I always regarded myself as not even preaching to the converted, I was titillating the converted.
"The audiences like to think that satire is doing something. But, in fact, it is mostly to leave themselves satisfied. Satisfied rather than angry, which is what they should be."
His favourite quote on the subject is from British comedian Peter Cook, who, in founding the Establishment Club in 1961, said it was to be a satirical venue modeled on "those wonderful Berlin cabarets which did so much to stop the rise of Hitler and prevent the outbreak of the Second World War".
______________________
Something very strange has happened.
Three days ago I was going to make a comment here at Obsidian Wings or maybe Taking It Outside about the limits of satire in the presence of true evil, something to the effect that the Yiddish sense of humor and whimsy was so effective at halting the rise of Hitler in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and this morning, while hunting around for some information on Tom Lehrer (with whom I am only tangentially familiar, which I will change soon), I found the quote above.
Lehrer makes the comment in the same article that Lenny Bruce the satirist became angry and therefore no longer funny. I would add that process reflected the world at the time.
Such as it is now in this country.
So does one drink the hemlock like Socrates* or does one head for the hills and fight back againt the malign and the stupid or, as Lehrer seems to have done, do you go back to your life and live it and hopefully love it without further comment (while keeping your head low for the palpable evil going on around us) or do you stick around to witness your satire become barren of humor, because the mood deteriorates?
Is a person to be counted in or out?
*any similarity between present company and either Socrates or Tom Lehrer is merely implied for effect and probably a trick of the light.
Posted by: Countme? | September 13, 2010 at 08:49 AM
Interesting and well detailed first post, Dr. S. I agree with the premise: a first strike on Iran is a bad idea, but for mostly different reasons. Our common ground is the horror of war and the inevitable human cost of even a 'surgical strike'. I am less sanguine about long term regional stability with a nuclear-armed Iran. Diplomacy and sanctions have failed to deter Iran so far. What will work down the road if and when Iran seeks regional hegemony? Or moves in that direction?
I can think of very few pre-war scenarios in which the argument you make could not be adapted, yet war ensued anyway. Sometimes, the other side just doesn't listen. Missing from your piece (or, at least missing from my reading of your piece) is: what is your fallback position if enough of the bad things others say about Iran turn out to be true: they get and use nukes, either overtly or coercively. What would be Dr. S' reaction?
And if, God forbid, Iran launches a successful first strike on Israel, what would Dr. S say and do then?
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 08:58 AM
His piece took the form of starting with a sentence saying something meaninglessly nice to someone in the forum who was polite -- "offers an engaging, thought-provoking analysis" -- then goes on to offer two sentences as to what Gerecht "is right about" -- and that's where your offending sentence is, the second sentence of a polite introductory statement -- and then spends the entire rest of his commentary about Gerecht completely disagreeing with everything Gerecht said, sentence by sentence, making a wholly consistent and non-stop case as to what Gerecht is "wrong" about: military action against Iran.
Lynch's tone is utterly mild, but the content of what he said doesn't seem to me to be "not-as-pro-war," but rather, that there's been no case whatever made to justify a war.
This strikes me more as an issue of rhetorical style than substance. Lynch is utterly polite. But he utterly disagrees with Gerecht, and Abrahms he completely gives up on as an honest interlocuter ("how disappointing"). He's simply not writing in a hot style.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 09:08 AM
Sorry to continue the OT point Countme? raises, but I thought it deserved a response.
To some degree, satire is its own reward, and doesn't need to achieve real-world effects to justify its existence.
It's fun and satisfying to have a good laugh.
In order for satire to have useful real-world effects, you need to have some kind of consensus that the thing you are lampooning is actually risible.
So, frex, if you mock Dick Cheney for shooting turkeys in a barrel, or shooting his friend in the face, or inventing heretofore unknown fourth branches of government, it can only have a real effect on policy, or on the public reputation of Dick Cheney, if lots of folks think shooting turkeys in a barrel, or shooting your friend in the face, or inventing new branches of government is in any way out of line or worthy of ridicule.
If lots of folks respond by saying, "Yeah, so what? Is there a problem with that?", then satire will, at most, be a matter of titillating the converted.
So, enjoy it for what it is, but it's not going to change facts on the ground.
The last 30 or 40 years of conservative effort has, however, demonstrated the real-world effectiveness of another rhetorical tactic: moving the "Overton Window".
To the degree that folks on the left want to make real change happen, they should leave satire to the entertainers and start talking seriously about concepts that currently are considered beyond the pale.
Lather, rinse, and repeat until they're no longer Big Scary Lefty Ideas, but are simply normal.
It works for creeps like the folks at Heritage and Cato, it'll work for the DFHs as well.
Make today's crazy talk the new normal.
Posted by: russell | September 13, 2010 at 09:16 AM
"Diplomacy and sanctions have failed to deter Iran so far."
Iran has not, to my observation, launched a military attack against anyone since the founding of the Islamic Republic.
One could certainly say that their allies, Hezbollah and Hamas, have made attacks, and that Iran has supplied them, but Iran itself has not.
There's only one argument I'm aware of that says Iran would suddenly become less less deterrable than Stalin's Soviet Union, and Mao's China, is that Iran's rulers are mad Twelvers who seek the end times, and who are indifferent to losing millions of Iranians if only they can nuke Tel Aviv.
There really doesn't seem to be much support for these claims, beyond a lot of huffing and puffing.
"Missing from your piece (or, at least missing from my reading of your piece) is: what is your fallback position if enough of the bad things others say about Iran turn out to be true: they get and use nukes, either overtly or coercively."
I'll answer for myself: first, using nukes "coercively" is too vague for me to address. Try an example?
As to "overtly," deterrence theory says you nuke back proportionally.
Now, might I ask you a question? What is your fallback position if enough of the bad things others say about what launching attacks on Iran turn out to be true: Iran and Israel and the U.S. and Hezbollah and Hamas plunge into an escalating shooting war, oil and gasoline prices go sky-high: where do you see that ending, and at what cost? What's your fallback? What's your worst case?
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 09:24 AM
Iran has not, to my observation, launched a military attack against anyone since the founding of the Islamic Republic.
But it has not been sanctioned or talked into foregoing development of nukes. I am aware that Iran has not crossed its borders except modestly in Iraq.
What is your fallback position if enough of the bad things others say about what launching attacks on Iran turn out to be true?
Which is why I am opposed to precipitating an attack, as I indicated. I think almost all of those things would happen to one degree or another.
There's only one argument I'm aware of that says Iran would suddenly become less less deterrable than Stalin's Soviet Union, and Mao's China
Not useful comparisons, either by scale, geography or history. The USSR invaded Poland, Finland and occupied Eastern Europe. It wasn't deterred at all. The PRC fought a war with India and intervened in Korea. No deterrence there. The PRC did not attack the West, with the exception of Korea, but then again, the PRC had nothing to attack with. The concern that Iran would attack the continental US is minimal to nonexistent. It's what Iran does with and to its neighbors that matters.
deterrence theory says you nuke back proportionally.
I know what deterrence theory says. I am asking what progressive deterrence theory is.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 09:43 AM
McKinneyTexas:
Watch in horror with the rest of the world as Tehran goes up in a mushroom cloud.
One point we Atlantic commenters made again and again -- but which was barely mentioned by the Serious People -- is that *Israel already has nuclear weapons*, probably more than 100 of them. A first strike against Israel would be horribly suicidal, which is a point commenter democraticcore argued: nuclear weapons aren't much good for attack, but they are *excellent* for deterrent defense, and that is what rational people would assume Iran wants them for.
Posted by: Doctor Science | September 13, 2010 at 09:48 AM
"Not useful comparisons, either by scale, geography or history. The USSR invaded Poland, Finland and occupied Eastern Europe. It wasn't deterred at all."
I'm sorry, but the USSR invaded Poland, Finland and occupied Eastern Europe before the U.S. bombed Hiroshima, as you surely know. Of course the U.S.S.R. wasn't deterred by something that hadn't happened yet.
"The PRC fought a war with India and intervened in Korea."
I'm sorry, but I'm not following you at all: how is any of this relevant to deterring a nuclear attack?
"...but they are *excellent* for deterrent defense, and that is what rational people would assume Iran wants them for."
I'll continue to say for the nth time that I think the most likely case is the Japan option: go up to the point where you could break out with a few months or weeks of work, but no further.
That achieves effective deterrence while also adhering to the NPT.
They get 95% or so of the benefits of and few of the risks testing a bomb would.
This isn't to say that I'm predicting there are no conditions in which they wouldn't go ahead and test. There likely would be, and I don't exactly what they'd be, of course. None of us knows for sure.
But I continue to think that Ockham's razor, and the history of the Iranian government suggests that largely rational behavior, overall, is what to expect of them, at least when considering an issue as major as nuclear war.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 10:04 AM
"and that is what rational people would assume Iran wants them for."
Really there is more than one rational assumption of the motive for Iran getting nukes. The most benign being simply deterrence against aggressors.
The challemge with this assumption is that rational people also assume that a less aggressive rhetorical stance would also accomplish this.
The second is to use the nukes as a threat to attain increased regional power, and deterrence of outside intervention in the event of a local ground war. I tend to lean toward this particular one (based on my opinion only of the tough talk of the elected leaadership and the continual denunciation of these weapons by the religious leaders behind them).
The amount of aggression against its neighbors that would be tolerated by the world community would be exponentially larger if the nuclear threat were in place.
The third, which is least likely but not out of the realm of possibility, would be the first strike capability to destroy as much of Israel as possible. While this is rationally counter productive there is a possibility that the leadership would see the retribution in the same way they view the death of a suicide bomber.
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 10:09 AM
Then there's the issue of what Fareed Zakaria well describes, as regards their religious statements on nuclear weapons:
Word.Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 10:11 AM
nuclear weapons aren't much good for attack, but they are *excellent* for deterrent defense, and that is what rational people would assume Iran wants them for.
Actually, tactical nukes have real utility in certain applications (with the countervailing downside of lowering the nuclear threshold). Not every nuke is designed as a city buster (counter value target, in the dead jargon of cold war calculus). The real problem, yet to be addressed by many, including most progressives, is the gap between conventional and nuclear deterrence.
Iran has a capable conventional component. Suppose, ten years from now, it invades Iraq or closes the Straits of Hormuz or starts a war with the Saudi's? Nuclear deterrence doesn't just prevent an unprovoked attack on Iran. Nukes aren't solely self-defensive. They can be used to prevent or deter a party from intervening conventionally if that party lacks its own nuclear capacity. Or even if it does. And if it does, the risk is escalation.
An aggressor with nukes has options that a non-nuclear aggressor doesn't.
Finally, having nukes is the ultimate in protecting the aggressor from total defeat. Forced regime change is off the table. To illustrate, if NKorea or Iran, once it has an arsenal, were to start a major conventional war, neither entity could be invaded, occupied and compelled to change regimes without a real risk of a final nuclear spasm. And a highly effective spasm at that assuming the defending armies were massed on the aggressor's borders.
What doctrine does Dr. S propose to contain/confront not just the irrational nuclear first strike, but the threat of or actual conventional aggression under a nuclear umbrella?
I stipulate that we would hope for reasoned dialogue, but failing that, what is Plan B?
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 10:14 AM
It helps (at least for me) to keep one thing firmly in mind. Much of the rhetoric coming from Iran's government, like much of the rhetoric coming from Israel, is all about political maneuvering of domestic factions. It isn't necessarily (and IMHO not even probably) an indication of actual policy intentions.
For a similar dynamic, consider how liberal Democrats in the US, in the run-up to an election, tend to talk about being "tough on crime." It isn't that they actually want or intend to take extreme measures on crime. But, correctly or not, they feel that they have to say things like that in order to attain/hold power.
Posted by: wj | September 13, 2010 at 10:18 AM
how is any of this relevant to deterring a nuclear attack?
The issue isn't limited to deterring a nuclear attack--conventional war under a nuclear umbrella against a country without the umbrella gives the attacker a much greater leverage. Conventional war with a nuclear armed power risks escalation and limits the defending powers, even if victorious, from forcing a regime change. Imagine having to have left the Nazis in power.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 10:22 AM
"Iran has a capable conventional component. Suppose, ten years from now, it invades Iraq or closes the Straits of Hormuz or starts a war with the Saudi's?"
Respond conventionally.
"An aggressor with nukes has options that a non-nuclear aggressor doesn't."
Yes. And thus containment theory.
"To illustrate, if NKorea or Iran, once it has an arsenal, were to start a major conventional war, neither entity could be invaded, occupied and compelled to change regimes without a real risk of a final nuclear spasm."
Not being interested in doing those things, I find this argument uncompelling.
"Imagine having to have left the Nazis in power."
Imagine having to leave Stalin in power. Imagine having to leave Mao in power.
Alternatively, imagine us deciding on "regime change" in the Soviet Union in 1946, before the U.S.S.R. got the Bomb.
Good idea?
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 10:41 AM
"To illustrate, if NKorea or Iran, once it has an arsenal, were to start a major conventional war, neither entity could be invaded, occupied and compelled to change regimes without a real risk of a final nuclear spasm."
Not being interested in doing those things, I find this argument uncompelling.
"Imagine having to have left the Nazis in power."
Imagine having to leave Stalin in power. Imagine having to leave Mao in power.
Alternatively, imagine us deciding on "regime change" in the Soviet Union in 1946, before the U.S.S.R. got the Bomb.
Good idea?
Gary, you are mixing and matching. We occupied Japan and Germany after WWII because circumstances made that necessary. No one wants to do something like that but sometimes it is necessary to fully defeat a regime that, if not defeated, poses a future threat. A nuclear-armed opponent has the ultimate deterrent. You can't intervene to stop genocide or to prevent rearmament and another war, your options are limited. It is fine to argue against pre-empting Iran's nuclear aspirations, but it is foolish to ignore the downside or the options Iran would have with nukes vs without.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 10:50 AM
Iran has a capable conventional component. Suppose, ten years from now, it invades Iraq or closes the Straits of Hormuz or starts a war with the Saudi's
This, to me, is completely wrong and verifiably so.
Iran has a struggling economy, and a limited conventional army. That is, Iran's military could cause an invader problems, and could lash out at Israel and the US, but is in NO position for conquest. NONE. It has no means of force projection sufficient to occupy territory, nor could its economy sustain conquest should it somehow develop the conventional/logistic capacity. Further, it's population does not support it.
The second is to use the nukes as a threat to attain increased regional power, and deterrence of outside intervention in the event of a local ground war. I tend to lean toward this particular one (based on my opinion only of the tough talk of the elected leaadership and the continual denunciation of these weapons by the religious leaders behind them).
No! See above. Pakistan got a nuke and pursued no such adventurism. Ditto North Korea. A nuke does not suddenly make a country capable of conquest. Period. Full stop.
The third, which is least likely but not out of the realm of possibility, would be the first strike capability to destroy as much of Israel as possible. While this is rationally counter productive there is a possibility that the leadership would see the retribution in the same way they view the death of a suicide bomber.
Iran's leadership has NEVER seen suicide this way. NEVER. That is why Iran's leadership has never undertaken a cause which will bring about its annihilation. And nuking Israel would entail nuking one of Islam's holiest sites, and end up killing millions of Muslims.
Not. Going. To. Happen.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 10:51 AM
Uh...what?
Aside from petty issues like lingering radiation and fallout, there's the political issue of being the ones that used a nuclear weapon for the first time in over a half-century.
Really, nukes are not simply conventional weapons on a larger scale. Use one in any context (other than in some complete wasteland, devoid of occupants), and you're more than likely going to kill lots of people just from neutron and gamma radiation.
What "real utility" were you thinking of?
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 13, 2010 at 10:52 AM
You can't intervene to stop genocide or to prevent rearmament and another war, your options are limited.
so ?
not everybody wants the US to have job of Global Policeman.
Posted by: cleek | September 13, 2010 at 10:54 AM
Finally, having nukes is the ultimate in protecting the aggressor from total defeat. Forced regime change is off the table.
Right. We couldn't invade and change their regime. This is not necessarily a bad thing though. And it is, according to the Pentagon and CIA, precisely why Iran wants to develop near capacity to build a bomb, if at all.
To illustrate, if NKorea or Iran, once it has an arsenal, were to start a major conventional war, neither entity could be invaded, occupied and compelled to change regimes without a real risk of a final nuclear spasm. And a highly effective spasm at that assuming the defending armies were massed on the aggressor's borders.
And yet North Korea has started no such war. Nor has Pakistan. Because the risks and costs are still there, even if their odds of surviving total defeat are better, few regimes would look at the ultimate prospects and decide it's a good idea.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 10:55 AM
I would also like to add that Iran is not likely to commit genocide. Why would they?
Again: not being able to invade, occupy and change regimes is not a bad thing.
Also, imagine if you were Iranian and the US discussed the downside of you attaining a nuke as the US not being able to achieve final victory against your country? Might motivate you to get one of them nukes, no?
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 10:59 AM
"Gary, you are mixing and matching. We occupied Japan and Germany after WWII because circumstances made that necessary."
Um, you brought up Japan and Germany. I completely agree they're irrelevant. I have no idea why you introduced them.
" No one wants to do something like that but sometimes it is necessary to fully defeat a regime that, if not defeated, poses a future threat. A nuclear-armed opponent has the ultimate deterrent."
Yes. If you can't, you can't. And we lived with Stalin, and his successors, and with Mao. Why are you not responding to this point?
"It is fine to argue against pre-empting Iran's nuclear aspirations, but it is foolish to ignore the downside or the options Iran would have with nukes vs without."
I acknowledge the downside. The world is amuck with downsides, and two bad alternatives. We pick the least bad.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 11:00 AM
The amount of aggression against its neighbors that would be tolerated by the world community would be exponentially larger if the nuclear threat were in place.
STOP THIS NOW!
You cannot use the phrase "exponentially larger" to compare only two things. Exponential growth characterizes a curve, but you can fit two points to any exponential curve you want. Any pair of points can be said to represent an exponential growth trend. It is only meaningful to speak about exponential growth when considering more than two points.
Now, you're free to write however you like, but when people who understand basic math see this, they'll assume that you're an ignorant person.
Posted by: Turbulence | September 13, 2010 at 11:04 AM
Seconded. My pet peeve is "increased exponentially", which can mean almost literally anything.
Consider very small positive exponents, and then exponents that are negative or exactly zero.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 13, 2010 at 11:08 AM
They certainly have supported this in the activities of their proxies. Yet, still, I agree that it is least likely.
Well, I will leave N. Korea alone since the history is pretty short on what they might use one for. It is not like they don't have muscle flexing going on.
Pakistan seems a silly example. Their primary conflict is with a nuclear armed neighbor, and certainly the dynamics in that part of the region are very different.
And, despite your period, having nuclear weapons does add conventional alternatives.
If you accept that there are other ways to ensure their security diplomatically, which you didn't comment on, then, by your estimate, there is simply no reason why they would want nuclear weapons. However, not addressing those alaternative ways to ensure their security leaves the nuclear option as the one they are pursuing. Which means 2 or 3 apply as possibilities in their strategic view.
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 11:17 AM
They certainly have supported this in the activities of their proxies. Yet, still, I agree that it is least likely.
So? People send troops to die, even though they themselves don't want to meet their respective makers. Oldest game in the book.
Pakistan seems a silly example. Their primary conflict is with a nuclear armed neighbor, and certainly the dynamics in that part of the region are very different.
And who is Iran's primary conflict with? No one really. And why are the dynamics so different?
And, despite your period, having nuclear weapons does add conventional alternatives.
No, it changes response to your conventional capacity, but does not add to it.
You can't resupply troops through a nuclear bomb, nor can you transport them to the battlefield.
Nukes don't help conquest. They help to prevent conquest of you.
If you accept that there are other ways to ensure their security diplomatically, which you didn't comment on, then, by your estimate, there is simply no reason why they would want nuclear weapons.
I don't accept that. Why should they? Diplomatically, they must rely on the whims of superpowers like the US which has, already, overthrown their government once, and in the 1980s, funded an aggressive dictatorship in a decades long war against it that led to hundreds of thousands of death.
Why on earth would they assume, now, that they can secure themselves diplomatically?
Now that would be irrational.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 11:23 AM
"They certainly have supported this in the activities of their proxies."
It's unclear from this whether you follow the point of having proxies.
"Pakistan seems a silly example. Their primary conflict is with a nuclear armed neighbor, and certainly the dynamics in that part of the region are very different."
I'm not following: using Pakistan as an example of a nuclear-armed state facing a nuclear-armed enemy, India, isn't like using Iran as an example of a nuclear-armed state facing a nuclear-armed enemy, Israel? It's "silly"? Why?
"And, despite your period, having nuclear weapons does add conventional alternatives."
Such as?
"If you accept that there are other ways to ensure their security diplomatically, which you didn't comment on, then, by your estimate, there is simply no reason why they would want nuclear weapons."
You may not have noticed that they have not secured other ways to ensure their security diplomatically to the extent that being closer to having the potential to break out into nuclear weapons would bring. It's perfectly rational. It's not good for Israel, or U.S. interests, or that of most of the Sunni Arab states, but it's perfectly rational, just as was the development of the Soviet nuke and the Chinese nuke, even though, as one apparently has to tirelessly point out, they never used them, and for perfectly good reasons that apply exactly as well to Iran.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 11:31 AM
Adding to that last point:
Maybe Iran would prefer to embrace the ideology and rhetoric that Iran prefers, rather than change to meet the US' approval on the off chance that, then, the US will leave Iran alone.
Remember, this is a country that has been colonized by Western nations, manipulated, disrupted and heavily interfered with for the over a century.
Sovereignty, and pride are big players here. They don't want to have to jump when Washington says jump, and they are rightly concerned that Washington would rather a pliable proxy be in charge. Someone like, say, I dunno, the Shah of Iran!
Yeah, I know, crazy of them to think that right.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 11:33 AM
A nuclear-armed opponent has the ultimate deterrent.
Presuming that they can deliver the nuke to the opponent that they're trying to deter.
Posted by: Phil | September 13, 2010 at 11:47 AM
Yes, that is one of the many things that have to work properly in order to project nuclear power.
Once a nation has demonstrated a working nuclear device, there just remain the trivial steps of:
-"weaponizing" the physics package
-(as Phil pointed out) having a suitable vehicle that can throw the payload some distance that's strategically useful
-(also part of Phil's point) having a suitably accurate guidance package for said vehicle
-(also implicitly part of Phil's point) having that vehicle be reliable enough (which implies a rigorous flight test regimen having been executed) to risk putting one of your few working physics packages on it.
-Having developed, designed assembled, tested and exhaustively established reliability of the safe/arm and fuzing mechanisms
There are lots of other things, too.
Note, though, that one thing that can work as an effective substitute for actually having done all of this is to imply that you have already done so. That might work if you're a decent bluffer, but it stops working right at the instant when someone calls your bluff in the worse way imaginable.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 13, 2010 at 12:03 PM
A lot of responses below, so my grammar/spelling/syntax may be subpar even for me. Also, work calls, so this is my last on this subject. Thanks, Dr. S for getting this going.
Iran has a struggling economy, and a limited conventional army. That is, Iran's military could cause an invader problems, and could lash out at Israel and the US, but is in NO position for conquest. NONE. It has no means of force projection sufficient to occupy territory, nor could its economy sustain conquest should it somehow develop the conventional/logistic capacity. Further, it's population does not support it.
The same was true for Iraq, yet it started two wars. Further, you assume that, over time, the situation won’t change. History argues against this, the proof being Iran’s current status vs. its status 10 years ago. All of the negatives you mention existed, yet Iran went forward with its program. Additionally, coercion, punishment, etc. are all military goals well short of conquest. Historically, the same arguments could have been made for the Soviet Union, Germanny and Italy in the early 30’s. Yet all three started wars.
Pakistan got a nuke and pursued no such adventurism. Ditto North Korea. A nuke does not suddenly make a country capable of conquest.
Neither Pakistan nor NK are geographically situated to threaten anyone. Pakistan borders India (a nuclear and much larger power) and Afghanistan. There is no where to go. NK is hemmed in by the PRC and SK, which has a large conventional force and is under our nuclear umbrella. And besides, because one country doesn’t start a war, doesn’t mean another country won’t.
And, by the way, aren’t you and others doing a lot of mind reading here, something you found pretty much unacceptable not too long ago in assessing a third party’s intentions.
What "real utility" were you thinking of?
Tactical nukes would be highly effective against a carrier group or massed armor/personnel. I don’t expect a country who would use nukes to be particularly worried about world opinion. Neither NK nor Iran have demonstrated much concern in that regard.
We couldn't invade and change their regime. This is not necessarily a bad thing though.
The flip side of not necessarily is necessarily. The need for forced regime change is foreseeable. The “who, when and why” are unknowns, but the need is there and has been demonstrated historically. History does have a tendency to repeat in general if not in the particulars.
And yet North Korea has started no such war. Nor has Pakistan. Because the risks and costs are still there, even if their odds of surviving total defeat are better, few regimes would look at the ultimate prospects and decide it's a good idea.
More mind reading. Since I believe threat assessment involves deductive reasoning to one degree or another, I am not criticizing, only pointing out the inconsistency. It is a truism that every country that hasn’t started a war is in a state of peace. Until the war starts. War is a historical certainty, the only open issues being with whom and when.
imagine if you were Iranian and the US discussed the downside of you attaining a nuke as the US not being able to achieve final victory against your country? Might motivate you to get one of them nukes, no?
True enough. Except I am not arguing for surgical strike--I oppose that--I am raising the risks we assume by not preempting. Further, your logic would have had no debate in the US pre-WWII about the wisdom of resisting the Nazis because that would have caused the Nazis to be even more aggressive. Or, more to the point, by your logic, the aim of unconditional surrender was a bad one because it prolonged the war.
I acknowledge the downside. The world is amuck with downsides, and two bad alternatives. We pick the least bad.
Fair enough. This is my only point. I am not in favor of preempting. Even if everything goes to hell in 5 or 10 years, trying to maintain an uneasy peace and to move toward stability is worth the risk.
Nukes don't help conquest. They help to prevent conquest of you.
This abstract assertion is wrong, both in abstract and in practice. As a hypothetical example, should the PRC wish to annex Vietnam, it could simply detonate one nuke offshore, as a warning, and give the ultimatum: surrender or face annihilation. Far fetched, sure. But it illustrates why this statement is wrong.
Why on earth would they assume, now, that they can secure themselves diplomatically?
Now that would be irrational.
Because things change over time? Because the cold war is over, eliminating the superpower proxy issues it spawned? Because the whimsical superpower has offered all kinds of concessions and safeguards if Iran does what you now say is irrational (Eric, are you arguing that Iran’s only rational course is to develop nukes? If that is true for Iran, isn’t it also true for every other totalitarian regime?).
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 12:24 PM
Looking at a map of Iran, I see the following:
To the east, Pakistan, a nuclear state with a non-trivial level of military cooperation with the US. Then Afghanistan, currently occupied by the US.
And, just beyond those two, India and China, both nuclear states.
To the northeast, Turkmenistan, as far as I know not particuarly hostile to Iran, but they have provided some level of support to the US in Afghanistan through limited airbase access and ground transport.
Just beyond Turkmenistan and Iran's other northern neighbors, Russia, a nuclear state.
To the west, Turkey, who generally align with the US in foreign affairs, and Iraq, currently occupied by the US.
Across the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, our BFF in the Arab middle east.
And a bit beyond the western neighbors, Israel, a nuclear state.
Maybe Iran has ambitions of regional conquest and dominance. That wouldn't surprise me at all, everybody wants to rule the world.
But I don't think we have to reach much beyond purely defensive motivations to explain their interest in a nuclear capability.
Many heavy players in the US have been calling for the overthrow of the Iranian government for years. Like, since 1979. And the US has somewhere between a modest to enormous military presence in almost every abutter to Iran, including the Indian Ocean.
It's weird to hear Americans talk about Iran being a threat to us or our interests. To me, it looks like they're in a box, with a knife at their throat.
I mean, really, just look at a map.
If we want them to step back from their nuclear program, maybe we should begin by knocking off our "regime change" rhetoric, and perhaps follow up with some basic security guarantees.
Posted by: russell | September 13, 2010 at 12:47 PM
To illustrate, if NKorea or Iran, once it has an arsenal, were to start a major conventional war, neither entity could be invaded, occupied and compelled to change regimes without a real risk of a final nuclear spasm. And a highly effective spasm at that assuming the defending armies were massed on the aggressor's borders.
It's a bit rich to describe armies poised to invade, occupy and compel regime change as "defending", even if the country to be invaded has started a major conventional war.
I mean the US started a major (not to mention aggressive and illegal) conventional war a few years back. If some force had attempted to invade, occupy and impose regime change on the US in response, would they just have been "defending" Iraq?
Posted by: Enrique Arroyo | September 13, 2010 at 01:06 PM
Your answer seems to be a non-sequitur, and I similarly amn't making sense of it, I'm afraid.
Eric wrote: "That is, Iran's military could cause an invader problems, and could lash out at Israel and the US, but is in NO position for conquest. NONE."
Your response: "All of the negatives you mention existed, yet Iran went forward with its program."
Iran went forward with its nuclear enrichment program. Yes. This demonstrates Iran's intent to invade anyone how? Your response seems to be a non-sequitur.
"Historically, the same arguments could have been made for the Soviet Union, Germanny and Italy in the early 30’s. Yet all three started wars."
And weren't faced with a nuclear deterrent. Relevance?
I remain utterly confused by your bringing up WWII, and then dismissing it, and now bringing it up again without having responding to your previous cycle of initiate-and-dimiss.
Previously:
Your response: Now you again bring up the pre-nuclear era, and I again point out that, gee, non-nuclear powers didn't possess much of a nuclear deterrent, and thus aren't useful in an discussion of how nuclear deterrence works. Again, what? Pakistan doesn't threaten India? That'll come as news to both sides. North Korea doesn't threaten South Korea? Why are we even talking about them then?No, we're talking about nuclear deterrence theory, a subset of game theory. It's not a little-written-about subject. What was the "real utility" of the Soviet Unions thousands of tactical nukes? And that of the U.S.'s?
None, because we strategically deterred each other from using a single one. This is how deterrence works.
"Further, your logic would have had no debate in the US pre-WWII about the wisdom of resisting the Nazis because that would have caused the Nazis to be even more aggressive."
One more time: nuclear weapons are not like conventional weapons. Respectfully, which books do you think best represent your views on nuclear deterrence theory?
I'll start by putting forward Freeman Dyson's Weapons and Hope. What's your favorite book on the topic?
And then the Vietnamese say "go fcuk yourselves."And then the Chinese nuke Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. And then what? They still have to conquer and occupy Vietnam.
How'd that work out for them last time?
Let's say China then nukes every Vietnamese urban area with over 100,000 in population.
Then what does China get? A lot of radioactive debris. And?
The logic of what they'd accomplish here, and why they'd do it would be?
Yes, that's why they haven't done it.
And we haven't even gone into the economic repercussions such an act would have on China, or the rest of the political downside.
Nuclear weapons against an enemy as rural and uninterested in surrendering as the Vietnamese have historically been, help you more than, say, having utter control of air and any given battle space you want, for a decade, how?
I'm not Eric, but obviously it's not the only rational course, it's a rational course. It's true for any regime that feels threatened. Say, like the United States, or France, or Great Britain, or Israel. Developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent is perfectly rational if the drawbacks don't outweight the benefits.The idea of non-proliferation, and the NPT, is to create conditions so that the drawbacks do outweigh the benefits. Of course, the U.S. is committed by the NPT to work to eliminate its nuclear weapons. If the U.S. were somehow to be treated identically to Iran, we'd be under sanctions. You don't seem too concerned about our lack of adherence to our NPT treaty commitments, though.
Aricle VI: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament."
Of course, Article IV also guarantees, among other states, Iran: "Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty."
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 01:10 PM
The same was true for Iraq, yet it started two wars. Further, you assume that, over time, the situation won’t change.
Iraq started two wars and lost. It would not have defeated Iran if it had a nuke unless it used it. And then it wouldn't have really succeeded in the whole conquest thing.
No, nukes are not good for conquest.
History argues against this, the proof being Iran’s current status vs. its status 10 years ago. All of the negatives you mention existed, yet Iran went forward with its program.
Huh? This is my argument, not yours. Iran's program doesn't require it to invade a country and hold territory
Additionally, coercion, punishment, etc. are all military goals well short of conquest. Historically, the same arguments could have been made for the Soviet Union, Germanny and Italy in the early 30’s. Yet all three started wars.
Wait, you're actually comparing pre-WW II Germany with Iran in terms of military/economic power? Come on man, that's ludicrous. Ditto the Soviets. Even Italy - and they were only willing to step out because they were under Germany's umbrella.
Iran is nowhere NEAR that. Not by a long shot.
Neither Pakistan nor NK are geographically situated to threaten anyone. Pakistan borders India (a nuclear and much larger power) and Afghanistan. There is no where to go. NK is hemmed in by the PRC and SK, which has a large conventional force and is under our nuclear umbrella. And besides, because one country doesn’t start a war, doesn’t mean another country won’t.
Yeah, and Iran is going to invade who? Afghanistan, you already ruled out. That leaves Iraq - and good luck with that with US bases there.
And, no, it doesn't mean another country won't, but if you argue that nukes make aggression easier, then it helps to have actual examples, especially when all the evidence is to the contrary.
And, by the way, aren’t you and others doing a lot of mind reading here, something you found pretty much unacceptable not too long ago in assessing a third party’s intentions.
How so? How am I reading minds and you aren't?
The need for forced regime change is foreseeable. The “who, when and why” are unknowns, but the need is there and has been demonstrated historically. History does have a tendency to repeat in general if not in the particulars.
Why? What is the need? When has it arisen? How often? This seems like the rare, rare, rare exception to the rule that, generally, almost always, forcible regime change is the wrong way.
More mind reading. Since I believe threat assessment involves deductive reasoning to one degree or another, I am not criticizing, only pointing out the inconsistency. It is a truism that every country that hasn’t started a war is in a state of peace. Until the war starts. War is a historical certainty, the only open issues being with whom and when.
So it's mind reading when you say a regime won't start a war that isn't in its interests, and yet not mind reading when you say it will?
And what does that mean? If war is a certainty, why don't we invade everyone preemptively? Bound to happen one way or the other, right?
Further, your logic would have had no debate in the US pre-WWII about the wisdom of resisting the Nazis because that would have caused the Nazis to be even more aggressive. Or, more to the point, by your logic, the aim of unconditional surrender was a bad one because it prolonged the war.
No, because my logic would have led to different answers when faced with the Nazis.
Instead, we have Iran: A country that has invaded ZERO countries and taken ZERO territory, with a middling military and shoddy economy totally incapable of conquest.
Different set of facts yields different answers, even with the same logic applied.
This abstract assertion is wrong, both in abstract and in practice. As a hypothetical example, should the PRC wish to annex Vietnam, it could simply detonate one nuke offshore, as a warning, and give the ultimatum: surrender or face annihilation. Far fetched, sure. But it illustrates why this statement is wrong.
Funny, you said both in practice and in theory, yet only came up with the most far-fetched theoretical usage.
Put it in practice.
Again, nukes don't help conquest.
Iran can't nuke the Gulf because it's in the Gulf. Nor could it nuke Kuwait to send a message to Kuwait because Kuwait wouldn't exist anymore. And neither would Iran as the US would, um, wipe it from the map.
Because things change over time? Because the cold war is over, eliminating the superpower proxy issues it spawned?
But our policies against Iran haven't changed. We still work to actively undermine it's regime, paying off groups that are on our State Dept's terror list.
Because the whimsical superpower has offered all kinds of concessions and safeguards if Iran does what you now say is irrational
Actually, and very importantly, we haven't. Iran has asked, repeatedly, for a declaration of non-hostility and a security pact to be part of the negotiations, and we have always and steadfastly refused. We insist, over and over, that all options are on the table.
But seriously: What concessions have we offered? What safeguards?
(Eric, are you arguing that Iran’s only rational course is to develop nukes? If that is true for Iran, isn’t it also true for every other totalitarian regime?).
First of all, Iran is not a totalitarian regime. Second, it would be hard to look at the respective fates of Iraq and North Korea and conclude that you're safer without nukes when you stand outside the US orbit.
That seems evident to me, and I'd be surprised if that wasn't the view from Tehran.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 01:19 PM
Oh yeah, a little less seriously, would Massachusetts remain serene if Alabama was next?
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 01:21 PM
"Iraq started two wars and lost. It would not have defeated Iran if it had a nuke unless it used it. And then it wouldn't have really succeeded in the whole conquest thing.
No, nukes are not good for conquest."
This presumes that the conventional war can't be won. In the other case, nuclear deterrence is certainly valuable to limiting those that would aid the opponent, say, with a nuclear threat.
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 01:25 PM
Observation: JFK was wrong and Eisenhower was right:
That's Peter S. Canellos, and quite right.Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 01:34 PM
This presumes that the conventional war can't be won. In the other case, nuclear deterrence is certainly valuable to limiting those that would aid the opponent, say, with a nuclear threat.
Not sure what the first part means. Could you unpack?
If the conventional war can be won, well then, the nukes weren't really needed, right? If, on the other hand, the conventional war couldn't be won without nukes, nukes aren't about to help you in too many situations - least of all, situations that Iran will find itself in in that they will either be going against other nuke states or states under the US's nuke umbrella.
The second part you seem to be saying that Country C would be less likely to come to the aid of Country B which is in a war with Country A - if Country A had nukes and could threaten Country C.
This might be true, but less so if Country C also had nukes - many many more - and was at a safe distance from Country A's nukes, and had much better delivery systems.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 01:42 PM
I couldn't let this one pass.
Again, nukes don't help conquest.
Ex. A--Hiroshima
Ex. B--Nagasaki
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 01:43 PM
Eric,
To unpack, by referencing two wars that Iraq lost you are limiting the discussion to cases where the conventional forces are inadequate to win either way.
Theen later you limit the general discussion by applying constraints that certainly are accurate:
But since we were discussing the utility of nukes in a general sense I concede your Country C point and stick with my general point.
In the tit for tat between India and Pakistan it would be much more likely for one to win a conventional war if the other didn't have nukes.
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 01:59 PM
McTex, two thoughts:
1. The US was not pursuing conquest - unless you disagree.
2. Regardless, that wouldn't have worked out so well if had Japan had more nukes than us, had any nukes or had a protector that was going to nuke us if we nuked them.
Which is the current situation for Iran.
Which country in the region is Iran going to nuke into submission, with either those nations not retaliating with nukes, or the US standing idly by?
Pakistan? India? China? Russia? Israel? Turkey?
Iraq? Saudi Arabia? Kuwait? Etc.
Seriously?
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 01:59 PM
In the tit for tat between India and Pakistan it would be much more likely for one to win a conventional war if the other didn't have nukes.
Why? And, for the record, they have actually gone at it a few times as is, and neither looks to be able to conquer the other and hold the territory.
Shoot, we have tons of nukes and we're having a devil of a time doing that in either Afghanistan or Iraq.
But now Iran is going to be able to? Becauase it has such a better military? More money to burn? Maybe a nuke or two in five years?
Much ado about nothing.
I mean, theoretically could nukes help a country conquer another: yes, in theory.
In practice, will nukes help Iran to conquer it's neighbors: No. First, Iran doesn't seem to display an imperial foreign policy urge. Second, it's neighbors either have nukes or US bases, making them bad targets for conquest - even nuclear-buttressed conquest.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 02:03 PM
Seconded. My pet peeve is "increased exponentially", which can mean almost literally anything.
Consider very small positive exponents, and then exponents that are negative or exactly zero.
I'm trying to make sense of this. You're just saying that "increasing exponentially" doesn't necessarily mean "growing quickly", although it it's often used thusly, right?
It certainly can't mean "growing purely linearly" or "fluctuating sinusoidally" (at least if used by someone who knows what they're talking about).
Posted by: Enrique Arroyo | September 13, 2010 at 02:04 PM
Uh, I join with others in asking what McKinney's glib pair of examples is supposed to prove.
What "conquest" was the United States engaged in, in which the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were keys to that conquest? And how does this relate to anything that he imagines Iran might wish to do in the future?
Because it seems to me that the cases he mentions are a case in which the recipient of the nuclear bombings was the aggressor in that war, a wildly expansionist aggressor which was in a position to win a protracted land war on its own turf.
What this has to do with Iran, and what he thinks its plans are, is beyond me.
In any case, I'm off to develop my trebuchet-based nuclear strategy.
Posted by: Phil | September 13, 2010 at 02:11 PM
"In practice, will nukes help Iran to conquer it's neighbors: No. First, Iran doesn't seem to display an imperial foreign policy urge. Second, it's neighbors either have nukes or US bases, making them bad targets for conquest - even nuclear-buttressed conquest."
To be clear, I don't necessarily disagree with this particular an specific assessment, (with a few concerns*).
It just doesn't seem to me that the general statement that having nukes isn't a helpful threat in limiting your opponents options in a conventional war is some universal truth.
*It also seems to me that your assessment of Iranian intentions and the level of threat is not shared by a significant set of UN Security Council members. Although I also think some of that is the machinations of the UN to try and stay relevant
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 02:15 PM
Conventional fire-bombing of Japanese cities killed far more Japanese than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs did:
See table at link for specific percentages of cities destroyed.What was actually the most devastating single attack against Japan?
The first major Tokyo raid by B-29s, alone: Again, that's simply from the one raid of the night of March 9th/10th.Overall firebombing results.
Comparatively:
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, as noted here: Yonai being the Navy Minister.Nuclear weapons were an excuse for Hirohito to support his few ministers who wanted to surrender, but they changed nothing in any military strategic way; the atomic bombs only changed things psychologically and therefore politically.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 02:17 PM
It just doesn't seem to me that the general statement that having nukes isn't a helpful threat in limiting your opponents options in a conventional war is some universal truth.
I'm saying that in the modern setting (other than when the US had nukes and no other country did), nukes are not much of a help in taking over countries.
They haven't helped any of the new nuclear powers do so, and Iran is particularly ill-suited for conquest - militarily, economically and geographically.
In theory, they could help. In the context of Iran, not really.
It also seems to me that your assessment of Iranian intentions and the level of threat is not shared by a significant set of UN Security Council members.
Not China and Russia - who are a lot closer to Iran than we are. We had to cajole and bribe them to come along for some relatively meek sanctions.
And regardless: If given the choice, I would choose for Iran not to have nukes. The questions are:
1. Does Iran actually want nukes.
2. If yes, will Iran actually get nukes.
3. If yes and yes, is there something short of war that we can do to get Iran to abandon the quest?
4. If not, is war better than a contained nuclear Iran?
Even granting certain answers to 1-3, I say that war would be worse.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 02:20 PM
It's also noteworthy that China has for decades had certain geopolitical goals re, for example, Tibet and Taiwan, that could be solved as trivially as he imagines a fantasy PRC invasion of Vietnam could be using nukes, and yet . . .
Posted by: Phil | September 13, 2010 at 02:26 PM
"Even granting certain answers to 1-3, I say that war would be worse."
First, as I said, with the information I have today I agree with this.
Second, requiring cajoling is how they deal with us on almost every issue, even if they really want the same outcome that we do. I find that it is no comfort that they seemed reluctant, but then supported sanctions.
Posted by: Marty | September 13, 2010 at 02:29 PM
In the real world, against what nation is Iran going to be the aggressor?
If Israel, it's suicide, either through counterattack from Israel, or likely from us.
Every other near neighbor is already itself a nuclear state, or is closely aligned with or occupied by a nuclear state.
It's always interesting to bat theoreticals around, but *in real life*, who is Iran going to invade and conquer?
Posted by: russell | September 13, 2010 at 02:30 PM
requiring cajoling is how they deal with us on almost every issue, even if they really want the same outcome that we do.
Sometimes this is true, when they know that we want it bad enough, but I don't think this was really the case here.
That said, of course as a rule, just about every nation would rather no other nation gets nukes.
Why would they want others to join the club?
I find that it is no comfort that they seemed reluctant, but then supported sanctions.
Eh. China and Iran have very good relations that go back many years. China would never sign off on a military strike, and was very reluctant to support some relatively weak sanctions.
They don't look too scared.
Ditto Russia.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 02:38 PM
1. The US was not pursuing conquest - unless you disagree.
2. Regardless, that wouldn't have worked out so well if had Japan had more nukes than us, had any nukes or had a protector that was going to nuke us if we nuked them.
Really, I have a lot of work to do, but still . . .
Eric posited that nukes can't be used for conquest. The stated goal in WWII was unconditional surrender which is indistinguishable from conquest. We got that, from Japan, after dropping two nukes. It doesn't matter who started the war, what matters is how it ends.
Eric's second point, above, is making one of my original points: possession of nukes goes a long way to immunizing an aggressor, like Japan had it had nukes, from unconditional surrender.
Which country in the region is Iran going to nuke into submission, with either those nations not retaliating with nukes, or the US standing idly by?
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE et al are all within conventional striking range of Iran. Nukes give Iran, or any aggressor, the capability of coercing, threatening, attacking (limited or not-so-limited) conventionally and being able to fend off a third party such as the US with tolerable loss, such as tactical defeat and retreat but no threat to the regime.
Nukes have a variety of applications in a variety of situations for the country willing to deploy them.
Worst case is a continued nuke program that eventually refines the capacity to build portable devices that can be sold or given to third parties. Sure, Iran is far too stable, rational, blah, blah, blah for this to ever happen, stability and reason being two of the defining traits of totalitarian, theocratic regimes. So, really, if this ever were to happen, the risk even in hindsight was so vanishingly small as to fully vindicate those who were willing (as I am) to live with a nuclear Iran. Or not. I am being facetious.
I say that war would be worse.
You are right, which is why I said at the beginning I do not favor preemption. That said, you go out of your way to minimize the potential downstream threats and to justify Iran's actions. I don't get this. It is enough to say, and demonstrate as can be easily done, that the immediate costs and blow back from yet a third war in that region make the long term and probably manageable risks of this proliferation the better reasoned option.
If we are wrong, however, and if Iran directly or indirectly initiates a nuclear attack, the consequences will dwarf what they would have been had action been taken a year or two ago or even today.
Smart people argued Hitler was no threat or was manageable or only wanted so much and no more, etc. They were wrong. Millions died. It could happen again. Probably won't, but it could.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 02:53 PM
How'd that work out for them?
I'm not sure why you think this point supports your assertion that we have to be concerned about Iran going on a regional conquest spree.
This is a very silly statement with which the good people of India and South Korea might take issue. If anything, the deterrent effect that helps keep NK and Pakistan from getting adventurous with their nukes completely undermines your arguments for why a nuclear Iran is unacceptable.
On the contrary, NK has demonstrated that deterrence and world opinion matter in the only way relevant in this discussion: they have neither used nukes nor used the threat of nukes to back military aggression.
Iran can't demonstrate anything of the sort one way or another because they don't have any nukes to deter.
This still boils down to the argument that we can't allow Iran to have nukes because we might have to invade them someday. It's not an argument as to why this is so and remains completely unsupported by a shred of evidence. The only support you offer is the term "demonstrated", which you keep using to refer to events that are hypothetical, irrelevant or which demonstrate the exact opposite of what you're arguing.
These risks are known and acknowledged. A lot of us think they are vastly outweighed by the risks of yet another war of aggression. If you're not arguing for intervention in spite of the former risks, exactly what are you trying to say?
You got a little straw on you there.
Our "logic would have had no debate in the US pre-WWII" about nukes because nobody had nukes pre-WWII.
Any pre-WWII debate about the conventional response to the Nazis is completely and totally irrelevant.
Yes. We said the same thing about Saddam--correctly, as it turns out.
We've been saying that for years.
It's not a difficult concept. It does not require mindreading or complex psychology. It is as rational and straightforward as getting a concealed carry permit when you live in a bad neighborhood.
Posted by: Catsy | September 13, 2010 at 03:08 PM
The stated goal in WWII was unconditional surrender which is indistinguishable from conquest.
OK, what?
Posted by: Phil | September 13, 2010 at 03:10 PM
"If you're not arguing for intervention in spite of the former risks, exactly what are you trying to say?"
I don't intend to put words in MiT's mouth (or keyboard), but MiT did write thusly in response to me:
I take him at his word.Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 03:21 PM
It certainly can't mean "growing purely linearly" or "fluctuating sinusoidally" (at least if used by someone who knows what they're talking about).
Sure it can. On a sufficiently small time scale, an exponential curve looks like a straight line.
And complex exponential growth is perfectly consistent with sinusoidal oscillation. Im{e^jt} = sin(t) after all. It doesn't get much more sinusoidal than that.
Posted by: Turbulence | September 13, 2010 at 03:22 PM
I should have referred to "McKinneyTexas," rather than "MiT," an abbreviated form of his prior handle. Sorry about that, McKinneyTexas.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 03:25 PM
Smart people argued Hitler was no threat or was manageable or only wanted so much and no more, etc. They were wrong. Millions died. It could happen again. Probably won't, but it could.
Again with the Hitler/Nazis. This analogy is inapt because Iran is nowhere near as powerful as WWII Germany, relative to the rest of the world. Not even within the same conversation - or better yet, not even in the same room where the conversation were taking place.
Iran couldn't take over Iraq, after a decade fought and half a million casualties.
They are, thus, not well positioned for global or even regional conquest.
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE et al are all within conventional striking range of Iran.
And yet Iran has never struck them.
Nukes give Iran, or any aggressor, the capability of coercing, threatening, attacking (limited or not-so-limited) conventionally and being able to fend off a third party such as the US with tolerable loss, such as tactical defeat and retreat but no threat to the regime.
So what. This is what Saddam suffered after Gulf I, and that was preferable to the second Iraq war I would say.
Worst case is a continued nuke program that eventually refines the capacity to build portable devices that can be sold or given to third parties.
Why? First, that technology likely eludes the USA, so I don't think that Iran will be anywhere near that for at least decades, if then.
Also, if the USSR never did this, nor China, why would Iran?
Sure, Iran is far too stable, rational, blah, blah, blah for this to ever happen, stability and reason being two of the defining traits of totalitarian, theocratic regimes.
Again, Iran is not totalitarian. Regardless, that "reason" seemed to control the actions of the USSR and China and, thus far, Pakistan and North Korea. Unless you're saying that reason was the defining trait of those regimes? Or not? Or what exactly?
So, really, if this ever were to happen, the risk even in hindsight was so vanishingly small as to fully vindicate those who were willing (as I am) to live with a nuclear Iran. Or not. I am being facetious.
The risk is what it is. Again, I'd rather Iran not go nuclear.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 03:44 PM
"Again, Iran is not totalitarian."
To expand: "politically repressive" is not synonymous with "totalitarian."
McKinneyTexas:
There wouldn't seem to be much need to rush to attack Iran any time in the next several years, at least, then, if the worst case is something so fantastic.Presumably the Iranians will have also made these mini-nukes -- do know how hard it is to design one of those? -- with not-yet-invented technology that make nuclear forensics useless.
The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center finds your lack of faith disturbing.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 04:13 PM
And complex exponential growth is perfectly consistent with sinusoidal oscillation. Im{e^jt} = sin(t) after all. It doesn't get much more sinusoidal than that.
Electrical engineering would be very difficult otherwise, and lots of other things, too, I have to think. (Or at least the way they taught EE when I was in school would have been completely meaningless, especially if we wanted to continue using AC power. And think of poor Euler's disappointment, not to mention Fourier's likelihood for a life of petty crime.)
Posted by: hairshirthedonist | September 13, 2010 at 04:14 PM
I take him at his word.
Thanks. Actually, I made this point in my initial post at 8:58: " I agree with the premise: a first strike on Iran is a bad idea, but for mostly different reasons. Our common ground is the horror of war and the inevitable human cost of even a 'surgical strike'."
I am saying that the risk of not preempting is greater than many here will allow.
Neither Pakistan nor NK are geographically situated to threaten anyone.
This is a very silly statement with which the good people of India and South Korea might take issue.
The subtext here is "geographically situated to threaten anyone who can't credibly deter them either independently or under our nuclear umbrella." Iran is no threat to Pakistan or Russia. They are a threat to Israel and to its non-nuclear neighbors.
Which prompts a not totally unrelated thought: you're probably familiar with the command and control apparatus we and the Sovs had in place to avoid a rogue detonation. How comfortable are you that Iran, or Pakistan for that matter, has or will have the level of control over its arsenal so as to reliably limit the threat of a rogue actor, for example, loading up a nuke on his/her fighter bomber and martyring him/herself over Tel Aviv (or at least making the effort)?
exactly what are you trying to say?.
"Exactly what I said", he replies with Farber-like wit and brevity. ;) I think there are greater risks in not preempting than you and many here see, but the end result is the same, I would not invade because you go from risk to certainty with no reasonable guarantee that we'd do more than postpone the inevitable.
Again with the Hitler/Nazis. This analogy is inapt because Iran is nowhere near as powerful as WWII Germany, relative to the rest of the world.
Eric, this is a completely fair analogy: people understated/reasoned away Hitler's threat. They didn't want a war. Hard to blame them, given the WWI body count. They were wrong. Equality of power isn't the point: rationalizing away a potentially huge threat (even one nuclear detonation is a huge event, in my book) to avoid a war is the point. That a general war with a nuclear armed Iran would have only half or a quarter of the casualties of WWII doesn't undercut the comparison.
If this works out, not going to war will be one of the best things we ever did. If not, well, we all have a lot to answer for.
There wouldn't seem to be much need to rush to attack Iran any time in the next several years, at least, then, if the worst case is something so fantastic.
Presumably the Iranians will have also made these mini-nukes -- do know how hard it is to design one of those? -- with not-yet-invented technology that make nuclear forensics useless.
This is a pretty good example of artificially defining-down a threat to minimize it. I used the word "portable", not "mini-nuke". Something that can fit in a container or a small vessel and that can be situated at or near a large population center is what I had in mind. You are saying something of this nature is technologically out of reach? How so? As for nuclear forensics, sure we can trace the material back to Iran, assuming Iran supplied the material in the first place. Iran could supply the technology and know how, using former Soviet material. Or, it could promptly report the theft of material some years before actual detonation to shift the onus away.
There are endless ways and means of making something bad happen. We buy a big bag of unknowns when theocrats get their hands on something like this.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 05:16 PM
Iran is no threat to Pakistan or Russia. They are a threat to Israel and to its non-nuclear neighbors.
But Israel has hundreds of nukes, and the means to deliver them (Iran has none, and no delivery system). Even if they get one, they would still be vastly outgunned, and deterred.
And, as I pointed out, the non-nuclear neighbors of Iran have US military bases on their turf. Makes them an unlikely target for nuking considering MAD.
How comfortable are you that Iran, or Pakistan for that matter, has or will have the level of control over its arsenal so as to reliably limit the threat of a rogue actor, for example, loading up a nuke on his/her fighter bomber and martyring him/herself over Tel Aviv (or at least making the effort)?
Not extremely comfortable, nor do I imagine they are with us - given all the talk amongst senior US military leaders about tactical nuke strikes.
But then, Tel Aviv is Israel's concern, not ours.
Eric, this is a completely fair analogy: people understated/reasoned away Hitler's threat. They didn't want a war. Hard to blame them, given the WWI body count. They were wrong. Equality of power isn't the point: rationalizing away a potentially huge threat (even one nuclear detonation is a huge event, in my book) to avoid a war is the point. That a general war with a nuclear armed Iran would have only half or a quarter of the casualties of WWII doesn't undercut the comparison.
If this works out, not going to war will be one of the best things we ever did. If not, well, we all have a lot to answer for.
I guess. To the extent that it's possible to reason away a threat, it is possible that I'm doing so now. But since I didn't estimate Hitler at all (wasn't born yet), it's kind of a moot point as well - with little I can do to refute it.
Also, is it incumbent on the USA to go to war with every potential threat to every other nation, possibly, ever. Everywhere?
This is a pretty good example of artificially defining-down a threat to minimize it. I used the word "portable", not "mini-nuke". Something that can fit in a container or a small vessel and that can be situated at or near a large population center is what I had in mind. You are saying something of this nature is technologically out of reach? How so? As for nuclear forensics, sure we can trace the material back to Iran, assuming Iran supplied the material in the first place. Iran could supply the technology and know how, using former Soviet material. Or, it could promptly report the theft of material some years before actual detonation to shift the onus away.
But we can't invade Iran and dismantle their ability to share technology and know-how. And it would still be an extremely risky gambit, likely to end Iran's existence. We would find out it was them. We would assume it was them.
Hell, most Americans think Saddam was behind 9/11 and he was mortal enemies with al-Qaeda!
No, Iran would not be so foolish.
And all that leaves aside this obvious point:
Why would Iran want to do that?
I remember saying the same thing in the run up to the Iraq war: What has Saddam ever done to us? Why would he be a threat to us? He wants to maintain power, not attack the US for no reason at all.
Same with Iran.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 05:29 PM
But! The risks of letting Iran move ahead with enrichment are indeed serious! Most most serious!
If enough people said that, would you then feel your point had been made sufficiently?
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 05:32 PM
Israel's anti-nuclear strikes against Iraq and Syria were as surgical and as casualty-free as humanly possible. They are textbook cases of being careful, saving lives, and preventing war. It can be done.
Iran has no defensive need for nuclear weapons. There is no aggressor that has been waiting around since 1979 to attack, so they can later be deterred by Iran's nukes. Saddam is gone.
If the weapons are not defensive, they must be offensive. The only targets reachable are the petroleum states and Israel. Iran's "Regional Domination" must mean petroleum monopoly. That is, an OPEC that can simply dictate prices at will. This is a way to get the West to bend its knee to Iran. In fact, it will lead to war.
Pakistan, India, and Israel have real enemies. Iran has none. Except, that is, those enemies created by Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Posted by: AreaMan | September 13, 2010 at 05:33 PM
Sure it can. On a sufficiently small time scale, an exponential curve looks like a straight line.
Looks like, but isn´t. And of course will utterly fail to model linear growth over larger time scales.
And complex exponential growth is perfectly consistent with sinusoidal oscillation. Im{e^jt} = sin(t) after all. It doesn't get much more sinusoidal than that.
Well, when describing the change of a single quantity over time as "increasing exponentially", I think it´s a safe assumption that the speaker doesn´t have in mind taking the imaginary component of the complex exponential function along the imaginary axis. At least no layperson or mathematician that I know would look at any fluctuating curve or data set, and say "there´s exponential growth".
Posted by: Enrique Arroyo | September 13, 2010 at 05:41 PM
Israel's anti-nuclear strikes against Iraq and Syria were as surgical and as casualty-free as humanly possible. They are textbook cases of being careful, saving lives, and preventing war. It can be done.
The Syrians and Iraqis killed in those strikes no doubt appreciate the restraint shown. As do their family members and friends.
Regardless: very, very different scenarios for at least a couple enormously important reasons:
1. Iran's facilities (there are more than one, which itself is a big difference) are spread out throughout a large territory and are in populated areas. There are also hardened targets that can't be destroyed with existing technology - or would require multiple, high payload ordnance. So not only will more Iranians die, but the targets wouldn't be fully destroyed to boot.
2. Iran has the capacity to retaliate, which in turn would invite retaliation, escalating to a much larger conflict.
Iran has no defensive need for nuclear weapons. There is no aggressor that has been waiting around since 1979 to attack, so they can later be deterred by Iran's nukes. Saddam is gone.
Key US political and military leaders discuss regime change relentlessly. Iraq is a lesson, not a source of comfort.
If the weapons are not defensive, they must be offensive.
1. There are no weapons at all, neither offensive or defensive.
2. Iran might want a weapon, but for defensive purposes, as mentioned above, and as surmised by the Pentagon and CIA.
Pakistan, India, and Israel have real enemies. Iran has none. Except, that is, those enemies created by Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Absurd. The US has worked against Iran for decades, beginning prior to its push for enrichment.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 05:41 PM
But then, Tel Aviv is Israel's concern, not ours.
Really? Then there's the argument for Israeli preemption. If you want to deter Iran, put Israel formally under our nuclear umbrella and hold it fully responsible for any nuclear attack on Israel.
Pakistan, India, and Israel have real enemies. Iran has none. Except, that is, those enemies created by Iran's nuclear weapons program.
AM--I hope you have some time on your hands.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 13, 2010 at 05:44 PM
Eric posited that nukes can't be used for conquest. The stated goal in WWII was unconditional surrender which is indistinguishable from conquest. We got that, from Japan, after dropping two nukes. It doesn't matter who started the war, what matters is how it ends.
Both conquest and defense, apparently.
Posted by: Enrique Arroyo | September 13, 2010 at 05:50 PM
Wikipedia lists the death toll for WWII (civilian and military, axis and allies) as 73 million.
You really want to put out an estimate of 18-37 million deaths for a war with a nuclear-armed Iran?
Posted by: elm | September 13, 2010 at 05:51 PM
Really? Then there's the argument for Israeli preemption. If you want to deter Iran, put Israel formally under our nuclear umbrella and hold it fully responsible for any nuclear attack on Israel.
Israel has arguments for Israeli actions based on Israeli interests.
I reject the notion that the US should go to war because of a potential, distant, hypothetical risk to Israel.
This because the USA is not part of Israel, nor vice versa, and, hence, that would be an unhealthy relationship with all types of moral hazard.
As for umbrellas, I don't think Israel needs ours, as they have over 100 nukes themselves, but I don't have a problem doing it anyway.
So be it. To the extent that any country in the world doubts it - for whatever crazy reason - I would put Israel formally under our umbrella.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 05:59 PM
AM--I hope you have some time on your hands.
I must admit that it's hilarious to me to read that Americans don't think that Iranians have enemies.
Read Iranian media - translated from Farsi, of course. Read Iranian authors. Try to get a sense of the mood in Iran.
They very much fear the US as a potential adversary.
Check that.
Read American media!
Read all the talk about attacking Iran - casual talk, as if it's a question of US costs and benefits.
Iranians? Second order concern.
Hell, read this thread!!
Again, casual talk about attacking Iran - full bore - in a massive war.
McTex: You narrowly come down on the side of not attacking. AreaMan clearly comes down on the other side.
And yet both of you claim, presumably with a straight face, that Iran has no enemies.
Then you say: it's only because of their nuclear program. This talk in American circles predated the supposed proximity of Iran to gaining a nuke (but then, they've been 1 year away for 30 years)
Since they've had a nuclear program since the days of the Shah, why attack now?
And, further, what about the Iraq-Iran war when we supported Saddam? Or our ongoing support for the MeK?
Should Iran view those as only actions to counter their non-existent nuclear weapons program?
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 06:08 PM
"Iran has no defensive need for nuclear weapons. There is no aggressor that has been waiting around since 1979 to attack, so they can later be deterred by Iran's nukes. Saddam is gone."
It's nice that you think so. Similarly, many said the same thing of the Soviet Union.
Stubbornly, because of their history with both the outside world, and the U.S. prior to the German invasion of the USSR, they persisted in thinking otherwise.
Similarly, the Iranian perspective actually differs from yours, and while they may indeed have -- and often do have, though it's crucial not to speak of the many power groupings in Iran as if they were a homogenous mass --a hyper-active sense of paranoia, the history of the U.S. government and the Shah, as well as the U.S. government's long history of interventions around the world, give all Iranians plenty of sound reason for legitimate concerns and some fears of being under continued threat by the United States and its allied forces, and that's not even to mention what others have, which is that we invaded both their neighbors and occupied them.
But, to be sure, if Iran (magically) invaded and conquered Canada and Mexico, we'd have no cause to be alarmed, or seek to develop nuclear weapons, if Iran had them, and we did not.
Absolutely.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 06:09 PM
heh
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 13, 2010 at 06:10 PM
"If you want to deter Iran, put Israel formally under our nuclear umbrella and hold it fully responsible for any nuclear attack on Israel."
You and I might be willing to trade Israel's nukes for a guaranteed U.S. nuclear umbrella (buy two for the price of one if you act quickly!), but it would be difficult to persuade the Israeli right-wing to put Israeli security, as they see it, ultimately out of the hands of the Israeli government, leaving them purely dependent on trusting the American government, whomever may lead it in future.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 06:13 PM
"Read Iranian media - translated from Farsi, of course."
Lots of Iranian media sites have English web editions.
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 06:16 PM
The need for forced regime change is foreseeable.
Why do people think we get to remove and replace other people's governments?
Why do we think other people will be happy with, or will accept, whoever we decide to put in place?
Doesn't it occur to anyone that the level of sheer damage we would cause by trying to implement something like "forced regime change" in a nation like Iran would make the whole project not really worthwhile?
The current government of Iran came into being as a result of a popular revolution against the last government we put in place there.
The government of Iran is what it is. They're not particularly friendly toward us, and both they and we have our respective reasons for not getting along.
But IMO we really need to deal with them as a given fact, rather than indulge in fantasies about "forced regime change".
The only people who are going to make any kind of effective regime change in Iran are Iranians.
One cluster****, or at most two, per generation, please.
Posted by: russell | September 13, 2010 at 06:46 PM
Oh, russell . . . if you start believing that even the wogs have the right to self-determination, pretty soon you'll start thinking of them as humans and everything. Can't have that, old chum. Gives them airs, and whatnow.
Posted by: Phil | September 13, 2010 at 06:48 PM
Speaking of nukes, the testers of these nukes thought this was a good soundtrack for these.
Be sure to view the short video at full screen.
A hundred official DOE nuclear test films!
Posted by: Gary Farber | September 13, 2010 at 07:46 PM
Late to the party and off-topic (as usual)
McTX -- Eric, this is a completely fair analogy: people understated/reasoned away Hitler's threat. They didn't want a war. Hard to blame them, given the WWI body count.
I'm really starting to resent the old history textbooks teaching of Chamberlain in Germany and the appeasement canard. Britain could not take on Germany. They had no air force and no air defenses. Their tank brigade was hopelessly out of date compared to Germany. They were way behind and they needed time to gear up. They could not have intervened had they wished to.
And Britain didn't underestimate Hitler's threat. If anything, they overestimated it at that time. The Luftwaffe was built for tactical support, not for strategic bombing in advance of an invasion of Britain.
Appeasement let Britain beef up using the time gained and some US lend lease.
[/tangent]
Posted by: nous | September 13, 2010 at 08:19 PM
Yes, provided they can attack it with sufficient accuracy. But it's always wise to keep in mind that carrier groups have in them one of the most heavily tested and evaluated missile defense systems in the world. Would you risk one of your single-digit-sized arsenal of nukes on that?
They also tend to be moving targets, and if you guess wrong about where they're going to be at impact time, well, too bad.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 13, 2010 at 08:42 PM
Looks like, but isn´t. And of course will utterly fail to model linear growth over larger time scales.
I think you're missing the point. Any set of real world data points that roughly fall along a line will also fall along a suitably chosen exponential curve.
At least no layperson or mathematician that I know would look at any fluctuating curve or data set, and say "there´s exponential growth".
Actually, modeling periodic data using complex exponentials is quite common in electrical engineering.
Posted by: Turbulence | September 13, 2010 at 08:59 PM
I think you're missing the point. Any set of real world data points that roughly fall along a line will also fall along a suitably chosen exponential curve.
No, I think it's you that's missing the point. The original question was whether "almost anything" could be called exponential increase. I'm arguing that's not the case - at least not if we add the modifier "reasonably".
Suppose I stuff a dollar in my mattress every day for the next fifty years, and wish to model my savings as a function of time in days. Will the points "fall along a suitably chosen exponential curve"? Well, I concede that if you scale your axes appropriately, you can find such a curve that looks much like the actual line. But no matter how you choose the curve, it's going to give absurd estimates for my savings for most of the days in question.
More pertinently, if I told anyone that my money is increasing exponentially, they would rightfully conclude that I have no idea what that means.
Actually, modeling periodic data using complex exponentials is quite common in electrical engineering.
I don't know whence the "actually", as this contradicts nothing I've said. My point was about what the phrase "exponential increase" means. My understanding is that it means "growing at a rate proportional to the quantity itself". This is equivalent to "capable of being modeled by a real valued exponential function of a real variable". I've spent the last 15 years or so of my life around university math departments, and I've never heard a mathematician describe any sinusoidal fluctuations as "exponential increase", despite the fact that they can be modeled using complex exponentials. I seriously doubt electrical engineers are wont to do so, either. If they are, it's certainly quite an eccentric usage.
Apologies to all for the tedious digression. I just wanted to know what Slarti was getting at, and I didn't think "not all growth can reasonably be called exponential" would be such a controversial proposition.
Posted by: Enrique Arroyo | September 13, 2010 at 11:01 PM
I can't imagine how the above could possibly be unclear, but "exponential growth" is commonly used to describe some kind of locally rapid increase in some thing.
Exponential can mean that, but it doesn't automatically mean that.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 13, 2010 at 11:40 PM
It was unclear to me for two reasons. First, that it was used in support of the claim that "[increased exponentially] can mean almost literally anything", instead of the more specific "'increased exponentially' can entail even very small instantaneous growth rates". Second, that even for small positive or negative exponents, exponential functions can have (arbitrarily) large growth rates.
I was able to surmise what you meant, but it was unclear enough that I thought I'd ask for a clarification. Thanks for that.
Posted by: Enrique Arroyo | September 14, 2010 at 01:37 AM
How does the discussion even get this far?
Iran stopped nuclear weapons development in 2003 according to our own intelligence. They've already cut deals on enrichment...
This is like Iraq all over again. The goal is regime change, and no facts on the ground can change that. So the discussion of how to deter Iran is fundamentally this shallow distraction from reality. The reality is that no matter what if the hawks had their way, Iran would be bombed.
We invaded Iraq after they let inspectors in for fuck's sake.
Posted by: Console | September 14, 2010 at 02:36 AM
...or zero growth rate. Or small rates of collapse. Or large rates of collapse.
So, sure, almost literally anything was an overstatement; I ought to have said lots of things that are not consistent with rapid growth. I thought that was a rather obvious point, but it never hurts to clarify.
Any function A^Bx that has A as a positive real number > 1 and B is a negative number will approach zero as X goes to infinity. Approaches zero is not, in any context I'm aware of, consistent with unbounded growth.
The flipside of this is that what's being described, mostly, when people casually mention "exponentially" isn't exponential growth at all.
I think I've beaten this to death, and then some, so I'm going to leave the discussion here. Hopefully I've clarified to the point where you understand where I'm coming from, even if you disagree with the opinion.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 14, 2010 at 08:00 AM
Next, let's take on the phrase "meteoric rise!"
Posted by: Phil | September 14, 2010 at 08:47 AM
Also: focused like a laser, and skyrocketing.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 14, 2010 at 09:26 AM
Would you risk one of your single-digit-sized arsenal of nukes on that?
Never said it would be easy, just that tactical nukes have efficacy.
Britain could not take on Germany. They had no air force and no air defenses. Their tank brigade was hopelessly out of date compared to Germany. They were way behind and they needed time to gear up. They could not have intervened had they wished to.
Depends on the point in time--when Hitler remilitarized the Ruhr, he was weak and could have been stopped. The French were numerically superior in tank numbers, if not quality and tactics/strategy. The point is that the bias was against war and against getting ready for war and war came anyway.
The need for forced regime change is foreseeable.
Why do people think we get to remove and replace other people's governments?
Why do we think other people will be happy with, or will accept, whoever we decide to put in place?
Doesn't it occur to anyone that the level of sheer damage we would cause by trying to implement something like "forced regime change" in a nation like Iran would make the whole project not really worthwhile?
Russell, I was speaking in the abstract, not with specific reference to Iran. If that wasn't clear, it is now. "Forced regime change" happens and is necessary only rarely. Sometimes, as in the case of South Africa, the force is mainly diplomatic/sanctions and internal change. Other times--Napoleon, Hitler, Tojo, Milosevic--force of arms is necessary. The necessity arises because the loss of human life leading up to regime change is such that it is the right thing, even if costly in terms of human life.
The Iranian regime has a number of the markers of an entity that could--the word here is "could"--prove to fall in the category of forced regime change candidates. If they get nukes, they have a much freer hand with their neighbors. Time will tell.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 14, 2010 at 10:01 AM
I don't think anyone has any objection to diplomatic sanctions or internal change. And I don't think either of those qualify as "forced regime change", certainly not in the context of talking about one country changing another's regime.
Hitler and Tojo lost wars that they started. Milosevic was committing genocide. The first is certainly a condition where force of arms is justified, and a very strong case can be made for the second.
Iran is neither starting a war, nor committing genocide.
Whenver we decide to "intervene" in another country's domestic politics to replace one government with one more to our liking, it bites us in the @ss. Iran, specifically, is among the textbook examples.
At some point, we would do well to figure that out.
Net/net, the argument that we shouldn't let Iran get nuclear weapons because someday we might want to replace their government by force arms seems, to me, to be hubristic to the point of insanity. If not insanity, profound folly. If those two things can be distinguished.
It's sufficient to say that it would be problematic and destabilizing, for about 1,000 reasons, for Iran to get nuclear weapons. We are within our rights to exercise every lawful diplomatic means to prevent them from doing so.
Note that "we'll kick your @ss" is rarely successful as a rhetorical tactice when de-escalation is the goal.
Beyond that, we're in act of war territory, and as far as I can tell Iran has done nothing to justify going to war with them.
Posted by: russell | September 14, 2010 at 10:19 AM
Beyond that, we're in act of war territory, and as far as I can tell Iran has done nothing to justify going to war with them.
But they have no enemies.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 14, 2010 at 10:37 AM
Net/net, the argument that we shouldn't let Iran get nuclear weapons because someday we might want to replace their government by force arms seems, to me, to be hubristic to the point of insanity. If not insanity, profound folly. If those two things can be distinguished.
I don't think anyone is suggesting this. The argument for preventing Iran from getting nukes is that the risk they will use them on Israel or a neighbor or let them fall into the hands of a third party is too high and intervention is required. The argument fails because the premise is uncertain and the cost--using the term very broadly to encompass the notions of propriety, justification, etc as well as lives and money--is both certain to be incurred and certain to be high. The only unknown is 'how high?'
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 14, 2010 at 10:40 AM
Let's take this in context, please. Countries like North Korea or Iran, in the present day: tactical nukes are useful against US carrier groups, or not? On a scale of 1-10, with 10 representing 90% probability of disabling (to the point of no longer being able to carry out its prime function without return to a naval repair facility) or destroying an aircraft carrier (and other ships, possibly) and 1 representing 10% chance or less, how do you think tactical nukes in the hands of those countries rate?
Not tactical nukes in general, but tactical nukes as might be used by those countries (or other developing nuclear powers) any time in the next few years.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | September 14, 2010 at 11:23 AM
At some point, we would do well to figure that out.
we won't.
Japan and Germany turning out well after WWII has convinced too many people that nation building is just a matter of a ton of money and a few years of tending the garden.
Posted by: cleek | September 14, 2010 at 11:36 AM
Let's take this in context, please.
* * *
Not tactical nukes in general, but tactical nukes as might be used by those countries (or other developing nuclear powers) any time in the next few years.
My initial comment referred to tactical nukes generally, and also to massed troops/armor in addition to a carrier group, but I can do the more limited version:
1. Using one of a few tactical nukes against a carrier group would be problematic, although it would raise the threat level substantially for the CG, forcing a diversion of offensive capability to defensive. This is 'use without deployment/detonation.'
2. Using a tactical nuke against massed troops/armor is a viable option and carries less risk of failure. Nothing is certain, i.e. the incoming jet or missle might be intercepted, but defensively, the ability to mass and overcome is degraded, protracting the conflict and heightening the defense's already inherent advantage.
3. While it would be highly unlikely for Iran to pre-position a tactical, portable, container-ized nuke in the US in the absence of hostilities, a later generation, container-capable nuke could be imported, perhaps successfully, once hostilities commenced or became imminent. Even making the effort and getting caught would be severely disruptive domestically since we could never know if we had found all of the attempted imports.
4. Instead of Option 3, Iran merely claims to have pre-positioned one or more nukes in one or more unnamed US cities and sends us on the mother of all goose chases and producing who-knows-what level of domestic chaos. Remember the anthrax hysteria?
In short, there are a variety of uses for smaller, less sophisticated nukes than is allowed by those who minimize what we are looking at. Some involve actual deployment, some don't. My list is hardly exhaustive.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 14, 2010 at 12:22 PM
McTx,
What makes you think that Iran does not ALREADY possess a couple of actual nuclear bombs? A domestic capability to produce the damn things is all well and good, but if I wanted to have nukes, I would certainly keep trying to acquire one or two ready-made ones, on the side. Wouldn't you?
--TP
Posted by: Tony P. | September 14, 2010 at 12:40 PM
I would certainly keep trying to acquire one or two ready-made ones, on the side. Wouldn't you?
No, I don't think so. The official line, if I understand it and I well may not, from Iran is that their intent is peaceful, they aren't looking to build a bomb. Trying to buy a nuke or two on the open market and getting caught would crystallize a lot of general antipathy toward Iran and directly impeach their public position. IOW, too much downside to getting caught.
Further, while there are surely some 'off the books' nukes floating around out there somewhere, there isn't a handy source of Iran-friendly nukes. Iran needs something that fits its capabilities: in the near term, something deliverable by a fighter bomber, mid term, something small enough to load as a missile warhead. I have no idea what the lead time would be to make a missile-capable warhead. That may be out of reach for Iran for quite sometime.
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 14, 2010 at 12:54 PM
I agree with McTex on that, FWIW.
Posted by: Eric Martin | September 14, 2010 at 12:56 PM
I agree with McTex on that, FWIW.
Ok, it's now under careful review.
:-))
Posted by: McKinneyTexas | September 14, 2010 at 12:59 PM