I'm Mook-E and I'm Back from the Dead

by Eric Martin

I'm not exactly sure why I took it upon myself to refute the periodic, triumphant claims that perpetual thorn-in-the-side-of-the-occupation Moqtada al-Sadr and his political movement were finished, and yet it became my sisyphisian chore - one that I've been busy with for the better part of 5 years (those would be 5 years of cyclical death and resurrection that would make a phoenix blush).  

Part of my preoccupation with knocking down this omnipresent meme stems from an aversion to the insidious interplay of propaganda and policymaking based on belief of that same propaganda.  Sadr represents a major obstacle to a prolonged U.S. presence (his movement strongly opposes it), and so proponents of maintaining that same presence repeatedly insist on his demise and irrelevance so as to magically sweep aside a major impediment.  However, such wishes do not actually mold reality.

This is from the March 2008 Edition:

According to Dan Senor, Moqtada al-Sadr is dead...again. Rumors of Moqtada al-Sadr's political demise seem to crop up every couple of months in certain circles (some recent examples were documented on this site here and here). Senor himself suggested after the Sadrist uprising in Najaf in 2004 that Sadr and his Mahdi militia had been neutralized and contained. But this time, Senor assures the reader, Sadr is really done for. Maybe. Sort of?

A mere one month later:

Sigh. You knew it was about that time didn't you? Rich Lowry becomes the latest volunteer to fill the monthly quota of "Moqtada al-Sadr is dead" proclamations (a recurring phenomenon of remarkable perseverence despite its unbroken streak of being...well, wrong each time). As I have warned, the danger in this fantastical thinking is that policy makers will eventually believe their own hype, and then proceed to underestimate Sadr which results in a string of tactical defeats. Sun Tzu 101 is baffling esoterica to them.

This legacy came to mind when I read this piece by Anthony Shadid in yesterday's New York Times:

The followers of Moktada al-Sadr, a radical cleric who led the Shiite insurgency against the American occupation, have emerged as Iraq’s equivalent of Lazarus in elections last week, defying ritual predictions of their demise and now threatening to realign the nation’s balance of power.

Their apparent success in the March 7 vote for Parliament — perhaps second only to the followers of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki as the largest Shiite bloc — underscores a striking trend in Iraqi politics: a collapse in support for many former exiles who collaborated with the United States after the 2003 invasion. [...]

The outcome completes a striking arc of a populist movement that inherited the mantle of a slain ayatollah, then forged a martial culture in its fight with the American military in 2004.

After years of defeats, fragmentation and doubt even by its own clerics about its prospects in this election, the movement has embraced the political process, while remaining steadfast in opposition to any ties with the United States. It was never going to be easy to form a new postelection government — and the Sadrists’ unpredictability, along with a new confidence, may now make it that much harder.

“As our representation in Parliament increases, so will our power,” said Asma al-Musawi, a Sadrist lawmaker. “We will soon play the role that we have been given.” [...]

The results of the election are not yet conclusive, and under a complicated formula to allot seats, the percentage of the vote will not necessarily reflect actual numbers in the 325-member Parliament.

But opponents and allies alike believe the Sadrists may win more than 40 seats. In all likelihood, that would make them the clear majority in the Iraqi National Alliance, a predominantly Shiite coalition and the leading rival of Mr. Maliki. If the numbers are borne out, the Sadrists could wield a bloc roughly the same size as the Kurds, who have served as kingmakers in governing coalitions since 2005.

In Baghdad alone, whose vote is decisive in the election, Sadrist candidates, many of them political unknowns, were 6 of the top 12 vote-getters.

“They cannot be dismissed,” a Western official said on the condition of anonymity, under the usual diplomatic protocol.

Disregarding the Sadrists has proved a motif of post-invasion Iraq. In the chaotic months of 2003, American officials habitually ridiculed Mr. Sadr as an upstart and outlaw, oblivious as they were to the mandate he had assumed from his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, whose portrait still hangs in the offices, homes and workshops of followers. The ayatollah was assassinated in 1999.

That enmity erupted in fighting twice in Baghdad and Najaf in 2004. Four years later, the movement, blamed for some of the war’s worst sectarian carnage, was vanquished by the Iraqi military, with decisive American help, only to rise again in provincial elections last year. Many politicians now see it as part of the political mainstream, albeit one with a canny sense of the street and a knack for fashioning itself in the opposition.

It is the popularity of political movements such as the Sadrist Trend, as well as the clout of religious leaders like Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, that make talk about the U.S. unilaterally deciding to keep troops in Iraq beyond the withdrawal timeline set forth in the SOFA so misguided.

These decisions are not ours alone to make.  We can no longer simply dictate terms - to the extent we ever could.

A large segment of Iraq's population wants us out of Iraq ASAP, and other factions will only tolerate our presence based on strict guidelines and parameters.  We can't just pretend these Iraqis don't exist and that they don't have a vote, even if we voice an oft-repeated mantra about the death of their movement and their leaders.

Again.

Comments

[bobbyp]

“The sun rises in the east,” a Western official said on the condition of anonymity, under the usual diplomatic protocol.

via IOZ

[Ugh]

These decisions are not ours alone to make. We can no longer simply dictate terms - to the extent we ever could.

A large segment of Iraq's population wants us out of Iraq ASAP, and other factions will only tolerate our presence based on strict guidelines and parameters. We can't just pretend these Iraqis don't exist and that they don't have a vote

Uh, yes we can, don't you think?

[Eric Martin]

Well, we can pretend, but reality won't be kind to us.

[cleek]

i'd say we can keep pretending for another decade or so.

what are they gonna do, start shooting at us ?

[Eric Martin]

Heck, we tried to "pretend" that we could appoint Chalabi Pres of the New Iraq. That didn't go over too well with the Iraqi people (Shiites and Kurds who were our "allies" while the Sunnis were largely fighting us).

Then we tried to delay elections until after an extended period of Paul Bremer "Viceroyship" to which, Sistani responded with a "beard full of hell no" to quote my friend Swopa.

Sistani demanded elections, and how those elections would be held, and we obeyed.

If we crossed Sistani, game over. He knew it, knows it now and so did we and do we.

[Ugh]

Well, we can pretend, but reality won't be kind to us.

It will be less kind to us, but I think I agree with cleek, we can pretend for at least another 10 years, if not 20, if not indefinitely. In fact that is the likely course, IMHO. If domestic politics will allow us to get out, we likely will, if they don't, we won't, Iraqi opinion will generally be irrelevant except to the extent it exerts any kind of pressure on domestic politics.

Actually, that's probably true of all things in US foreign policy, now that I think about it.

[Eric Martin]

Iraqi opinion will generally be irrelevant except to the extent it exerts any kind of pressure on domestic politics.

Well, yeah. But the point is, Iraqi "opinion" is often expressed in ways that affect domestic politics. See, ie, the insurgencies and the effects on the popularity of the war.

If we cross Sistani, and the Shiites start fighting us (again at least for JAM), that would create a lot of pressure.

[cleek]

If we cross Sistani, and the Shiites start fighting us (again at least for JAM), that would create a lot of pressure.

just going over some of the talking points we've already seen:

they fight us because they hate democracy.

if they fight, it means our job isn't done.

we will leave when things are stable.

these factions are fighting for control of the country and we can't leave them in the middle of a civil war.

the fighters are linked to al-Q.

etc..

no, i think we'll leave as soon as the American hawks decide they've had enough. and not a second before that.

(though i'd love to be proved wrong!)

[Eric Martin]

just going over some of the talking points we've already seen

Yeah, and piss-all that did in terms of shoring up domestic support for the war/occupation. Americans want out. They are tolerating the current denouement because there is only low level anti-US violence. If US soldiers start dying by a count of a couple a day again, and costs start soaring through the roof again, there will be a lot of domestic pressure to get out - pronto. Hawks be damned.

Same reason we haven't attacked Iran yet despite the fact that the Hawks are clamoring for it: there are actual limitations on our armed forces and domestic will - and those limitations matter.

i think we'll leave as soon as the American hawks decide they've had enough.

But the SOFA was most definitely NOT what the hawks wanted - and they yelped and hollered, but there was little they could do. Ditto the current timeline for withdrawing the first 50,000 troops. Reports are that withdrawal is on sked, but the hawks are yelping again (everyone from Tom Ricks to the Weekly Standard - yet no change).

[cleek]

Reports are that withdrawal is on sked,

i hear that too. and every time i hear it, it's with the qualifier "barring any new outbreaks of violence." i think that bar is probably pretty low.

and even if the current withdrawal goes through, it's still a partial withdrawal. even if we only have 45,000 troops there, we're still there in a big way.

i'll believe we're out as soon as we're out. frankly, i'll be (pleasantly) surprised if that happens in the next decade.

no, i've never won an award for optimism. :)

[Eric Martin]

and even if the current withdrawal goes through, it's still a partial withdrawal

According to the schedule set forth in the SOFA. It would be highly irregular if we pulled out more troops faster than that. Even the wildest "optimist" would not expect that.

The remainder of the troops are to be pulled out at a later date, as per the SOFA.

What I expect is about 5-10K troops thereafter under a new agreement. But only if the Iraqis want us there - which they just might as trainers/advisors (it will be our military equipment after all).