We Chiseled and We Switched

by Eric Martin

I don't envy President Obama's predicament in Afghanistan.  It's hard to think of a region that has been less hospitable to foreign interlopers throughout ancient and modern history (earning itself the moniker "Graveyard of Empires").  And yet despite this foreboding track record, it is unclear that President Obama is willing to deviate from that familiar, if tragic, path traveled most recently by Britain and the USSR.  Not that Obama's options are all that attractive.  Bush left him with a mismanaged and directionless occupation to unwind (or not).  The exact nature of the hoped-for success via a continued military occupation is hard enough to define, let alone achieve, yet withdrawal has its downsides as well - including the potential for an intense civil war and the return of repressive elements such as the Taliban. 

While entirely too much has been made of the importance of Afghan safe havens in terms of conducting successful terrorist attacks (just as too little has been made of the ability to replicate similar safe havens elsewhere and our ability to disrupt any such haven from afar now that we are making such interdiction a priority), there is little doubt that Obama would pay a steep political price if he were to withdraw and an attack occurred that had some traceable connection to Afghanistan.  While an attack emanating from hubs in, say, Europe or Yemen may be just as (or more) likely, those connections would not prove as damaging despite the underlying reality of the terrorist threat.

So it is that Obama seems to be trading Bush's muddled vision of Afghanistan for his own, with a vague yet grandiose (if often contradictory) recitation of implausible goals and exaggerated fears, all buttressed by a refusal to acknowledge the costs of continuing our occupation.  As if they were trivial (think trillions of dollars - less than the costs of health care that has Washington in a tizzy, but then wars never seem to count as spending).  As Rory Stewart suggests, it's almost impossible to decipher an actual policy direction from the pomp and flourish: 

When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.

It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. [...]

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’

These connections are global: in Obama’s words, ‘our security and prosperity depend on the security and prosperity of others.’ Or, as a British foreign minister recently rephrased it, ‘our security depends on their development.’ Indeed, at times it seems that all these activities – building a state, defeating the Taliban, defeating al-Qaida and eliminating poverty – are the same activity. The new US army and marine corps counter-insurgency doctrine sounds like a World Bank policy document, replete with commitments to the rule of law, economic development, governance, state-building and human rights. In Obama’s words, ‘security and humanitarian concerns are all part of one project.’

This policy rests on misleading ideas about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state. Even if the invasion was justified, that does not justify all our subsequent actions. If 9/11 had been planned in training camps in Iraq, we might have felt the war in Iraq was more justified, but our actions would have been no less of a disaster for Iraqis or for ourselves. The power of the US and its allies, and our commitment, knowledge and will, are limited. It is unlikely that we will be able to defeat the Taliban. The ingredients of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya – control of the borders, large numbers of troops in relation to the population, strong support from the majority ethnic groups, a long-term commitment and a credible local government – are lacking in Afghanistan.

He continues, highlighting some points that I have been making regarding the mythic importance of "safe havens":

Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security. Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaida? And how safe would this safe haven be? They could give al-Qaida land for a camp but how would they defend it against predators or US special forces? And does al-Qaida still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?

Furthermore, there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy). Nor is there any necessary connection between state-formation and terrorism. Our confusions are well illustrated by the debates about whether Iraq was a rogue state harbouring terrorists (as Bush claimed) or an authoritarian state which excluded terrorists (as was in fact the case).

It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives? Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.

Yet the current state-building project, at the heart of our policy, is justified in the most instrumental terms – not as an end in itself but as a means towards counter-terrorism.

With so convoluted a policy, with its mosaic of cross-purpose justifications and strategies, it is no surprise that Obama's choice of McChrystal (a noted counter-terrorism practitioner - aka, a "killer") was curious given the underlying rhetoric and nod in the direction of counterinsurgency ("COIN", noted for its population centric concern and restraint in terms of the use of force).  As Judah Grunstein suggests to explain this apparent contradiction:

...[It seems that] the COIN rhetoric is simply a scaffolding that's been slapped over a strategy that has neither the resources, the political will, nor the local support necessary to succeed.

Those limitations are real.  Even the Afghan optimists (the COIN experts that think that we must "succeed," and that we have a shot at succeeding) think that our only hope is to commit tens of thousands more troops for at least the next decade at a price tag (when combined with non-military outlays) in the neighborhood of several trillions of dollars.  Oh, and even then we'll only succeed if we also eradicate the poppy crop and reorder Pakistan's society while we're creating a stable Afghanistan.

As unrealistic an allocation of resources (and set of goals) as that may seem, it actually gets worse.  Back to Stewart:

In pursuit of this objective, Obama has so far committed to building ‘an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000’, and adds that ‘increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed.’ US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain’s). Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget.

Some policymakers have been quick to point out that this cost is unsustainable and will leave Afghanistan dependent for ever on the largesse of the international community. Some have even raised the spectre (suggested by the example of Pakistan) that this will lead to a military coup. But the more basic question is about our political principles. We should not encourage the creation of an authoritarian military state. The security that resulted might suit our short-term security interests, but it will not serve the longer interests of Afghans.

Given the unappetizing, politically unpalatable menu of options available in terms of crafting an Afghanistan policy, Obama seems to be picking and choosing ala carte, while vastly overselling the risk of starvation, as well as the sumptuousness of the feast - a meal that is doomed as much by the basic ingredients as by their haphazard combination.  If the recent escalation is part of one last push to try to set a decent stage for fuller withdrawal, so be it.  But mission creep is an omnipresent concern with so amorphous and ambitious a set of goals (already there is talk that McChrystal will request thousands more troops from Obama in the near future - one wonders what the response will be and under what rationale?).

Unless and until Obama scales back his goals, and takes a more measured reckoning of the actual costs of withdrawal (total or partial), the policy manifestations will continue to be plagued by an incoherent blend of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, targeting segments of the Afghan population while ostensibly under the rubric of population centric protection, air strikes and hearts and minds, nation building and piecemeal aid, erecting a centralized state and showing sensitivity to the local culture of decentralization, etc., all sold using the ominous rhetoric of an existential threat and the resource allocation of a middling concern. 

Comments

[Point]

Not a lot of time on my hands at present to respond (or even read! -- sorry) the article in full, but wanted to link to an article that makes a pretty good rebuttal to the idea of Afghanistan as a "graveyard of empires" or ungovernable region.

[Point]

Will get back to you -- thanks to Eric for the post!

[Eric Martin]

I'm not sure I buy Bergen's arguments. Re: graveyard = yes, there were "military victories" but there was little or no staying power. I mean, we already won a military victory in Afghanistan. Does that make it a successful empire-building experience?

Further, there are obvious differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan, just as there were differences between Vietnam and Iraq. Yet, despite the differences, Vietnam and Iraq were both failures (massive, resource draining, failures). So too will our effort in Afghanistan be a failure unless we scale back our goals and tailor our strategy and outlays to match.

[Eric Martin]

Bergen, like the others, makes little or no mention of costs or resources, other than to say that "The United States can neither precipitously withdraw from Afghanistan nor help foster the emergence of a stable Afghan state by doing it on the cheap; the consequence would be the return of the Taliban and al-Qaeda."

So, we can't do it on the cheap. But not on the cheap will run in the neighborhood of $3 trillion. Where do we get $3 trillion from? When we can't find $1.5 for health care for our citizens? When our deficit just hit $1 trillion?

[Point]

FWIW, it looks like real HCR will happen -- or is at least possible -- in a largely deficit neutral way.

http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=324

Seriously though, when I have some real time to dig my teeth into this...

[stefan]

It strikes me that 'a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000' costing $3 billion a year isn't overstretch. The population of Afghanistan is 32 million (larger than Iraq). Comparing this number to a peacetime UK strikes me as a bad comparison, but even here were not too far off. Total UK military forces including reserves are 440,000 and policed another 150,000 or so, for a total of a bit under 600,000.

So were talking about a Afghanistan with about 40% more security forces per capita than a peacetime UK.

Obviously there are some social differences between Afghanistan and advanced industrial countries. But peasant societies of the 20th century have been highly mobilized for the military. Serbia, with a population under 5 million fielded 450,000 men in August 1914.

Figures from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Armed_Forces

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1717038.stm

[Eric Martin]

Stefan: the overstretch isn't based on proportion to population, but rather in answering the question of how does Afghanistan come up with the $3 billion a year?

As Stewart points out, the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million.

That's $2.4 billion in supplementals needed to pay for the force, and even then, the Afghan government would have $0 leftover to handle every other function of state.

[stefan]

Eric,

$3 billion comes from foreign sources. Not a big cost item for the US (less than 1% of US DoD spending). I sort of doubt the $3 billion figure, but even with a higher figure would be very affordable -- there are a lot more tempting budget cuts out there than saying this isn't doable even as a multi-decade project.

[Marty]

"Further, there are obvious differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan, just as there were differences between Vietnam and Iraq. Yet, despite the differences, Vietnam and Iraq were both failures (massive, resource draining, failures). So too will our effort in Afghanistan be a failure unless we scale back our goals and tailor our strategy and outlays to match."

How long do we keep saying that Iraq waas a failure, at least in comparison to Vietnam it has, up until now, been a lot more successful.

[Eric Martin]

Stefan,

It would establish the near-permanent dependency of the Afghan government on US largesse. The definition of a client state. That makes me very nervous.

Also, in a nation with weak institutions, such a big strong army could become a threat to the government via coup.

[Uncle Kvetch]

If I keep hitting myself on the head with this hammer, it'll probably kill me.

If I stop hitting myself on the head with this hammer, there's no telling what might happen.

Better the devil you know, I always say.

[klunk]

[stefan]

Eric,

yes, there are problems with building a large US funded Afghan security force. But unaffordability to the US, as you previously stated, isn't one of them. Focusing on the real political issues this creates is probably more informative.

[steve]

(a noted counter-terrorism practitioner - aka, a "killer") ...

This to my mind calls everything you have written into question ... though I MAY try and wade through it once I calm down.

If you are going to be serious be serious ... if you're going to indulge in name calling write shorter posts ... they're easier to ignore

[woot]

But what Stewart's offering as an alternative - 20,000 SOF and more development aid - isn't that much better. It's basically a Phoenix program plus aid that probably won't be delivered because of violence. I'd have more respect for his analysis if he actually followed through on it and called for a withdrawal. As it is, he's trying to have it both ways and failing.

[Eric Martin]

This to my mind calls everything you have written into question ... though I MAY try and wade through it once I calm down.

Not name calling at all!!! That's how the military community refers to counterterrorism vs. COIN practitioners. It's not derrogatory at all. CounterT practitioners kill terrorists. COIN practitioners focus on the population - less so on killing terrorists.

Calm. Down.

[Eric Martin]

But unaffordability to the US, as you previously stated, isn't one of them. Focusing on the real political issues this creates is probably more informative.

Did I actually state that this was unaffordable to the US? Actually, I didn't. I said that the Afghan govt had no hope in paying for it, and would thus need $3 billion in payouts.

I never said that amount was too much for the US to gather. But I did say that it would create a bad dynamic.

[Eric Martin]

I'd have more respect for his analysis if he actually followed through on it and called for a withdrawal. As it is, he's trying to have it both ways and failing.

I tend to agree that full withdrawal is better. But I appreciated Stewart for starting the conversation.

[kid bitzer]

you know, steve, i think you're misreading eric's use of the word "killer". it's a term of art; it describes one approach as opposed to other approaches.

here's mcchrystal himself from an npr interview:

npr: Your experience is in the area of special operations. You're basically a hunter-killer. You've hunted down bad guys like Saddam Hussein, but this is a very different fight; it's a counterinsurgency. How is it different from your previous job?

mcchrystal: It's interesting. I did spend an awful lot of time as a counterterrorist, which was in the hunter-killer mode....

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105630899

here's description from u.s. news and world report:

"That has led some to wonder if McChrystal may be more of a bad-guy killer than the gentleman-general counterinsurgency expert, exemplified by General Petraeus...."

http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/iraq/2009/05/18/mcchrystal-represents-a-new-direction-at-the-pentagon-and-in-afghanistan.html

i found those just by googling "mcchrystal killer".

you might want to do that sort of thing yourself next time, instead of switching into outrage mode.

[liberal japonicus]

I'm headed out for a family vacation with internet access qustionable, so I can't really fulfill my role as the loyal opposition on this subject, but this point
there is little doubt that Obama would pay a steep political price if he were to withdraw and an attack occurred that had some traceable connection to Afghanistan. While an attack emanating from hubs in, say, Europe or Yemen may be just as (or more) likely, those connections would not prove as damaging despite the underlying reality of the terrorist threat.

hits the nail on the head. Just because some realities may be political, it does not mean that they can be waved aside. I'd also echo steve's point about name calling. It isn't really helpful.

[MikeF]

Interesting article by Stewart, although I agree that the policy suggestions are a bit wishy-washy given the implications of his analysis. He wrote a couple of books about his travels in Afghanistan and his time working in the coalition government in Iraq, both of which are quite good.

[stefan]

Eric writes:

"Did I actually state that this was unaffordable to the US? Actually, I didn't. I said that the Afghan govt had no hope in paying for it, and would thus need $3 billion in payouts.

I never said that amount was too much for the US to gather. But I did say that it would create a bad dynamic."

I don't know about 'would create a bad dynamic' -- the Afghan government budget looks like it is pretty dependent on foreign funding right now and for the foreseeable future, with taxes making up about 20% of spending now, before the increase in security force strength. I don't think kicking in another $3 billion on top of the more $2.6 billion currently provided by foreign sources isn't a going to 'create' a bad dynamic. This is already a financially dependent state.

The question here is what actual trade-offs there are: a state with 450,000 security forces financed (cheaply) from abroad vs. a country with a Taliban dominated society, or some intermediate solution. It is not clear that more foreign financing given how much foreign financing is currently going in will lead to a more authoritarian outcome: there are other dynamics at work as well and outcomes are not predetermined by funding levels. On the other hand, making the system work with much less foreign funding or declining security looks like it is not sustainable.

No time now to write more deeply about this, just a plea for you not to skip too many corners in your arguments.

[Fred]

The goals. Britain and the USSR had different goals than the US.

We don't have to defeat the Taliban. The US is only after the Taliban for protecting al-Queda. Once we kill Osama, we can mellow out. We lived with the Taliban in Kabul before, we could again.

But barring such a radical change, all we need is some other Pashtun bastard to take over and keep the Taliban down somewhat. Once Osama is dead, we can call it victory.

No need to install shopping malls, democracy, accountability and all that other foreign stuff.

And there's no oil there, so Afghanistan is not going to field strategic weapons.

[Point]

Hey -- still not a lot of spare time, but I wanted to speak to the central point that "it's almost impossible to decipher an actual policy direction from the pomp and flourish":

From where I sit, Obama himself has been very clear on the fundamental mission in Afghanistan:

"Now, I can articulate some very clear, minimal goals in Afghanistan, and that is that we make sure that it's not a safe haven for al-Qaida, they are not able to launch attacks of the sort that happened on 9/11 against the American homeland or American interest."

Now, as to how valuable denying Al Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan is -- Eric and I have debated* this subject in the past, and many of his points are brought up here as well.

I look forward to when I can sit down and get into some good threading on the subject again.

*sorry, link wasn't working -- it was this site, on the thread for Eric's article "Hanging Out with Young Thugs that All Carry Nines"

[Point]

Also, sorry about the lack of link on Obama quote -- it was from an interview w Jim Leher.

[Eric Martin]

Point: I don't have too much of a problem with the minimal goals as listed. My problem is the other, more grandiose rhetoric and what that might signal. Also, the potential for mission creep - not to mention the enormous costs involved.

[Gary Farber]

"(earning itself the moniker 'Graveyard of Empires')."

As I've pointed out here before, and don't care to reiterate, or go find my last comment on the topic, this is generally grossly exaggerated.

[Gary Farber]

"Oh, and even then we'll only succeed if we also eradicate the poppy crop"

It's late enough that, again, I'm not going to cite again, but this is out of date; we've officially changed policy on this; there was various coverage of this good news in the past month. One of those things I mean to blog about....

Oh, okay, see here, for example: US changes course on Afghan opium, says Holbrooke. U.S. reverses Afghan drug policy, eyes August vote; U.S. to phase out poppy eradication.

Etc.

[Gary Farber]

"How long do we keep saying that Iraq waas a failure, at least in comparison to Vietnam it has, up until now, been a lot more successful."

"At least in comparison to Vietnam"?

There's a bar set low enough that a quark couldn't do the mambo under.

[Omega Centauri]

I've said for a long time that 9-11 was a mental illness inducing trama for the US. We cannot think rationaly about policy vis-a-vis funny looking Muslims, because of our collective amygdala hijack. Politically this manifests as, "If I (some politician) do anything that allows the opposition to blame my actions for a hypothetical future attack -the political cost to me (and by extension to my side in the culture war) -is unthinkably bad". So outside of policy wonk style discussions, it is impossible to propose a rational evaluation of costs, benefits, or risks.

Until we recognize, that we have been traumatized into a national mental illness, I don't think we will be able to get past this problem. But no one wants to raise that awareness because, at least in the early phase, it would be politically highly unpopular.

[Pinko Punko]

At least the cops don't come in/spare us the legal poems

Eric, I find it a little odd that you see to have an affinity for some of my all time faves.

[Point]

Glad to be back Eric*:

I'm really glad you responded -- as the post was, I was having some trouble unpacking it for discussion^, so I can really appreciate a brief summary that makes these distinctions.

You mention:

1) the "more grandiose rhetoric and what that might signal"

2) "the potential for mission creep"

3) "the enormous costs involved"

Seems, off the bat, that these involve really three different discussions -- points 1 and 2 relate more to how the administration may be cornering itself into a box in not properly adjusting the population's expectations, while 3 stems right into our conversation on the very value of denying AQ a safe haven.#

And just like that I have to get going -- but I'll be back shortly, and look forward to continuing this conversation.

*sorry I'm taking so long to post; the comments below were a point I tried to put up last night -- technical troubles

^not unclear, mind you, just a little on the intricate side -- not complaining in the least!

#For example, if denying AQ safe haven in Afg. is of the utmost necessity to US National security, then the potential costs are of little importance.

[Russ]

"It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners."

I just read almost the very exact thoughts about Africa by Paul Theroux in his Dark Star Safari. I must read book.

[Eric Martin]

It's late enough that, again, I'm not going to cite again, but this is out of date

Gary, I wasn't so much referencing current policy, as what the CNAS group and other "optimists" have been saying were necessary steps to succeed.

Eric, I find it a little odd that you see to have an affinity for some of my all time faves

Well, have you ever seen us both in the same room?