by Eric Martin
A recently leaked memo from Defense Secretary Gates has caused a bit of a stir in foreign policy circles due to the arguable "bombshell" lurking in the lede:
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has warned in a secret three-page memorandum to top White House officials that the United States does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability, according to government officials familiar with the document.
The usual suspects have glommed on to Gates' admission as to the dearth of effective long term policies for derailing Iran's nuclear program in order to blame the Obama administration's approach for that state of affairs (Gates, who was also Defense Secretary in the Bush administration, would be the one in charge of drawing up the military's version of such plans).
But there's a better, more fundamental reason why there is no effective, long-range policy at the ready: because there isn't one that exists (at least, not one that is within the range of what is deemed politically acceptable in Washington). If there was an easy option, or even a feasible one, after all, why wouldn't Obama's predecessor have availed himself of it during his full 8 year tenure?
Nevermind the facts, though, there's political hay to be made. So Obama's critics on the right go about either re-writing, or writing off, recent history in order to attempt to distinguish Obama's approach from Bush's, and then blame the former for the current predicament even though there is far more similarity and continuity than difference.
The results are clear, if damning, for Bush/Cheney: the administration's policies vis-a-vis Iran did nothing to significantly slow the progress of its nuclear program. In addition to fighting a massively counterproductive war that greatly enhanced Iran's stature in the region by eliminating its main regional foe, Saddam's Baath regime, while tying down U.S. military assets in a vulnerable position, the Bush team combined bluster, lack of engagement and ineffectual sanctions to achieve nothing.
Obama has begun to slowly unwind that war (while escalating another to Iran's West east), toned down the bluster a bit (though not entirely), dabbled in engagement (but not in any meaningful sense) and is currently chasing his own version of not-quite-crippling sanctions. The results will likely match the Bush team's output.
Both administrations seem to recognize the futility of military options, even if some elements within and without each enclave remain willfully blind. In the Times story cited above, there's this tidbit from top brass that the hawks aren't quite as focused on:
Separately, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote a “chairman’s guidance” to his staff in December conveying a sense of urgency about contingency planning. He cautioned that a military attack would have “limited results,” but he did not convey any warnings about policy shortcomings. [emphasis added]
Despite these warnings, and others, many of those making the most noise about the Obama administration's "failure" are doing so as a means of framing the inevitability and necessity of military strikes. However, those attacks could and likely would lead to a massive escalation that the U.S. is ill-advised to engage at any time - let alone now with two massive commitments and other vulnerabilities. Not that logistical constaints, the counsel of military brass and other reality based concerns have ever been an impediment to the warmongering class.
At the very least, the pro-war set, and the GOP in general, will whistle past the Bush administration's lack of results and blame Obama's emphasis on "engagement" and pursuit of "diplomacy" in order to discredit non-bellicose means, and weaken a political opponent. However, Obama never really undertook a comprehensive and earnest attempt to "engage" the Iranian regime, address and account for its vital interests and take the necessary steps to begin to explore a way to forge a workable modus vivendi that would do much to obviate Iran's desire to obtain the deterrent effect of near-nuclear weapons capacity (or at least reduce anxiety if it eventually did regardless).
Unfortunately, "diplomacy" has been used as a means of encircling Iran in its defensive crouch, rather than attempting to coax it out of that position. As Daniel Larison points out in the context of Obama's sanctions shopping and the futility thereof:
This has always been the problem behind Obama’s “engagement” policy, which has had precious little to do with actually engaging Iran in a sustained way. Obama wanted to change the means the U.S. used to pursue the same unreachable end, namely the elimination or severe limitation of Iran’s nuclear program. What the administration and its hawkish critics have been unable to see is that it is the end, not the means, that needs to be changed. Acknowledging this would force Iran hawks to admit that pretty much everything they have said about Iran policy has been wrong.
And in a prior post:
This is why the administration should never have gone down the path of pursuing new sanctions: the administration has committed itself to a policy mechanism that will not yield the results it wants. There is no sanctions regime short of embargoes that would be seen as acts of war that could conceivably compel Iran to act as Washington wishes, and an embargo could easily lead to war anyway. The pursuit of sanctions will not only open the door to a hawkish Republican political challenge, which is forthcoming no matter what Obama does, but which will also contribute to the constant pressure for escalation against Iran regardless of who occupies the Oval Office after Obama’s first term ends. We have heard it all before: sanctions have been tried and they failed, and now we have no choice but to attack to prevent a “growing and gathering” threat, etc.
Of course, there is always the choice of accepting what cannot be prevented, but the administration is horrifed by the thought of being the ones in charge when Iran acquires a nuclear weapon (even though Iran is probably far away from acquiring one) and fears the political attacks that will follow if it “fails” to prevent the inevitable. All of these troubles stem from the original mistake of making the elimination or severe limitation of Iran’s nuclear program the objective of U.S. Iran policy, and instead of correcting this error upon entering office Obama redoubled our pursuit of this objective. It may be that the administration is now recognizing the degree of international indifference to the Iranian “threat” and coming to understand the impracticality and risks of imposing “crippling” sanctions. Now that it has come this far, it has trapped itself in a position in which it will not compel any change in Iranian behavior, and it will be mocked at home for its “weak appeasement” while simultaneously destroying whatever chance there was of some sustained engagement.
So round and round they go, the generals and civilian leaders in their labyrinths looking for answers in vain, and bleeding political capital for being unable to find the chimera that they pretended was there in the first place.
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