Shoot First, Beg Questions Later

by Eric Martin

Bernard Finel argues against knee-jerk resort to the use of military force in places like Yemen - or rather, argues that the full implications of such involvement should be subject to a more rigorous strategic analysis before the bullets fly.  Finel points out that military involvement creates reinforcing loops of circular reasoning that tend to deepen the level of commitment and partnership beyond the extent originally intended.  When the ties being bolstered are with unsavory regimes and other elements, the alliance can be more trouble than it's worth.  Further, when getting involved in such a manner makes you a player in a complex, often inscrutable web of local conflicts and combatants, you usually end up a loser because you can't win someone else's civil war.  

I would love to know how the discussions about Yemen strategy have developed inside the administration because this deepening involvement is a prime example of the challenge I have tried to highlight.  There are al Qaeda operatives working in Yemen.  Killing them may, in the short-run, disrupt their operations.  That is a worthwhile goal. 

But what are the long-term consequences of a deepening U.S. involvement?

This is not a trivial question.  Once you begin to use force — with or without the consent of a local government — you become deeply embedded into the security environment in that country.  From there it becomes logical to further deepen the involvement over time.  Recall the argument over Afghanistan policy.  Many proponents of escalation argued (paraphrasing): “Well, maybe it wasn’t a good idea to get so deeply involved, but we are there now and how to deal with things as they are, not as we would wish them to be.”

In Yemen, our use of force now is creating the antecedent conditions that will later on justify more and deeper intervention, in part because by allying ourselves with the Saleh government we both make all of his enemies our enemies and we are also extending a tacit offer of protection because at some point, someone will argue, “we have to back Saleh, otherwise other Muslim leaders won’t be willing to side with us.”

But if we step back and think about end states — i.e. begin a process of strategic assessment — isn’t it obvious that the goal for the United States ought to be disentangle itself from politics in a place like Yemen and seek to insulate ourselves from disorder that may arise there?  There is no coherent U.S. interest in support of mediating the various internecine disputes on the Arabian peninsula, is there?

As a consequence, this deepening involvement, even though it satisfies a visceral urge to whack some bad guys does not necessarily contribute to any long-term desire national security goal.  Which isn’t to say that in striking al Qaeda operatives we are not gaining some measure of security in the short-term. 

But without a sound strategic framework in place, how can we weigh the long-term costs against the short-term benefits?

In the parlance of our times, I believe that is referred to as "dithering."  Or perhaps the evergreen, "appeasement."  Either way, Very Serious people shoot first, questions be damned.

Comments

[Bryan Emrys]

Very serious people shoot first, then immediately walk away.

[Eric Martin]

Very serious people shoot first, then immediately walk away.

Hmmm, walking away is cutting and running. The Seriouser (sic) policy is to stay indefinitely.

[Fraud Guy]

Is it because we do not have a long term strategic vision, but a short to medium term political one?

[joel hanes]

Once you begin to use force — with or without the consent of a local government — you become deeply embedded into the security environment in that country. From there it becomes logical to further deepen the involvement over time.

The tarbaby problem.

At the beginning of JFK's administration, the US officially had only 600 "advisors" in Viet Nam.