Obsidian Wings

Nothing Says "Peace" Like Foreign Mercenaries

by Eric Martin

As discussed on this site on numerous occasions, one of the oddest arguments for escalating/perpetuating our military presence in Afghanistan is the stated fear that our withdrawal would destabilize Pakistan.  Implicit in this formulation is the presumption that our ongoing military occupation of Afghanistan (and concomitant military/political activity in Pakistan) is having a stabilizing effect in Pakistan itself.  This nostrum about the therapeutic value of large numbers of US forces pursuing US interests through force, like many of the widely accepted foreign policy myths, lacks supporting empirical evidence.  

In fact, the empirical evidence is all pointing in the opposite direction.  Pakistan today is far less stable than it was when we first invaded: there are raging clashes between the government and militant forces causing refugee crises numbering in the millions, there has been an increase in the frequency and intensity of domestic terrorist attacks, the Pakistani population is increasingly anti-American and increasingly radicalized, there is a crisis in leadership - with the current President, Asif Zardari nursing approval ratings in the sub-Cheney realm, etc.

Further, there are few compelling theoretical arguments as to why our presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and pursuit of our narrow agenda in each locale, should help to stabilize Pakistan.  Consider the following:

1. Our policy of targeting the Afghan Taliban (a group long cultivated as a valuable ally of Pakistan vis-a-vis India) while facilitating good relations between India and the Karzai government is extremely unpopular in Pakistan -  especially with the powerful elites in the ISI and armed forces. 

2. Our policy of military strikes in the Af-Pak border regions, and pressure on the Pakistani government to apply military pressure in those same areas, has led to violent clashes between local militant groups and the Pakistani government.  These conflicts have come complete with terrorist strikes on various domestic targets and a raging refugee crises - all of which the population blames on us and, as aiders and abettors, the Zardari government.   

3. We are viewed by large swaths of the population as, alternatively, an imperial power and a Western crusader intent on weakening a powerful Muslim nation while seizing its nukes, which makes any indigenous groups adopting our agenda instantly suspect.  This is a problem for the Zardari government, or any potential allies.

4. With the economy cratering, an educational system in disarray and a major unemployment crisis leaving large portions of the population without work, the large US military presence and the conflict it perpetuates is serving as an enticing scapegoat and distraction.

In this environment, moderates are either being sidelined or making common cause with extremists in pushing for anti-American policies and positions.  Radicalization is rampant, causing deeper and more intense schisms.  The government is being delegitimized, and faith in democracy rocked.  In many ways, Pakistani society is being torn asunder.

The fault lines along which Pakistan is being rended are in large part the result of Pakistan's own dysfunctional political culture and national security obsession with India.  The latter has led to a hypermilitarization of society, a weak dedication to democratic rule, a warped economy made to serve the military class, skewed government spending objectives, a too-powerful intelligence apparatus and an unhealthy willingness to cultivate religious extremists as putatively useful proxies (in this, the US and Pakistan shared common cause in Afghanistan in the 1980s). 

Eventually, Pakistan will have to reckon with these pathologies and find ways to normalize its own political culture.  However, while the United States did not create these problems, by forcing Pakistan to accede to our agenda, against its own perceived interests and over the objections of a distrustful population, we are making it more likely that these flash points erupt rather than unwind according to a slower, more natural process.

It is with these concerns that I read, in horror, a story by Jeremy Scahill about the uptick in US-sponsored mercenary activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan by groups such as Blackwater. 

At a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, "snatch and grabs" of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan, an investigation by The Nationhas found. The Blackwater operatives also assist in gathering intelligence and help run a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel to the well-documented CIA predator strikes, according to a well-placed source within the US military intelligence apparatus.

While reports of Blackwater's involvement have been cropping up over the past half year or so, Scahill provides the most comprehensive take to date.  According to Scahill, Blackwater's pool of well experienced former special operations personnel has become invaluable to the US military in at least two ways: First, we lack an adequate number of as-experienced soldiers to conduct operations without bringing in mercenary groups like Blackwater.  Second, the private status of the mercenary groups - as well as some chain-of-command work-arounds put in place by Rumsfeld and Cheney - provide much sought after plausible deniability, secrecy and, ultimately, unaccountability.

So let me see if I have this straight: We must continue our mission in Afghanistan/Pakistan lest our departure destabilizes Pakistan.  But we can only continue our mission in Afghanistan/Pakistan if we utilize mercenaries in the fight.  And, further, the use of mercenaries in the pursuit of conducting airstrikes with little accountability in Pakistan will further the goal of stabilizing Pakistan.  Because, well, who in Pakistan will object to that?

Right. 

This Makes Sense How?

by Eric Martin

Nicholas Kristof from a couple of weeks back:

President Obama and Congress will soon make defining choices about health care and troops for Afghanistan.

These two choices have something in common — each has a bill of around $100 billion per year. So one question is whether we’re better off spending that money blowing up things in Helmand Province or building up things in America.

The total bill in Afghanistan has been running around $1 million per year per soldier deployed there. That doesn’t include the long-term costs that will be incurred in coming decades — such as disability benefits, or up to $5 million to provide round-the-clock nursing care indefinitely for a single soldier who suffers brain injuries.

So if President Obama dispatches another 30,000 or 40,000 troops, on top of the 68,000 already there, that would bring the total annual bill for our military presence there to perhaps $100 billion — or more. And we haven’t even come to the human costs.

As for health care reforms, the 10-year cost suggests an average of $80 billion to $110 billion per year, depending on what the final bill looks like.

Granted, the health care costs will continue indefinitely, while the United States cannot sustain 100,000 troops in Afghanistan for many years. On the other hand, the health care legislation pays for itself, according to the Congressional Budget Office, while the deployment in Afghanistan is unfinanced and will raise our budget deficits and undermine our long-term economic security.

So doesn’t it seem odd to hear hawks say that health reform is fiscally irresponsible, while in the next breath they cheer a larger deployment of troops in Afghanistan?

Meanwhile, lack of health insurance kills about 45,000 Americans a year, according to a Harvard study released in September. So which is the greater danger to our homeland security, the Taliban or our dysfunctional insurance system?

Interestingly, the Republican Party and some conservative Dems are seizing on the need to further escalate our military commitment in Afghanistan as the reason why we can't tackle health care reform legislation at this juncture (or ever): 

The policy debate in Washington is currently focused on two topics: a possible escalation of the war in Afghanistan and health care legislation. Both a troop escalation and health care reform carry significant price tags — roughly $100 billion and $80-$100 billion a year respectively. (It should be noted that health care reform, unlike a troop surge, would cut the deficit.)

When it comes to these two debates, hawkish senators have laid out their priorities. They are more than willing to fund a risky troop surge that is increasingly opposed by both Americans and Afghans, yet remain stalwart opponents of health care reform that could save the lives of the 45,000 Americans who die every year because they lack access to health care.

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN)...suggested to host John King that health care legislation should be delayed until next year to focus on Afghanistan, saying, “The war is terribly important. … So this may be an audacious suggestion, but I would suggest we put aside the health care debate until next year, the same way we put cap and trade and climate change away and talk now about the essentials, war and money.”

A war of highly dubious value is an absolute essential.  Health insurance for the tens of thousands of Americans dying each year because of the lack thereof?  Not so much. 

It's well past time that the hypocrisy of these so-called budget hawks receives the focus it deserves.  To sum it up: politicians that are supposedly concerned with budget deficits have no problem spending trillions on outlandish military boondoggles, but refuse to raise taxes to pay for any part of those misadventures in order to keep them from blowing a hole in the budget.  And they find the concept of health care reform to be entirely too costly, even though it is deficit neutral and the positive outcomes far, far likelier than those expected from the war(s). 

How...moderate!

Happy Thanksgiving (belated edition)

by Eric Martin

Eric remained unimpressed with David's theory of how the personal lives of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer impacted their respective philosophical outlooks.

He's a Man of Faith

by Eric Martin

"I have long supported the goal of universal health care," Lieberman told reporters. "Ned Lamont can talk about it. I’ve been doing something about it all the time I’ve been here.

-2006 

Peter Beinarttheorizes as to the motivations behind Joe "With Us on Everything But the War" Lieberman's recent about face on the issue of affordable health insurance for the American people.  According to Beinart, Lieberman's shifting position stems from hurt feelings:

For close to a decade, [Lieberman] got nearly perfect scores from the American Public Health Association, which backs a single-payer health-care system, and in lieu of that, the “public option.” Now, all of a sudden, he’s so outraged by a public option that he’s threatening to filibuster any bill that contains it. The arguments he makes on behalf of his new position are remarkably weak: He says the public option will raise costs, even though the Congressional Budget Office has said no such thing, and even though logic suggests that by competing with private insurers, a government plan will actually drive costs down. Some have accused Lieberman of shifting right in order to win backing from the insurance industry in preparation for a 2012 reelection run. But, in fact, he gets relatively little insurance money, and Connecticut politicos mostly think he won’t run.

So why is he doing this? Because he’s bitter. According to former staffers and associates, he was upset by his dismal showing in the 2004 Democratic presidential primary. And he was enraged by the tepid support he got from many party leaders in 2006, when he lost the Democratic primary to an anti-war activist and won reelection as an independent. Gradually, this personal alienation has eaten away at his liberal domestic views. His staff has grown markedly more conservative in recent years, and his closest friends in Congress are now Republicans John McCain and Lindsey Graham. For Lieberman, the personal has become political, and it has pushed him further to the right.

The irony is that when Lieberman was officially a Democrat, he was ideologically independent—a living manifestation of the Humphrey-Jackson tradition. Now that he’s technically an independent, he’s becoming a standard-issue conservative. For people who believe—as Lieberman himself once did—in progressive health-care reform, it’s a tragic shift.

Let's assume for the sake of argument, that Beinart has this mostly right - there aren't a lot of competing theories that make much sense.  Think of the implications, though: Joe Lieberman is willing to abandon a cause that he believes in and had championed because some Democratic voters rejected him in a couple of elections.  Those relatively humdrum events in a politician's career arc were enough to cause him to reverse a core conviction. 

It would be one thing if he had longstanding ideological opposition to such programs, and were merely voting his beliefs.  Public option proponents could chalk up his current position to ignorance, or misguided principles.  However, Lieberman has long believed, quite earnestly, that the public option will save American lives by the millions, that it is the right thing to do, and that the government should provide such safety nets for Americans in need. 

Despite this, he just doesn't care enough to vote yes.  Actually, it's worse - he won't even vote to shut down a filibuster and let a bill with a public option come to the floor for an up or down vote (that he could then vote "no" on). 

Suffice it to say that if Lieberman gets his way, tens of millions of Americans will bear the brunt of his childish revenge fantasy - many paying for the privilege in tears shed over premature dying loved ones and shattered lives.  And the worst part is, Lieberman knows the result.  But Joe will at last have the last laugh, regardless of at who's expense.

So here's a suggestion to that excellent judge of character Harry Reid: How about a little bitterness of your own?  Why should this callous narcissist keep a committee chair or other boon bequeathed by a Party that he delights in spiting to such grotesque extents?

[UPDATE: Larison is right in this comparison:

In this way, Lieberman is just like McCain, whose flirtations with the Democratic Party and the occasional liberal legislative initiative were similarly driven by bitterness over his experience in the 2000 primaries. Arguably, the health care fight ought to have pulled Lieberman back into his party’s orbit and could have won him new respect among the party rank-and-file, but the problem is that he is too much like McCain. They both have an unusually inflated estimate of their own importance, they both tend towards sanctimonious moralizing, and they enjoy the attention they receive for breaking with their party leaders. The more contentious the issue, and the more the party’s base wants something, the more attractive breaking ranks becomes. The health care debate was too tempting.

Soul mates.]

You Can Go with This, or You Can Go with That...

by Eric Martin

Steve Clemons tries to suss out the price tag associated with escalation/continuation in the rudderless conflict in Afghanistan:

The White House is suggesting the price tag will be...$1 million per new soldier per year.

And can I add that these figures do not seem to include the long term health costs that the US commits to with our soldiers -- nor other ongoing benefits.

That means that a surge of 40,000 troops will cost approximately $40 Billion on top of the $65 billion/year the US is currently spending on its military deployments.

$105 billion. [...]

The health care bill that is being considered by the Congress now costs approximately $85 billion/year -- just to set some context.

For more context, Afghanistan's nominal GDP was $11.7 billion last year.

That's right. . .$11.7 billion -- and we are considering spending ten times that on this military engagement.

But think of how many American lives we'll save/make qualitatively better with access to health care...an open-ended multi-decade occupation of Afghanistan.  It's all about priorities.  We can either have a far-flung, interventionist, heavily military-reliant foreign policy, or we can provide the same level of social services as other industrialized nations that have no interest in the former.  I'm not even talking about cutting the military budget in half or anything so drastic.  Just keeping the foreign adventurism in check, and otherwise looking for common sense reductions where we can find them (and if anyone thinks there is no waste in a Pentagon budget, I've got a new line of bridges to sell you).

As a society, these are the decisions we will have to make.  In a sense, America is nearing a crossroads.  We can either have a massive presence in Iraq and Afghanistan for the next quarter century and beyond - and perhaps open up some new fronts - or we can cut back on those enormous expenditures and realign our spending priorities to deliver vital services like infrastructure investment and a true medical social safety net.

When Hawks Collide

by Eric Martin

Although it won't pass, unfortunately, this is the right idea:

Senior House Democrats have introduced legislation that would impose a surtax beginning in 2011 to cover the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. [...]

“For the last year, as we’ve struggled to pass health care reform, we’ve been told that we have to pay for the bill — and the cost over the next decade will be about a trillion dollars,” the three lawmakers said in a joint statement. “Now the president is being asked to consider an enlarged counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, which proponents tell us will take at least a decade and would also cost about a trillion dollars. But unlike the health care bill, that would not be paid for. We believe that’s wrong.” [...]

“The only people who’ve paid any price for our military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan are our military families,” Murtha, Obey and Larson said in a joint statement. “We believe that if this war is to be fought, it’s only fair that everyone share the burden.”

At a time when there is hyper-concern* over rather large budget deficits, it is imperative that the American people confront - eyes wide open - the costs of maintaining two extremely costly occupations.  Especially when debating the affordability of health care legislation that is a bargain by comparison.  Contra Ronald Reagan, defense spending is a budget item.  If new legislation aimed at bettering the lives of the American people has to be "paid for" by various revenue gathering/cost cutting schemes, then so too should military spending initiatives such as the continuation of our military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

*(The increasingly evident sense of urgency for budget reduction is poorly timed, and perhaps irrational, considering the demands of government spending in connection with a Keynsian approach to combating a recession where interest rates are floored.  But it is a long term problem that we need to address)

Fear is the Mind-Killer

by Eric Martin

Steven Simon, whose work I admire greatly, discusses the negative reaction to the decision to try Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in a civilian court.  After summarily dispensing with the more inane critiques of Obama's decision, Simon takes on the notion that a trial could serve as a platform for KSM to propagandize effectively.  His analysis dovetails neatly with my prior post on the subject:

Which brings us to the idea that allowing Mr. Mohammed to take the stand will give him a soapbox. The truth is, if the trial provides a propaganda platform for anybody, it will be for our side.

First, federal courts do not permit TV cameras in the courtroom, so the opportunity for “real time” jihadist propagandizing won’t exist. And while defendants and their lawyers can question witnesses, they cannot make speeches; judges are kings in this domain and can quash irrelevant oratory. Some point out that in earlier terrorism trials, like those of the plotters of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the defendants did ramble at length. True, but does anyone who fears a circus now remember a single word from those earlier trials?

The real propaganda event is likely to unfold very differently. Instead of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed making his case, we will see the full measure of the horror of 9/11 outlined to the world in a way that only methodical trials can accomplish. Historically, the public exposure of state-sponsored mass murder or terrorism through a transparent judicial process has strengthened the forces of good and undercut the extremists. The Nuremberg trials were a classic case. And nothing more effectively alerted the world to the danger of genocide than Israel’s prosecution in 1961 of Adolf Eichmann, the bureaucrat who engineered the Holocaust.

In the case of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alternatives — indefinite incarceration without trial, or a military tribunal closed to the public followed by execution — are far more likely to inspire militant recruits. And highlighting the transparency in our judicial process would strengthen America’s reputation just as cracks are beginning to appear in the jihadist base. A growing number of radical Muslim clerics and theoreticians have reversed course in recent years. [...]

...Polling since 2001 has shown that in most Muslim-majority countries, tolerance for terrorism and support for Al Qaeda is gradually eroding. It is strongly in our interest to reinforce these trends by underscoring the terrorists’ killings of civilians and our own commitment to the rule of law.

To reiterate a point from the previous discussion, counterterrorism efforts go awry when plagued by fear and other poorly thought out emotional responses.  Unfortunately, the Republican Party is either locked in that mindset, or cynically manipulating those sentiments for political gain.  Whatever their motivation, cooler heads must prevail.

(h/t to the Aardvark)

This Constitution Kills Fascists

by Eric Martin

Johann Hari has a fascinating piece in The Independentthat recounts his interviews with several British nationals that have made the journey from active participantsin jihadi/terrorist causes and back.  Hari's quest to find out how and why certain people join terrorist groups, or espouse and propagate radical Islamist ideology, had been frustrated by the reticence and dissembling of persons active in those circles.  His entreaties were met more with propaganda than introspection or insight.  

More recently, a group of increasingly vocal disillusioned ex-jihadis (the subjects of the story) have provided Hari with a more unguarded glimpse into the thought processes and evolution of radical.  Unsurprisingly, the profile that emerges tracks with the findings of Marc Sageman:

1.  Those that join these causes tend not to be very religious in their younger years.  In fact, their ignorance of Islam leads them to uncritically accept certain radical Wahhabist teachings as gospel.  Unfortunately, due to the fact that the Saudi Arabian government spends lavishly to spread Wahhabism to all corners of the globe through the state-funded proliferation of literature, teachers, madrasas and mosques, the Wahhabist presence is so ubiquitous and domineering that young Muslims looking to learn more about their religion frequently stumble upon this pernicious brand for lack of visible alternatives.  And, likewise, one of the most effective means of rehabilitating terrorists/jihadists is Koranic study.

2. The enlistees are not poor or uneducated - quite the opposite.  Most have quality educations and come from middle class backgrounds. 

3. There is a common element of alienation: they tend to be first or second generation immigrants caught between worlds, without feeling at home or comfortable in any particular identity.  This is one of the reasons that many go looking for deeper meaning in their religious roots, and one of the alluring aspects of joining jihadist groups: they create a gang-like sense of group identity, belonging and a powerful bonding mechanism.      

...This is the identity I hear shouted by young Islamists throughout the East End: I might sound like you, but I am nothing like you. I am Other. I belong elsewhere – in a place that does not yet exist, but that I will create, with my fists and my fury.

Jimas told their members they were part of a persecuted billion, being blown up and locked down across the world. "It was a bit like a gang," he says. "And we had a strong sense of being under siege. It was all a conspiracy against Islam, and we were the guardians of Islam. That's how we saw ourselves ... A lot of my friends would wear the army boots, and carry knives." I realise now that for a nebbish intellectual boy, it must have felt intoxicating to be told he was part of a military movement that would inevitably conquer history.

In some instances, this sense of alienation is exacerbated by a traumatic incident of racism - Hari's interviewees came of age during the rise of the skinhead movement in Britain, and many were physically attacked and otherwise menaced.

Given these factors, it would be overstating the case to argue that these recruits took up the radical cause in reaction to US/Western foreign policy.  However, it would also be myopic to suggest that such policies have no effect at all on the overall problem.  Rather than give in to the self-serving claim that "the terrorists will hate us no matter what we do" (partially true as there will always be some number of sadistic, desperate, disturbed people), it is better to look at ways that we can craft our policies to disrupt their operations, thwart recruiting efforts and reduce the numbers of actual terrorists and quality of support they receive (which should be the focus of proper counterterrorism).  Take for example, Maajid Nawaz's attempts to recruit new militants in Egypt:

He started to recruit other students, as he had done so many times before. But it was harder. "Everyone hated the [unelected] government [of Hosni Mubarak], and the US for backing it," he says. But there was an inhibiting sympathy for the victims of 9/11 – until the Bush administration began to respond with Guantanamo Bay and bombs. "That made it much easier. After that, I could persuade people a lot faster."

And later:

Every one of them said the Bush administration's response to 9/11 – from Guantanamo to Iraq – made jihadism seem more like an accurate description of the world. Hadiya Masieh, a tiny female former [Hizb ut-Tahrir ]HT organiser, tells me: "You'd see Bush on the television building torture camps and bombing Muslims and you think – anything is justified to stop this. What are we meant to do, just stand still and let him cut our throats?"

On the other hand, instances of commitment to liberal, democratic ideals helped to puncture the spell of jihadi propaganda:

But the converse was – they stressed – also true. When they saw ordinary Westerners trying to uphold human rights, their jihadism began to stutter. Almost all of them said that they doubted their Islamism when they saw a million non-Muslims march in London to oppose the Iraq War: "How could we demonise people who obviously opposed aggression against Muslims?" asks Hadiya.

And for Maajid Nawaz:

In Mazratora Prison, Maajid was held in solitary confinement for thee months. It was a bare cell with no bed, no light, and no toilet: just a concrete box. Then he was taken out suddenly and told his trial for "propagation by speech and writing for any banned organisation" was beginning in the Supreme State Emergency Court. But Maajid's Islamist convictions were about to be challenged from two unexpected directions – the men who murdered Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Amnesty International.

HT abandoned Maajid as a "fallen soldier" and barely spoke of him or his case. But when his family were finally allowed to see him, they told him he had a new defender. Although they abhorred his political views, Amnesty International said he had a right to free speech and to peacefully express his views, and publicised his case.

"I was just amazed," Maajid says. "We'd always seen Amnesty as the soft power tools of colonialism. So, when Amnesty, despite knowing that we hated them, adopted us, I felt – maybe these democratic values aren't always hypocritical. Maybe some people take them seriously ... it was the beginning of my serious doubts."

The dynamic flows something like this: when the United States and other Western powers/groups appear to act hypocritically - treating democracy and freedom by double standards - it has a radicalizing effect on a population that perceives itself to be at the sharp end of that hypocrisy. 

On the other hand, where those same Western elements act in accordance with their ideals - especially when doing so, on principle, is against their immediate, narrow interests - the example set can begin to loosen the hold of radical Islamist propaganda.

Consider that phenomenon against the backdrop of the commotion surrounding the decision by the Obama administration to try Khalid Skeikh Mohammed in a civilian court.  According to many voices on the right like Senators Jeff Sessions and Lindsey Graham, there is something we lose by granting due process rights to accused terrorists:

[Graham] said Holder was jeopardizing national security by determining that wartime combatants, potentially even Osama bin Laden, could be given constitutional legal protections usually provided only to U.S. citizens and foreigners convicted of regular crimes, not acts of war. 

But, in reality, there is very little jeopardy involved.  Our courts have an exemplary track record in terms of providing fair trials to terrorists, almost always resulting in guilty convictions for the guilty.  Further, and in some ways more importantly, it is vital that the United States matches its deeds with its rhetoric, and sets an example that subverts jihadist propaganda.  Whether it be torture, black sites or indefinite detention without due process rights, the costs are much higher than any illusory benefit derived.

The other fear expressed by leading conservative voices is that the trial will somehow redound to the benefit of KSM and his cause by giving him a platform from which to proselytize, or that there is something lost by treating KSM like a common criminal rather than something more profound.  However, most leading counterterrorism experts view criminal justice proceedings differently - it is often more humiliating and myth-puncturing than it is aggrandizing.  Consider, for example, the way Hizb ut-Tahrir abandoned Maajid Nawaz when he was imprisoned, and only renounced contact upon his release.  Further, the point is to try to bring KSM down to size, not build up his reputation.  As Marc Sageman noted:

There has been talk of an al-Qaeda resurgence, but the truth is that most of the hard core members of the first and second waves have been killed or captured. The survival of the social movement they inspired relies on the continued inflow of new members. But this movement is vulnerable to whatever may diminish its appeal among young people. Its allure thrives only at the abstract fantasy level. [...]

Terrorist acts must be stripped of glory and reduced to common criminality. Most aspiring terrorists want nothing more than to be elevated to the status of an FBI Most Wanted poster. “[I am] one of the most wanted terrorists on the Internet,” Younis Tsouli boasted online a few months before his arrest in 2005. “I have the Feds and the CIA, both would love to catch me. I have MI6 on my back.” His ego fed off the respect such bragging brought him in the eyes of other chat room participants. Any policy or recognition that puts such people on a pedestal only makes them heroes in each other’s eyes — and encourages more people to follow the same path.

It is equally crucial not to place terrorists who are arrested or killed in the limelight. The temptation to hold press conferences to publicize another “major victory” in the war on terror must be resisted, for it only transforms terrorist criminals into jihadist heroes.The United States underestimates the value of prosecutions, which often can be enormously demoralizing to radical groups. There is no glory in being taken to prison in handcuffs. No jihadi Web site publishes such pictures. Arrested terrorists fade into oblivion. Only martyrs live on in popular memory. 

In this instance, doing the right thing ethically is also the right thing to do strategically.  A no-brainer once you can get past the emotionalism and fear surrounding the fraught subject matter.  At its root, America's best defense is being America again. 

My first Newsweek story: Senate May Thwart Stupak

By Lindsay Beyerstein

My first Newsweek story, on the Stupak Amendment, the senate bill, and what's next in the fight over abortion access under health reform.

National abortion-rights advocacy groups were outraged when the House passed the Stupak amendment to the health-care bill. The amendment—named for its sponsor, Democratic Rep. Bart Stupak—would bar patients who receive government affordability credits from buying health insurance that covers elective abortions, even if they pay for the abortion component with their own money. It seemed as if the reproductive-rights establishment had been blindsided by Speaker Nancy Pelosi's last-minute deal to placate the conservative Democrats in Congress and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). The reality is much more complicated. [...]

In which it is revealed that Mitt Romney is the Queen of Hearts

by von

I suppose that I should say something about Sarah Palin.  I know, I know, she's pretty obscure.  She's not even a one-term govenor.  She's a quitter.  She's a losing VP candidate.  She doesn't have any expertise.  She hasn't really done much. 

Kind of a waste of a post.

Still, Palin paid someone write a book for her.  And she was on Oprah.  That makes her newsworthy. Right?  And I'm kinda a Republican.  Who, by the bye, initially thought that Senator McCain made a brilliant move in picking her.  (There is a self-damning comment of mine somewhere on RedState.com, but I haven't the heart to track it down.)  So maybe I should say something. 

Or maybe I should pull an undergrad move, and quote a movie instead: 

Mrs. Iselin: Tom, I know you have strong, personal feelings about Johnny and about me. But, what I would like to find out is, how strong they really are. To put it as simply as possible, If Johnny's name were to be put forward at the convention next week, would you attempt to block him?
Sen. Thomas Jordan: [taken slightly aback] You're joking, of course?
Mrs. Iselin: Mr. Stevenson makes jokes, I do not.
Sen. Thomas Jordan: You're seriously trying for the nomination for Johnny?
Mrs. Iselin: No, we couldn't make it. But he has a good chance for the second spot. Now, I've answered your question, but you haven't answered mine. Will you block us?
Sen. Thomas Jordan: Would I block you? I would spend every cent I own, and all I could borrow, to block you. There are people who think of Johnny as a clown and a buffoon, but I do not. I despise John Iselin and everything that Iselinism has come to stand for. I think, if John Iselin were a paid Soviet agent, he could not do more to harm this country than he's doing now. You have asked me a question. Very well, I shall answer you. If you attempt a deal with the delegates, or cause Johnny's name to be brought forward on the ticket, or if, in my canvass of the delegates tomorrow morning, I find that you are so acting, I will bring impeachment procedings against your husband on the floor of the United States Senate. And I will hit him, I promise you, with everything in my well-documented book.

That's a bit overblown, of course.  Palin is hardly a threat to the country:  right now, John Edwards has a clearer path to the presidency than she does.  Palin mostly represents a threat to the Republican party.  She excites some part of the base, surely, but doesn't excite it in any useful direction. She has no plans, no proposals, no platform.  She just exists, sucking air and denying oxygen to Republicans who might lead the party in a new direction.  A winning direction, perhaps.

Indeed, unless Palin makes a graceful endorsement early and then shuts the hell up -- two things that seem unlikely -- there is only one Republican who might benefit if Palin's circus continues through 2012.  It ain't Huckabee.  He needs Palin's social conservative voters.  So does Jindal.  The wonky types also lose.  Mitch Daniels, the Indiana govenor, nails competency but flubs excitement.  Pawlenty too.  Each needs a Palin-type working for him, not against him.   

The only candidate that conceivably benefits from Palin is Mitt Romney.  Well connected, well established:  Palin may suck the oxygen from a room, but Romney sucks the money.  Romney also can't help but like the contrast between him and Palin.  More importantly, so long as Palin is around, it's going to be that much harder for another candidate to get traction against him.

Mitt Romney:  Queen of Hearts.