The Hollow Sham

by Eric Martin

Marc Lynch has an extremely insightful post about the impact of US foreign policy on the Middle East and its various ruling regimes:

"So the Arab core grows hollow," laments former Bush administration Middle East adviser Elliott Abrams in the Weekly Standard today. Most of the essay is an unexceptional restatement of neo-conservative tropes: Obama is weak, Arabs only respect power, Turkey has become a radical Islamist enemy... you can fill in the rest of the blanks. But the lament about the hollowness of the Arab core deserves more careful attention. Why has the Arab core grown so hollow? After all, the Arab core --- in his definition, mostly Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- has been closely aligned with the United States for many decades, and its leaders cooperated very closely with the Bush administration on virtually every issue. This points to a contradiction at the core of the approach favored by Abrams. The cooperation by these Arab leaders, in the face of widespread and deep hostility towards those policies among much of the Arab public, contributed immensely towards stripping away their legitimacy and driving them towards ever greater repression. The approach outlined so ably by Abrams isn't the solution to the problem of this "hollow Arab core." It is one of its causes. And the problem with Obama administration's regional diplomacy thus far has been that it has changed too little.. not too much.

Abrams attributes the diminished influence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the advancing age of those countries' respective rules, but Lynch correctly critiques this thesis as "oddly personalized."  Aside from that curious angle, Abrams misses the actual story, and it's an important, if inconvenient, one - and Lynch tells it quite well.  By virtue of Egypt and Saudi Arabia's relegation to the mere parroting of  unpopular US foreign policy dictates, those nations are incapable of showing any initiative, offering creative solutions or inspiring much confidence from other regional powers in terms of new policy directions.  Compared those moribund regimes with Turkey, which has taken on a more kinetic leadership role, as evidenced by both the brokering of peace talks between Israel and Syria (which had Iran's blessing), and the nuclear fuel deal with Iran (with an assist from Brazil).

The advancing age of a few individuals is not on its own a satisfying explanation for the declining influence of Arab leaders. States like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have lost influence not only because of their leaders' advancing age, but also because of the deep unpopularity of many of the policies they have been led to defend by the United States. A more vigorous Hosni Mubarak would not make Egypt's role in enforcing the blockade of Gaza more attractive to most Arabs. Abrams, who has long been a vocal advocate of democracy promotion in the Middle East, would likely agree that the stultifying repression in these countries has impeded the emergence of new leaders. But he, like many neoconservative advocates of democracy promotion, rarely addresses head on the reality that the policies pursued by these friendly autocrats in support of U.S. policy objectives contribute deeply to the unpopularity of those regimes. The Arab core has been hollowed out in large part because of, not in spite of, its role in American foreign policy.

The Bush administration sought to polarize the Middle East into an axis of "moderates" -- grouping Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and other like-minded Sunni autocrats with Israel -- against "radicals" such as Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. The Arab leaders on which the U.S. relied mostly went along, cooperating to a considerable degree in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and siding against Hezbollah in the 2006 Israeli war with Lebanon and against Hamas during the 2008 Israeli attack on Gaza. But Arab public opinion was largely on the other side, with broad majorities of the population in most of those Arab countries angrily denouncing both the Israeli wars and their own leaders for the positions they took in line with American preferences. To contain this popular anger and to continue to help American policies (such as Egypt's enforcing the blockade of Gaza), those Arab regimes became increasingly repressive. It is not an accident that after all the Bush administration's rhetoric about democracy promotion, it almost completely abandoned such efforts by early 2006 after the electoral victory by Hamas, and its legacy was a Middle East considerably less democratic than when it took office.

Ironically, or not, while fealty to our agenda has drained the prestige of our putative allies, opposition to our policies (and those of Israel) has led to increased popularity in the region for Iran and Hezbollah - who, rightly or wrongly, are seen as the only groups defending the Palestinians from Israeli oppression.  And don't even get me started with the canard of describing regimes like Saudi Arabia as "moderate."

It is also not an accident that the two most vital, energetic forces in the region today, Qatar and Turkey, are the two countries which have tried the hardest to break away from the Bush administration's polarized world view. Each attempted to play the role of a bridge across the regional divides, maintaining ties with both sides in order to depolarize regional politics. Both are close American allies with strong military ties and both have had good relations with Israel in the past. At the same time, both maintain good relations with actors in the so-called "radical" camp and have made major efforts to reach out to Arab public opinion rather than to try to silence or repress it. As relatively new actors on the scene, they have been palpably impatient with a moribund old order and unconcerned with finding a way to fit in with the entrenched, calcified lines of conflict in the region.

The failure of the Obama administration thus far is not that it has been insufficiently aggressive, a "fierce and certain ally [which] gives moderates strength and radicals pause." It is that it has not changed enough. It has too often remained locked in the Bush administration's framework of moderates and radicals, and has failed to truly take advantage of the opportunities offered by these energetic new "bridge" actors such as Turkey and Qatar. The growing Arab disenchantment with Obama is rooted in the widespread belief that American policies have not changed very much from the Bush years despite the improved rhetoric. [...]

...[F]or the most part, the Obama administration chose to fall back on the conventional policies of the past: Palestinian reconciliation remained in the hands of an enfeebled and partisan Egypt, the grand bargain with Iran faded from an agenda dominated by the nuclear question and sanctions, and the Turks are now seen as more of a problem than an asset. Breaking through some of these intractable problems will require not going back to the failed approach of the Bush administration, but rather rediscovering the genuine conceptual changes which Obama originally brought to the table.

Not only has the Iranian government's popularity in the region grown because of its independent policies, but the Iranian public does not blame the United States for propping up its regime, and thus has a more favorable view toward America than populations in neighboring countries, such as the Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose publics tend to blame America for the longevity of their respective regimes.  Quite an inverse dynamic.

Our Middle East posture could stand a complete overhaul, but as Lynch notes, Obama doesn't seem inclined to make a go at it.  In his defense, such an attempt would face a massive amount of resistance from various quarters.  But the path of less resistance isn't as easy a road as it might appear at first.  And there is definitely some room around the edges that he could nibble.

Comments

[Ugh]

but the Iranian public does not blame the United States for propping up what are, in the case of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, corrupt and brutal regimes.

You mean they don't blame us for propping up the Iranian regime, the way the public in SA and Egypt blame us for their regimes? Sounds like you're saying that the Iranian public doesn't blame the US for propping up the SA and Egypt regimes in that sentence, which doesn't seem right to me.

And also, what kind of "influence" are we talking about here? Influence in the region among governments, the various populations, with the US? It's not clear to me from the post.

[Eric Martin]

Alright, I may try to fix the syntax on that.

My son is teething, and sleep is not a part of my life right now.

[Eric Martin]

As for influence, I should have been more explicit, and will edit for those purposes as well.

But influence is multifaceted: influence in terms of popularity and opinion shaping, and influence in terms of taking leadership positions on important issues (see, ie, Turkey's brokering of Syrian/Israeli peace talks, Turkey's brokering of a nuke deal with Iran, etc).

By virtue of Egypt and Saudi Arabia's relegation to mere parroting of US foreign policy, they are incapable of showing any initiative, offering creative solutions or inspiring much confidence from other regional powers in terms of new policy directions.

[Ugh]

I know about teething so no worries (Ugh Jr's got his first 8 teeth but no molars yet, which we've heard can be awful).

And thanks for the note on influence.

[Eric Martin]

Yeah, little E-Money's first 3 teeth came in last month (two front teeth on the bottom, and a canine). Now his two front teeth are coming in, and his sleep patterns have been whacky.

[Eric Martin]

Alright, I think it reads better now (as in, actually makes a lick of sense)

[Turbulence]

Ironically, or not, while fealty to our agenda has drained the prestige of our putative allies

While I generally agree with this post, I think you should be a little more cautious on this point. The primary reason that Egyptians are angry with the Mubarak regime has nothing to do with us: they're angry because economic growth hasn't happened and because Mubarak is absurdly corrupt. They're also unhappy about broader events in the middle east, but none of that really compares to "my 35 year old son has to continue living with us because there are literally no apartments for him to move into" or "my son was rejected from medical school despite having top marks because I couldn't afford to pay a large enough bribe".

It is not always about us. Now, the fact that everyone knows Mubarak relies on US support to keep control of the country does cause negative feelings about the regime to translate directly into negative feelings about the US. But these are separate things. If the US told Egypt it could do whatever it wanted as long as it kept peace with Israel, Egyptians would still hate the regime and would still blame the US for propping it up because the economy would still be in the toilet and the regime would still be unspeakably corrupt.

[Eric Martin]

Agreed Turb. I meant that more in terms of regional prestige, and less in terms of popularity within their own countries.

The full quote mentions the regional frame of reference, but it wasn't exactly clear from my wording:

"Ironically, or not, while fealty to our agenda has drained the prestige of our putative allies, opposition to our policies (and those of Israel) have led to increased popularity in the region for Iran and Hezbollah - who, rightly or wrongly, are seen as the only groups defending the Palestinians from Israeli oppression. "

[Turbulence]

Ah, thanks for explaining Eric.

[Eric Martin]

Incidentally, I'll likely be talking Egyptian politics (amongst other topics) tonight with an Egyptian friend whose smart as a whip (The Century Foundation employs him at the moment). He writes on the subject occasionally, and is worth a brain picking, as it's not an area that I have paid to much attention to on my own.

[bobbyp]

Eric,

Your Egyptian friend should write a post.

Our biggest mistake was not doing the following immediately after 9/11:

1. Jailing Rudy Giuliani for incompetence.
2. Impeaching Bush.
3. Cutting all foreign aid to Egypt.
4. Cutting all foreign aid to Israel.
5. Invading Saudi Arabia.

To show my true spirit of compromise and accommodation, pick any three :))))

[Nell]

Our Middle East posture could stand a complete overhaul, but as Lynch notes, Obama doesn't seem inclined to make a go at it.

"Complete overhaul"? Hell, he's doing his best to imitate his dim bulb predecessor in every detail.

He's sticking Clapper in as DNI -- a guy who pushed the "Saddam sent his WMD to Syria" b.s. -- using a recess appointment.

[alphie]

"Hell, he's doing his best to imitate his dim bulb predecessor in every detail. "

Maybe Obama just doesn't give a rat's ass about the drama queens of the Middle East.

A proper position IMHO.

[Eric Martin]

Your Egyptian friend should write a post.

I made the case last night - at least, that he should write more and I'd link to it.

[El Cid]

Still, you have to appreciate all the incredible concern Elliot Abrams brought to democracy promotion in Central America, such as denouncing a New York Times reporter's work as anti-ally ideology which exaggerated out of gossip the El Mozote massacre, because, you know, the Salvadoran regime was young and vibrant, as were many of its victims.

I'm so glad that such types as Abrams still have an important role in our public policy debates.