by Eric Martin
Last week, the Washington Post published a story detailing some of the tensions between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as recently discussed on this site. According to the Post story, the Taliban is increasingly assuming a dominant role (or returning to a dominant role after the down period that occurred post-US invasion):
As violence rises in Afghanistan, the power balance between insurgent groups has shifted, with a weakened al-Qaeda relying increasingly on the emboldened Taliban for protection and the manpower to carry out deadly attacks, according to U.S. military and intelligence officials.
The ascendancy of the Taliban and the relative decline of al-Qaeda have broad implications for the Obama administration as it seeks to define its enemy in Afghanistan and debates deploying tens of thousands of additional troops.
Although the war in Afghanistan began as a response to al-Qaeda terrorism, there are perhaps fewer than 100 members of the group left in the country, according to a senior U.S. military intelligence official in Kabul who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
This trend comes amid news that the lucrative and vital flow of cash from wealthydonors in the Gulf region that al-Qaeda used to great effect in the past has been increasingly shifting to the Taliban.
The Post piece also highlights some recent Taliban political/strategic adjustments that have created quite a stir in the jihadi community because of the potential schism with al-Qaeda indicated by these shifts:
Omar's mission is to force U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan and to recapture the country. His group is particularly active in attacking U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan, his home base.
This year, Omar's military committee published a rule book for followers, calling on them to protect the population and avoid civilian casualties -- much like U.S. counterinsurgency principles. He has railed against the corruption of President Hamid Karzai's government, an issue that resonates with Afghans. He has also solicited support from other Muslim countries. But al-Qaeda's agenda of global holy war and taste for mass-casualty attacks, no matter how many Muslim civilians are killed, complicate that goal.
In a February interview with al-Samoud magazine, Taliban political committee leader Agha Jan Mutassim praised the Saudi Arabian government, called for Muslim unity and said the Taliban "respects all different Islamic schools and branches without any discrimination" in Afghanistan.
Such positions may put Omar's Taliban at odds with al-Qaeda's extremist Sunni agenda of overthrowing what it sees as corrupt Muslim governments and targeting Shiites. Analysts said that Omar, who leads a council of Taliban commanders based in or around the Pakistani city of Quetta, wants such countries as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan to recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government if it regains power and that he has little interest in fomenting war elsewhere.
"We assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not extend its hand to cause jeopardy to others," Omar said in a written statement in September.
The messages from the Taliban leadership since the spring amount to something of a "revolution," said Wahid Mujda, a political analyst who was a Foreign Ministry official under the Taliban government. "Al-Qaeda's path is now different from the Taliban's path, and they are growing more separated."
However, not all groups lumped together under the clunky "Taliban" moniker are moving in the same direction as Mullah Omar's faction. Importantly, the powerful Haqqani faction is strengthening its ties:
Although that may be true of Omar's faction, observers here say that other segments of the Taliban have become more closely entwined with al-Qaeda than ever.
The Haqqani-led faction, which is blamed for many of the deadliest attacks on U.S. troops in eastern Afghanistan, works so closely with al-Qaeda that distinctions between the groups may be irrelevant, officials said.
In the lawless border town of Miran Shah in Pakistan's North Waziristan region, where insurgents hold sway and experience little interference from the Pakistani army, Haqqani's Taliban works side by side with al-Qaeda. Haqqani developed close ties with Arab fighters during the war against the Soviets in the 1980s, during which he received funding from the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. One of his wives is Arab. When bin Laden fled the U.S. invasion in 2001, he took refuge with Haqqani in a safe house between the Afghan city of Khost and Miran Shah, according to Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid.
Haqqani's network, which experts say maintains links with Pakistani authorities, fights in eastern Afghanistan.
It will be interesting to see to what extent, if any, the NATO military presence focuses on Haqqani's network in the east, rather than Omar's in the south. Or whether or not US military officials attempt to probe this potential divide and drive a wedge to deepen it.
OK, this must be the seventh time I've tried to make a quick post*, but here it goes:
I'm unsure yet what to make of Omar's comments. He's given AQ sanctuary before, last time he tried to convince the world he wasn't protecting them was pretty sheet thin, and he's not in the strongest position at present. That said, I'm not writing this news off, at least not completely.
Whatever the case, the Haqqani faction does pose a more imminent risk, as it strengthens its relationship with AQ, so focusing efforts on them (at least for now) makes a lot of sense.
I'll try to get back to you when I can.
*not on your end, I assure you
Posted by: Point | November 16, 2009 at 01:12 PM
Looking at it now, I think all those false starts helped me get my point across pretty decent. Hope it's not the last...
Posted by: Point | November 16, 2009 at 09:06 PM
... but it looks like, here, it will be :(
Posted by: Point | November 18, 2009 at 12:24 PM