As Many Times, Times the Timetables

by Eric Martin

Joe Klein reports on what is becoming an increasingly popular form of pre-emptive scapegoating for what will be the inevitable failure to achieve the more grandiose objectives in Afghanistan (via Michael Cohen): 

There are increasing grumblings about the timetable set by Obama, which would begin troop withdrawals in July 2011. "It's like fighting with both arms tied behind your back," a former senior military official told me.

See, also, John McCain and Congressional Republicans making a variation of the same argument. 

These arguments are wrong on so many levels that it's hard to know where to begin.

First, while Obama did set an 18 month timetable to begin withdrawing some troops in December 2009, the war began more than 8 years before Obama even made such a tacit commitment.  So if it is the timetable, and not the intractable nature of the conflict, that is hampering our efforts now, and for the next few months, what exactly was holding up progress during the intervening 8+ years?  Procrastination?

Which is a nice segue to one of the arguments underlying the "timetable ruined everything" thesis: the timetable will provide sustenance to the Taliban and other insurgent groups, while leading the Afghan people to side with those groups rather than the Karzai regime.

Again, though, this defies logic, chronology and causality.  For a considerable swath of the Afghan resistance, news of our imminent departure will not provide impetus to fight us, but, rather, the continued presence of a large, foreign occupying power is the very reason they are fighting in the first place.  For what David Kilcullen calls "accidental guerrillas," it is prolonged occupations, not announced future partial withdrawals, that provide the determinative incentive to fight.

As for the Taliban, they have been fighting us for almost 9 years, and would continue to fight us no matter how long we stay.  For them, it is a religious/ideological duty to fight, and it's not as if they were on the verge of throwing in the towel this past December, but since Obama announced an aspirational timetable, now they'll pick up their guns again.  Like the accidental guerrillas, they will fight us for as long as we occupy their country.  Full stop. 

Staying will not cause them, or the rest of the Afghan population, to become any more enamored with the remarkably corrupt Karzai government propped up by foreign eleements, and cobbled together from often-brutal and retrograde warlords (some of which the Taliban usurped to popular delight in the 1990s).

Along these lines, the Taliban, as well as the rest of the Afghan population, have, from the outset, understood quite well that the United States would not be staying forever (heck, I'm sure if you took bets early on, few would have guessed that we'd have lasted the 10+ years we're already slated for).  And there's a good reason for that: while the United States could conceivably remain in Afghanistan with its current occupying force structure for the next quarter century, the costs would be astronomical, vastly outweighing any potential benefits - with dogged obstinacy replacing reason, common sense and effective allocation of resources.  Or, in other words, the triumph of neoconservative foreign policy.

On the other hand, the Taliban and the assorted non-Taliban resistance groups live in Afghanistan (or just across the Durand Line), which is, to state a tautology, infinitely cheaper in terms of maintaining a presence within that country.  As the locals are fond of pointing out, quite correctly, "NATO has all the watches, but we have all the time."      

Ultimately, it's up to those that want to blame the timetable for the lack of progress in Afghanistan to do two things.  First, point to all the progress that was being made during the prior 8+ years that was somehow interrupted and turned back because of the timetable - progress that would be substantial enough to offer real promise for a positive outcome, within reasonable cost limits, and in the near future.  Next, in a related sense, explain what exactly we would be achieving now but for the announced timetable.

As if such a secondary phenomenon as a proposed timetable at this late stage in a protracted conflict were in any way responsible for the more crucial difficulties stemming from dealing with a complex matrix of fighting factions: from ideological/religious fighters and warlords, to "accidental guerrillas," tribal groupings and drug growers/smugglers.  Or the deep corruption and pervasive ineptitude of the Karzai regime (that has little to do with Karzai the person, and more to do with necessary alliances with self-interested warlords, and other demographic realities). 

Or perhaps the underlying ethnic/regional rifts/competitions (both within Afghanistan, and vis-a-vis neighboring countries like Pakistan), the lack of basic foundations on which to build advanced, Western-modeled institutions, geographical and logistical obstacles and myriad other far more essential impediments that have stymied our efforts, and will continue to do so for as long as we pretend that "we" are the ones driving events, with every utterance from the President a sea-changing moment.

Comments

[cleek]

i wouldn't get too excited about any deadlines that Obama talks about.

[Eric Martin]

cleek, this link you speak of, it does not seem to be working...

[cleek]

hmm...

try this one.

[Eric Martin]

Not sure this is analogous.

Upon taking office, Obama ratified the timeline in the previously agreed-to SOFA, signed by US and Iraqi government officials.

As of now, Obama has stuck to the SOFA timeline.

Not saying he will always remain so faithful to that agreement, but thus far he has.

[cleek]

it's analogous enough for me.

what he sayeth he does not doeth.

[Eric Martin]

Yeah, I suppose. But one was campaign fluff and the other was stuff said while he was Presidentin'.

I would have preferred a quicker timeline from Iraq, but honoring the SOFA is not the worst, and does follow protocol in terms of recognizing past agreements and abiding by them.

[Ugh]

From the speech at cleek's link, apparently it was one year ago that the Iraqi forces were able to "stand up."

Somehow I missed that.

Eric: When does SOFA have us out (other than the seemingly neverending "residual" force)?

[Eric Martin]

All out by 12/31/11.

The SOFA does not even account for the residue.

That would have to be negotiated separately.

By the end of this month, our "combat" forces must be out of Iraqi cities.

[Marty]

I suppose my reaction is that it is the unusual circumstance where everyone is saying the same thing (Afghanistan policy is bad and failing, and will fail) for whichever of the myriad of reasons that they pick. COIN was a waste, the timetable ensured we couldn't make military gains, Afghanistan has no reliable government, Pakistan isn't really going to help, etc.

The blame is Obama's, no matter which reason you choose. He has had two bites at the new strategy apple and did nothing right except cover his political flank with the deadline.

It is time to use the timeline to start reducing active operations, diddle around the capitol and Bagram until we can bring everyone home and declare victory domestically because he met a deadline. And quietly get everyone out of Iraq while we're doing that.

[Eric Martin]

The blame is Obama's, no matter which reason you choose. He has had two bites at the new strategy apple and did nothing right except cover his political flank with the deadline.

Well, if he sticks to the timeline, then he did something right with the timeline and it wasn't "covering his flank" as much as picking a decent policy - even if it only came after a wrong-headed escalation.

[Nate]

Reality doesn't matter, it's just more of the groundwork for the "We were winning until those liberals stabbed us in the back!" bullshit narrative, lifted directly from Vietnam. AGAIN.

[Eric Martin]

Agreed Nate. That's definitely a big part of it, as well as the COIN-danistas defensive maneuver to try to preserve their precious theories from the withering fire of reality.

[Hartmut]

The Right goes directly to 1918 these days bypassing Vietnam. At least the editorial cartoons that began to appear shortly after the Iraq invasion and never fully went away copied German motives with the donkey replacing the Sozi as the one with the dagger.
It's of course easier now that GIs wear "Fritz" helmets copied from the German Stahlhelm design.

[cleek]

it's just more of the groundwork for the "We were winning until those liberals stabbed us in the back!" bullshit narrative,

America cannot fail, it can only be failed.

subtitled: what a fool believes.

[Eric Martin]

Don't go gettin all doobie on me man...

[Ugh]

There are increasing grumblings about the timetable set by Obama, which would begin troop withdrawals in July 2011. "It's like fighting with both arms tied behind your back," a former senior military official told me.

And now this Rolling Stone article shows up. All very interesting (and by "interesting" I mean "we're so fncked.").

[Eric Martin]

There is definitely going to be big time military push back.

The question is, will Obama blink, and how will the establishment media treat his resolve or lack thereof, depending.

[Ugh]

There is definitely going to be big time military push back.

I still don't understand this mindset. Is it all about "winning" or, at least, "not losing"? I mean, WTF, can't someone at the Pentagon say "this is a dead loser, why not cut our losses and get out"?

[Eric Martin]

Ugh,

Too much reputation on the line. Too much history of infighting, etc. I'll touch on it all in a post today.

[Nate]

Ugh: How often does anyone in any organization argue for changes that would reduce their power, budget and influence?

Of course the military's never going to argue that we're done, or that we don't need all these fancy toys to blow things up, or any of the sort. At least not while it's all run by career generals who've come up to appreciate their positions.

[Ugh]

Nate: How often does anyone in any organization argue for changes that would reduce their power, budget and influence?

That's a fair point, but nobody is going to get killed because I demand that my department at my firm get to keep the spacious cushy corner offices when they're clearly not needed and costing the firm much money.

[Nate]

I never said power plays in bureaucracies had any sense of proportion to them. And the military is an extremely large bureaucracy.

[Kenneth Almquist]

"...what exactly was holding up progress during the intervening 8+ years? Procrastination?"

Well, yes. I agree with the larger point you are making here, but procrastination is exactly what happened. At least I don't think that Bush and the conservatives who supported him actually decided not to win the war in Afghanistan; they just never got around to trying. In 2002, the Taliban was offering almost no resistance. We could have done as many reconstruction projects as we were willing to pay for. In 2003, the Taliban began to regroup, but the Bush and his conservative supporters were more interested in Iraq than in addressing the problem.

By now, as you point out, "For a considerable swath of the Afghan resistance... the continued presence of a large, foreign occupying power is the very reason they are fighting in the first place." One of the challenges we faced when we invaded Afghanistan was to try to get things done before that happened. Obviously we missed that deadline. I don't know whether a different outcome was possible, but if the Bush Administration tried to meet the deadline, they certainly kept quiet about it.

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