by Eric Martin
When I predicted last week that the Iranian election imbroglio would be used as a pretense by neoconservatives (and other factions that prefer conflict with Iran) to declare potential negotiations/engagement with Iran a dead letter, I didn't expect to see the argument made by two foreign policy writers whose work I admire greatly and with whom I tend to agree as a rule (three if you include Kevin Drum). First, Rob Farley:
I also suspect that it is going to be extremely difficult to carry out any engagement strategy with Iran going forward. If the regime survives, it will be because of the loyalty and brutality of its security forces. With that brutality on display on US televisions (if only rarely) it will be much more difficult for Obama to build any domestic support for talks. Moreover, it's not clear that he should; knowing that the Iranian regime was repressive before these latest incidents, and acknowledging that many US allies in the region don't even bother with the fiction of elections doesn't change the fact that it's an ugly bit of business. I'd rather, other things being equal, not have my President engage with Iran while the current group of thugs is in power. Finally, I do think that the repression has opened greater opportunity for what might be termed a non-interventionist coercive strategy; this is to say that more and tougher sanctions against the regime are on the table now than was the case two weeks ago.
There are more than a few issues I have with Farley's piece. On the one hand, he acknowledges the fact that the US not only engages with - but has good relations such that it bestows enormous amounts of aid on - other less democratic regimes in the region. But whereas Farley is not calling for a clean break with Saudi Arabia, Egypt or any of the other less-than-democratic regimes, he would prefer that Obama not engage Iran. Under what principle this distinction is made is unclear and, yet, there are the two standards standing in stark contrast.
I feel compelled to repeat the words of Vice President Biden:
“Talks with Iran are not a reward for good behaviour,” [Biden] told NBC...“Our interests are the same before the election as after..."
Indeed, they are, and so are Iran's. Our interests still include convincing Iran to put safeguards in place to ensure that it does not weaponize uranium, and to try to gain more cooperation from Iran in the region generally speaking. If those were laudable goals worthy of pursuing via direct engagement before the election, they remain so today.
And what, may I ask, is the alternative? The Bush administration refused to engage Iran, and this did not advance our interests in the region in any measurable way (actually, it is plausible to argue - as Farley and I have in the past - that the Bush administration approach was counterproductive).
What Farley recommends is another round of (or simply tougher) international sanctions - assuming that we can get China and Russia, and our European allies, as applicable, on board [update: sanctions outside the negotiation process are problematic, though when part of that process, they serve a more fruitful purpose]. This policy, too, seems ill-advised. As Robert Wright argues, engagement itself (giving the state in question a stake in the international order) is more likely an engine of liberalization and means to de-escalate tensions. Sanctions, on the other hand, tend to entrench resistance and foster a bunker mentality:
America's security will best be served if all nations are by then free-market democracies, because ... the entanglement of such nations in the global economy strengthens their incentive to preserve world order and their inclination toward international cooperation — including, crucially, highly intrusive arms control.
...Making free-market democracy pervasive is only crucial to America's interest in the long run, over decades. Hence: no need to rush into, say, the Iraq war.
...Progressive realists (unlike neocons) believe that economic liberty strongly encourages political liberty. So (a) America should economically engage, rather than isolate, countries like Iran and North Korea, and (b) more generally, economic engagement offers a path to peacefully fostering the free-market democracy that neocons are inclined to implant via invasion.
There is another potential course of action for dealing with Iran's nuclear program, one that is preferred by many that seek to preemptively cut short Obama's outreach (though, to be clear, not Farley himself): a military attack that would, most likely, provoke retaliation that would escalate to something even nastier. At a time when our military has little flexibility to deal with a third front.
Given those stakes, and the success rates of the various approaches, it would be better if we got over our squeamishness the same way we do every day with some of our "allies" in the region, and the way we have with other regimes throughout our history. As Larison is right to point out:
As I said before, Nixon went to China after the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution. For that matter, detente advanced under Brezhnev, who had just smashed the 1968 uprisings in central and eastern Europe; Sadat made peace with Israel after the Arabs had almost overrun the country in 1973. There was a time when we understood that these sorts of governments needed to believe that they were secure before they could take the risk of negotiating with old foes on major national security questions. What is so strange is that the psychology of strength and weakness that hawks apply to U.S. foreign policy (usually wrongly) all the time would be quite appropriate to apply to the internal politics of an authoritarian state, but they don’t do this because they are too busy citing the authoritarians’ abuses to justify confrontational policies against them. If they stopped for a moment and applied their constant fear of “showing weakness” to an analysis of the internal politics of the authoritarian regimes in question, they would see that the presence of a viable, vibrant opposition is probably the surest guarantee that the regime will make no deals with Washington. Authoritarians are most likely to make deals on security and foreign policy issues once they feel secure and in place. The ones who cannot afford to make a deal are those who are vulnerable and fear appearing weak, which invites internal challenges.
The latter point Larison makes regarding the regime in question's tendency to negotiate in earnest from a position of security speaks directly to an argument put forward by Matt Yglesias reacting to Farley's post:
I would add to that the observation that a regime win would simply make me much less confident that engagement will work. The hope behind an engagement strategy was that the Supreme Leader might be inclined to side with the more pragmatic actors inside the system—guys like former president Rafsanjani and former prime minister Mousavi. With those people, and most of the Iranian elites of their ilk, now in open opposition to the regime, any crackdown would almost by definition entail the sidelining of the people who might be interested in a deal. Iran would essentially be in the hands of the most hardline figures, people who just don’t seem interested in improving relations with other countries.
Under the circumstances, the whole subject of American engagement may well wind up being moot.
Here, Yglesias forces a complex, but almost entirely inward-facing, Iranian struggle for power between the current regime and a heterodox amalgamation of clerical factions (longtime adversaries with the current regime), reformers and liberals, into an American-centric frame. The election in Iran was not decided around issues of engagement with America vs. not, or pursuit of a nuclear program vs. abandonment (most Iranians, even the protesters, favor the continuation of a nuclear program). Rather, it was a contest between factions of elites concerned primarily with domestic and economic matters - not to mention Khamenei's insecurity at the surprising size and scope of the burgeoning reform movement that he wanted to stop in its tracks, which speaks to Larison's argument.
That is not to say that there are not differences in the general orientation of the two camps toward the United States. Thus, it is possible that the outcome of the election and its aftermath, which will likely result in Ahmadinejad's retention of power, is a harbinger of an Iran that is unwilling to negotiate in good faith. But it is equally plausible that Khamenei was intent on securing his position (and ensuring his control over the process) ahead of negotiations that appear inevitable given Obama's lead. Or, perhaps, that the force of pushback Khamenei received this election cycle will lead him to pursue engagement in order to attempt to have something to show the population in terms of achievements.
Of course, we won't know what the Iranian regime's disposition is until we ask. So let's not cancel the party before we even send out the invites.
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