The Pony Express Local, Part II

by Eric Martin

In another example of the pushback against Colonel Reese's call for a slightly accelerated timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, The New Republic's Michael Crowley makes an appeal to the "tar baby conundrum," as I termed it back in March 2008:

The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can't leave can we - I mean, what about the oil...? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can't leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.

Here is Crowley on why Obama should reconsider his plans for pulling US forces out of Iraq:

Moreover, the strategic calculus has changed since Obama unveiled his withdrawal plan in October 2007. Back then, American troops were dying as they policed a civil war that looked nearly impossible to resolve peacefully. Today, however, there's reason to think that it's U.S. troops who are the only thing holding Iraq together.

Of course, Crowley was amongst the chorus of voices issuing warnings back in 2007 that withdrawal in the midst of such heightened civil war violence was too risky.  Only now, according to Crowley, we can't leave because of the relative peace.  Either way, we stay.

Crowley's assertion that US forces are the "only thing holding Iraq together" is also highly dubious, if convenient.  For 6+ years, Iraq has been a violent, roiling mess of insurgencies (plural) and civil wars (plural).  During that period, US forces have been unable to put a halt to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (actually, US forces were one faction that was adding to the body count), nor have our soldiers been able to prevent the internal and external displacement of 4 million Iraqis (over 15% of Iraq's population), amongst other horrific events.  Despite this prior impotence, now our forces have become all powerful in determining outcomes?

Due to a series of developments associated with the Surge - though not dependent on US forces necessarily or entirely (ie the Awakenings shift, the walling off of cities, the effects of ethnic/sectarian cleansing, Sadr ceasefire, etc) - violence has been reduced considerably (though not eliminated).  But despite this confluence of events that work to keep violence at relatively low levels, Crowley would have us believe that our troops are the "only" thing keeping Iraq together.  More likely, Iraqis will or will not perpetuate these conflicts according to their own prerogatives and objectives, as they have done during the prior 6+ years of US occupation.  And as many continue to do to this day.

Next Crowley offers a puzzling bit of analysis steeped heavily in the narrative of Petraeus as savior of Iraq - but that narrative is juxtaposed with a series of hypothetical events that belies Petraeus' reputation, not that Crowley notices:

If Iraq does seem to be headed back towards chaos as U.S. troops withdraw, what will Obama do? It's hard to say for sure. During the campaign, he was tonally emphatic about ending America's commitment there. But he has always allowed for revisions based on the judgment of his commanders. It's awfully hard to imagine that surge architect David Petraeus would be willing to watch his gains there disappear in a maelstrom of car bombs and sectarian assassinations. If Petraeus says we need to maintain a substantial troop committment, will Obama defy him?

Crowley is arguing that Petraeus, whose popularity and esteem is based largely on his ostensible success with the Surge, is someone whose wisdom even the President should heed.  However, if the Surge (Petraeus' claim to fame) turns out to be the failure its critics have claimed and no political reconciliation materializes and Iraq's warring factions resume their suspended (not abandoned) conflicts, Crowley asks if Obama will "defy" a general who is deemed so wise...because of his Surge-related success that turns out to be a chimera!?!? 

That logical doozy leaves aside the upside-down view Crowley sketches with respect to the relationship between civilian and military leaders.  Crowley suggests that Petraeus might not be "willing to watch his gains disappear."  Then asks, "will Obama defy him?"  But that's completely backwards - and indicative of a dangerous trend in American political life whereby military leaders are deified and granted an undue presumption of wisdom in terms of policy making.

First of all, Obama is the Commander in Chief.  He gives the orders, and Petraeus follows them.  By definition, Obama could never "defy" Petraeus - although the inverse is certainly possible.  Military leaders deserve respect and deference within a certain range of military policy discussions/battlefield planning, but they are not best suited to make larger strategic and/or policy decisions.  Decisions such as whether and when to withdraw troops from a war zone (though certainly their input is invaluable with respect to the logistics of that process). 

There are several very good reasons to preserve this civilian-military dynamic.  For one, Petraeus might favor preserving "his" gains because that is "his" goal based on military objectives that are, by nature, narrowly construed.   Petraeus does not need to consider the astronomical costs involved.  He does not have to worry about budgets, deficits, taxes, revenues and debt.  He does not concern himself with domestic policy issues that require funding, nor does he bother with environmental crises that require attention.  He does not answer to the American people via the ballot box. 

Yet because of the importance of those issues, factors that don't enter a general's calculus under most circumstances, and in order to preserve civilian dominance over military personnel necessary to safeguard liberal democracy, it is vital that the chain of command - and presumption - favors the Commander in Chief.  So, no, Obama should not hesitate to defy Petraeus if doing so is in the best interest of the American people, even if such a decision comes at the expense of a general's ego.

Crowley ends his piece with another head scratcher:

Ultimately what this means is that Obama may be faced with an excruciating choice: Will he use limited American military resources to stabilize Afghanistan?--or to maintain stability in Iraq? It is, ultimately, not unlike the choice faced by George W. Bush, who neglected Afghanistan not out of stupidity, but because he believed that anarchy in Iraq posed the greater threat to American security. Obama has suggested he believes the opposite to be true. If Iraq starts teetering on the brink of collapse, we'll see how firmly he believes it.

But that analysis of Bush's motives - and wisdom - is plausible only if you look at history from late March 2003 on, ignoring the events that created the predicament.  One could argue that after Bush decided to invade Iraq and unleash breathtaking chaos in that country while Afghanistan was itself an unsettled question, he was faced with a difficult choice in terms of allocating limited resources between two needy theaters of war. 

But that would ignore the recklessness and, yes, the sheer stupidity of deciding to invade Iraq while troops were fighting a bitter battle in Afghanistan with the outcome uncertain, and the situation so desperately in need of more resources and attention.  Whatever credit Crowley wants to bend over backwards to give Bush for his attempts to pick the less destructive path while prioritizing two wars should be wiped away completely by reminder of the fact that Bush would have had only one war to focus on if Bush hadn't willingly, and foolishly, rushed to open a second front with the first still active.  For no good reason. 

Which is, at the absolute very least, a remarkably stupid thing to do.  But really, it's far more tragic than that.

Comments

[Ben Alpers]

Eric, I sympathize entirely with your criticism of analyses of the Iraq situation that pass over the sheer stupidity of trying to invade Iraq in the first place. But couldn't one say that even more analyses of Afghanistan tend, also, to overlook the sheer folly of invading that country in the first place?

The main advantage that the invasion of Afghanistan had over the invasion of Iraq is that it was neither illegal nor based on entirely false pretenses.

However, I think a very good case can be made that it was equally stupid, especially if one focus on its likely medium- and long-term impact.

[david kilmer]

I can't wait until the human race evolves to the point where we examine issues in order to find the truth of the matter and to seek a pragmatic solution. Seriously. Can't wait.

[Eric Martin]

However, I think a very good case can be made that it was equally stupid, especially if one focus on its likely medium- and long-term impact.

Perhaps, but disrupting al-Qaeda was a vital interest, and it has actually succeeded in many respects. And in order to realize that goal, some level of military involvement was needed, including some number of "boots on the ground."

As far as nation building, well, that's a good debate.

[jrudkis]

I think Reese has got it right: we can't do any more to prepare the government structures than we have. The difficulties that remain are long standing cultural norms that we simply can't change. The weak link is the Iraqi Air Force, but by its nature we don't have to develop that in country...and it would probably be preferable to do that training out of the country so we don't have rogue pilots dropping bombs on our convoys.

Staying for short term stability just kicks the problem down the road at great expense: whenever we leave, there is going to be an uncertain vacuum. Staying longer just means putting more treasure into the pit before we get off the nest and find out what hatches.

[Gary Farber]

"But that's completely backwards - and indicative of a dangerous trend in American political life whereby military leaders are deified and granted an undue presumption of wisdom in terms of policy making."

How dare that upstart Truman, who wasn't even FDR, but was that little tailor, that machine politician, from Missouri, fire the god Douglas MacArthur?

To be sure, I'm not aware there are signs that Petraeus holds himself in quite such high self-regard as MacArthur did, nor requires such sychophancy as MacArthur did, but, then, few humans could. Nor does Petraeus's career match the length and (over-rated) legend of MacArthur.

I'm just saying that the parallel, to whatever degree there might be one, springs to mind.

[Gary Farber]

Sycophancy. I'm in a rush because theoretically the guy who will come take my computer away for a day or two and fix the broken USB parts will arrive any minute.

I should still be online via the MacBook back-up, knock wood, albeit likely less prolifically, since I'm still not used to the OS or keyboard or trackpad.

Whoops, here he is!

[John Miller]

Looking back on the decision to go into Afghanistan, based upon conditions now, is not really appropriate. To say it was stupid is discounting what may have taken place had it been done propely.

Of course, this would involve a lot of "what if" type of thinking. But there is little doubt that if attention had remained focused of Afgahnistan at a high enough lebvel, with appropriate use of force and other, more ground up building of the country, with Afghans leading the way, things might be extremely different.

Up until our invasion of Iraq, even most of the muslim world was not as antagonistic toward the US, the Taliban had suffered the loss of most of the actual support it really had, and al Qaeda was definitely losing its ability to recruit.

Given all that, and minus bombing a few wedding parties, etc. the actual decision to go in may well have been brilliant, not stupid.

[Gary Farber]

And I'm back, on the Emergency Holographic MacBook!

Which I'll be on the next few days, until the desktop comes back.

Isn't there some kind of "page down" equivalent on these keyboards? Scrolling is awfully tedious.

[Gary Farber]

"But couldn't one say that even more analyses of Afghanistan tend, also, to overlook the sheer folly of invading that country in the first place?"

I'll at least defend the initial overthrow of the Taliban. I think that was entirely defensible, and a reasonable idea, although, yes, it involved killing people, and I neither had to do the killing nor suffer in any way from it, so yes, it's completely easy for me to take that stance, and I'm aware of that.

Beyond that, I'm less sure what we should have done in Afghanistan, although I'm sure that the Bush administration's decision to continue a half-assed war, while pulling out vital personnel and resources for the war in Iraq, was not the way to go. Either a more or less complete military withdrawal, or a maintenance of a huge effort, are the obvious two other primary choices to argue in favor of.

[Turbulence]

Isn't there some kind of "page down" equivalent on these keyboards? Scrolling is awfully tedious.

Try holding down the function key while pressing either the up or down arrow key.

[Gary Farber]

Regarding that keyboard query: I'm still idly curious if there's an answer, but I've ended up plugging in my Windows keyboard via USB hub, thus curing the problem for now, aside from having to get used to odd way I'm forced to place the MacBook at a 45 degree angle next to the keyboard, due to my desk space limitations.

This is all so fascinating, isn't it?

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

"I can't wait until the human race evolves to the point where we examine issues in order to find the truth of the matter and to seek a pragmatic solution. Seriously. Can't wait."

This is purely a bit of friendly snark (since I realize you're using the term evolve figuratively), but assuming the current Darwinian structure for understanding evolution is reasonably correct, megafauna species evolution is (on a human time scale) a very slooooowwwwww process. So you may be waiting a while. Also, it tends to involve species exctinction a lot. Which could be kind of a bummer.

[Gary Farber]

"since I realize you're using the term evolve figuratively"

Inner science fiction fandom has had jokes since the 1940s, when a lunatic sf fan named "Claude Degler" used to travel about claiming that sf fans were a higher form of evolved human beings, and that they/we had Cosmic Minds, so those of us privy to that kind of fanhistory have joked ever since about having Cosmic Minds. (A famous line from the forties came from a well-known fan Jack Speer sending Claude a series of postcards saying "I have a cosmic mind: now what do I do?")

Anyway, I think that's the kind of "evolution" being referred to. :-)

[hairshirthedonist]

So you may be waiting a while.

I'm still waiting for smellevision to replace television. It's almost a decade past due.

[Adam]

Pretty cheap rhetorical trick to ask, "What if Petraeus disgrees?" when Crowley has no idea what Petraeus might think about the proposal.

[Turbulence]

To say it was stupid is discounting what may have taken place had it been done propely.

I'm sorry, but when I looked at G W Bush and his administration in 2001, I did not see a President and administration that seemed either more competent or more ethical than the JFK, LBJ, and Nixon administrations. Which suggested to me that any war Bush started had a substantial probability of turning out about as well as Vietnam did. When you start wars, things can get out of your control very easily: being really smart and really honest is insufficient to guarantee decent, let alone good outcomes. By 2001 it was clear that the Bush administration was not particularly competent and honest compared with recent Presidential administrations, so there was no reason to believe they could be trusted with something as important as a war.

[Eric Martin]

By 2001 it was clear that the Bush administration was not particularly competent and honest compared with recent Presidential administrations, so there was no reason to believe they could be trusted with something as important as a war.

See, I actually thought, at the time, that experienced hands like Rumsfeld would do a decent job of it. And I thought it was necessary to disrupt al-Qaeda and with them the Taliban.

The staggering incompetence was not as easy to spot back then, and while it was clear that the Bush team was pushing a small government agenda, they seemed to be treating the DOD with respect.

[John Spragge]

Micheal Crowley has every right to call for a constitutional convention that would install an American paramount military commander over whom the civilian president has no authority. But until he succeeds in that effort, Mr. Crowley has no business writing as though General Petraeus's "willingness" to do anything had any relevance to his plainly mandated and sworn duty if faced with an order from President Obama: salute, say "yes sir", and carry out the order diligently and without reservation. Inevitably, the Iraqis will have to stand up for their democracy or lose it, like the citizens of any other country on Earth; legally, they will have to do it by the end of 2011; in practice, it might as well happen sooner rather than later. But even if you could make out a solid case that American forces can stay in Iraq, even if you argue that they should stay, it does not do to forget that President Obama has the final authority.

[david kilmer]

Yeah, it was definitely a tongue-in-cheek remark - the idea being that we have to wait for evolution to solve the problem since we apparently aren't going to do anything to solve it of our own volition. Of course, that assumes that truth-seeking and pragmatism have an evolutionary advantage that rationalizing what we want to believe does not.

[Gary Farber]

"I'm sorry, but when I looked at G W Bush and his administration in 2001, I did not see a President and administration that seemed either more competent or more ethical than the JFK, LBJ, and Nixon administrations."

Neither did I, to put it mildly.

However, where I went wrong, as regards Afghanistan, and even to some degree in the early days of Iraq, was that I completely underestimated how thoroughly and deeply Bush and Cheney and their political-level appointees (Feith, etc.) would step in to make crucial decisions, rather than leave the crucial decisions on Afghanistan to the military professionals, and the professionals at State, AID, and the other departments. I didn't expect Weinberger to override professionals like Eric Shinseki and those like him.

That was what I got completely stupidly wrong. I way underestimated just how activist the political appointees would be in making the relevant decisions, and reject the decisions of the departmental professionals, and I accept full responsibility for my errors of judgement in this.

Worse, I was still ambivalent about the decision to go into Iraq until some time after it was done. I never came out for the invasion, but I didn't oppose it, either; I stayed on the fence for the first few months, growing more and more doubtful each week, until long before Abu Ghraib (though I couldn't now pin down which week) I concluded it was a complete mistake, but it wasn't until Abu Ghraib that I completely and thoroughly denounced the war and how wrong I had been to not have realized it earlier.

Plus, of course, invading Iraq was, I came to realize, a complete mistake in any case. I also accept full responsibility for having taken a few months to realize this, rather than just having been deeply ambivalent about the pros and cons for some time. It took me a year to be this clear.

So feel free to doubt my judgment in such matters, given that other people did a much better job of getting it right far earlier.

One other factor in my ambivalence was that I had retrospectively concluded that I had been in error in, at the time, opposing Gulf War 1991; at the time, I actively opposed the invasion of Kuwait, and argued for relying on containment of Hussein's regime.

When subsequent details came out about the then genuine nuclear program in 1991 of the Iraqi government -- the program later dismantled by the IAEA -- and that then the Hussein regime indeed hadn't been far off from a nuclear weapon, I concluded that I had been wrong in opposing the 1991 invasion, because I concluded that the dangers of Saddam Hussein with nuclear weapons were sufficient to, now that I was aware that he was in fact much closer than I had estimated, justify the 1991 invasion of Kuwait to retake it, after all.

And when 2003 came around, having made the previous error was a large factor in my ambivalence, as I didn't want to repeat what I regarded as an error in 1991. I over-corrected to the point of reaching ambivalence.

So I wound up getting it at least partially wrong both times, unless, of course, you take the view that the 1991 retaking of Kuwait wasn't worth it, or was wrong.

For the record.

[Adam]

I wonder what the Bush Administration would have done if one of their generals had defied them by telling them they needed more troops to invade Iraq?

OH WAIT