Pony Express Local, Part I

by Eric Martin

As is customary with the ebb and flow of the Iraq withdrawal debate, Col. Timothy Reese's widely disseminated memo calling for a slightly accelerated timeline for removing troops from Iraq has provoked responses from those that warn against deviating from the original timeline (at least in terms of getting out ahead of schedule), and those that advocate pushing the ultimate withdrawal date back a decade, or longer (as necessary).

The latter link is from a Barbara Walter column in the Los Angeles Times which argues that the risks of a civil war re-erupting in Iraq should compel us to maintain a troop presence in Iraq for "an additional five to 10 years" beyond the 2011 deadline imposed by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) previously agreed to by the governments of Iraq and the United States.  

In making her case, Walter undermines the narrative of the successful Surge.  Recall, the Surge was supposed to create space for the various warring factions to forge a lasting political reconciliation.  Its critics, however, have claimed that the Surge has only managed to freeze conflicts in place, conflicts which would be thawed out and revisited at a later date (and even then, the Surge was only able to achieve this with the help of extenuating circumstances):  

A country that has experienced one civil war is much more likely to experience a second and third civil war.

That's partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. [...]

Combatants who end their civil war in a compromise settlement -- such as the agreement to share power in Iraq -- almost always return to war unless a third party is there to help them enforce the terms.

While she may have a point about the likelihood of various civil wars reigniting, it's less clear that there has ever been even a compromise agreement to "share power in Iraq."  That power sharing agreement, the elusive 'political reconciliation' that was, again, the primary goal of the Surge, has yet to emerge.  The current governing pact has never really had widespread buy-in from various insurgent and insurgent-friendly groups - hence the need to expand beyond the four corners of the current political set-up, amend the constitution and reach accords on various other key issues such as federalism/centralism, control of oil, incorporation of Sunnis into the security forces, etc.

Perhaps that only bolsters her point regarding the risks for the resumption of violence.  Where she is on decidedly shakier ground, however, is in her estimation of the ability of US soldiers to prevent that eventuality.

American soldiers have kept a lid on internecine fighting. But the recent increase in violence in some of Iraq's cities reveals that different groups began jockeying for position as U.S. troops left the cities in the hands of Iraqi security forces in June and in anticipation of complete U.S. withdrawal.

Right now, U.S. forces serve two important purposes. First, they signal to Maliki and the dominant Shiite population that a decisive victory over the Sunnis and Kurds will not be possible. They also signal to the less-numerous Sunni and Kurdish populations that both of these groups will be protected from Shiite exploitation over time. Remove U.S. forces and U.S. involvement in Iraq and you simultaneously embolden the Shiites while telling the weaker groups they must fend for themselves.

On the other hand, the presence of US forces in Iraq - and their concomitant support for the ruling government (Maliki's government) - has also made it easier for Maliki to ignore the need to offer real political concessions to aggrieved factions.  After all, he's been insulated from the effects of taking a maximalist position by the presence of US forces which have acted as his government's de facto guardian. 

Along these lines, the US military has actively supported Maliki's campaigns to weaken rivals such as the Sadrists, and stood passively by as Maliki has balked at paying the salaries of the Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq militias that had ceased insurgent activities in exchange for an alliance with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq and, supposedly, a place in Iraq's nascent security forces and a paycheck from the Iraqi government.  The latter two inducements have not been forthcoming.

Further, contra Walter, while US troops have been in Iraq for well over 6 years, it's not entirely clear to what extent they've been able to "keep a lid on internecine fighting."  Even in the supposedly Post-Surge Victorious Iraq, hundreds of Iraqis are dying each month due to political violence.  That represents an improvement over the civil war period, but is still ghastly enough.

However, a large number of US troops were present during that excessively bloody chapter which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, led to the displacement of roughly 4 million more and caused severe demographic shifts in key cities and towns (from heterogeneous ethnic/sectarian blends to homogeneous enclaves).  But if such an episode was possible with 150,000 troops present, why is Walter so certain that the 50,000 troops she envisions remaining behind will be able to prevent a sequel?

The U.S. needs to decide what outcome it is willing to live with in Iraq. It's likely that if the U.S. withdraws all of its troops on schedule, the strategic balance will dramatically shift in favor of the Shiites, and they will press for full control over the state. This, in turn, will probably goad the Sunnis and Kurds back to war, likely ending in a brutal Shiite victory and the establishment of an authoritarian state.

The hope is that Shiite leaders (and their constituents) would rather avoid such a massive conflict, and in pursuit of that objective, would offer real political concessions and other inducements (and the aggrieved factions would show similar willingness and forbearance).  But if Shiite leaders are not so inclined now, there is little reason to think they will be differently disposed in 5-10 years.  If exerting full control is a goal worth fighting and dying for, what difference does a decade make - especially when the roughly 9 years leading up to the 2011 deadline had thus far not altered the calculus? 

This is especially true when the Shiite-dominated government in power has two things going for it - two things that will stay with it during the extension of the withdrawal deadline proposed by Walter.  The Shiite-dominated government can continue to consolidate power while US troops remain in Iraq playing a helpful role, and as soon as US forces outlive their utility, the Shiite-dominated government can demand that US forces leave according to the timeline in the SOFA or according to the terms of a subsequent agreement. 

We do not have any credible leverage anymore, and it is unclear to what extent we ever had as much influence as our pundits/politicians liked to pretend (see, ie, Grand Ayatollah Sistani's ability to dictate events).  Put another way, if political reconciliation was such an important goal to the US throughout the past 6+ years, why haven't we been able to impose our will to bring it about?  If the answer is that we lacked the ability to impose such a decision on the Iraqi population, why would that ability be greater now?

Walter's arguments are at their weakest when she ignores the reality of the timeline imposed by the SOFA, when she talks past the lack of leverage and when she tries to formulate an actual plan for reconciliation:

If the U.S. wants to avert this scenario, it will need to create real incentives for Maliki and the Shiites to offer a fair deal that transfers real political power to the Sunnis and Kurds by the 2011 deadline, and then it needs to help them enforce it over time. This would require that those 50,000 "support troops" remain in Iraq until the new political institutions are firmly established, something most experts believe will take an additional five to 10 years.

"Real incentives"?  What, exactly, are those?  Where have they been hiding for the past 6+ years?  Walter doesn't say.  Also left unmentioned is the means by which the US would unilaterally void an agreement between two sovereign governments and simply opt to stay in Iraq against the will of the Maliki government. 

Or is it that we will offer Maliki such an overwhelmingly compelling set of "real incentives" that he will be happy to cede power to his rivals and acquiesce to a prolonged US troop presence?  Again, what is this irresistible package of incentives?  Shouldn't we try to come up with that silver bullet before showing up with guns in hand?  Then again, maybe if we stay another decade, we'll find that pony after all.

Comments

[Ugh]

while US troops have been in Iraq for well over 6 years

$@@!#!#$$#!!!

[jrudkis]

It is probably unrealistic to think you can ever intervene in a civil war and make a long term solution. Sometimes it is best to let the war happen and have a clear victor. I don't think it would have been in the long term interest of the US to have Britian and France intervene in our Civil War. At best we would have been partitioned, with a long border with bitter enemies on either side.

Iraq is different since we kicked off the civil war, and it was reasonable and our responsibility to try and find a solution...but since it seems clear that we have done all we can in that regard, we should pull out and hope that whatever stability exists is enough to prevent catastrophe.

[Nell]

David Swanson remarks on how the deadline for holding a referendum by Iraqi voters on the U.S.-Iraq security agreement is passing with almost no notice by media, antiwar organizations, or foreign policy wonks.

He makes the point I made last year until I was blue in the face: the agreement signed by Maliki and Bush is not a Status of Forces Agreement but a treaty that also requires Senate ratification, no matter how convenient it now is for Pres. Obama and the Democratic leadership in the Senate to ignore it.

Before they were in power, Obama and Biden understood that. Now, as with state secrets, rendition, preventive detention, and so many other things, it's all good once you're the king.

Have seen references to Obama admin proposals for private military to be stationed in Iraq for all eternity. No longer able to dismiss that as implausible, but also lack stomach to research actual state of play. He's so much worse across the board than even my low, low expectations that I wonder how the true believers are handling the cognitive dissonance.

[Eric Martin]

Have seen references to Obama admin proposals for private military to be stationed in Iraq for all eternity.

Would have to see a link to comment. Not sure there are enough private soldiers available (and they don't have the hardware), and considering Erick Prince just got the book thrown at him, I'd say unlikely.

He makes the point I made last year until I was blue in the face: the agreement signed by Maliki and Bush is not a Status of Forces Agreement but a treaty that also requires Senate ratification, no matter how convenient it now is for Pres. Obama and the Democratic leadership in the Senate to ignore it.

Not sure how this changes things. Also, it's incumbent on Congress to check the executive. Obama shouldn't overreach, but all Presidents will. Only Congress/the SCOTUS can stop them.

[Eric Martin]

David Swanson remarks on how the deadline for holding a referendum by Iraqi voters on the U.S.-Iraq security agreement is passing with almost no notice by media, antiwar organizations, or foreign policy wonks.

I've been remiss, but that's because I've seen it coming for so long the actual passing of the event was so ho-hum.

Right now, Maliki doesn't want a referendum because it would imperil the deal he has - which is to his advantage. He controls the timing, and can extract maximum concessions for any potential extension.

The referendum (demanded by Sistani) was useful when he was negotiating the original SOFA because he could use it as a warning for the US to: (a) not overreach; and (b) give in to his demands.

After getting (a) and (b), Maliki and Sistani will table the referendum - put it off until the next round of bargaining to be used in the same way.

[Eric Martin]

In that sense, Swanson is wrong to call Maliki a puppet. He's getting the better of this deal, and the minute he and/or Sistani think otherwise, they can show us the exit.

[Gary Farber]

Barbara Walter (not to be confused, of course, with "Barbara Walters"):

[...] If the U.S. wants to avert this scenario, it will need to create real incentives for Maliki and the Shiites to offer a fair deal that transfers real political power to the Sunnis and Kurds by the 2011 deadline, and then it needs to help them enforce it over time. This would require that those 50,000 "support troops" remain in Iraq until the new political institutions are firmly established, something most experts believe will take an additional five to 10 years.

One of the most robust findings in the civil war literature is the importance of active peacekeepers in helping to implement compromise settlements. Between 1940 and 2002, if peacekeepers were present on the ground, settlements were implemented and civil wars ended. If peacekeepers were not present, they were not.

Notably absent from her article are any references to what Iraqis want.

What happens in Iraq is, apparently, still entirely an American responsibility. Iraqi opinion? Not relevant.

Eric: "Not sure there are enough private soldiers available (and they don't have the hardware),"

I'm not at all sure of the first point: it depends on what mission you intend to task them with, and there are an awful lot of ex-soldiers floating around the world.

And on the second point, the world is awash in spare arms and the arms trade, up to and including full-blown battle tanks, so I'm really skeptical of that assertion.

[gwangung]

I'm not at all sure of the first point: it depends on what mission you intend to task them with, and there are an awful lot of ex-soldiers floating around the world.

As in...who's paying all these private forces?

[jrudkis]

Does the third party showing in Kurdistan recently change the dynamics appreciably? Presumably a weakened Kurd leadership might be more likely to discuss compromise, esp. regarding oil revenue.

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

"A country that has experienced one civil war is much more likely to experience a second and third civil war."

Ahh, so that's why the UN keeps sending those pesky black helicopters to fly over my house. Having already experienced one civil war (two if you count the Revolutionary War), the USA is obviously an at-risk state for another civil war.

That's partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. [...]"

Compromise of 1877?
Rise of the KKK?
The Civil Rights struggle during the 20th Cen.?
The Southern Strategy?

Seems to me that the US is on solid ground in giving advice to Iraqis about how to manage the inconclusive, messy, and long drawn out aftermath following in the wake of a civil war. At least this is one area where we have lots of experience to draw upon.

[Davis X. Machina]

Recall, the Surge was supposed to create space for the various warring factions to forge a lasting political reconciliation.

It might have worked. I haven't heard McCain slanging Romney, or vice versa recently, and General Petraeus' name is bandied about as a potential '12 candidate as well, and the last supplemental for Iraq sailed through Congress.

Oh, you mean the Surge was about political reconciliation in Iraq....

[Eric Martin]

I'm not at all sure of the first point: it depends on what mission you intend to task them with, and there are an awful lot of ex-soldiers floating around the world.

And on the second point, the world is awash in spare arms and the arms trade, up to and including full-blown battle tanks, so I'm really skeptical of that assertion

My point being, all the existing merc outfits would have a very hard time fielding and maintaining 50,000 troops. While the arms might be out there, it would be truly radical for the US govt to greenlight a mercenary army equipping itself with serious hardware like that. A few flying vehicles and some light armor is one thing (Blackwater). But to give them the go ahead to purchase tanks and other heavy arms? That's a hell of a leap, and I'm HIGHLY skeptical that the Obama admin or even Bush admin would OK such a development.

That was one of the checks put on the capacity of Blackwater and other such outfits.

[jrudkis]

When I was in Iraq, private security firms were restricted to 7.62 or smaller rounds. Some of the more reputable firms would not even ride in Army vehicles that were armed above that just to be sure that they were not violating the restriction (presumably worried about photos or something that might indicate they were the people with the weapons).

On the otherhand, there are private firms that train foreign armies to use heavier weapons, like tanks and artillery. It is not that big a jump for firms to employ the weapons they are already training people to use.

And the private firms used a lot of people from Peru, Uganda, Fiji, etc., so it would not be hard to come up with 50,000 troops.

[amocz]

I guess for some people, the dream never dies -- the "dream" in this case being the arrogant assumption of the USA as the "indispensable nation", without whose wise and disinterested counsel (not to mention the airstrikes, UAV attacks and midnight raids) the "backward peoples of the world" will inevitably come to grief, as they are simply incapable of self-governance, and might be so forever, without having our sterling example stuck in their faces to Suck.On.This for a few decades. White Man's Burden, an all that.

I hate to bring it up, but our presence there has long been exposed as being an invasion which was based on lies, our occupation of their country an act of unprovoked aggression: the very definition of a war crime.

We need to get out now, all the way out, while we still can. We do not need to leave a few thousand troops hanging around as sitting ducks, and a tripwire to full involvement all over again, whenever the "sectarian civil war" situation goes ballistic -- which it will. Too bad about the 4000+ American and 1 million+ Iraqui casualties this clusterf**k has cost; send that bill to Dallax, TX -- by way of The Hague.

[Gary Farber]

"My point being, all the existing merc outfits would have a very hard time fielding and maintaining 50,000 troops."

I was thinking that anyone not enlisted in a national army counted as "private troops."

Which is to say, among those already numerous in Iraq, are the "Sons of Iraq," the Shiite militia, the peshmerga, and Sunni jihadis, as well as still fighting Ba'athists, and, of course, Sadrists. Let alone foreigners willing to come for Islamist reasons, let alone people who just want a paycheck, and aren't fussy about who pays them.

But, to be sure, Nell wasn't at all clear as to what she was referring to when she first brought "Have seen references to Obama admin proposals for private military to be stationed in Iraq for all eternity" into the conversation, and not all the folks I've mentioned would be, I think, "greenlighted" by the Obama administration. Peshmerga and "Sons of Iraq," though, we have history with.

And general, "neutral," what we commonly consider "mercenaries," whether for Big Corporations like Blackwater, or individuals for higher, are quite numerous.

Of course, if it's the Iraqi government we're talking about, maybe they can hire Gurkhas, or get the French Foreign Legion on their side, or get the Saudis to pay the Pakistanis for some troops. Etc. Lots of poor countries do good business sending out troops in return for nice compensation. During the "Blackhawk Down" "incident," Pakistani and Malaysian troops played a major role. (The general view of most of the American troops was that they were not impressed with the enthusiasm of these other troops, but differing points of view on such matters are common.)

"And the private firms used a lot of people from Peru, Uganda, Fiji, etc., so it would not be hard to come up with 50,000 troops."

Yep. The world over, poor people join the military, and then leave. But with a skill! And a need for a job.

But if we're talking organized and private, why, DynCorp alone reportedly has 16,800 employees. Xe Services LLC, formerly "Blackwater," "trains more than 40,000 people a year," every year!

They also make their own drones, their own Armored Personnel Carriers, their own naval training facilities and ships, and their own air force airlines!

[...] In March 2006, Cofer Black, vice chairman of Blackwater USA, allegedly suggested at an international conference in Amman, Jordan, that the company was ready to move towards providing security professionals up to brigade size (3,000–5,000) for humanitarian efforts and low-intensity conflicts. [...] The company denies this was ever said.[162]

[John Spragge]

The U.S. needs to decide what outcome it is willing to live with in Iraq.

OK. So does that mean Britain has to decide what outcome it is willing to live with in India? And the Russians get to decide what outcome they can "live with" in the Czech Republic?

[Eric Martin]

They also make their own drones, their own Armored Personnel Carriers, their own naval training facilities and ships, and their own airlines!

Yeah, but that's not enough.

[Uncle Kvetch]

And the Russians get to decide what outcome they can "live with" in the Czech Republic?

And Mexico decides what outcome it can live with in Texas.

I can dream, can't I?

[Nell]

I brought up the merc-force-to-stay-forever trial balloon only to illustrate my state of mind. If I had more confidence in this admin, I'd have followed the link, researched it, saved it, etc., sure that it either wasn't as bad as the headline sounded or was someone pushing an agenda that could be stopped.

Now, with preventive detention on the horizion, and Kris/Johnson testimony clearly pointing to abandoning criminal justice system in favor of "legalizing" a new manufactured multi-level set of show trials, while Gen. Westmoreland,uh, McChrystal asks for more troops to escalate in Afghanistan (which Eric's more recent post addresses), I no longer have any confidence that any plan attributed to ObamaCo is too outlandish, too at odds with what people thought they were getting.

On the Maliki electioneering front, here's what the people have to look forward to:

Baghdad blast walls to come down

[Gary Farber]

On the Maliki electioneering front, here's what the people have to look forward to:

Baghdad blast walls to come down

I'd like to optimistically hope that's good news; at the least, all the necessary ethnic cleansing has long been accomplished, hasn't it? Or am I being too optimistic?