Obsidian Wings

Can't Write Them Out of the Script Entirely

by Eric Martin

This, from an e-mail correspondence with the Wall Street Journal's Anand Gopal re-printed with his permission, sums up why it is both repugnant yet necessary to attempt to negotiate with certain Taliban factions as part of the effort to establish a durable settlement to the many-sided conflict:

...Mullah Omar...[is] not that far removed from the society he came from. The Taliban did not just drop out of the sky one day--they are expressions of the rural, pre-modern, reactionary outlook prevalent in the Pashtun hinterlands. Women are essentially enslaved in these rural Pashtun areas, and this has little if nothing to do with the Taliban. Take a trip through the Pashtun countryside and you will meet many "women-hating, porn-fearing, music-despising people." I remember during my first week as a journalist in Afghanistan, I went to the aftermath of U.S. bombing raid and asked one man for the name of his wife (who had been injured). He pulled out a gun, slammed me to the floor and nearly killed me (because mentioning a man's wife in public is tantamount to adultery in those areas). Another time I remember a female Afghan friend I had (a university student) who made a call to a radio-call in show to request a song. When her family found out they cut all of her fingers off and force fed them to her (because singing and music is sinful). In fact, the word for musicians and public performers in Pashto -- dum -- is also a derogatory term!

The point isn't to excuse Mullah Omar or be a sort of moral relativist but rather to explain that the Taliban are products of the society they were born from and it isn't productive to call them "nuts". It will take years of modernization, urbanization and de-tribalization to change the cultural outlook in these areas, I believe. In the meantime, Mullah Omar and his ilk have shown themselves to be quite rational, with a sensible strategy to try and reclaim power. They've even gone a step further recently, expunging most references of Islam from their statements. They've gone out of their way to remove commanders who treat the population poorly and have instituted a mechanism to deal with complaints from locals. This isn't because they are a humanitarian organization all of a sudden but because they (like the Americans) realize that the population is the prize and they are trying to do everything they can to win them over. Therefore they are a very different movement from the one that ruled in the nineties.

Adding that they've also begun making a rhetorical break from al-Qaeda, attempting to quiet concerns in foreign capitals about the prospect of their return to power in some capacity or another.

In truth, many of the warlords and former Taliban factions cobbled together in the Karzai government harbor the same retrograde attitudes toward women and modernity.  Nevertheless, that is the society that we are dealing with, and part of the reason that some of the more grandiose notions of nation building need to be tempered.  That is also why talk of wiping out the Taliban is so misguided.

Gopal's observations are also germane in terms of dispelling the notion that one or another faction represents the Afghan people while the other doesn't.  In the regions described, these are the Afghan people in most instances.  This is a notion that I tried to convey in a post in early October:

In the debate over the future of US policy in Afghanistan, it is taken as a given by most proponents of prolonging the occupation that our presence is benefiting the Afghan people...In fact, through repetition and embellishment, the factions that we are supporting have become stand-ins for the entire Afghan population, at least in the abstract.  To leave, it is argued, would be to abandon "Afghanistan" the nation, or the "Afghan people," writ large. 

This formulation ignores the obvious rejoinder that for US forces to stay and battle the "Taliban" (whatever that term is supposed to mean on any given day) means to target large swaths of that same Afghan population.  Some of the anti-government groups are remnants of the Pashtun-dominated Mullah Omar-led Taliban that hosted al-Qaeda, some are entirely unrelated tribal entities, some are ordinary Afghans radicalized by the presence of a foreign occupying army, some are narco-warlords defending their turf and revenue stream, some smaller group are foreign fighters, etc. 

Regardless of the exact identity and motivations, and aside from the small group of foreign fighters, the people that we are killing also count as the Afghan people.  In actuality, we are protecting certain Afghan factions while doing our best to kill others.  It is an unstated, reflexive act of dehumanization to associate our favored factions with the "Afghan people" while relegating those groups that oppose the Afghan government to some form of limbo status in terms of their humanity/national identity.

Admittedly, it weakens the attractiveness of the narrative.

Bulletproof...I Wish I Was

by Eric Martin

I tend to come down on the John Cole side of the Cole/Sullivan debate about whether Obama should fire Janet Napolitano prior to the results are in from the fact finding effort.  Regardless, other than some unfortunate phrasing taken out of context and blown wildly out of proportion, it remains unclear whether she did anything wrong in her capacity as head of the Department of Homeland Security with respect to the most recent failed terrorist attack.

Spencer Ackerman makes a compelling case that there might not be a culpable party, or parties, in connection with Abdulmutallab's ability to board the flight in question:

New information may surface. But based on this, is it really fair to point the finger at the intelligence community here? Abdulmutallab’s father told embassy officials in Abuja that he didn’t know where his son was, but mightbe in Yemen. The CIA had that information. NSA has information that a Nigerian might be used for an attack sponsored by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. If all of this had gone into the [National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)], would someone have put two and two together — setting off the process for pulling Abdulmutallab’s visaor putting him on the no-fly? Maybe. And the rationale for the all-source, multi-agency NCTC is all about intelligence sharing. But remember: the inputs are that the guy’s dad says he’s dangerous; he’s Nigerian; he might be in Yemen; and al-Qaeda in Yemen may be looking to use a Nigerian in a forthcoming attack. Is that really enough?

The answer to that question most certainly requires a policy decision, not an intelligence decision. The intelligence community is drinking from a fire hose of data, a lot of it much more specific than what was acquired on Abdulmutallab. If policymakers decide that these thin reeds will be the standard for stopping someone from entering the United States, then they need to change the process to enshrine that in the no-fly system. But it will make it much harder for people who aren’t threatening to enter, a move that will ripple out to effect diplomacy, security relationships (good luck entering the U.S. for a military-to-military contact program if, say, you’re a member of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, since you had contacts with known extremists), international business and trade, and so on. Are we prepared for that?

Similarly, there’s a reasonable issue to investigate about intelligence-sharing processes even in the pre-specific-threat level. But remember: that just increases the firehose of data NCTC must process. Information is supposed to filter up to NCTC in strength and specificity from the component intelligence agencies so that NCTC isn’t overwhelmed. If we want to say that there should be a lower standard for sharing with NCTC, fine. But then either NCTC needs to be given more resources, or we risk missing the nextAbdulmutallab because NCTC’s analysts will be drowning in nonspecific data and trying to rope it to flotillas of additional information. It’s reasonable to ask, however, what the CIA did post-Nov. 19 to investigate Abdulmutallab specifically. But it’s also important to remember that barely a month passed between his father’s warning and Flight 253.

None of this is to excuse any complacency. It’s to provide context for evaluating whatever complacency occurred.

Something to consider.  Attempting to perfect homeland security will inevitably require tradeoffs in terms of what policies receive funding from an already strapped budget, as well as compromising freedom and liberty, both domestically and for foreigners experiencing contact with the United States.  The latter, by the way, should be an asset in terms of building connections and relationships that redound to our benefit in terms of creating goodwill.  The higher the walls we erect around fortress America, the less positive the experience will be.

Speak Softly, and Don't Buy Anyone A Stick

by Eric Martin

After reading this piece from Michael Ledeen and this one from Bruce McQuain, I was meaning to write this Matt Duss post, which Matt has so generously done himself saving me the effort:

In response to the Iranian regime’s violence, the Green Movement protests have grown bolder. The regime now seems stuck in a self-perpetuating cycle, in which almost every action it takes in response to the protests seems to only further erode its standing among Iranians and strengthen the opposition.

And this is at the heart of what the protesters are seeking to do – delegitimize the regime until it simply can’t stand. In an attempt to break out of this trap, the regime today ginned up counterrevolutionary protests – ordering people to attend and offering free metro transit. In a similar vein, the regime has sought to paint the protests as a Western-inspired plot. So what we are seeing is a struggle for legitimacy – for the hearts and minds of the average Iranian.

Yet as Iran erupts, the far-right in the US wants to lend the regime a lifeline. John Bolton said yesterday:

I would say that mere rhetorical support for the demonstrators, for the opposition is not enough. …If we’re going to support them, we should support them tangibly, with financial support, communications, perhaps other support, as well…Will some of the guns go to the side of the demonstrators? If they do, there’s a chance the regime could fall. If they don’t, I think the disparity in power between the government and the opposition is simple too great, and so the most likely outcome is Ahmadinejad and the regime stay in power.

The best way to undermine the movement is to do exactly what Bolton is advocating. It is true that no matter what the regime will claim the protests are part of a western plot – the regime is already doing this – but this claim while perhaps persuading a few, doesn’t appear to be all that persuasive given the breadth of the protests. Yet if Obama were to read a speech from the John Bolton playbook, the regime’s claims all of a sudden become a lot more persuasive. While the regime is not going to loop on state-television a clip of Obama saying the crackdown is brutal, it sure would loop a statement of Obama saying the US is going to work to forcefully support the Green Movement. Such a statement would be music to the regime’s ears and would allow them to regain the nationalist mantel that is slipping out of their grasp.

It's important to remember that Iranians are kind of sensitive to foreign interference in their internal affairs, with good reason considering the history involved.  Thus,heavy-handed US involvement would likely backfire in the ways that Duss lays out. 

Further, strategically speaking, the Green movement is trying to appeal to certain segments of the national security state/armed forces so that the movement can achieve the critical mass needed to unseat the current regime.  It likely won't be able to do so unless it can garner at least some support (even tacit) from the state security/armed forces apparatus.

Those state security/armed forces elements, however, will not go along with a revolution armed and/or bankrolled by the United States.  On the contrary, such actions by the United States would likely provoke a massive and violent reaction.  Along those lines, the more the Obama administration appears to be meddling in Iranian affairs (such as calling for regime change ala Ledeen), the more twitchy the security forces will get about joining such a bold undertaking whose aims are rather ambitious and, in some ways, revolutionary - with all the attendant uncertainty and anxiety that accompany such change.

But don't take it from Matt Duss or me, take it from Iran's dissident reformers, and the leaders of the Green movement itself, from Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi to Shirin Ebadi, Trita Parsi and Akbar Ganji.  There is a consensus in terms of advice for the US government: don't get actively involved, and don't push too hard rhetorically.  Trust them.  They know Iran better than self-styled "experts" like Michael Ledeen. 

Some Cats Really Like to, You Know, Profile and Front

by Eric Martin

The overwhelming consensus amongst counterterrorism scholars, experts and practitioners is that intelligence and law enforcement are the most effective tools available in terms of implementing effective counterterrorism policy, and, thus, these options should be relied on primarily.  Not only does the military approach and attendant "war" rhetoric play to the advantage of transnational, stateless terror groups like al-Qaeda, but so too does that approach feed the overinflated, romantic sense of importance that is so appealing to potential recruits and members. As the RAND Corporation put it rather succinctly in a 2008 report, the US should optimize its approach by:

• Mak[ing] policing and intelligence the backbone of U.S. efforts. Al Qa'ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This requires careful involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as their cooperation with foreign police and intelligence agencies.
• Minimiz[ing] the use of U.S. military force. In most operations against al Qa'ida, local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate and a better understanding of the operating environment than U.S. forces have. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all.

Key to this strategy is replacing the war-on-terrorism orientation with the kind of counterterrorism approach that is employed by most governments facing significant terrorist threats today. Calling the efforts a war on terrorism raises public expectations — both in the United States and elsewhere — that there is a battlefield solution. It also tends to legitimize the terrorists' view that they are conducting a jihad (holy war) against the United States and elevates them to the status of holy warriors. Terrorists should be perceived as criminals, not holy warriors.

The good news is that the United States has a natural advantage in the law enforcement/intelligence arena: moreso than in European nations struggling with Islam-perverting terrorism, the Muslim community in the United States tends to feel more accepted, less alienated and less persecuted.  This assimilating melting pot effect has helped to establish a human trip wire within the Muslim community, with numerous plots weeded out and interdicted by American Muslims themselves, working in close concert with law enforcement and intelligence personnel.

However, that is not an immutable dynamic.  Wajahat Ali had a solid piece discussing some of the positive and negative trends regarding these issues recently:

The arrest of five American Muslims in Pakistan allegedly conspiring to join the terrorist groups Jaysh Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba exposes a troubling phenomenon of domestic radicalisation, but also highlights an evolved, proactive Muslim American community seeking partnership to curb extremism. [...]

These isolated examples of imported radicalism nonetheless fuel the latent prejudices of a minority convinced their 4 million Muslim American neighbours represent a treacherous fifth column of stealth jihadists ready to spontaneously ignite...

This misperception certainly is not assuaged by prominent religious and political figures, mostly stemming from the Republican party, who espouse divisive rhetoric fostering mistrust and fear. Franklin Graham, an influential evangelical Christian, recently stated on CNN: "We have many Muslims that live in this country. But true Islam cannot be practised in this country...I don't agree with the teachings of Islam and I find it to be a very violent religion." Sarah Palin casually suggested we "profile away" when it comes to our American neighbours of Muslim and Middle Eastern backgrounds.

This polarisation and the reckless mentality of treating Muslims as suspects instead of partners not only subverts civil rights and due process but greatly hinders the best opportunity to combat domestic radicalisation: respectful co-operation with the Muslim American community.

As an example, the Virginia Muslim community's private and public response to the arrest of five of their young people marks a decisive change of proactive engagement with law enforcement resulting from mutual trust and open communication. Upon discovering a video left behind by the alleged leader of the group declaring his plans to fight on behalf of Muslims, his parents consulted with the Council on American-Islamic Relations (Cair) who reported the disappearance of the young men to the FBI. Ironically, the FBI as of last April refused to view Cair, the most influential Muslim American advocacy group, as an "appropriate liaison partner" due to unfounded and baseless allegations connecting its executives to Hamas.

In addition, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee recently issued a proposal for law enforcement officials and Muslim Americans to use their respective resources and strengths to unite in combating terrorism. However, they stressed an important caveat: "Unfortunately, in the current political climate, the actions of certain law enforcement agencies – whether spying on peaceful activist groups and houses of worship without reasonable suspicion, or religious profiling – have added to difficulties."

Unfortunately, in reaction to the most recent foiled underpants bomber* plot, many leading conservative voices are once again renewing calls for the type of profiling that undermines the very same sense of community, shared values and belonging that has helped to tamp down domestic-born terrorist threats.  Pursuing such policies would be a terrible self-inflicted wound, weakening a valuable domestic law-enforcement/intelligence asset.

In a related sense, the numerous calls for trying Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in military tribunal rather than in a civilian court mistakenly serves to elevate his status from common criminal to soldier/holy warrior.  Former McCain campaign aide Michael Goldfarb goes further (see, also, William Kristol), seemingly ruing the fact that torture will be off the table, as well as displaying a shocking level of ignorance as to the workings of the US criminal justice system:

Of course, we also don't get to interrogate him to find out who he was working with and what other plots are out there. If he were treated as an enemy combatant and transferred to military commission system, we could use Army Field Manual techniques without Miranda (not as effective as enhanced techniques, of course, but much better than standard police practice). We could use his non-Mirandized statements against him in military commissions, so long as the statements were not forcibly coerced and were otherwise reliable. Instead, it's three squares a day, the best legal defense the ACLU can provide, and maybe the chance for parole before the kids he was trying to kill on that plane even make it out of college.

One can safely assume that, contra Goldfarb, Abdulmutallab will face a conviction and lengthy prison sentence, even without self-incriminating statements derived via torture and/or interrogation by military personnel.  Here's another egregious example of pining for torture/military interrogation:

But as Spencer Ackerman pointed out in his debate with Pat Buchanan— who was openly advocating torturing Abdulmutallab — on MSNBC this morning, there is nothing to indicate that he is not cooperating fully under routine interrogation techniques.

Do they think that if he’s not under military control, he’s not being interrogated? The FBI has been interrogating him from the moment he was arrested and all indications are that he has been cooperative and has already revealed his connections to Al Qaeda, where he got the bombmaking materials and so forth.

But this gets it exactly wrong in at least two ways.  First, we want to downplay the importance of terror suspects, not hype them up.  As Marc Sageman noted:

The United States underestimates the value of prosecutions, which often can be enormously demoralizing to radical groups. There is no glory in being taken to prison in handcuffs. No jihadi Web site publishes such pictures. Arrested terrorists fade into oblivion. Only martyrs live on in popular memory.

Unless, of course, we're talking extra-judicial prisons like Gitmo which can be used to highlight our hypocrisy and thus weaken our claims to the moral highground.  Not only would abstention from torture and the use of civilian courts with standard rights afforded the defendant do the most to drain the glory from the would-be martyr, and thus reduce the appeal for potential copycats, but actually living up to our ideals is itself a potent weapon in convincing would-be and active terrorists of the error of their ways. 

In this instance, doing the right thing is also the right thing to do.

(*And, yes, the "underpants bomber" is an excellent tag for Abdulmutallab.  Talk about undermining the romantic image.)

Brett Favre

by von

If you don't like American Football, skip this post.  I'll return to insulting your refined political senses -- and disagreeing with Eric's well-intentioned foreign policy gaffes -- in a future post.

Brett Favre.  Brett effing Favre.  I used to hate that guy.  I still kinda hate that guy. Some of it came from being too close, familial close, to Green Bay fans.  Some came from those worshippers in the media (you know who you are).  And some of it was honestly earned, because Favre was, at heart, a gunslinger; a brawler; a guy who survived on his talent and not his skill.

Anyone can luck out with talent, after all.  You get born with it.  It's no work. Skill is what's special.

Heck, I bet you a beer that I can drink you under the table.  You gonna give me a prize for the alcoholic gene?  (And if you're gonna give me a prize, could you make it a shot of Maker's next to a cucumber and cream-cheese sandwich?  'Cause such a thing is like springtime in December.)

Anyhoo. 

We were talking about Farve.  (At least I was.)  And my hatred of him ... former.  Because the bile isn't with me any more.  I don't look on him with disgust.  I don't look on him like one of the nouveau riche; a Gaudi home; a too-talented prick.  The rage that Peyton Manning used to give to you, before you learned, Favre used to dispense for me.

And I don't think that I was wrong. I think that Farve was a prick.  A gunslinger.  A guy with a better arm than brain.

It's just that he isn't any more.  Turning forty did more for Favre's standing in my eyes than every other accomplishment.  He's a player, now.  It took a while, but the seasoning set.  And I'm loving watching him.  Even stranger, I'm starting to like him. 

I'm watching Monday Night Football in a hotel bar, and I'm rooting for the Bears.  But something else, disconcerting, is stirring.  The love that dare not speaks its name: 

Favre. 

Perish, forsooth!

UPDATE:  Maybe it's easier because he's losing.  Down 13-0, and expect no further updates 'cause I'm going to bed.

UPDATE 2:  Just returned to the blog, and noticed that I managed to both spell and misspell Favre's name in various places.  Thanks to all for the corrections:  This is what happens when you post on a little-bitty keyboard and don't proofread.

Draining the Swamp...Again and Again and Again

by Eric Martin

Matt Duss on Lieberman's most recent bout of warmongering with respect to Yemen.  One wonders whether these are the types of dots that Pete Hoekstra demanded connecting:

It’s also very much worth noting that the ranks of Yemen’s Islamic extremist insurgency have been fed by fighters returning from Iraq, bringing with them tactics and experience gained in one of the previous wars that Joe Lieberman supported. Unfortunately, the nature of our national security debate is such that militaristic voices like Lieberman’s will always be treated as “serious,” even when the problems they’re proposing to solve have only been made worse by their previous harebrained militarism.

Why, it's almost as if more war leads to more radicalization and not the other way around.  

Hmmm.

What if, then, more war in Afghanistan and Pakistan was not the answer to tamping down radicalization in Pakistan and stabilizing a country that wasn't in dire need of stabilizing before we expanded that conflict? 

[pauses to ponder]

Nah, that's just crazy hippie talk.  Silly me, negative consequences (worst case scenarios in fact) only flow from ending wars.

A Contrast In Styles

by Eric Martin

Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen, who I linked to last week, had fascinating interview with Glenn Greenwald (via Yglesias).  Some excerpts below.  First, the Bush administration, in what is a familiar refrain, putting domestic politicis ahead of policy:

Yeah, I think the track record of US-Yemeni relations here is extremely important. So if you go to November 2002, this is when the CIA launched an unmanned drone that then carried out a targeted strike on the head of al-Qaeda in Yemen at the time, a man named Abu Ali al-Harethi, and this was one of the initial drone strikes in the war on terror. Immediately after that, the Bush administration - this attack took place on November 3 2002 - someone in the Pentagon leaked this to US newspapers.

This was the way the Bush administration I believe really needed an early victory on the War on Terror and they were trying to use this example to bolster their Republican allies for the midterm elections, which were going to take place on November 5, so two days after the strike. And this leak caused a great deal of problems for the Yemeni government back at home.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh felt as though he had been sold out by the US for domestic political concerns. And since then, Yemen's cooperation with the US against al-Qaeda has really gone downhill. Yemen started focusing on other things; they weren't as forthcoming in sharing intelligence and giving the US access to prisoners and things of this nature; and so for the Obama administration, certainly it's in their best interests to put a Yemeni face on these strikes and to make sure that they're the silent partner behinds the scenes helping the Yemeni government, that they're not too obvious in their actions.

And this also I think, if the US was too obvious, could come back to bite them, because then al-Qaeda can easily turn this to its rhetorical advantage by saying things like, oh, President Abdullah is only a paid agent of the Americans who is doing whatever it is the Americans want, and so if you're a true Muslim, you'll follow us.

Some more history/backstory:

Well, let me talk about it this way, if I can. This is the second incarnation of al-Qaeda in Yemen. Immediately after September 11th, we had what I like to term the first phase of the war against al-Qaeda. This lasted essentially from, say, the USS Cole attack in 2000 and really the September 11th attacks in 2001, up through November 2003. So, in this phase, the US and Yemeni governments partnered very closely. There was the drone strike in November 2002 that I mentioned earlier, and this was largely, at least for al-Qaeda, a reactionary war.

Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda had often thought of Yemen as sort of a refuge where they could come, relax; the Yemeni government ignored them as long as al-Qaeda ignored the government and didn't carry out any attacks. It was essentially what could best be called a tacit non-aggression pact between the two. Now, after September 11th, that of course all changed; President Saleh was very worried that Yemen would be on the US hit list, and so he cooperated quite closely with the US government after the strike in November 2002. One year later, the Yemeni government arrested Abu Ali al-Harethi's replacement, so really by November 2003, al-Qaeda in Yemen had been largely defeated by the US and Yemeni governments.

Then there's a period from about November 2003 to February 2006 where there's very little, almost no al-Qaeda violence in the country. Then in February 2006 there's a prison break of 23 al-Qaeda suspects including the individual I mentioned earlier, Qasim al-Raymi, as well as an individual named Nasir al-Wuhayshi. Both Qasim al-Raymi and Nasir al-Wuhayshi had spent time with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, trained in the camps there; Nasir al-Wuhayshi was actually a lieutenant, a personal aide to bin Laden - he fought with bin Laden at the Battle of Tora Bora before eventually moving to Iran and then being extradited back to Yemen where he stayed in jail until he escaped.

So from February 2006 up to today, we have this second phase of the war against al-Qaeda in Yemen. And this is when al-Qaeda has really become a threat, because they've certainly learned from the first phase. They changed a lot of their tactics, and since February '06 up until now, they've done a very good job of really building a durable infrastructure that can sustain and withstand the loss of key leaders, so when you assassinate cell leaders, you don't find the organization crumbling down around himself. And in January of 2009, they moved from being what you could call a local chapter of al-Qaeda just based in Yemen, into more of a regional franchise, this al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, which is the name that they use today.

Since then they've really been working to almost match their actions to their rhetoric, so their rhetoric says that they want to be an organization that can carry out attacks throughout the region, that is, throughout the Arabian peninsula. And so you've seen this; they've targeted Saudi Arabia's counter-terrorism chief, Mohammed bin Nayef, for assassination, they've launched other attacks into Saudi Arabia that were foiled before they could take place. But this is the real danger that they present right now, is not just in Yemen, but using Yemen as a launching pad for attacks throughout the region.

Some sage advice going forward:

I think it's important for the US to realize that it's not going to defeat al-Qaeda in Yemen tomorrow, or next month, or even next year. Like I said, al-Qaeda right now is just too strong and too entrenched in Yemen. There really is no magic missile solution to the problem. It's going to be a very long and a very different fight.  And military strikes like the one that we saw last week, they really need to come at the end of the process, when al-Qaeda has been isolated from the population, when its rhetoric has been discredited, not at the beginning of the process, when al-Qaeda members are still seen as pious individuals defending their faith.

And that, for me, is the mistake that the US made, not necessarily in partnering with the Yemeni government to go after these individuals. Certainly, you have to do that, but just in having the chronology of the attacks wrong.  They didn't do the proper field work, they didn't do the proper groundwork to undermine al-Qaeda to the degree that these attacks would be seen as a good thing by the Yemeni population. Instead, they're been seen as a bad thing and as something that al-Qaeda, at least in my view, will be able to use these strikes and to really replace and offset any of the losses that they may have had. It's really, for al-Qaeda, a recruiting field day. [...]

That is, anywhere that you're going to do this sort of military strike without the proper groundwork and preparation work, you're going to run into the same problem, where it's going to be very, very counterproductive. And if you expand the net of who is al-Qaeda - and it's important I think to remember in Yemen, there's almost what, I think could best be called an Islamist spectrum.

That is, a number of people who view Islam as a political matter and who, at least in the West, it would be very easy to look at them, and they look like al-Qaeda and they sort of say many of the same things that al-Qaeda says, but they're not necessarily al-Qaeda. And in Yemen, al-Qaeda only occupies one point along this spectrum. And so if you want to broaden the war out, and target all of these people, or say that they're all al-Qaeda, then you're opening yourself up to a war that you can never end, because you're just fighting way too many people in Yemen. So the idea is to narrow this point of who exactly is al-Qaeda to as small as it can be possibly be before you attack.

Very sensible, informed by contextual and nuanced understanding, tempered by due circumspection and based on sound strategic thinking. On the other hand, there's Joe Lieberman urging the rash course:

Sen. Joseph Lieberman, (I-Conn) a renowned hawk and one of the foremost champions of the invasion of Iraq, warned on Sunday that the United States faced “danger” unless it pre-emptively acts to curb the rise of terrorism in Yemen.

“Somebody in our government said to me in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, Iraq was yesterday’s war. Afghanistan is today’s war. If we don’t act preemptively, Yemen will be tomorrow’s war,” Lieberman said, during an appearance on “Fox News Sunday”. “That’s the danger we face.”

Ugh.

I Don't Even Play a Terrorist Mastermind on TV, but...

by Eric Martin

Um, even I could find a suitable workaround for this one:

“Among other things, during the final hour of flight customers must remain seated, will not be allowed to access carry-on baggage, or have personal belongings or other items on their laps,” said a statement posted on Air Canada’s Web site, citing the new TSA rules.

While the new regulations were supposed to be in effect just for U.S.-bound international flights, some passengers on domestic flights said they also had to abide by the restrictions.

So, a would-be bomber waited until the final hour of the flight before going to the bathroom to prep a jerry-rigged bomb.  In rote response,the TSA is thinking of banning movement in the cabin, access to carry-ons and belongings in the laps...during the final hour of flights?

Because everyone knows how crucial the last hour is to executing such plots.  Henley is right:

The sheer superstition involved would be grimly amusing if one didn’t have to live here. One would-be terrorist did X on a flight. Therefore let us forbid X in the future! It is classic magical thinking. It’s of a piece with being unable to muster a plurality of people who accept evolution. How long before we are back to bloodletting as standard medicine?

Security theater of the absurd.

Our Nation Has Been Put In Harm's Way!

by Eric Martin

I am certain, dear reader, that you will find the following bolded excerpts to be as alarming as I did:

Abdulmutallab was released from a hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on Sunday after being treated for burns, according to Gina Balaya, a spokeswoman for the U.S. attorney's office in Detroit, Michigan. The 23-year-old is charged with attempting to set off an explosive device aboard a Northwest Airlines flight from the Netherlands shortly before its landing in Detroit on Christmas Day, and was being held in an undisclosed location, Balaya told CNN.

Not only was Abdulmutallab not kept exclusively in Gitmo, but he was actually in a hospital in Michigan! Which, I am pretty certain, is in the actual United States! 

What's worse, it is entirely possible that the "undisclosed location" referenced in the article could very well be a prison in the United States.  Which means Abdulmutallab is likely in some American's backyard at this very moment, or attending PTA meetings or plotting to kill us all at the neighborhood block party and the like.

Our leaders just don't get it.

Christmas Baby Blogging

by Eric Martin

Here's a nice father son moment to warm yer darn cockles...(which are in need of warmin').

And here, the little guy has had enough of Dad's kisses.  As for Dad, he finds the cheeks to be simply irresistible.