Obsidian Wings

Deep Inside the Baucus Caucus

by publius

Inside Max Baucus’s Senate conference room.  The bipartisan panel of six Senators is negotiating a bipartisan deal on health coverage reform.   The Democratic Senators are Baucus, Conrad, and Bingaman.  The Republican Senators are Grassley, Snowe, and Enzi.

BAUCUS:  Thanks everyone for being here.  I know everyone understands the historical stakes, and everyone wants to accomplish real reform.  I applaud you all – bipartisanship is what makes this country great.

DAVID BRODER:  Amen Senator.

BINGAMAN:  Why is he here?  (Broder blesses the room and leaves).

BAUCUS:  I am especially grateful that our Republican friends are willing to put politics aside, and to compromise and make concessions for bipartisan reform.

ENZI:  Where are the Doritos, Max?

BAUCUS:  Item #1 – the surtax.  Now, I hate the House as much you do.  Especially Pelosi.  

GRASSLEY:  Especially Pelosi.

BAUCUS:  But this proposal seems like a narrowly targeted tax that will keep deficits under control…

GRASSLEY:  Sorry Max.  That’s a non-starter for us.

SNOWE:  Non-starter.

BAUCUS:  I apologize.  You’re right – I don’t know what got into me.  It just sweeps too broadly.  

GRASSLEY:  Happens to the best of us.

BAUCUS:  New idea – how ‘bout we limit the surtax to millionaires then?

SNOWE:  That will devastate small businesses.

GRASSLEY:  They’re the backbone of our economy.

BAUCUS:  How about billionaires?

SNOWE:  Too devastating.

BAUCUS:  Strong argument Olympia.  How ‘bout we limit the surtax only to billionaires who have been convicted of securities fraud?

SNOWE:  That puts us on a dangerously slippery slope.   I mean, where does it stop?

GRASSLEY:  Investments by billionaires are the backbone of our economy.

ENZI:  Bingaman, beef jerky me.

BAUCUS:  OK – how about we apply the surtax only to billionaires who are convicted pedophiles and whose name begins with a “M”?

GRASSLEY:  First or last name?

BAUCUS:  First.

(Snowe and Grassley huddle and whisper.  Snowe emerges, shaking her head).

SNOWE:  Sorry Max – you don’t raise taxes during a recession.  It’s a non-starter for us.

BAUCUS:  Ok, no surtax.  The next item – the employer mandate – still covers a lot of our costs anyway…

GRASSLEY:  About that….

SNOWE:  Non-starter.

BAUCUS:  I’m happy to have it kick in only at high payroll thresholds.

SNOWE:  I can scarcely imagine the devastation on small business.

GRASSLEY:  Small business is the backbone of our economy.

BAUCUS:  That’s a really good point.  No mandate then.

CONRAD:  I’m gritty.

BAUCUS:  Next item – the public option.

(Long pause.  All parties suddenly start laughing loudly, slapping each other on the back).

GRASSLEY (laughing):  Dammit Max, you always get me on that one.  I nearly snorted Diet Sprite out my dern nose.

BAUCUS (still laughing, catching his breath):  Next item – subsidies for the working class.

GRASSLEY:  Max, you know I believe in helping the working man.

BAUCUS:  You’ve dedicated your life to that man.

GRASSLEY:  But these projected deficits are just scarin’ me.

BINGAMAN:  You realize we wouldn’t have these deficits if you agreed to even one…

BAUCUS:  Shut it!  Where are your manners?  Go get Enzi some more Doritos.  (to Grassley)  My apologies – you were saying…

GRASSLEY:  I’m not sure we can agree to these subsidies.

SNOWE:  They’re non-starters.

BAUCUS:  What if we lower subsidies to 300% of poverty?

GRASSLEY:  The CBO will kill us on that.

SNOWE:  Just think of the Politico headline.

BAUCUS:  Well, this here is a pickle of a jam, ain’t it my friends?  Any ideas?

GRASSLEY:  Actually, yes.

SNOWE:  We should just ditch the subsidies.

BAUCUS:  You mean lower them?

SNOWE:  Remove them.

BAUCUS:  You've got to give me more than that.  Let’s set them at five dollars above the poverty line.

SNOWE:  Non-starter.

BAUCUS:  Two dollars.

SNOWE:  Non-starter.

BAUCUS:  Fifty cents.

(Snowe and Grassley huddle and whisper.  Snowe emerges, shaking her head).

SNOWE:  Non-starter.

BAUCUS:  Will you at least let me keep the ban on pre-existing conditions?

GRASSLEY:  Did you not get our message on that?

SNOWE:  That’s a non-starter too.

GRASSLEY:  Too potentially devastating on small business.

BINGAMAN:  What does that even mean?

ENZI (belching):  Enzi bag EMPTY!  (smacking Doritos bag loudly against Bingaman’s face)  Enzi want MORE!

BAUCUS:  My friends, let me apologize for this rudeness.  I will of course accept your gracious conditions.  And he’ll (pointing to Bingaman) get you more Doritos.

GRASSLEY:  Good man, Max, you’re a true patriot.

SNOWE:  We’ve accomplished something great here.

BAUCUS:  It’s historic.

BINGAMAN:  You realize that you’ve agreed to a bill that doesn’t actually do anything.  You’ve literally eliminated every single provision.

SNOWE:  It gets a great CBO score though.

GRASSLEY:  And just think how sweet the Politico headline will be.

SNOWE:  Don’t forget Halperin.

BAUCUS:  Well, now, Bingawhacha over there –

BINGAMAN:  Bingaman.  I’m the senior Senator from New Mexico.

BAUCUS (whispering to Grassley):  I told my secretary Ben Nelson, but she misunderstood me.  And I don't want to hurt his feelings...  (back to group)  Well, that boy there makes a good point.  What do we get in return?  Remember that I have to go back and sell this to the damn liberals.

GRASSLEY:  It’s a fair question, and we’re willing to work with you here.  

BAUCUS:  That sounds like the Chuck I know.

GRASSLEY:  Here’s our deal – we promise that no Senate Republican will be mean to you on the Sunday morning talk shows, and that no one will call you a liberal.

SNOWE:  For three months.

BAUCUS:  Well, boys, that there sounds like a deal I can live with.  Benjamin…

BINGAMAN:  Bingaman.

BAUCUS:  Get me the Post editorial room.

Losing Hearts While Losing Your Mind

by Eric Martin

This highly recommended, if heart-rending, story from the Colorado Springs Gazettetells of a group of soldiers that returned from Iraq only to fall prey to severe mental illnesses that were largely self-medicated through, and as a result exacerbated by, drug abuse.  The soldiers in the applicable unit have committed serial acts of violence, including murder, since their return.  Although painful to read, the article focuses on one of war's inevitable costs, a facet that rarely if ever gets the attention it merits (in fact, the cultural reluctance to acknowledge the severe mental trauma of war often leads to untreated - or self-treated - conditions that only get worse). 

In the course of the reporting, the article also ends up highlighting some of the primary contradictions and limitations at the heart of the Counterinsurgency ("COIN") Doctrine - the military doctrine that has been given too much credit for "winning" the war in Iraq (Iraqis are still dying each month in the hundreds as the war continues) and that supposedly lights the way forward in Afghanistan.

To generalize, COIN Doctrine - as embodied in the Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual and other relevant texts - makes clear that a large number of troops are required for any successful COIN operation.  Further, this large number must usually be kept in theater for 5-15 years, at least.  The exact ratio varies, but is usually in the range of 1 soldier for every 50-200 members of the underlying population - a ratio that would have mandated more than double the 145,000 troops committed to the Iraq war at the beginning and, roughly speaking, throughout.

COIN Doctrine also requires that the soldiers involved develop (or already have) some level of cultural sensitivity/knowledge, that they show restraint in the use of force and that they win the loyalty of that same population (the infamous "hearts and minds").

Therein lies the tension: On the one hand, an extremely large force is needed - much, much larger than the force that our military has strained to maintain in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 7+ years.  On the other hand, despite the sheer numbers involved, that force also has to be well educated (even if only contextually), well disciplined and capable of showing restraint despite the effects of combat.  

Yet, all groups will inevitably have a few bad apples.  When you expand the size of the group (especially through lowering standards and turning a blind eye to behavioral problem cases), you only increase the number of undisciplined soldiers capable of hindering efforts to win over the population.  But here's the kicker: even the non-bad apples eventually breakdown in a war zone.  The stresses and psychological trauma of combat have effects on the decision making/moral faculties of soldiers, regardless - as a rule.   

This is especially true when they are required to make multiple, prolonged deployments in the pursuit of those COIN-recommended troop levels.  In Iraq, we didn't even reach those vaunted ratios, and the effort to keep a lesser number of boots on the ground still wreaked havoc:

The psychological casualties may be particularly heavy in Iraq, he said.

“In the Civil War, if you experienced really traumatic fighting, chances are you didn’t make it,” he said. “Today, you can be blown up multiple times and go right back into the fight.”

In Vietnam, most draftees did one yearlong tour. Since the start of the Iraq war, some soldiers have been deployed three times for 12 to 15 months each.

Those soldiers will not be able to maintain the high level of discipline/restraint required by COIN Doctrine.  From the article: 

Soldiers said discipline started to break down.

“Toward the end, we were so mad and tired and frustrated,” Freeman said. “You came too close, we lit you up. You didn’t stop, we ran your car over with the Bradley.”

If soldiers were hit by an IED, they would aim machine guns and grenade launchers in every direction, Marquez said, and “just light the whole area up. If anyone was around, that was their fault. We smoked ’em.”

Other soldiers said they shot random cars, killing civilians.

“It was just a free-for-all,” said Marcus Mifflin, 21, a friend of Eastridge who was medically discharged with PTSD after the tour. “You didn’t get blamed unless someone could be absolutely sure you did something wrong. And that was hard. So things happened. Taxi drivers got shot for no reason. Guys got kidnapped and taken to the bridge and interrogated and dropped off.”

More from the same article:

In the quest to win, John Needham said, some in his platoon turned ugly.

The soldier said some loaded their rifles with hollow-point bullets designed to expand on impact, making them more lethal. These bullets are banned by international treaties.

It wasn’t just one platoon, either. Eastridge said soldiers in his platoon, including himself, used hollow-point bullets, too. It was easy to get them sent from home, Eastridge said. Both soldiers said some guys in their units carried illegal stun guns, as soldiers had in the first deployment.

The Army said it investigated Needham’s claims and found no evidence.

But there was more to the platoon’s tactics.

In a December 2007 letter to the Inspector General’s Office of Fort Carson, which investigates crimes within the Army, Needham told of the atrocities he saw. His father provided a copy to The Gazette.

One sergeant shot a boy riding a bicycle down the street for no reason, John Needham said. When Needham and another soldier rushed to deliver first aid, the sergeant said, “No, let him bleed out.”

Another sergeant shot a man in the head without cause while questioning him, Needham said, then mutilated the body, lashed it to the hood of his Humvee and drove around the neighborhood blaring warnings to insurgents in Arabic that “they would be next.”

Other Iraqis were shot for invented reasons, then mutilated, Needham said.

The sergeants particularly liked removing victims’ brains, Needham said.

Needham offered a photograph of a soldier removing brains from an Iraqi on the hood of a Humvee and other photos as evidence. His father supplied copies to The Gazette.

Therein lie some of the fundamental weaknesses of COIN Doctrine: the number of troops required is generally not available for the prolonged lengths of time required (at least, not as our armed forces are presently configured).  By augmenting ground forces to accommodate those target levels (especially in a crisis where lower standards are applied), one also increases the risks of including larger numbers of ill-disciplined soldiers that will undermine the effort.  Further, by keeping soldiers deployed for extended periods - and frequently redeploying them - in order to keep the proper troop-to-population ratios, it is likely that even well-disciplined soldiers will lose their self control.

That, completely aside from the grisly human costs on both sides of any conflict.

You can almost always judge a book by its cover, except when you can't

by von

Confirmation bias probably plays a role here, but:  now that we have the actual transcript, it seems clearer than ever that Officer Sergeant Crowley was out of line in arresting Professor Gates.  As Andrew Sullivan notes, you can't reconcile Crowley's report with either the tape or the witnesses.  Crowley seems to have arrested Gates for being annoying rather than for any actual crime.  Whether race played a role in the arrest is kinda secondary at this point:  The fundamental point is that cops shouldn't arrest a person who hasn't committed a crime.  Otherwise the guy in a police uniform is a vigilante or a bully -- not a cop. 

Which brings up another point.  I value our public servants, including cops who put their lives on the line day in and day out.  Police work is a tough job, with a dozen ways to fail for every one way to stand out as brilliant.  And I'm a believer that singing the praises of our public servants should go further than just idle words on the internet.  (That's one reason why I'm looking at a certificate from the local FOP (Fraternal Order of Police) lodge, thanking me for a donation that I just made to support one of their programs.) 

Now, if you read the above paragraph out of the context of my posts on the Crowley-Gates affair, I guarantee that you'd peg me as someone who presumes that the police are telling the truth.  A guy whom every prosecutor wants on his jury and every defense lawyer wants to strike.  Indeed, didn't I admit in a prior post that one of (great) uncles is a retired police chief?  The prosecutor thinks that she'll put a cop on the stand, and von will bring the rope for the hanging.  Surely.

You'd be wrong.  I presume almost the exact opposite about cops being truthful.  Cops do a difficult job.  I respect them a ton.  But cops are human.  And the very difficulties of the job make it inevitable that corners get cut.  And it seems that corners definitely got cut in the Gates case.  (That's about as polite as I can say it.)  If you were to press me, I'd say that my best guess is that many cops lie about a lot of the small things and some cops lie about the big things as well -- because it makes their job easier, and it's easy for them to get away with a lie.  Unless there's a tape, who's going to call them on it?  (Which is an argument for taping almost every interaction between cop and civilian, incidentally.) 

Is that fair of me?  To the individual cop who deserves to be judged on his or her own merits, no.  So if you call me for jury duty, I'll try to put my bias aside.  But there's also a lesson here about the limits of experience.  You might be 90% right when you judge a book by its cover.  When you take one look at me, for instance, and say:  that dude likes cops.  But that 10% -- that unexpected quirk, incident, or bias -- will almost always get you in the end.

But, y'know what?  We've talked an awful lot about Crowley and Gates. Probably too much.  

This is an open thread.  

UPDATE:  Corrected an error (as noted).

Booze, Cigarettes and Coffee: The Three-Part Healthcare Test

by von

There are three essential components to health care reform -- or else it's not worth doing.

1. Coverage.  Obviously, the reform has to cover folks who are currently uninsured. 
2. Personal.  Everyone should have access to good health care; good health care shouldn't depend on a person having a job.  Health care is a personal good.  Aside from this fact, the US's system of linking health care to employment puts US companies at a competitive disadvantage by subjecting them to the so-called "triple tax":  companies pay once for their employee's health care, indirectly subsidize Medicare and Medicaid through those payments,* and pay higher premiums to help cover the  cost of treating the uninsured.  This triple tax is then passed along to employees in the form of a lower salary, and other negative effects.** 
3. Deficit.  We pay an unprecedented amount for health care -- indeed, no other OECD country devotes as much of its economy to health care as we do -- and we face an enormous, and growing deficit. Health care reform should reduce both, and you should see the reduction in the budget projections.  (See "bending the cost curve," below.)

Those should be the criteria for evaluating any health care reform package.  Note what's left out:

• Claims that we will "bend" the cost curve.  There are sensible things that we can do to try to moderate cost, and nearly every plan tries to do at least some of them.  But no one has presented a test to determine whether any of them will work to the degree promised.  Indeed, the CBO estimates that at least one of the reforms under debate -- HR 3200, presented by the Democratic leadership in the House -- will bend the cost curve in the wrong direction.  Hope is not reform.
• An argument for, or against, a public option.  I'm against most versions of a public option, but whether a plan has -- or doesn't have -- a public option shouldn't be part of the test.  If a public option meets the three criteria, then the plan must be taken seriously.  (What does it mean when I say I'm against "most versions of a public options"?  Well, I can see the arguments for state-run cooperatives, particularly if multiple states are allowed to band together in the same cooperative.)

These three, related criteria -- the impact on coverage, personal care, and the deficit -- are the criteria that I propose that we use to measure any health care plan. 

If you look beyond labels and rigorously apply those three criteria, I think that you'll find that the version of health care favored by the Democratic leadership in the House (HR 3200) is a bad idea.  Yes, HR 3200 expands coverage to a certain extent.  But, as a recent report by the CBO confirms, HR 3200 strengthens the link between employment and good health care.  That's a step in the wrong direction.  You should have access to health care because you're a person, not because you're employed.  Linking health care to employment is also bad for business.  Indeed, the legacy cost of health care is a key reason why we, the tax payers, have been forced to bail out American automakers. 

HR 3200 also penalizes small businesses.  Under HR 3200, a business with a payroll as low as $250,000 -- that could be a family-owned restaurant or a local bookstore -- either has to pay for its employees' health insurance or is subject to a penalty.  Employees of small businesses should absolutely have access to good coverage.  But it's a bad idea to mandate that small businesses pay for that coverage.  It's not as though small business owners are currently refusing to provide health insurance to their employees because they're evil; health insurance is expensive.

Regarding the last element of the test -- the deficit -- HR 3200 has a disastrous impact.  Even if Congress adopts the new penalties and surcharges imposed on small businesses, the surtax on the wealthy, and the numerous other complicated regulatory and tax changes hidden in HR 3200's one-thousand-plus pages, HR 3200 still adds $239 billion to the deficit over the next decade while having none of its purported "curve shifting" benefits. 

HR 3200 is not a good bill.  Its defects are fundamental.  It should be killed, not reformed -- particularly since HR 3200 is not the sole Democratic option.  There are many other Democratic bills in circulation, several of which don't have HR 3200's problems.  But these alternate Democratic (and  Republican) bills won't have a chance to breathe so long as HR 3200 is sucking the oxygen out of the room. 

The Democratic leadership in the House needs to get out of the way.

*This is because, by law, Medicare and Medicaid usually pay doctors less for any given service than a private insurance plan.  Thus, to continue to make acceptable profits, doctors tend to charge private insurers more than they otherwise would. These additional charges are passed along to employers (and, indirectly, employees) in the form of higher insurance premiums.

**That employer health care results in lower cash wages is also among the findings of the authors who studied Hawaii's mandatory employer-based health care system. 

UPDATE:  Some minor wordsmithing.

UPDATE 2:  Good.  There will be no healthcare vote in the House before the August recess.  That gives opponents of HR 3200 an excellent chance to kill the bill, and, perhaps, give time for the bipartisan Senate group discussed by Publius (or, as I suspect Publius hopes, a different group) to consider other options.

No Exit

by publius

I've never read No Exit.  My understanding of the general plot is that three people get stuck in a room in hell with some rather annoying Chatty Cathys.  They think they'll be tortured, but actually the punishment is confining them together in a room from which they can't escape each other's company.  "Hell is other people," all that jazz.

Reading this NYT article made me think of that play.  The basic story is that the "fate" of health care depends on Baucus's playgroup of six Senators -- 3 Rs and 3 Ds -- who are hammering out a bipartisan health care reform.  The playgroup is Baucus, Conrad, Bingaman, Snowe, Grassley, and Enzi. 

In the article, we learn that the three Dems have already given away (1) the public option; (2) the employer mandate; and (3) the surtax.  I'm not worried though -- I'm sure Baucus has won some key concessions from the party with 40 Senators.

Anyway, the whole thing reminds me of No Exit not because they're all trapped in a room.  After all, they're buddies who enjoy each other's company.  No, it reminds me of the play because it's the inverse of No Exit.  They're not trapped in some room in some random part of the country.  The country is trapped in them. 

As the stimulus debate taught us, and as health care is teaching us, and as cap-and-trade will teach us, the range of the "possible" in America apparently runs from Max Baucus to Olympia Snowe.  That's the left and right-most edges of the spectrum.  And we're all trapped there -- even with 60 Senators, it seems.

[On a more substantive sidenote, this story may turn out to be good news.  At this point, maybe the bill just needs to get out of Baucus's hands.  Let him pass something, anything, that doesn't mandate clubbing the uninsured, and then let the House and the Senate health committee try to improve it].

How Strong Are The Blue Dogs?

by publius

In my ongoing obsession with the Blue Dogs, I've been wondering -- why exactly should we expect the 52-member Blue Dog coalition to vote as a bloc?  How exactly can the coalition's leadership maintain discipline once Pelosi starts twisting arms?

In thinking about all this, I decided to run some numbers on the Blue Dogs.  The chart below shows all 52 members of the Blue Dog Coalition, and how their congressional district voted in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections.  (The Blue Dog list is here, and the congressional vote break down comes from this wonderful chart at Swing State).  I tried in vain to post a neat Excel table into Typepad, but no such luck.  So the chart below was the best I could do.

Anyway, looking at the numbers influenced my thinking on the Blue Dogs in several ways.  Generally, I have a bit more sympathy for them.  But I also think they're not quite as strong as people think.  Here are my various observations:

First, many of these Representatives are in extremely hostile territory.  For these people, I have more sympathy.  I mean, you can't really expect anything from people like Dan Boren (McCain +32) or Gene Taylor (McCain +36).  You just hope for a vote for Pelosi and then wish them a merry two years.  I do wish, though, that they'd at least keep quiet, but these are rough districts so you can understand the motivation for ostentatious distancing.

And there are many others like them.  By my count, 31 of the 52 self-proclaimed Blue Dogs are in McCain districts (many being heavy McCain districts).  Another five are either tied or Obama +3 or less.

Second, even some of the pro-Obama districts are a bit deceptive because there were big (perhaps temporary) jumps in 2008.  Look at John Barrow (GA-12) -- his district was Obama +9, but was essentially tied in 2004.  Melissa Bean's district was Obama +13, but was also Bush +12 in 2004.  It's understandable that some of these members are skittish about jumping on board with Obama's agenda given historical voting patterns.

Third, there are several Blue Dog districts that are very strong Obama -- most of them being in California.  For instance, by my count, there are 11 districts that were at least Obama +10, AND voted for Kerry (or essentially tied) in 2004.  These are: 

• Joe Baca (CA-43) (+38)
• Leonard Boswell (IA-3) (+10)
• Dennis Cardoza (CA-18) (+20)
• Jim Cooper (TN-5) (+13)
• Jim Costa (CA-20) (+21)
• Jane Harman (CA-36) (+30)
• Mike Michaud (ME-2) (+12)
• Loretta Sanchez (CA-47) (+22)
• Adam Schiff (CA-29) (+38)
• David Scott (GA-13) (+43)
• Mike Thompson (CA-1) (+34)

It's inconceivable to me that these individuals (with the exception of the odious Jim Cooper) would ultimately vote against Pelosi on this issue.  And if they do, this set of seats is particularly appropriate for primary challenges. 

In short, the Blue Dogs are both stronger and weaker than I thought.  Most of the ones causing trouble seem to be structurally limited by electoral realities.  Mike Ross, for instance, doesn't need to be seen as helping Obama in an Arkansas district that shifted from Bush +3 to McCain +19 (I wonder why the district would do that?).

At the same time, though, there are many Blue Dogs whose districts will push them the other way.  Loretta Sanchez, for instance, has come out strongly for the public option.  And you can understand why.  It just seems impossible for the Blue Dog leadership to muster a 52-strong bloc.

And that, then, is the way to undermine the Blue Dogs.  The leaders seem hopeless because they're enjoying their day in the sun AND are constrained by their districts.  So the better option is not to work from the top down, but from the bottom up. 

In short, pick off the rank and file.  It would be nice, for instance, to ask these 11 Representatives exactly where they stand at the moment.  And then go from there.

Blue Dogs

A Stimulus for Tomorrow, Part 9

by von

I am a bit surprised by the lesson offered in Publius' post, The Fool's Errand of Political Cover.  Contrary to Publius, the lesson from the debates over the Democratic stimulus package is not that it's pointless to try to cooperate with the other side (i.e., folks like me). Rather, the lesson may well be that y'all need better Democratic leadership.  

Publius writes:

The current GOP line of attack is that the stimulus is a “failure.”  Even if you think the stimulus is bad policy, this argument is ridiculous.  Maybe the stimulus will ultimately fail, but it’s too early to say anything either way (though it has helped states). ...

The lesson is this — it doesn’t really matter what you do, the ultimate law is going to get attacked.  So it needs to work.  Good policy is the best defense. 

Remember that the two main political attacks against the stimulus were (1) it’s too big; and (2) it’s too porky (Porkulous, honeybees, etc.). ...

And that brings us to today.  If the stimulus fails, it will fail because it wasn’t big enough and didn’t get out fast enough.

So:  It's wrong to attack the stimulus as "not working" because the stimulus isn't going to start working until next year.  And it's a pity that the stimulus wasn't bigger on the front end: the stuff that would have entered the economy by now.  If only someone had written an overlong, repetitive series of pieces arguing that the so-called "stimulus" was a stimulus for tomorrow's recession -- not today's -- and would do precious little in the short term.

Oh, wait:  someone did! Me! A Stimulus for Tomorrow, Parts 1, 2, Hilzoy's response, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8!  Those old posts criticize the Democratic leadership for designing a stimulus that was too small on the front end and too large on the back end.  That is, Democrats in the House designed a stimulus that cost a lot, but wouldn't much impact the economy until after 2009.  This back-loaded design wasn't the fault of "moderates" or Republicans; it was a structural flaw in the Democratic bill as introduced.  Indeed, here's my very first post on the unadulterated Democratic bill -- before us grubby moderates and Republicans got our hands on it:

Government spending is a different story.  Spending is the single largest portion of the bill when you consider the entire ten-year period at issue, 2009-2019. But spending has the smallest impact -- by far -- in the critical 2009 time period. ....

So: most of the government spending won't occur until after the recession is projected to end. 

I and others argued for more money in the front-end of the stimulus -- the so-called "Part B" -- paid for by less spending in 2010-2019. Publius argued for more front-end spending as well.  The Democratic leadership, however, didn't introduce a front-loaded stimulus.  The Democratic leadership introduced a bill that was back-loaded.  And here we are, with a stimulus that virtually everyone concedes hasn't worked yet (if it works at all).  

That's not to say that Publius and I necessarily agreed on a solution.  But we both diagnosed the same problem with the stimulus package, and it was a problem that was created by the Democratic leadership. Put the blame for that problem where it belongs:  on the Democratic leadership. 

The Fool's Errand of Political Cover

by publius

The current GOP line of attack is that the stimulus is a “failure.”  Even if you think the stimulus is bad policy, this argument is ridiculous.  Maybe the stimulus will ultimately fail, but it’s too early to say anything either way (though it has helped states).  In short, the "failure" argument is aimed at the lowest of low-information voters — plus Glenn Reynolds.

But the new GOP attack provides a valuable lesson for people like Max Baucus who are clinging to the hope of winning a few Republicans to provide political cover on health care reform.  The lesson is this — it doesn’t really matter what you do, the ultimate law is going to get attacked.  So it needs to work.  Good policy is the best defense.  (Yglesias has pounded this particular drum at various times in the past).

Remember that the two main political attacks against the stimulus were (1) it’s too big; and (2) it’s too porky (Porkulous, honeybees, etc.).  Democrats, being Democrats, responded to these attacks in some unfortunate ways. 

First, they cut a rather large amount of state aid for no discernible policy reason.  Second, they took (and are taking) too long to get the money out.

The broadband grant process is a good example.  The process there has moved way too slow.  One reason is that officials don’t want to be accused of wasting money.  And that’s all fine — but right now, our country would be well-served by paying newly-unemployed people to dig holes in their backyards.  I’m not saying we should throw the grant money away — but I think the fears of Porkulus attacks have unnecessarily delayed spending.

And that brings us to today.  If the stimulus fails, it will fail because it wasn’t big enough and didn’t get out fast enough.

So here's how this game works:  Republican and centrist Dems attack the stimulus and force changes that make it less effective.  Then, a few months later, these same parties turn around and attack the stimulus as being ineffective, even though their own requested cuts and critiques made it less effective.

But hey, that’s what the opposition party does.  It's what any rational party leader has to expect.

So the lesson for health care is that the attacks will come regardless of whatever accommodations Baucus makes.  At the end of the day, it’s better to bite the bullet and get the policy right.  Political cover isn’t coming under any circumstances.  And more to the point, the pursuit of political cover is itself a dangerous game because it leads people to adopt bad policy for bad reasons. 

Of course, the other side of this coin is that the GOP doesn’t have cover either if good reform gets through.  That’s their gamble. 

And that’s why this fight is going to be so hard — it’s the highest of stakes.  The Republicans have grasped this reality — it remains to be seen if the Democrats do.

Dear Mr. Ross - Please Return The Favor

by publius

As I’ve noted, the Blue Dogs currently benefit from the Democratic Party’s institutional commitment to health care — both nationally and locally.  Nationally, this commitment has helped elevate the Dems into the majority, which benefits every member of the caucus.  Health care is a key part of the national brand, and it has strengthened party identification, loyalties, etc. for years.

Locally, health care gets individual Dems elected.  Better health care is one of those rare issues (like Social Security) that Democrats can (and do) run on in every district in all 50 states.  The strength of the “franchise's” reputation on this issue helps local candidates everywhere.

What’s annoying then is that the Blue Dogs aren’t returning the favor.  They’re accepting the benefits of the party’s reputation on health care, while refusing to help build and maintain that reputation. It’s essentially the Little Red Hen problem — they want to eat the bread, but don’t want to help make it.

Take Mike Ross (D-AR) — the Blue Dog point man on coverage reform.  Granted, he’s from a conservative district (McCain won 58-39).  And no one’s expecting him to toe the party line on every issue.  But health care is different.  Ross has benefited directly from the party's commitment to, and reputation on, health coverage reform.  In fact, as I show below, he explicitly ran on health care in 2000 when he narrowly unseated Republican Jay Dickey (see below).

The point of the excerpts below is to show the value of the party’s health care reputation even to conservative Blue Dog Mike Ross.  It helped him win.  Yet now, when he’s got a chance to actually deliver, he’s choosing to drag the party down in a needlessly ostentatious way. 

It’s not even the substance of the disagreement that most bothers me, but the manner.  The Blue Dogs could rock the DC media establishment — and give Obama an enormous boost — by coming out this week and declaring that reform will happen hell or highwater.  They have agency, and they could choose to negotiate with carrots rather than sticks.  They could be the heroes in arguably the most important legislative debate of our generation.

Instead, the preferred narrative — “we’ll go home you big liberals” — has fed Republican critiques and frames, and it’s threatening to drag the whole thing down. 

Anyway, here’s a sampling of Ross’s reliance on the issue of health care in his 2000 victory over Dickey (all cites from Lexis):

Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (ADG), 11/2/00:

[The Ross campaign said], "Instead of doing the job he was elected to do, Dickey has skipped out on votes for education, health care, and, shockingly, minimum wage."

ADG, 10/28/00, “4th District Clash is on Medicare; Ross slams ‘95 vote”:

Democratic nominee Mike Ross said that Thursday was the fifth anniversary of a vote by Dickey to cut Medicare by $ 270 billion over seven years.  . . . "I will never vote to cut Medicare funding and will fight to expand home health care and make health care more affordable and accessible in rural areas."

ADG, 10/21/00:

The Ross campaign's rejoinder from spokesman Kris Schultz said that Ross "is out there talking to the people about education, Medicare, Social Security, and health care" while "Jay Dickey continues to get stuck in the sludge of negative campaigning."

ADG, 10/7/00:

[The Ross campaign spokesperson said], “Jay [Dickey] claims he comes home; why can't he take the time to debate when he is home? Because he is afraid the people will see his record on Social Security, Medicare, health care and education."

. . .

"While they're making these untrue charges, Mike [Ross] is out there in the field talking to Arkansans about real issues like Medicare, health care, jobs and education," [the Ross campaign] said. "We wish we could get Dickey to talk about the issues."

I’m glad health care could help you out Mike.  We need you to return the favor buddy.  And if you're too exposed at home, then you shouldn't be the point man.

Bleg: Austin City Limits Advice

by publius

The schedule for Austin City Limits (a ginormous music festival in early October) is out.  You can see the schedule here.

So here's my bleg -- I need help plotting my listening strategy (which takes months of intense preparation).  There are always several bands playing at once -- and I've never heard of a lot of them.  So if there are any bands (esp. lesser-known bands) that you think are must-sees, I'd be much obliged. 

Also, the most troubling conflict is Girl Talk and Sonic Youth (I've never seen either).  Not sure what I'm supposed to do about that.  The Lily Allen/Andrew Bird conflict is also problematic.