We Should Only Be So Lucky

by Eric Martin

Some of the more curious disconnects between rhetoric and reality in recent memory surrounded the myriad justifications for the Iraq war which included the ubiquitous and self-satisfying "democracy promotion" and "liberation" narratives.  The problem was that the self-styled do-gooders urging on the expenditure of large quantities of blood and treasure in the ostensibly moral cause of liberating Muslims were frequently the same folks that harbored deep-seated anti-Muslim biases.  There was vacillation between nuke Mecca and indignant impatience with the lack of flowers and candy. 

Then there were the militarists that were urging for the unrestrained application of military force and disregard for civilian lives, despite, again, the alleged altruistic justificiation for the wars they wanted to pursue without reservation.  This tension has increasingly come to the fore as Obama, heeding the advice of presumed right-wing darling General Petraeus (and McChrystal), has advocated a shift to counterinsurgeny (COIN)-infused rules of engagement, which have been derided as "politically correct" naivete by the same groups that extol the genius of the author of those rules.

The most recent example of this hostility to COIN doctrine juxtaposed with the oversized regard for its main proponents can be seen in the reaction to Obama's suggested timeline for the commencement of withdrawal.  The fear, as expressed by those outraged that a timeline was actually announced, is that the Taliban would be able to lay low and hide until our withdrawal, which is now a fixed date (sort of).  But why would that be a bad thing?  From a Jason Sigger post:

What would happen if the Taliban and AQ reserved their forces and stood down for 18 months?

- Order would be restored.. Afghan government and Coalition order, not Taliban order.

- Afghan security forces would continue to get training. Expansion of security forces would create jobs.

- Infrastructure creation could begin in earnest. Currently more is spent on security for infrastructure programs than for construction. Infrastructure creation requires labor.

18 months will peal away quickly but it's more than enough time to dull the desire for Taliban-style stability.

18 months of work for locals, real jobs will certainly be preferable to getting shot at.

If the Taliban were smart, they would do anything but hide for the next year and a half. They would perpetuate the violence, in fact they would increase the violence. They're well financed and local paid fighters are expendable.

Right.  And 18 months would mark the beginning of the withdrawal process, not the end, so really, the Taliban would have to lay low for about 2-3 years if they wanted to stay out of sight.  In that interim, we would have the chance to make substantial headway in securing the population, winning hearts and minds, training security forces and bolstering the credibility of the government - the vital objectives of COIN doctrine.  Matt Duss adds:

If killing the enemy were the main goal, then their decision to hunker down and wait for the U.S. to begin leaving might be a problem. But as the main goal of the new COIN strategy in Afghanistan is to secure the population, build trust with local communities through effective delivery of services, all the while increasing Afghan capacity to continue doing those things when we leave, it’s really not. The Taliban “waiting us out” would just give the U.S. more time and space to make Afghanistan a more inhospitable place for the Taliban.

Beyond that, the “they’ll wait us out!” argument betrays a pretty clear lack of understanding of the counterinsurgency strategy being implemented in Afghanistan, in which the civilian population, not the enemy insurgents themselves, are the focus of operations. When Sen. John McCain criticizes talk of withdrawal by insisting, as he did on Meet the Press yesterday, that “The rationale for war is to break the enemy’s will,” all he’s telling us is that he hasn’t bothered to do his homework on this particular war. Which, given McCain’s known preference for empty sloganeering over actual policy, should be shocking to no one.

Someone with some actual journalistic chops should point out to John McCain and all the other timeline alarmists that we want the Taliban to throw us in that briar patch.

Comments

[nous]

John McCain's crib of what war is about reveals an awful lot about his ideology. He's a Jominian rather than a Clausewitzian strategist. He sees war as an existential contest between two opposing parties, not as one available means of furthering political policy. All nuance drops out as soon as someone starts swinging.

Not that this is a surprise.

[Point]

I think it's saying something that I agree with just about every word in this post* -- save, maybe, the last part:

"Someone with some actual journalistic chops should point out to John McCain and all the other timeline alarmists that we want the Taliban to throw us in that briar patch."

All I'm saying is, don't sell yourself short, Eric!

*must be the Wednesday air ;)

[John Miller]

Point, I daresay that not you nd myself, agre with this post, but I wouldn't be surprised if even LJ agrees.

This "they'll wat us out" argument is one of the most stupid arguments yet frm that side of the spectrum, which when you consider most of their arguments about anthing, is really saying a lot.

[John Miller]

That was the most typo ridden comment I hav ever posted, and that says alot. The firt entences should read "Point, I daresay that not only you and I agree with this post, but I wouldn't be surprised if ven LJ agrees." and "wat" should be "wait."

[Point]

"and "wat" should be "wait""

Yeah, I was wondering how making Ethipian stew was supposed to help the Taliban; not that the proper spelling makes any more sense...

[hairshirthedonist]

We can’t stay forever at the proposed troop levels, so it’s not as if the Taliban couldn’t play the same “lay low” game without the proposed (and conditional) date having been stated.

The more I think about it, though, the more I think the conditional draw-down date is a min being presented as a max. I think it means “we will not begin leaving any sonner than.”

The stated premise of the drawdown date is that Afghanistan, as a nation-state, needs to be able to begin handling its own security – to keep the Taliban from rebuilding. (And if the Afghans are not ready to begin taking over by then, when will they be, and what would then be the point of staying any longer, at least militarily?) It’s not a free-for-all for the Taliban, even putting aside the fact that starting a draw-down is not the same thing as leaving en masse.

Or maybe the Taliban frat will just be on probation, with their thumbs on the champagne corks and the kegs on ice, waiting to call their buddies from the al Qaeda house to come over and party like it's 1999. It's so much cooler to think of it that way.

[herr doktor bimler]

From the perspective of McCain and the rest of the pro-war lobby, the great thing about the "They'll wait us out" argument is that any reduction in hostilities in Afghanistan can be spun as a defeat for the COIN strategy, requiring an aggressive response and longer occupation.

[John Thullen]

The Taliban and the Republican Party and al Qaeda can't be talked to, negotiated with, incentivized, whatever.

Tactical nukes for the lot of them.

Except for the Taliban and al Qaeda, who might be open to negotiation.

[kid bitzer]

first test of credibility for the "but they'll wait us out!" crowd:

did you shout that just as loud when bush was pushing his "surge" in iraq?

[Model 62]

The drawdown date is a clear signal to the local leadership that if it intends to remain in power, it needs to get its house in order sooner rather than later, same as the drawdown deadline in Iraq (which came first in the guise as advice from the Iraq Study Group); it's a necessary component. Most critics probably agree with this assessment, but agreeing with one's political opponents is not good politics. So we get this sort of wankery, instead.

[Marty]

I am amazed at the capability of the supposed progressives to go from hardline positions on withdrawal to supporting a non-withdrawal date that bordered on a lie and was a purely political construct for internal consumption.

After years of berating the same military leaders for not having a date in Iraq it simply wasn't feasible to not have one in Aghanistan. That was for the left. (Not for the Afghan government, there were other ways to deliver that message IMO.)

Then, for the right, (meaning moderate Dems) they needed to make sure it wasn't really a date. So they send Gates and Clinton and the Generals out to make sure no one believes it's a date.

Then you berate McCain for recognizing that this is a war and it needs to be won. Whether through bombs, troops or the lack of support from the people, winning is destroying the enemies will to continue to fight. We have to win or leave the Afghans in a position to win, my bet is we really don't believe the second one.

[nous]

Aaaand Marty weighs in as a Jominian, too.

We do not need to destroy the enemy's will to fight. We need to make sure that the enemy's actions do not prevent us from achieving our political goals and prevent the enemy from achieving any political goals that run counter to ours. If this means ignoring them while they continue to take wild swings, then so be it, especially when they can do more meaningful damage to our economy and our culture by provoking a fight than they can by shouting and kicking us in the shins.

[Marty]

nous,

In which case we should just come home?

[Ugh]

"they’ll wait us out"

Uh, they fncking live there, they'll wait us out if we declared we'd be there for another 40 years.

Oh, and apparently the Taliban die in groups of 30.

See also.

[russell]

Then you berate McCain for recognizing that this is a war and it needs to be won.

WTF does "won" mean?
What "enemy" are we fighting?
How do we know when we've destroyed their will to fight?
Are there ways to get them to stop fighting us that don't require us to kill them?

What is the end state we're trying to achieve?

No Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
No Al Qaeda anywhere in Afghanistan or Pakistan?
No Al Qaeda anywhere in South Asia?
No Al Qaeda?

If any of the above, please explain how a continued US military presence in Afghanistan makes that happen.

No Taliban in Afghanistan?
No Taliban anywhere?
Maybe some Taliban, but only as a political entity, not as a military rival to whatever central government is in Afghanistan?
And which "Taliban" are we talking about?

What if the Pashtuns prefer the Taliban to the central government of Afghanistan?
What if *some* Pashtuns prefer the Taliban to the central government of Afghanistan?
What if, by some significant set of metrics, the Taliban are actually *better* than the central government of Afghanistan?

What is the end state we're trying to achieve?

How does considering our involvement in Afghanistan to be a war help bring that end state about?
What are the metrics of victory? How do we know when we have won?

If there aren't clear answers to all of the above, then "this is a war and it needs to be won" has no useful meaning.

I'm not even talking about whether it's true or not. It simply has no meaning. There's nothing to debate or discuss, it's just empty rhetoric.

What is the end state we're trying to achieve? And "peaceful friendly Afghanistan" is not enough, that's like saying "let's all be happy".

What, specifically, does Afghanistan have to look like before we can say we've achieved our goals in staying there, and we can now remove our military presence without considering it a failure.

If you can't answer that, there's no point in discussing whether it's a war or not, or whether it can be won or not.

Personally, I berate McCain because he likes to drag his sorry behind to the TV studio every Sunday so he can beat his chest and yap about "victory", but I've yet to hear him articulate a meaningful definition for that which is in any way congruent to the real world. Or, rather, I don't berate him, I just consider him and his point of view irrelevant.

If you'd like to attempt a reply to any or all of the above, I'm all ears.

[Eric Martin]

I am amazed at the capability of the supposed progressives to go from hardline positions on withdrawal to supporting a non-withdrawal date that bordered on a lie and was a purely political construct for internal consumption.

Who are you talking about here?

I, personally, can explain my position - which I did in a recent post on Obama's plan.

The jist is that if Obama's timeline is real - and not a fake out - then his plan is better than some of the other plans that have been discussed at high levels (10-15 years of intense COIN operations, etc.).

However, in that post, I said that I would prefer a more accelerated timeline, and that if the 2011 timeline start date was an illusion, than the plan was worse than advertised in obvious ways.

Regardless, that doesn't make the drivel about timelines leading to the Taliban laying low any saner. Especially because if events turned out as feared by McCain et al re: the Taliban laying low, the benefits would redound to us.

[Marty]

Russell,

I agree with almost everything you have said, most particularly this:

What, specifically, does Afghanistan have to look like before we can say we've achieved our goals in staying there, and we can now remove our military presence without considering it a failure.

If you can't answer that, there's no point in discussing whether it's a war or not, or whether it can be won or not.

However, my complaint is that the President defined it as a war of necessity. As such, he should answer those questions; He should be held accountable for the definition.

McCain pointing out that, once it is defined as a war, then making the other side quit fighting is how you win, is a pretty minor point.

The point on it being good or bad to have a date certain is not to be laid at the feet of McCain or Republicans, on Meet the Press this week (transcript here)Gates and Clinton made all the arguments against a date certain, all McCain added is that you should have a date, or not, but not both.

[Marty]

"The jist is that if Obama's timeline is real - and not a fake out - then his plan is better than some of the other plans that have been discussed at high levels (10-15 years of intense COIN operations, etc.)."

So this quote from Sec Gates from the Meet the Press link earlier must be disappointing:

Well, first of all, we're not talking about an abrupt withdrawal. We're talking about something that will take care--take place over a period of time. We--our commanders think that these additional forces, and one of the reasons for the president's decision to try and accelerate their deployment, is, is the view that the this extended surge has the opportunity to make significant gains in terms of reversing the momentum of the Taliban, denying them control of Afghan territory and degrading their capabilities. Our military thinks we have a real opportunity to do that. And it's not just in the next 18 months, because we will have significant--we will have 100,000 forces, troops there, and they are not leaving in July of 2011. Some, handful, or some small number, or whatever the conditions permit, will begin to withdraw at that time.

Bold Mine.

[Eric Martin]

So this quote from Sec Gates from the Meet the Press link earlier must be disappointing

Yes, very much so. My lukewarm support of the "not worst case option" is entirely contingent. As I've said all along.

If you read my post, I flagged some other examples of double speak. In these paragraphs:

"Then, of course, there's the very real fear that Obama will not stick to his timeline - out of his own designs, or fear of crossing the potent defense establishment that never quite finds the right conditions for withdrawal. Speaking of which, there are some disturbing initial wisps of smoke about Obama delaying the SOFA withdrawal dates for Iraq at the request of Odierno and other military leaders on the ground. Odierno's recalcitrance should surprise no one.

Nor should an Afghan version of military foot dragging come as a shock when it eventually, inevitably materializes. In fact, as Michael Crowley points out, there is already plenty of early caveating and jockeying with respect to the fluidity of the 2011 date."

[Eric Martin]

The point on it being good or bad to have a date certain is not to be laid at the feet of McCain or Republicans

The point that the Taliban will lay low if you set a date should be laid at the feet of the people making that point, whoever they are. At the moment, they are McCain and other Republicans.

Gates and Clinton made all the arguments against a date certain

Did they argue that a date would allow the Taliban to lay low until withdrawal?