We Should Only Be So Lucky

by Eric Martin

Some of the more curious disconnects between rhetoric and reality in recent memory surrounded the myriad justifications for the Iraq war which included the ubiquitous and self-satisfying "democracy promotion" and "liberation" narratives.  The problem was that the self-styled do-gooders urging on the expenditure of large quantities of blood and treasure in the ostensibly moral cause of liberating Muslims were frequently the same folks that harbored deep-seated anti-Muslim biases.  There was vacillation between nuke Mecca and indignant impatience with the lack of flowers and candy. 

Then there were the militarists that were urging for the unrestrained application of military force and disregard for civilian lives, despite, again, the alleged altruistic justificiation for the wars they wanted to pursue without reservation.  This tension has increasingly come to the fore as Obama, heeding the advice of presumed right-wing darling General Petraeus (and McChrystal), has advocated a shift to counterinsurgeny (COIN)-infused rules of engagement, which have been derided as "politically correct" naivete by the same groups that extol the genius of the author of those rules.

The most recent example of this hostility to COIN doctrine juxtaposed with the oversized regard for its main proponents can be seen in the reaction to Obama's suggested timeline for the commencement of withdrawal.  The fear, as expressed by those outraged that a timeline was actually announced, is that the Taliban would be able to lay low and hide until our withdrawal, which is now a fixed date (sort of).  But why would that be a bad thing?  From a Jason Sigger post:

What would happen if the Taliban and AQ reserved their forces and stood down for 18 months?

- Order would be restored.. Afghan government and Coalition order, not Taliban order.

- Afghan security forces would continue to get training. Expansion of security forces would create jobs.

- Infrastructure creation could begin in earnest. Currently more is spent on security for infrastructure programs than for construction. Infrastructure creation requires labor.

18 months will peal away quickly but it's more than enough time to dull the desire for Taliban-style stability.

18 months of work for locals, real jobs will certainly be preferable to getting shot at.

If the Taliban were smart, they would do anything but hide for the next year and a half. They would perpetuate the violence, in fact they would increase the violence. They're well financed and local paid fighters are expendable.

Right.  And 18 months would mark the beginning of the withdrawal process, not the end, so really, the Taliban would have to lay low for about 2-3 years if they wanted to stay out of sight.  In that interim, we would have the chance to make substantial headway in securing the population, winning hearts and minds, training security forces and bolstering the credibility of the government - the vital objectives of COIN doctrine.  Matt Duss adds:

If killing the enemy were the main goal, then their decision to hunker down and wait for the U.S. to begin leaving might be a problem. But as the main goal of the new COIN strategy in Afghanistan is to secure the population, build trust with local communities through effective delivery of services, all the while increasing Afghan capacity to continue doing those things when we leave, it’s really not. The Taliban “waiting us out” would just give the U.S. more time and space to make Afghanistan a more inhospitable place for the Taliban.

Beyond that, the “they’ll wait us out!” argument betrays a pretty clear lack of understanding of the counterinsurgency strategy being implemented in Afghanistan, in which the civilian population, not the enemy insurgents themselves, are the focus of operations. When Sen. John McCain criticizes talk of withdrawal by insisting, as he did on Meet the Press yesterday, that “The rationale for war is to break the enemy’s will,” all he’s telling us is that he hasn’t bothered to do his homework on this particular war. Which, given McCain’s known preference for empty sloganeering over actual policy, should be shocking to no one.

Someone with some actual journalistic chops should point out to John McCain and all the other timeline alarmists that we want the Taliban to throw us in that briar patch.

Comments

[nous]

John McCain's crib of what war is about reveals an awful lot about his ideology. He's a Jominian rather than a Clausewitzian strategist. He sees war as an existential contest between two opposing parties, not as one available means of furthering political policy. All nuance drops out as soon as someone starts swinging.

Not that this is a surprise.

[Point]

I think it's saying something that I agree with just about every word in this post* -- save, maybe, the last part:

"Someone with some actual journalistic chops should point out to John McCain and all the other timeline alarmists that we want the Taliban to throw us in that briar patch."

All I'm saying is, don't sell yourself short, Eric!

*must be the Wednesday air ;)

[John Miller]

Point, I daresay that not you nd myself, agre with this post, but I wouldn't be surprised if even LJ agrees.

This "they'll wat us out" argument is one of the most stupid arguments yet frm that side of the spectrum, which when you consider most of their arguments about anthing, is really saying a lot.

[John Miller]

That was the most typo ridden comment I hav ever posted, and that says alot. The firt entences should read "Point, I daresay that not only you and I agree with this post, but I wouldn't be surprised if ven LJ agrees." and "wat" should be "wait."

[Point]

"and "wat" should be "wait""

Yeah, I was wondering how making Ethipian stew was supposed to help the Taliban; not that the proper spelling makes any more sense...

[hairshirthedonist]

We can’t stay forever at the proposed troop levels, so it’s not as if the Taliban couldn’t play the same “lay low” game without the proposed (and conditional) date having been stated.

The more I think about it, though, the more I think the conditional draw-down date is a min being presented as a max. I think it means “we will not begin leaving any sonner than.”

The stated premise of the drawdown date is that Afghanistan, as a nation-state, needs to be able to begin handling its own security – to keep the Taliban from rebuilding. (And if the Afghans are not ready to begin taking over by then, when will they be, and what would then be the point of staying any longer, at least militarily?) It’s not a free-for-all for the Taliban, even putting aside the fact that starting a draw-down is not the same thing as leaving en masse.

Or maybe the Taliban frat will just be on probation, with their thumbs on the champagne corks and the kegs on ice, waiting to call their buddies from the al Qaeda house to come over and party like it's 1999. It's so much cooler to think of it that way.

[herr doktor bimler]

From the perspective of McCain and the rest of the pro-war lobby, the great thing about the "They'll wait us out" argument is that any reduction in hostilities in Afghanistan can be spun as a defeat for the COIN strategy, requiring an aggressive response and longer occupation.

[John Thullen]

The Taliban and the Republican Party and al Qaeda can't be talked to, negotiated with, incentivized, whatever.

Tactical nukes for the lot of them.

Except for the Taliban and al Qaeda, who might be open to negotiation.

[kid bitzer]

first test of credibility for the "but they'll wait us out!" crowd:

did you shout that just as loud when bush was pushing his "surge" in iraq?

[Model 62]

The drawdown date is a clear signal to the local leadership that if it intends to remain in power, it needs to get its house in order sooner rather than later, same as the drawdown deadline in Iraq (which came first in the guise as advice from the Iraq Study Group); it's a necessary component. Most critics probably agree with this assessment, but agreeing with one's political opponents is not good politics. So we get this sort of wankery, instead.

[Marty]

I am amazed at the capability of the supposed progressives to go from hardline positions on withdrawal to supporting a non-withdrawal date that bordered on a lie and was a purely political construct for internal consumption.

After years of berating the same military leaders for not having a date in Iraq it simply wasn't feasible to not have one in Aghanistan. That was for the left. (Not for the Afghan government, there were other ways to deliver that message IMO.)

Then, for the right, (meaning moderate Dems) they needed to make sure it wasn't really a date. So they send Gates and Clinton and the Generals out to make sure no one believes it's a date.

Then you berate McCain for recognizing that this is a war and it needs to be won. Whether through bombs, troops or the lack of support from the people, winning is destroying the enemies will to continue to fight. We have to win or leave the Afghans in a position to win, my bet is we really don't believe the second one.

[nous]

Aaaand Marty weighs in as a Jominian, too.

We do not need to destroy the enemy's will to fight. We need to make sure that the enemy's actions do not prevent us from achieving our political goals and prevent the enemy from achieving any political goals that run counter to ours. If this means ignoring them while they continue to take wild swings, then so be it, especially when they can do more meaningful damage to our economy and our culture by provoking a fight than they can by shouting and kicking us in the shins.

[Marty]

nous,

In which case we should just come home?

[Ugh]

"they’ll wait us out"

Uh, they fncking live there, they'll wait us out if we declared we'd be there for another 40 years.

Oh, and apparently the Taliban die in groups of 30.

See also.

[russell]

Then you berate McCain for recognizing that this is a war and it needs to be won.

WTF does "won" mean?
What "enemy" are we fighting?
How do we know when we've destroyed their will to fight?
Are there ways to get them to stop fighting us that don't require us to kill them?

What is the end state we're trying to achieve?

No Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
No Al Qaeda anywhere in Afghanistan or Pakistan?
No Al Qaeda anywhere in South Asia?
No Al Qaeda?

If any of the above, please explain how a continued US military presence in Afghanistan makes that happen.

No Taliban in Afghanistan?
No Taliban anywhere?
Maybe some Taliban, but only as a political entity, not as a military rival to whatever central government is in Afghanistan?
And which "Taliban" are we talking about?

What if the Pashtuns prefer the Taliban to the central government of Afghanistan?
What if *some* Pashtuns prefer the Taliban to the central government of Afghanistan?
What if, by some significant set of metrics, the Taliban are actually *better* than the central government of Afghanistan?

What is the end state we're trying to achieve?

How does considering our involvement in Afghanistan to be a war help bring that end state about?
What are the metrics of victory? How do we know when we have won?

If there aren't clear answers to all of the above, then "this is a war and it needs to be won" has no useful meaning.

I'm not even talking about whether it's true or not. It simply has no meaning. There's nothing to debate or discuss, it's just empty rhetoric.

What is the end state we're trying to achieve? And "peaceful friendly Afghanistan" is not enough, that's like saying "let's all be happy".

What, specifically, does Afghanistan have to look like before we can say we've achieved our goals in staying there, and we can now remove our military presence without considering it a failure.

If you can't answer that, there's no point in discussing whether it's a war or not, or whether it can be won or not.

Personally, I berate McCain because he likes to drag his sorry behind to the TV studio every Sunday so he can beat his chest and yap about "victory", but I've yet to hear him articulate a meaningful definition for that which is in any way congruent to the real world. Or, rather, I don't berate him, I just consider him and his point of view irrelevant.

If you'd like to attempt a reply to any or all of the above, I'm all ears.

[Eric Martin]

I am amazed at the capability of the supposed progressives to go from hardline positions on withdrawal to supporting a non-withdrawal date that bordered on a lie and was a purely political construct for internal consumption.

Who are you talking about here?

I, personally, can explain my position - which I did in a recent post on Obama's plan.

The jist is that if Obama's timeline is real - and not a fake out - then his plan is better than some of the other plans that have been discussed at high levels (10-15 years of intense COIN operations, etc.).

However, in that post, I said that I would prefer a more accelerated timeline, and that if the 2011 timeline start date was an illusion, than the plan was worse than advertised in obvious ways.

Regardless, that doesn't make the drivel about timelines leading to the Taliban laying low any saner. Especially because if events turned out as feared by McCain et al re: the Taliban laying low, the benefits would redound to us.

[Marty]

Russell,

I agree with almost everything you have said, most particularly this:

What, specifically, does Afghanistan have to look like before we can say we've achieved our goals in staying there, and we can now remove our military presence without considering it a failure.

If you can't answer that, there's no point in discussing whether it's a war or not, or whether it can be won or not.

However, my complaint is that the President defined it as a war of necessity. As such, he should answer those questions; He should be held accountable for the definition.

McCain pointing out that, once it is defined as a war, then making the other side quit fighting is how you win, is a pretty minor point.

The point on it being good or bad to have a date certain is not to be laid at the feet of McCain or Republicans, on Meet the Press this week (transcript here)Gates and Clinton made all the arguments against a date certain, all McCain added is that you should have a date, or not, but not both.

[Marty]

"The jist is that if Obama's timeline is real - and not a fake out - then his plan is better than some of the other plans that have been discussed at high levels (10-15 years of intense COIN operations, etc.)."

So this quote from Sec Gates from the Meet the Press link earlier must be disappointing:

Well, first of all, we're not talking about an abrupt withdrawal. We're talking about something that will take care--take place over a period of time. We--our commanders think that these additional forces, and one of the reasons for the president's decision to try and accelerate their deployment, is, is the view that the this extended surge has the opportunity to make significant gains in terms of reversing the momentum of the Taliban, denying them control of Afghan territory and degrading their capabilities. Our military thinks we have a real opportunity to do that. And it's not just in the next 18 months, because we will have significant--we will have 100,000 forces, troops there, and they are not leaving in July of 2011. Some, handful, or some small number, or whatever the conditions permit, will begin to withdraw at that time.

Bold Mine.

[Eric Martin]

So this quote from Sec Gates from the Meet the Press link earlier must be disappointing

Yes, very much so. My lukewarm support of the "not worst case option" is entirely contingent. As I've said all along.

If you read my post, I flagged some other examples of double speak. In these paragraphs:

"Then, of course, there's the very real fear that Obama will not stick to his timeline - out of his own designs, or fear of crossing the potent defense establishment that never quite finds the right conditions for withdrawal. Speaking of which, there are some disturbing initial wisps of smoke about Obama delaying the SOFA withdrawal dates for Iraq at the request of Odierno and other military leaders on the ground. Odierno's recalcitrance should surprise no one.

Nor should an Afghan version of military foot dragging come as a shock when it eventually, inevitably materializes. In fact, as Michael Crowley points out, there is already plenty of early caveating and jockeying with respect to the fluidity of the 2011 date."

[Eric Martin]

The point on it being good or bad to have a date certain is not to be laid at the feet of McCain or Republicans

The point that the Taliban will lay low if you set a date should be laid at the feet of the people making that point, whoever they are. At the moment, they are McCain and other Republicans.

Gates and Clinton made all the arguments against a date certain

Did they argue that a date would allow the Taliban to lay low until withdrawal?

[Marty]

"Gates and Clinton made all the arguments against a date certain

Did they argue that a date would allow the Taliban to lay low until withdrawal?"

Yes, read the transcript.

[russell]

The line of argument I find most frustrating in all of the debate on Afghanistan is that our goal must be to defeat the Taliban.

The Taliban live there. Some non-trivial portion of the Pashtuns, who are a very non-trivial portion of the Afghans, are either quite supportive of the Taliban, or at least prefer them to the central government in Kabul.

They're not going to wait us out. They are just going to be there, because there isn't anywhere else for them to go. They were there before we got there, they've been there the whole time we've been there, and they'll be there when we leave.

It seems to me, FWIW, that any stable outcome in Afghanistan is going to have to account for, and find a place for, the Taliban as social and political actors.

I recognize that Taliban military are shooting at our guys. I'm not sure the solution to that is to keep shooting back until they're all dead.

If we stay there for another 50 years, the Taliban or someone quite a bit like the Taliban will be there when we leave.

[hairshirthedonist]

I am amazed at the capability of the supposed progressives to go from hardline positions on withdrawal to supporting a non-withdrawal date that bordered on a lie and was a purely political construct for internal consumption.

As for me, I think we should be leaving and never said otherwise. But that has no bearing on my opinion of the stupidity of the "Oh, no! He announced a draw-down date!" crowd. And saying the draw-down date isn't a real draw-down date is an entirely different criticism than saying there shouldn't be a (stated) draw-down date.

[hairshirthedonist]

I recognize that Taliban military are shooting at our guys. I'm not sure the solution to that is to keep shooting back until they're all dead.

Getting out of range would be among the other solutions, I think.

[Sapient]

I really don't think this war has anything to do with what Afghanistan "looks like" for us to leave, other than that we will always have to have a strong enough presence there, either militarily or diplomatically, to keep people who hate us away from the nukes. It's all about this quotation from Obama's speech:

"Since 9/11, al Qaeda’s safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.

Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future."

We can talk about al Qaida in other places in the world, but along the Afghan-Pakistan border, they could get control of nuclear weapons.

Obama is trying to do something that's effective, but will be the most efficient and effective option given our precarious resource situation.

In order to do what Obama thinks is the minimum in terms of intelligent security, we have to have governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan with whom we can find partnership in warding off the nuclear threat. He never said that we were going to withdraw all of our troops in 18 months, and I don't see how we could do that - but he thinks that if we have more people there now, we may be able to have fewer people after that, and he's making that calculation because everybody knows, including the Taliban, that we can't keep a large military force there forever. (In other words, it's not news to the rest of the world that we're going broke.)

I hope Obama is right.

[Eric Martin]

Yes, read the transcript

You are right, and so they are every bit as deserving of derision for their views.

It is a silly position, regardless of whether you're a Dem or a Republican.

Thanks for the info.

[Sapient]

russell re: the Taliban: "They're not going to wait us out. They are just going to be there, because there isn't anywhere else for them to go. They were there before we got there, they've been there the whole time we've been there, and they'll be there when we leave.

It seems to me, FWIW, that any stable outcome in Afghanistan is going to have to account for, and find a place for, the Taliban as social and political actors."

That's probably true, but they don't have to be politically in control. I think that's what we're trying to ensure doesn't happen.

Remember when Bush was threatening invasion of Iraq based on WMD? There was an interesting discussion about protecting the U.S. against such a WMD threat by way of "muscular diplomacy" - in other words inspections backed by a credible military threat. (Of course, it came to pass that inspections were carried out, revealed no WMD's, but that wasn't good enough for Bush; we had to use the military anyway just to say we could.) But the theory of diplomacy plus credible military threat seemed like a plausible strategy.

In order to have diplomacy plus credible military threat, it seems like we have to set the stage in Afghanistan for an effective diplomatic relationship. I'm pretty sure that's what Obama wants Afghanistan to look like. The situation as it stands doesn't lend itself to the possibility of effective diplomatic engagement that would promise security to the United States and its allies.

[Eric Martin]

we will always have to have a strong enough presence there, either militarily or diplomatically, to keep people who hate us away from the nukes

I don't see how an escalation and multi-decade occupation of Afghanistan helps us to achieve that. The nukes were secure before we invaded, and their security has little to do with our occupation of Afghanistan. If anything, we've pused AQ into Pakistan proper, which I'm not sure helps (but then, I don't think it's a major threat either - the nukes are under tight wraps).

We can talk about al Qaida in other places in the world, but along the Afghan-Pakistan border, they could get control of nuclear weapons.

How? The nukes are under tight wraps. The biggest fear would be to push Pakistan to the point of breaking and revolution, at which point there would be vulnerabilities. But if that's the fear, then why press a war that's pushing Pakistan closer to the brink?

In order to do what Obama thinks is the minimum in terms of intelligent security, we have to have governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan with whom we can find partnership in warding off the nuclear threat.

The government in Afghanistan can ward off the nuclear threat? I think that's a stretch. And I don't see how an escalation and multi-decade occupation of Afghanistan helps us to achieve that in Pakistan. Seems to be having the opposite effect.

The Taliban don't care for nukes. The Afghan Talibs want to control Afghanistan.

[Point]

Looking at Sapient's point, I found some sense; my big concern is, irregardless of how secure Pakistan's nukes are*, the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan is becoming a new true AQ sanctuary -- a key resource in carrying out MTA's, and hard to come by (esp. post 9/11).

This doesn't mean that every and all who currently call themselves "Taliban" must be barred from holding any amount of political power; it only means that they must be denied enough, and in such a way, as to prevent AQ from renewing their protected safe havens.

That means we need to work with the governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (and that means limiting the Taliban's influence in both).

*not to doubt Eric, but I'd love to see a link -- just for some peace of mind, understand...

[Point]

Reading over my comment; probably should have said "nevertheless" or "though" before "my big concern", TBC...

[Sapient]

"the nukes are under tight wraps"

Maybe. I hope so. I don't feel particularly comfortable about those nukes, and I'm not alone.

"The Taliban don't care for nukes. The Afghan Talibs want to control Afghanistan."

I doubt the Afghan Talibs had any interest in bombing the World Trade Center either. The problem is not with their interests, but with whom they allow to find safe haven in their country and who goes back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"The government in Afghanistan can ward off the nuclear threat?" No, but it helps us to have a strong diplomatic relationship with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to help deter people who are a threat to our interests, including those who might be able to use the nuclear weapons there.

The situation in the two countries have gotten worse for a number of reasons, including perhaps our mishandling of Afghanistan. I find it difficult to believe that any administration would feel comfortable completely washing its hands of any situation occurring there. What I think Obama's trying to do is bring enough security to establish a window for diplomatic initiatives to take place among those likely to be powerful, including Taliban. What he doesn't want is a "failed state" where there is no diplomatic possibility because no one has enough authority to speak as "government".

[Eric Martin]

Pakistan's nukes are kept in separate pieces. The triggers are kept separate from other components to make for redundant security precautions. The military has a tight coterie of elites in charge of their safety - even going as far as yanking any ostensible control from Zardari in recent weeks.

Even the bomb story linked above by sapient only allows for the proximity of "nuclear material" - not an actual weapon. Not that we want nuclear material falling in the wrong hands obviously.

According to Sy Hersh, the US and Pakistan are increasing joing security measures in order to further those objectives.

It's not that I'm not concerned, mind you. Or that I don't foresee risks. It's just that I don't see how our military campaign is serving the interest of keeping AQ out of Pakistan and/or away from the nukes.

After all, the bomb story linked to above happened in October. The article said incidents have been increasing, not waning. All while our troops were humping around Afghanistan in large numbers.

My biggest fear comes from extremists in the Pakistan armed forces collaborating with al-Qaeda. The question is, is our war making that more or less likely?

I hope the latter, and fear the former.

[Point]

"nuclear material - not an actual weapon"

"nukes" =/= "nuclear material" -- doh! (slaps self on forehead) Thanks for the clear language, Eric.

"My biggest fear comes from extremists in the Pakistan armed forces collaborating with al-Qaeda."

Not a crazy position, considering their military's track record.

[Sapient]

"My biggest fear comes from extremists in the Pakistan armed forces collaborating with al-Qaeda. The question is, is our war making that more or less likely?

I hope the latter, and fear the former."

Me too. This is when, though, I can only hope that the people who are privy to our best intelligence are doing what's sensible. I voted for Obama based on my belief that he is inquisitive, intelligent, prudent and methodical, and am trusting his judgment on this. One thing I do know is that the U.S. would not be comfortable losing its intelligence capabilities in the region, and if that's threatened by our "friends" losing power in Afghanistan, nobody's going to let that happen.

[Nombrilisme Vide]

@Sapient:
The situation as it stands doesn't lend itself to the possibility of effective diplomatic engagement that would promise security to the United States and its allies.

This is, not to put too fine a point on it, not credible. Afghanistan has never posed a meaningful security threat to the United States*. If you include the obscenely corrupt and illegitimate Karzai government under the "allies" heading, I'll concede it... but don't see that as a meaningful concern, and certainly not one worth killing 30s and 30s of Afghan civilians and American soldiers for.

*9/11, you say? I'll see your 9/11 and raise you a 3/11 and 7/7. Those latter didn't seem to be all that prevented by our disruption and occupation of Afghanistan. If you want to argue that the former took more planning and coordination than the latter, or were smaller scale, I'd point out that said planning largely occurred in Western nations, and the smaller scale was likely a result of tighter security measures, again applied in Western nations. We're drifting into tiger-repellent rock territory here.

[Mike]

Definitive. Well done.

[Nombrilisme Vide]

(I should point out that I understand you feel its important to deny "safe havens", and this is a fundamental point of disagreement. However, I would argue that it is incumbent upon you to 1) demonstrate that denying safe havens is either necessary or sufficient to prevent large-scale terrorist strikes, and 2) provide a credible rationale for believing that a post-withdrawal Taliban government would be willing to provide a safe haven given the cost of doing so previously. The latter point is the most important and least supported of the two, and a refusal to address it would disincline me to take anything you say seriously.)

[Sapient]

"I would argue that it is incumbent upon you to 1) demonstrate that denying safe havens is either necessary or sufficient to prevent large-scale terrorist strikes, and 2) provide a credible rationale for believing that a post-withdrawal Taliban government would be willing to provide a safe haven given the cost of doing so previously."

It's not incumbent upon me to do either. A post-withdrawal Taliban government would only take power (possibly) after a civil war. We might be able to establish a diplomatic relationship with a post-civil war Taliban government, or maybe not, but we would certainly lose the ability to control any wildcards there in the meantime. I may be wrong, but it doesn't seem to me that there is a strong Afghan national identity. The relationships among tribal entities throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to be what worries us. If it were just a matter of the Afghan people, as a nation, deciding their own fate within their borders, it's my impression that we would have been long gone.

[Nombrilisme Vide]

With all due respect, upthread you argue that we cannot let matters stand "as they are now", or even leave a situation in which the Afghan Taliban might eventually win the civil war, because they would then provide safe haven to terrorists who would strike the US. If you wish to put forth such claims, it is incumbent upon you to defend the aforementioned points - most pointedly the latter of the two.

[elm]

I suspect that any post-withdrawal Afghan government will include individuals who are currently identified as Taliban. The alternative would be to kill a whole lot more people in Taliban-controlled areas and to force the survivors to accept the corrupt Karzai government.

If they disarm and if they have to govern, then they will be subject to political pressure from Afghan rivals and diplomatic pressure from abroad. I suspect that the locals want roads, electricity, schools, and wells more than they want to harbor Arab militants.

[Point]

"I would argue that it is incumbent upon you to 1) demonstrate that denying safe havens is either necessary or sufficient to prevent large-scale terrorist strikes, and 2) provide a credible rationale for believing that a post-withdrawal Taliban government would be willing to provide a safe haven given the cost of doing so previously. The latter point is the most important and least supported of the two, and a refusal to address it would disincline me to take anything you say seriously.)"

The first point I know I've discussed on previous threads*. As to the second, the fact that their previous incarnation was crazy enough to do it before, combined with the continued cooperation among AQ and several Taliban factions, makes such a renewal seem likely.

*Not that I'm not ruling out revisiting it, even here; just saying...

[Nombrilisme Vide]

Point, I don't mean this to sound as harsh as I'm pretty sure it will, but it's almost dehumanizing to casually assume as you do here that a nationalist Taliban government is going to look at the last decade and make a cost-benefit analysis wherein they would likely conclude that it would be to their advantage to provide safe haven to an active international terrorist organization. That they were "crazy enough" to do it before their nation got invaded and occupied, their government toppled, and tens of thousands of their fellow Afghans killed has bearing without caveat only if you make some very peculiar assumptions about the mentalities of the Afghan people.

At the very least, I would ask that you provide meaningful argumentation for them being likely to do so again beyond the bald assertion you make here. Failure to do so puts you in the unenviable position of appearing to either deny the brutal effects the invasion, occupation, and ongoing civil war have had, or believe that the Taliban are essentially monstrous cartoon characters.

(Regarding current ongoing cooperation: is there a significant cost to the factions doing so? I rather doubt it. Post-occupation for an Afghan government would be another story, but when all insurgents are treated a priori as AQ allies, there's little reason not to make use of what resources are available.)

[russell]

I may be wrong, but it doesn't seem to me that there is a strong Afghan national identity.

My understanding is that Afghanistan was a coherent political entity from the founding of the Durrani Empire in 1747 until the Marxist revolution in 1978. Or, actually, through the Marxist revolution and until the end of the Soviet invasion in 1992.

My sources are basically wiki level, so take it with a grain of salt. But as I understand it, Afghanistan has been a pan-tribal political entity for a couple hundred years. Longer than the US has existed in its current form.

[Point]

"Point, I don't mean this to sound as harsh as I'm pretty sure it will, but it's almost dehumanizing to casually assume as you do here that a nationalist Taliban government is going to look at the last decade and make a cost-benefit analysis wherein they would likely conclude that it would be to their advantage to provide safe haven to an active international terrorist organization."

Did the Taliban make a cost benefit analysis when they gave sanctuary and aid to an organization whose stated purpose was to kill American civilians, and not just destroy American power, but do so by getting them to invade Afghanistan?

Did they make a cost benefit analysis when, after AQ carried out the largest terrorist attack in history, killing several thousand Americans, the US asked said sanctuary to be put to an end -- and in response, they defended OBL, and made no serious effort to even extradite him?

Maybe they did -- after all, AQ stated end was to bring down "apostate" governments to establish governments modeled on the Taliban across the muslim world. Or maybe they didn't.

Whatever the motives, the Taliban has given AQ safe haven, they have defended AQ's safe haven (falling from power in the process), and many of them continue to work with AQ to this day.

I don't want to seem harsh either, and I definitely don't want to cause offense* -- but to see the same thing happen over and over again, and to expect different results is the definition of insanity. To risk the security of the American people on such an expectation is dangerously naive.

*I really mean that

[Sapient]

russell, I'm no expert - I've read one book - but, from Wikipedia:

"The term "Afghanistan," meaning the "Land of Afghans," was mentioned by the 16th century Mughal Emperor Babur in his memoirs, referring to the territories south of Kabul that were inhabited by Afghans.[20] Until the 19th century the name was only used for the traditional lands of the Pashtuns, while the kingdom as a whole was known as the Kingdom of Kabul, as mentioned by the British statesman and historian Mountstuart Elphinstone.[21] Other parts of the country were at certain periods recognized as independent kingdoms, such as the Kingdom of Balkh in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.[22] With the expansion and centralization of the country, Afghan authorities adopted and extended the name "Afghanistan" to the entire kingdom, after its English translation had already appeared in various treaties between the British Raj and Qajarid Persia, referring to the lands subject to the Pashtun Barakzai Dynasty of Kabul.[23] "Afghanistan" as the name for the entire kingdom was mentioned in 1857 by Friedrich Engels.[24] It became the official name when the country was recognized by the world community in 1919, after regaining full independence over its foreign affairs from the British,[25] and was confirmed as such in the nation's 1923 constitution."

It's my impression that Afghanistan whose longest period of stability (again from Wikipedia) was a 40-year period in the 20th century, was seen as a coherent entity more by those not living there than those that were. In contrast, the area of the Hindu Kush, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has for hundreds of years been the home of Islamic fundamentalists who are the "base" of the Taliban.

I'm not in favor of killing all of these people, by the way. But I find it worrisome that nuclear "materials" are in a place that's accessible to people so hostile to the West.

[elm]

"hostile to the West"

Yes, what did the west ever do to them?

"I'm not in favor of killing all of these people"

What alternatives are you willing to consider?

[Nombrilisme Vide]

Did the Taliban make a cost benefit analysis when they gave sanctuary and aid to an organization whose stated purpose was to kill American civilians, and not just destroy American power, but do so by getting them to invade Afghanistan?

Was this particular purpose, particularly the part about inspiring invasion, stated before or after said invasion? I honestly can't recall ATM, and am not sure whereabouts I might find a reference on short notice, but I'd rather suspect it was after, not before.

Did they make a cost benefit analysis when, after AQ carried out the largest terrorist attack in history, killing several thousand Americans, the US asked said sanctuary to be put to an end -- and in response, they defended OBL, and made no serious effort to even extradite him?

"Serious" is a very subjective term in this context. I would respond by asserting that the US made no "serious" effort to secure his extradition - I seem to recall some fairly unequivocal language about not negotiating with terrorists, and a bald refusal to present evidence of his guilt. These are hardly hallmarks of a serious desire to see someone extradited, and in perfect frankness I would hardly blame a nation for refusing to extradite someone to a nation which refused to present evidence of guilt, and in fact claimed that evidence was beside the point because "[they] know he's guilty".

Whatever the motives, the Taliban has given AQ safe haven, they have defended AQ's safe haven (falling from power in the process), and many of them continue to work with AQ to this day.

Again, it's highly debatable as to whether they had any choice regarding "defending AQ's safe haven", as frankly the US had all appearances of making extradition requests in extraordinarily bad faith, with a desire to be rebuked, and it's far from clear they would not have invaded "just to make sure" (using reasoning much like you present above) in any case. The US wanted blood, Bush wanted blood. Perhaps if the Taliban had responded to the quite-irregular extradition "request" by hog-tying OBL and dumping him unceremoniously into USSF hands Iraq would have just gotten invaded a year sooner, but that was far from clear at the time.

I don't want to seem harsh either, and I definitely don't want to cause offense* -- but to see the same thing happen over and over again, and to expect different results is the definition of insanity. To risk the security of the American people on such an expectation is dangerously naive.

Over and over again? One instance does not constitute "over and over again". Furthermore, the last decade has made quite bloodily clear that there are consequences for such actions. The situation has changed. The calculus has changed. To pretend it hasn't is to be willfully blinkered.

Also, you raise the matter of "the security of the American people". If you insist on bringing this up, we must revisit the matter of the necessity of "safe havens". If safe havens are not necessary to launch attacks killing hundreds or thousands of Americans, your claims regarding the necessity of eliminating the least possibility that one could arise falls flat out of the gate. In that case, we are assuredly slaughtering many thousands of Afghan civilians (and 30s of insurgents) to inquantifiably reduce (but never eliminate) the chance that several thousand Americans might die. Frankly, 3/11 and 7/7 strongly suggest that havens are indeed unnecessary, and that militarily eliminating every possibility of their arising is more likely to increase danger (by projecting an image of a brutal crusading imperialist aggressor) than reduce it.

[Sapient]

elm? What DID the west ever do to Afghanistan? In fact, the U.S. armed the very people who now hate the U.S. As late as 2000, the U.S. was funding the Taliban government's efforts to eradicate heroin manufacturing. Why not answer your own question - what did we do to the Taliban that they sheltered al Qaida?

And as for not "killing all these people", I'm in favor of leaving, in case you haven't been following the thread, after the period that Obama suggests is necessary to bring enough security for the Afghan government to start have a chance to rebuild some of the country, and to allow us the possibility of dependable diplomatic alternatives. I was never a fan of Bush's policies, and didn't trust him to lead a war in Afghanistan, whether justified or not. But here we are. Assuming that the U.S. leaves, and adopts a hands-off policy during the course of Afghanistan's civil war, do you think that the Afghan people will be left to decide their own fate? Who do we mean by "the Afghan people"? The women? The Taliban? Who?

[Point]

"I honestly can't recall ATM..."

FWIW, my memory says OBL outlined his plan well before 9/11; does anybody have a link with the right date? (Eric?)

"Over and over again? One instance does not constitute "over and over again""

I'm counting their initial invitation, their continued sanctuary, their post 9/11 defense, and their alliance post-invasion as separate "instances"; I guess we can put that under "semantics".

"If you insist on bringing this up, we must revisit the matter of the necessity of "safe havens"."

Fine by me*.

Put simply, it's a lot easier to kill a few people than several thousand, in terms of team coordination, long range planning, and so forth. A loose, grassroots network can give you a lot of smaller terrorist incidents, but the more ambitious the plans -- dependent on a tighter and more regulated network -- require something more. In the case of 9/11, that something more included Afghanistan.

A safe haven is key to developing this network -- to have a secure place for face to face networking on a global scale. This, and other benefits that come with safe haven (e.g. a base to better manage finances) are essential in planning and executing more the complex and ambitious terrorist attacks.

"Frankly, 3/11 and 7/7 strongly suggest that havens are indeed unnecessary..."

At best, they show that small or medium terrorist attacks do not need complex networks; I'm talking about something more akin to an act of war, aka Massive Terrorist Attacks (MTA's)** or 9/11 level attacks.

*my computer access and future schedule notwithstanding
*sorry if the acronym was less than clear

[elm]

Sapient: Britain conducted three wars in/against Afghanistan between 1839 and 1919 and meddled in both internal and foreign affairs during this time. Russia also meddled in Afghan affairs at that time. That meddling and killing was mostly a game of dueling empires. Neither flavor of foreign intervention was good for the Afghan state (such as it was) or the people there.

Later, of course, the U.S. (and other governments) funded violent religious fundamentalists to fight a proxy war against the U.S.S.R. Again, neither side had the interests of the Afghan people in mind. Following that, the rest of the world washed its hands of the radicals it had funded and left them to have couple of nice civil wars.

The Afghan people have every reason to treat foreign involvement with suspicion.

Mullah Omar's decision to shelter Bin Laden is most reasonably explained by the apparent alliance between the two men. Bin Laden helped Omar by killing Omar's enemies, praise for Omar himself, and funding Omar's faction. It's not at all clear that Arab militants are well-liked by the people of Afghanistan.

I take no pleasure in saying that the fate of the Afghan people looks grim. The government is corrupt and ineffective over much of the country. Recent election fraud will undermine Afghan elections for the foreseeable future. Neither the Taliban nor the Karzai government appears to respect the will of the Afghan people.

The only dim hope I have is that some elements of the Taliban can be coerced/convinced to disarm and join the government (and that Karzai can be coerced into accepting that). In that case, there's a chance that the factions will compete through election fraud rather than civil war.

I do not believe that McChrystal's COIN strategy has a good chance of success. A large assumption in that plan (if I recall correctly) is that an Afghan army and police will be effective in securing U.S. interests. There is little to no historical basis for believing this. Compare with the the Philippine–American War, which took 126,000 U.S. military personnel and the population of the Philippines at the time was 1/4 that of Afghanistan today -- which suggests a necessary U.S. force of 500,000 (also, the Philippines was a U.S. territory for 30 years after that).

[Nombrilisme Vide]

"Over and over again? One instance does not constitute "over and over again""

I'm counting their initial invitation, their continued sanctuary, their post 9/11 defense, and their alliance post-invasion as separate "instances"; I guess we can put that under "semantics".

How about we don't? None of those separate "instances" have much in common beyond shared participants. The initial invitation lacked the major arguments against it in that there was a relatively little political cost associated with accepting them. The continued sanctuary (by which I presume you mean post-embassy-and-Cole bombings) drew cruise missiles and rebukes, so there was a clear cost to hosting them, but not a state-threatening one. Post-9/11, again, it's not clear the US was acting in good faith with its extradition requests - I freely concede this is the point at which it seems least rational for them to have continued to offer sanctuary, but the consequences of refusal look far clearer in hindsight than they did at the time. See also the level of consequences the "continued sanctuary" brought - prior consequences were not state-threatening, so this third instance is significantly different than the second, though these two are probably the most similar of the four. Post-invasion alliances with some Taliban factions? Totally different animal. Since to the US Taliban = AQ, there's little cost and much benefit to using AQ resources and manpower so long as their goals (kill the infidel soldiers, use Afghanistan as a honeypot) don't directly conflict with Taliban goals (free Afghanistan, reclaim the government).

I find it difficult to assume that any of these "instances" except the third offer any real insight into whether a post-occupation Taliban even might be inclined to host AQ again... and even that seems pretty weak evidence of future willingness when one considers the immediate result of that decision. Sure, they might, but I hardly find citation of them doing so prior to invasion and occupation to be compelling "proof" that they would be willing to do so once more if, after expending years of blood, sweat, and tears, they managed to reclaim power.

A loose, grassroots network can give you a lot of smaller terrorist incidents, but the more ambitious the plans -- dependent on a tighter and more regulated network -- require something more. In the case of 9/11, that something more included Afghanistan.

Speculation. The related and substantially similar Bojinka plot reached a quite advanced stage w/o the benefit of Afghanistan. At best, some financing was funneled through Sudan - and it's not clear that was necessary, just that this was where their source of funding happened to be operating out of.

At best, they show that small or medium terrorist attacks do not need complex networks; I'm talking about something more akin to an act of war, aka Massive Terrorist Attacks (MTA's)** or 9/11 level attacks.

Assertion. Please demonstrate that 9/11 was logistically on a different order of magnitude than 3/11 or 7/7. I.e., that the planning, funding, and other preparation were substantially more involved than NMTAs, rather than the targets being larger. The only extremely involved portion of the 9/11 attacks was the procurement of flight training - the rest required patience, dedication, and resolve, not profound organization.

Also consider the Oklahoma City bombing. I would staunchly argue this was in scope on the same order of magnitude as 9/11 - if there had been more conspirators than 2 (plus 2 accomplices, but still) the casualty figures could have climbed far upwards from the 168 who died. This attack was carried out for $5000, and was organized by individuals. Prior to 9/11, it was the most massive terrorist attack on US soil - and it required no deep organizational roots, just a single cell of individuals who knew and trusted each other, with shared political ideology.

I'll again cite the Bojinka plot as well. Aside from the financing, there was no significant logistical tail. It's hard to meaningfully judge the magnitude of this because it was thwarted during planning, but it does not point to a need to have a safe haven for training or networking purposes, and it is not clear if the financing would have been more difficult to manage had AQ not had haven in Sudan.

Basically, show your work. I don't accept a priori that an attack with casualty figures in the thousands necessarily demands more planning (let alone a national-level safe haven) than an attack that "merely" kills tens or hundreds. The difference is largely in the ingenuity of the attackers, and the vigilance of their targets. Your cited reasons for such a haven being necessary are very, very fuzzy.

[Hartmut]

As Rachel Maddow put it the day before yesterday: it looks like the Taliban are already effectively in power in some parts of the country and during the night. During the day the officials from the Kabul regime call the shots (pun intended) while the Taliban offcials lay low. During the night the Karzaiistas hide shivering in their guarded homes while the Taliban governors/judges/etc. rule. To say that the Taliban have to be prevented from coming back might therefore be based on false assumption in the first place (i.e. that they are not 'there' at the moment).

[Eric Martin]

FWIW, my memory says OBL outlined his plan well before 9/11; does anybody have a link with the right date? (Eric?)

Osama discussed it with a Pakistani journalist after the Cole bombing - thinking that was enough. It wasn't.

That being said, many high level Taliban felt that Osama went too far with 9/11, and were none too happy because they knew their goose was soon to be cooked.

It's hard to feel sympathy given the pattern of attacks launched by AQ, but from many accounts I've come across, he didn't exactly consult with the Taliban leadership about his 9/11 plans.

[Eric Martin]

Hartmut, this Nir Rosen piece discusses the Taliban shadow governments cropping up all over Afghanistan (and owning the night).

http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php

[Point]

"How about we don't?"

Suit yourself; I'm done with the subject.

"Also consider the Oklahoma City bombing... if there had been more conspirators than 2..."

Than they would have needed some way of meeting and recruiting them, while not giving away the plan -- some kind of network*...

"I'll again cite the Bojinka plot as well. Aside from the financing, there was no significant logistical tail. It's hard to meaningfully judge the magnitude of this because it was thwarted during planning..."

No kidding; looking over the planned attacks, I saw a lot of holes that still needed filling, not the least of which was more personnel in the planes part of the operation. As I understand it, there was Yousef and Wali Khan Amin Shah, who KSM knew through OBL. (WKAS and OBL fought together in Afghanistan.)

"it does not point to a need to have a safe haven for training or networking purposes, and it is not clear if the financing would have been more difficult to manage had AQ not had haven in Sudan"

I won't speak to terrorist training (at least here), but otherwise this is the opposite of the conclusion I reach looking at this.

This seems consistent with a pattern of attempts at similar plane operations, both successful (eg 9/11) and failed (eg Heathrow**).

When it comes to MTA's that less similar to 9/11 -- using nuclear or radioactive material, for example -- you have only educated speculation, but even then, the same principles of organization apply (only more so), making a base of operations with some kind of sanctuary all the more necessary.

All that said, I can understand looking at this same evidence, and not reaching the same conclusion***; saying a certain resource is necessary to a relatively recent threat is going to be something of a judgment call. As such, agreeing to disagree wouldn't be the craziest thing...

*if such a network, devoted to causing massive damage in the US existed within the country, I'd say we'd be a country with some serious problems, arguably an insurgency

**though in this case, the central man, Rashid Rauf, technically did the "base" work in Waziristan, I would say this was an attempt by AQ to use their developing safe haven for further attacks

***at least on the subject of safe haven necessity

[Sapient]

Interesting that Nir Rosen says that "McChrystal assumed that creating a centralized, functioning state in Afghanistan, which has never had one, is possible."

When I said that I didn't think that Afghans had a strong national identity, this is perhaps closer to what I should have said.

[Point]

Also, thanks to Eric for clearing up the TL.

[hairshirthedonist]

I not the most historically astute guy by any stretch, so I'm putting this out to get the thoughts of people who are better informed than I.

It seems to me that there is a significance attributed to Afghanistan as The Place Al Qaeda Loves that fails to consider (fully) the fact it happened to be an attractive battleground upon which to fight imperial aggressors (i.e. the Soviets), while receiving funding, weapons and training from a superpower (i.e. the US), in defense of Muslims (i.e. most of the Afghans, including the Taliban).

My point is that OBL and what later became Al Qaeda were in Afghanistan with the cooperation of the Taliban for historical reasons that had nothing (or very little) to do with setting up shop for terrorist attacks on the US. Those who became Al Qaeda were simply already established there when they decided to begin attacking US interests, so that's where they did it from. I'm not sure how much that translates into Afghanistan being The Place to Be after all that has taken place over the last 8 years or what will have taken place after the next 18 months.

Do your worst against my possibly flimsy logic or flawed facts, only if you like, of course.

[Eric Martin]

I'll say that some counterterror gurus claim that al-Qaeda doesn't want Afghanistan as a safe haven any more because Pakistan is much better in terms of being secure, modern, and strategically important to their cause.

[Point]

Hair, while you bring up a decent enough point, I think it bears remembering that AQ only set up shop in Afghanistan after being booted from Sudan, by which point they had developed something of a record. It was far from their first choice.

Which ties nicely to Eric's following point -- because while we can work with Pakistan to seriously disrupt (and -- fingers crossed -- eventually remove) AQ's developing safe haven, we still need to be cautious that the organization can't respond by simply reviving their previous one.

[nous]

...we still need to be cautious that the organization can't respond by simply reviving their previous one.

Or, like drug cartels, simply find another location with a small but sympathetic local population and few US assets in the region. No need to go back to Somalia.

Which is why I think we will have as much luck with these safe havens as we have had with the War on Drugs.

[Sapient]

"Which is why I think we will have as much luck with these safe havens as we have had with the War on Drugs."

This is why I don't think any of this is about safe havens generally. I think it's all about safe havens close to Pakistan's nukes. I know they're all secure and all that ...

[Point]

"Or, like drug cartels, simply find another location with a small but sympathetic local population and few US assets in the region."

And a regime (or ruling power, or what have you) willing to give them sanctuary, which is a lot harder to come by.

"No need to go back to Somalia..."

... seeing as the ICU has made it clear they don't want AQ in their backyard.

[Marty]

"What happened to my blog?"

It's gone. We just talk about war strategy now.

[Eric Martin]

"What happened to my blog?"

It's gone. We just talk about war strategy now.

Alas, where have all the authors gone? None but me to tend the shop, and so...what Marty said.

[Point]

Uh guys, I don't think that's Hilzoy; I wouldn't recommend clicking the link; and it should probably be flagged.

[JanieM]

Folks, seriously, it's clear on the face of it that that wasn't hilzoy; she would never contribute a comment like that.

And I strongly suggest not clicking on the link.

Or in other words, cleanup needed on Aisle X.

[Eric Martin]

Doh!

[Nombrilisme Vide]

When it comes to MTA's that less similar to 9/11 -- using nuclear or radioactive material, for example -- you have only educated speculation, but even then, the same principles of organization apply (only more so), making a base of operations with some kind of sanctuary all the more necessary.

The major problem I have with your conviction that your MTAs require the specific sort of setup 9/11 enjoyed is that you're drawing conclusions from a sample set of... what? Less than 10 cases? Maybe less than 5? With only one actual example of a successful MTA?

It would be nice if we could conclude that 9/11 was in a category by itself not because of its perpetrators' ingenuity in exploiting a particular vulnerability on the part of its victims, but rather because doing that much damage a priori requires a certain level of organization to achieve... but I, unlike you, fail to see how we can. 9/11 was spectacularly devastating not because of the preparation that went into it, but rather because of the opportunity it seized upon. It may be that it was facilitated by its planners having a failed state safe haven - it may not; how many people have been detained for having "gone to Afghanistan for terror training"? There are definite drawbacks to wanting to engage in the face-to-face networking in a location viewed as dedicated to such by all involved parties. I'll admit that I'm drawing from a sample size only a bit larger than yours (though it is larger since I'm not shoehorning 9/11 into a category of its own), so my conclusions lack rigor as well - though in my favor I'm not asserting a negative to be proven. But I can't for a minute bring myself to believe that large-scale attacks can be averted simply by denying dedicated safe havens in failed states. That smacks of wishful thinking.

Maybe you're just less pessimistic than I am. In any case, I suspect agreeing to disagree is probably for the best.

[Point]

I think that's a fine way to end it. It was my pleasure to disagree with you, NV.

[russell]

When all is said and done, here is how I think Afghanistan is going to play out.

Obama, by virtue of his own temperament and the political realities he operates in, doesn't really see any options other than a continued, and expanded, military presence in Afghanistan.

We're going to put 100K folks in country there. The bulk of them will be there for 2 or 3 years. A significant number will be there for at least another 5.

At some point we'll just get tired of being there, or somebody else will be president and will have other priorities, or conditions on the ground will change such that it no longer makes sense for us to be there.

Whoever is driving the bus at that point will cook up a good rationale for leaving, and we'll leave.

Afghanistan will look, upon our departure, about how it looks today.

If you think otherwise, I'll ask you to show me one single example from the last fifty years of US history where it's played out any way other than how I've described.

Schools, water, reliable electric service, a basic public health program. Those things will change Afghanistan.

Guns, not so much.

Yes, all of those things need a basic level of public security to make them work. We're not providing that, and twice as many of us is not likely to make that any different.

I wish Obama luck.

[Sapient]

"At some point ... conditions on the ground will change such that it no longer makes sense for us to be there."

I think everyone would say that true, even the people who support our current presence there. Everyone DID forget about Afghanistan when we were all about Iraq and I don't doubt that "we'll" forget about it again very, very shortly - I mean, with all we have to think about - hell, Tiger Woods was unfaithful!

"Yes, all of those things need a basic level of public security to make them work. We're not providing that, and twice as many of us is not likely to make that any different."

A lot of people think that's not true. I'm not qualified to know. What we probably can be sure of is that without it, Afghanistan will continue its civil war, and the Taliban will probably be the dominant political force, as it was prior to 2001. And we'll be totally at the mercy of Pakistan's unstable government to have any influence in the border region. Maybe that's okay, but it's a huge risk (in terms of national security and politics) for any president to take right now.

[russell]

A lot of people think that's not true.

Lots of people think all kinds of things.

Iraq is about 437K square km, with a population of about 30M.

Afghanistan has about the same population, but is 647K square km, and includes much more difficult terrain. It's about the size of Texas, with a topography like the intermountain US west. High, rocky, arid, and harsh.

The population of Afghanistan is also, I believe, significantly more dispersed than in Iraq, where folks are more highly concentrated around urban centers.

And, Afghanistan has a very, very, very long history of not liking foreign occupation, benign or otherwise. And everybody has guns. Lots and lots and lots of guns.

I'd be delighted if all it took to establish a basic level of security and a competent central government in Afghanistan was another 30 or 40 thousand American troops. I think a stable, responsible, friendly, and self-sufficient Afghanistan is one of the finest things one could hope for.

I'm also no expert in how to run an occupation, or a nation building exercise. I'm not expert in military operations. I'm not an expert in the history and culture of Afghanistan.

I'm just looking at the simplest, most obvious of the salient features. Afghanistan is probably going to be harder than Iraq, and Iraq is more or less a shambles. Iraq will be a shambles for many years to come. And Iraq has billions of dollars in annual income to draw on, by virtue of the ocean of oil it sits on.

So, I'm skeptical that Obama's Afghanistan military surge is going to make that country anything other than what it is now, which is an occupied country run by the more or less corrupt and discredited client government of the occupying force.

My personal opinion is that that scenario is not going to play out in our best interest long term. I hold that opinion because I've seen this movie before, more than once. It's certainly not something I can see the Afghans liking very much. In fact, in my mind, those things are related to a significant degree.

I don't particularly blame Obama for the choice he's making. Afghanistan has been an incredibly chaotic place for at least a generation, Bush's efforts there were ineffective, Obama inherited a mess.

It would take an act of inspired creative political imagination at the level of something like, perhaps, the Marshall Plan to come up with an alternative to doubling down on the military option. Actually, probably something more dramatic and inspired than the Marshall Plan would be needed.

I'm not sure what, exactly, that might be, and I don't think anybody on the political stage right now, Obama included, has the kind of mind to dream it up.

More's the pity.

In short, as far as making wonderful things happen in Afghanistan, I think we're hosed. IMO our own best interests would be better served by spending our money, blood, and effort on infrastructure like schools, water, electricity, and public health, and our political initiatives should be directed to helping the Afghans put a government in place that they actually trust. Those things aren't gonna happen.

If we're worried about nukes, we need to do whatever we can to make sure the Pakistani nuclear materials are locked down tight, from the top down. There's nothing we can do in Afghanistan that's going to make that situation any better or worse.

If we're worried about acts of militant Islamic terrorism, we better get our intelligence and criminal investigative acts together here on the home front, because militant Islamic terrorists have demonstrated tremendous creativity and resourcefulness in coming up with ways to kill us. They don't need Afghanistan. Berlin, Somalia, or New Jersey will do.

In fact, I think we're going to look back on the days when Al Qaeda ran big training camps, with lots of highly visible infrastructure and the support of the Afghan Taliban, as the good old days. We're not likely to have an enemy that easy to keep tabs on again anytime soon.

How's that for a crappy situation?

A year from now we can compare notes and see how things are going, and whose predictions about how things were likely to play out ended up being closer to the reality. I'd be delighted to be proven wrong.

[Jay Jerome]

-Oh, man.. it's hard (arrg) to say this, but russell is (uuugg)..

-Go on, say it...

-I can't, no I can't do it..

-Say it or no cookies tonight... and I mean it!

-OK,OK, OK (gasp) russell is ... exactly right on Afghanistan, he nailed it...

-Good, now you can have your cookies..

-No thanks, I've lost my appetite. Maybe tomorrow, if it's those with the chocolate chips and raisins ...

[Sapient]

"A year from now we can compare notes and see how things are going, and whose predictions about how things were likely to play out ended up being closer to the reality."

Hope you're not talking about me when you're looking at whose predictions were correct, because I didn't make any. I certainly am not quarreling with your statement that Afghanistan is a mess - I'm not sure anyone is. I don't think anyone has any confidence in the "plan". I just think that it's the best Obama thinks he can do.

"In short, as far as making wonderful things happen in Afghanistan, I think we're hosed. IMO our own best interests would be better served by spending our money, blood, and effort on infrastructure like schools, water, electricity, and public health, and our political initiatives should be directed to helping the Afghans put a government in place that they actually trust. Those things aren't gonna happen."

I don't think wonderful things are going to happen either. But when you say that our best interests would be better served ... I agree. Isn't that what the "security" is there to enable?

So, do you suggests we just pack up every last person and leave? How do we make sure everything's tight and secure in Pakistan - take over Pakistan? Those are their nukes, not ours!