This One's Optimistic

by Eric Martin

In the aftermath of Obama's big speech on Afghanistan, Judah Grunstein observed that the prospective plan as enunciated had something for everyone - as well as the potential to disappoint all listeners.  That was my immediate take as well - not that it was a unique or particularly insightful observation.  This push/pull was probably not unintentional, either, as Secretary of State Clinton was ready with the same message for the media later in the day.

In focusing on the parts of the plan that appeal to me - and acknowledging, even then, the contingent nature of those aspects - my basic summation is: it could have been worse.  That is to say that if Obama is serious about the 2011 date to begin withdrawal (or if he finds himself boxed into a political/logistical corner regardless), then his Afghanistan plan is at least tolerable when compared to the alternatives.

Allow me to clarify. 

My biggest fears have centered around the possibility that Obama would heed the advice of the new counterinsurgency (COIN) gurus that were either in place already (Petraeus) or promoted, en masse, from CNAS (and other DC/defense environs) to key positions in the White House/Pentagon/Foggy Bottom, etc.   

According to CNAS's analysis, "success" in Afghanistan entails, amongst other exceedingly difficult objectives:  creating a stable Afghanistan governed by a legitimate, representative government, eradicating all Pakistani safe-havens, wiping out the poppy crop and stabilizing the region generally speaking.  And that's for starters. 

Even the proponents (who have every incentive to lowball estimates) predict that, if all goes well, the task will take an additional 5-10 years (or more), require tens of thousands of additional troops and will ring up a price tag that will end up in the trillions.  Not only are the objectives unrealistic and the strategic necessity dubious, but pursuing this course would be crushingly expensive and demand an outsized share of America's other resources at a time when there are so many other pressing needs. 

However, Obama seemed to create a good amount of space between his path forward and that recommended by either the CNAS/COIN manual or neocon/liberal hawk delusions.  As Glenn Greenwald points out, Obama's speech sought to scale back unrealistic goals and propagandistic embellishment, signaling the lack of an open-ended commitment and, in connection therewith, a willingness to seek more realistic solutions that would facilitate an exit beginning circa 2011.

[Obama] explicitly rejected a mission of broad nation-building "because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests"; he said he "refuse[d] to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests"; and even vowed to incorporate the convertible factions of the Taliban into the government. 

And that is the key.  If Obama is serious about the 2011 date, and serious about abandoning the fanciful notions of reorganizing Afghanistan's entire political life and quarter century commitments, then his plan is a decent enough alternative (I would prefer an accelerated timeline, of course, but I'm not in charge).  As mentioned in a recent post with respect to my fears that Obama was leaning toward the COIN camp:

Since at least last March of this year, I've been holding out hope that Obama was ultimately gearing up for one last military push in Afghanistan to try to better our leverage/negotiating position ahead of an attempt to disentangle ourselves militarily from the web of conflicts in that region. 

Even under my ideal version of events, due to logistical constraints, withdrawal would take months to set in motion anyway. So 18 months (July 2011) doesn't seem like too long a period during which to make that final push - even if it ends up being ill-fated and wasteful (or I could be wrong and it might have some significant, lasting beneficial effect). 

However, the push won't come without costs.  In addition to delaying the commencement of withdrawal (which would begin the savings), the surge of troops will come with a hefty price tag.  Travis Sharp has the details:

Adding 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will cost $30 billion during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010...

This $30 billion comes in addition to the previously requested FY 2010 defense budget of $68 billion for Afghanistan...

In 2010 alone, U.S. military spending on Afghanistan will equal nearly one-half of total spending on the war since 2001...

In 2010, the troop increase in Afghanistan will cost each individual American taxpayer $195 dollars. (IRS)

In 2010, the troop increase in Afghanistan will cost $2.5 billion per month, $82 million per day, $3.4 million per hour, $57,000 per minute, and $951 per second...

In 2010, the United States will spend more on Afghanistan than every other country in the world spends on defense individually, with the exception of China. Of course, total U.S. defense spending in 2010, at over $700 billion, will be roughly five times greater than China’s total military budget.

And that doesn't even count the loss of human life that our stepped up military operations will lead to.

Then, of course, there's the very real fear that Obama will not stick to his timeline - out of his own designs, or fear of crossing the potent defense establishment that never quite finds the right conditions for withdrawal.  Speaking of which, there are some disturbing initial wisps of smoke about Obama delaying the SOFA withdrawal dates for Iraq at the request of Odierno and other military leaders on the ground.  Odierno's recalcitrance should surprise no one.

Nor should an Afghan version of military foot dragging come as a shock when it eventually, inevitably materializes.  In fact, as Michael Crowley points out, there is already plenty of early caveating and jockeying with respect to the fluidity of the 2011 date.

However, just as there will be institutional pushback on the 2011 date, so too will there be pressure for withdrawal from certain sectors.  For one, our European allies are unlikely to keep up commitments past that date.  At the very least, the political leaders involved will pay a higher price to do so, and will likely try to make 2011 less tentative.  

In turn, it will be up to American voters and Democratic lawmakers to tie Obama to his own timeline to the greatest extent possible.  Take him at his word, and treat his speech like he meant it.

Comments

[Point]

(to repeat myself from a previous thread)

ISTM that, with the debate splitting between those who don't think escalation (or the war) worth it, and those who think that even an indefinite stay is worth the cost, the strategic value of timetables was eerily forgotten.

From the speech:

"Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort -- one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan."

[Eric Martin]

Yeah, as long as he means it, I can live with this.

[Mike]

I don't for a moment think it's the case, but it would be remarkable if Obama really were using the 30,000 troops as a Trojan Horse to get a real withdrawal starting in 18 months past the "Praetorian Guard" of COIN-General-Gods who are in a position to sink his presidency with just a few more leaks (at which they'll shake their heads and regret in hushed tones) and innocent Q&A sessions.

[Eric Martin]

Well, I think their resistance played into his decision. So he figures he's got to ante up either way, and if it doesn't work out, those COINdanistas will have less credibility to ask for more in 18 months.

[Mike]

Perhaps, and hope for a better hand because right now he's holding no cards what with having campaigned on resourcing the fight and having what I suspect is no viable alternative in which he had enough confidence to present to us in a way that would neutralize the strong hand of the generals.

To be clear, I don't think this is the case. I think he's all in for all intents and purposes, intends to use all available forces coming out of Iraq in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, and intends this withdrawal only in terms of a slow de-surging of the surged troops, leaving the corpus of our current presence there for the duration of his presidency. But I would be pleasantly surprised if he really started to draw down below current levels in his (sic) second term.

[mutt]

Ah, well. Maybe Ive attended too many military funerals to see any good in this. the goals set can not be met. Period.
We WILL leave, period.
Every Afghan & US kid killed during this ....plan? Am I supposed to call it a plan?- is gratuitous. To "save face" or to protect Dim poll numbers, or to assure the flow of war profiteer "campaign contributions".
This is sickening.

[wonkie]

I have sort of the same reaction as you. He's the new PResident, the war is his rewsposbity now and it looks to me like he tried to come up with something that mighht work with the idea that we're outa there if it doesn't. WHich seems to me to be about as responsiblie a way to deal with someone else's mess as is possible.

[Mike]

PResident. Whether intentional or not, brilliant.

[DBake]

But we've been winning for over 8 years now, and here he wants to limit us to only another 18 months of victory. A real president would let us keep winning this war forever.

[Jacob Davies]

I certainly hope it works, and I don't (and never did) rate the chance of it doing so as zero. I'm in the UK visiting my family this week and the news is all about Afghanistan. I can hardly say I claim to speak for a whole nation (especially one I have spent only 5 weeks in over the last 11 years), but I do think that there is a different narrative of the post-9/11 period here in which the American failure to commit enough troops to Afghanistan represents a gigantic betrayal of NATO allies. Essentially, the US was attacked, asked for help in Afghanistan, and was willingly granted that help by its allies. But instead of really taking on the Afghanistan problem, it went off to Iraq.

For the UK, since it followed on with Iraq, the problem is a little different. But for Germany and France and other allies that did not want to invade Iraq, there is a completely accurate interpretation of their commitment to help in Afghanistan: every German or French soldier in Afghanistan freed up one American to go fight in a war of choice in Iraq. Or the other way around: every American in Iraq is one who could have been in Afghanistan instead of a soldier from a NATO ally. And people wonder why many NATO allies were upset about Iraq!

In that light there is a way in which the US recommitment to Afghanistan may repair some of the damage done to NATO. No NATO ally wants to stay in Afghanistan forever, but they certainly don't want to be left holding the bag when the US goes all ADHD on the conflict. I argued for a withdrawal strategy, and I am not convinced that 30,000 or 40,000 or 100,000 more US troops will be enough to accomplish the desired goals in Afghanistan. But more troops may be better than the status quo ante. (That's not an argument I made before this, although I thought about it. Maybe I should have, but I thought that side had plenty of advocates already and that it would confuse things to say "We need a lot fewer troops in Afghanistan! Or a lot more!")

[rea]

This $30 billion comes in addition to the previously requested FY 2010 defense budget of $68 billion for Afghanistan...

The total being roughly 10 times the annual GDP of Afghanistan. You'd think there would be some way to use all that money to resolve this without killing people.

[ajay]

Jacob makes a good point. And it grates that the US is begging and begging for more NATO troops for Afghanistan, despite still having more of its own troops in Iraq. To put it another way: Afghanistan is, judging by troop numbers rather than speechifying, the number one military priority for pretty well every member of NATO, except for the US. For the US, it's a fairly distant second.