It's that Same Old Riddle, Only Starting from the Middle

by Eric Martin

As I've been warning for some time, one of the reasons that our Afghan policy will not work is that Pakistan, which has the considerable advantages of geographic proximity, cultural affinity/knowledge, historical ties and what it perceives as vital strategic interests in Afghanistan, is working at cross-purposes:

Pakistan's main spy agency continues to arm and train the Taliban and is even represented on the group's leadership council despite U.S. pressure to sever ties and billions in aid to combat the militants, said a research report released Sunday.

The findings could heighten tension between the two countries and raise further questions about U.S. success in Afghanistansince Pakistani cooperation is seen as key to defeating the Taliban, which seized power in Kabul in the 1990s with Islamabad's support.

U.S. officials have suggested in the past that current or former members of Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, have maintained links to the Taliban despite the government's decision to denounce the group in 2001 under U.S. pressure.

But the report issued Sunday by the London School of Economics offered one of the strongest cases that assistance to the group is official ISI policy, and even extends to the highest levels of the Pakistani government.

"Pakistan's apparent involvement in a double-game of this scale could have major geopolitical implications and could even provoke U.S. countermeasures," said the report, which was based on interviews with Talibancommanders, former Taliban officials, Western diplomats and many others.

"Without a change in Pakistani behavior it will be difficult, if not impossible, for international forces and the Afghan government to make progress against the insurgency," said the report, written by Matt Waldman, a fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, spokesmanfor the Pakistani army, which controls ISI, rejected the report, calling it "rubbish."

"In the past, these kinds of baseless and unsubstantiated allegations have surfaced and we have rejected them," said Abbas.

He pointed out ISI has suffered many casualties fighting militants in the country.

But the Pakistan military's campaign has been focused on Pakistani Taliban battling the state, not Afghan Taliban waging war against NATO troops in Afghanistan. The army has resisted U.S. pressure to wage offensives in areas of the country the Afghan Taliban use as sanctuaries, despite billions of dollars in American military and civilian aid.

Many analysts believe Pakistan is reluctant to turn against the Afghan Taliban because the government believes the group could be a key ally in Afghanistan after NATO forces withdraw, and the best partner for countering the influence of archenemy India in the country.

[The report can be found here, ht ajay]

Recognizing this, when the Obama administration was throwing in its lot with the COIN-danistas at CNAS, it was raising alarm bells for me.  For one, COIN-danistas themselves all claim that COIN is extremely expensive, time consuming, troop intensive and, even after chewing through all of those resources over the course of a couple of decades, as one of COIN's notable advocates puts it, "you merely set the conditions for political success." 

That's an enormous commitment of resources for the opportunity to roll the dice at some later date - and as the staggering levels of violence still occurring in Iraq after the supposedly successful Surge confirms, "setting the conditions" does not translate into actual political success quite frequently.  Speaking of which, according to the just released Global Peace Index report, Iraq is the most violent, least peaceful country in the world - edging out both Somalia and Afghanistan.

The CNAS report that appeared so alluring to the Obama team when it was crafting its Afghan policy made no secret of the costs, timetable and scope associated with the operation, as well as the dubious odds for success.  In addition, that report contained one enormous caveat: unless the US could compel Pakistan's cooperation in, not only ceasing active support for the Afghan Taliban, but in eradicating that group's safehavens in Pakistan as well, the mission would fail. 

Given that it was fairly obvious that Pakistan would be unlikely to withhold all aid to the Afghan Taliban, let alone wipe out their sanctuaries in Pakistan, the CNAS plan seemed like a non-starter, destined to fail by its own criteria.  And yet it is unclear whether the Obama team came to the same conclusion.

Comments

[Ugh]

Speaking of which, according to the just released Global Peace Index report, Iraq is the most violent, least peaceful country in the world - edging out both Somalia and Afghanistan.

Success!

I wonder what will last longer, NATO/US troops in Afghanistan, or Pakistanis living in Pakistan. I guess the US troops in Germany, Japan, Italy are all ongoing experiments with no firm conclusion yet.

[Julian]

I hope the recent discovery of a trillion dollars of resources in Afghanistan will help it (re?)claim that coveted top spot.

While this discovery might be good or great for the economic prospects of Agfhanistan, I think it also means that we will never leave.

[Eric Martin]

I'm not sure it's a recent "discovery" as the information was reported in 2007, and was largely known by the Soviets when they were in charge back in the day.

I think the recent "revelation" is strategically timed to prop up sagging public support.

[Ugh]

I think the recent "revelation" is strategically timed to prop up sagging public support.

Ding ding ding! See Ambinder.

[Julian]

I certainly concluded the same thing about the timing, Eric, but I didn't know this was such old news. Have we started handing out no-bid mining contracts on these things yet, though?

[Eric Martin]

Not yet. Those will be the decisions of the "free" and "liberated" Afghan people.

See, ie, Iraq.

[cleek]

democracy, whiskey, lithum hydride!

[ajay]

The report itself is here:
http://www.crisisstates.com/Publications/dp/dp18.htm

(you might want to link to it in the post, EM)

[Eric Martin]

done. thanks ajay

[Jacob Davies]

The paragraph that struck me the most from the NYT minerals story (which I agree is a fairly pathetic press release posing as news) was this:

"At the same time, American officials fear resource-hungry China will try to dominate the development of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, which could upset the United States, given its heavy investment in the region. After winning the bid for its Aynak copper mine in Logar Province, China clearly wants more, American officials said."

The United States has made a "heavy investment" in the region which can be used to justify claims of rights to develop mineral resources? That's funny, because I thought NATO was in Afghanistan to punish the Taliban for harboring bin Laden and to help the Afghan people resist them. But now it turns out we're "investing" in rights to exploit mineral resources for US companies. Who could have predicted this strange turn of events!

And yes, who could have predicted that Pakistan would continue to side with the Taliban just because they are longstanding best buddies with the Taliban and are cognizant of the fact that they - unlike us - will be living next door to Afghanistan until the end of time.

[Hartmut]

With all the lithium the Taliban are of course just one tiny wee little step away from acquiring thermonuclear weapons and would hand them to Osama* before the paint is dry who in turn would blow up Colorado Springs on Good Friday next year. That's not an option.

*and Iran of course. What do you mean, they hate each other? They are all stinking Moose-slims and therefore all in cahoots.

[Eric Martin]

Hartmut, I believe the term is "jihadists."

[Hartmut]

Just paving the way for Sister Sarah to make a moose/muslim joke about knowing from experience that both are shot best from helicopters.

[Hartmut]

Not to forget Ben Ito Muslimi.

[wj]

Let's see
- the US departs Afghanistan
- the Chinese, after raw materials, move in
- the Taliban, et al., start fighting the Chinese (godless communists must be at least as bad as the US, after all)
- the Chinese, being less inhibited that we are, hit back. Hard.
- the Pakistani ISI helps the Taliban
- the Chinese, figuring that resources are more important than history, take exception

And we end up with a rapprochement between China and India. This is a bad thing???

[Nell]

The CNAS report that appeared so alluring to the Obama team when it was crafting its Afghan policy made no secret of the costs, timetable and scope associated with the operation, as well as the dubious odds for success. In addition, that report contained one enormous caveat: unless the US could compel Pakistan's cooperation in, not only ceasing active support for the Afghan Taliban, but in eradicating that group's safehavens in Pakistan as well, the mission would fail.

Given that it was fairly obvious that Pakistan would be unlikely to withhold all aid to the Afghan Taliban, let alone wipe out their sanctuaries in Pakistan, the CNAS plan seemed like a non-starter, destined to fail by its own criteria. And yet it is unclear whether the Obama team came to the same conclusion.

The Obama team was in great need of a plan that would simply kill time with endless U.S. deployments while appearing on the surface to be a "plan". So as not to upset the Pentagon powers-that-be (and the big big slice of the U.S. electorate sensitive to any sign of "weakness") with any actual change.

CNAS met that need from early on.

No other advice needed, wanted, or sought out even for appearance's sake. This crowd, like so many others in their position, thinks they know everything worth knowing.

[Ugh]

So as not to upset the Pentagon powers-that-be

What is it that the Pentagon powers-that-be wanted with an extended occupation of Afghanistan? What do/did they get out of it? Serious questions.

[Eric Martin]

(godless communists must be at least as bad as the US, after all)

Yeah, see the USSR's occupation and the birth of the Taliban (at least, when its core got fighting experience).

What is it that the Pentagon powers-that-be wanted with an extended occupation of Afghanistan? What do/did they get out of it? Serious questions.

More money, justified budgets, more lucre for arms makers who are future employers, a testing ground to hone skills, a way to feel relevant.

Bottom line: the Pentagon as an institution likes to be engaged in something, somewhere. The more the merrier, as long as it doesn't break the back of the military.

[Jacob Davies]

Ugh: What is it that the Pentagon powers-that-be ... get out of it?

Ask any 8 year old boy in the middle of playing with his toy soldiers if he wants to pack them away so he can come to the table and eat his vegetables.

Then there's the ongoing ability to channel money to particular contractors in exchange for hiring you after you quit your government job.

But I think it's mostly about the toy soldiers.

[Ugh]

Eric: Bottom line: the Pentagon as an institution likes to be engaged in something, somewhere. The more the merrier, as long as it doesn't break the back of the military.

Well, what would do the latter, where they got to the point that they couldn't get people to join the military anymore? And they didn't seem to be engaged in much (hot war, at least) post-Vietnam and pre-Iraq War I. I guess the USSR gave the excuse to keep upping the budget, and pre-9/11 they were itching for China as a replacement (and to which they are now returning, it seems).

It's all very depressing, but it just seems that specifically pressing to keep up the Afghanistan, uh, thing, with the Obama administration was not necessarily critical to keep the money flowing, what with Iraq going on, Iran, AL QAEDA (BOO!), etc.

And I would note that all your stated reasons seem to consider the cost in soldiers lives secondary in the eyes of the brass (not yours, of course).

[Uncle Kvetch]

Generals and majors always seem so unhappy unless they got a war.