The Sugar-Free Daddy

by Eric Martin

John Mueller makes an important pointabout the nature of the Taliban/al-Qaeda relationship that rarely gets the attention it deserves:

President Barack Obama insists that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is about "making sure that al Qaeda cannot attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests and our allies" or "project violence against" American citizens. The reasoning is that if the Taliban win in Afghanistan, al Qaeda will once again be able to set up shop there to carry out its dirty work. As the president puts it, Afghanistan would "again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." This argument is constantly repeated but rarely examined; given the costs and risks associated with the Obama administration’s plans for the region, it is time such statements be given the scrutiny they deserve.

Multiple sources, including Lawrence Wright's book The Looming Tower, make clear that the Taliban was a reluctant host to al Qaeda in the 1990s and felt betrayed when the terrorist group repeatedly violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements and fomenting violence abroad. Then the al Qaeda-sponsored 9/11 attacks -- which the Taliban had nothing to do with -- led to the toppling of the Taliban’s regime. Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the "AfPak" region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention. And even if al Qaeda were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory there, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its "safe haven" in Pakistan.

The very notion that al Qaeda needs a secure geographic base to carry out its terrorist operations, moreover, is questionable. After all, the operational base for 9/11 was in Hamburg, Germany. Conspiracies involving small numbers of people require communication, money, and planning -- but not a major protected base camp. [emphasis added]

In addition to Lawrence Wright, Steve Coll makes the same argument in The Bin Ladens: namely, that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were not natural allies, willing to support each primarily out of a religious or ideological affinity.  On the contrary, Osama bin Laden had to lavish enormous amounts of money on Taliban leaders in order to stay in their good graces.  In addition to other tributes, Osama employed his construction know-how to build palaces, homes and other facilities for Taliban leaders.  Without those sweeteners, it is unlikely that the Taliban would have long tolerated what was, essentially, a band of problematic interlopers with an agenda that was irrelevant to the inwardly directed Afghans.

Now that the Taliban has been made aware of the sizable costs that they could and would incur should they decide to reprise their previous landlord/tenant relationship with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, it is less likely that they would be so inclined.  And now that the US and other nations have are taking the task of disrupting al-Qaeda's financing networks seriously (with time, money and other resources dedicated to the cause), it would be harder for Osama and others to generate the funds needed to buy their way in.

And, again, even if al-Qaeda succeeded in finding a foothold in Afghanistan despite these obstacles, such bases aren't the sine qua non of successful terrorist attacks.  Not by a long shot.

Comments

[thebewilderness]

It has seemed to me, from the beginning, to be just another thin veneer overlaying a policy of collective punishment.

[tyronen]

This strikes me as completely wrong. See for one Ahmed Rashid's book "Descent into Chaos" which explores the highly symbiotic relationship between Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistani and Kashmiri extremists, and Central Asian jihadists like the IMU.

Al Qaeda didn't just supply money (which, in any case, the Taliban can raise easily from heroin sales) - they supplied foreign fighters to the Taliban ranks.

If the link was that tenuous, surely the Taliban would have considered turning bin Laden over to the US after 9/11. They fled into Pakistan instead.

The Taliban made no attempt to form an actual administration and actually govern Afghanistan during their time in power. They remain in a state of perpetual war - and if they defeated Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, their next target would be Pakistan to the south and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the north.

They need Al Qaeda to keep them embattled against the world, since they don't want peace or any kind of normal international standing.

[Omega Centauri]

Even if we take as given, a high probability that a Taliban Afghanistan would not again host highly visible groups intent on projecting violence into far corners of the world, the political calculus may not change substantially. If you grant some nontrivial probability that they might do it again, then the political cost of making policy based upon this assumption -and being proven wrong by events is catastrophic (to ones political career, and probably one's political party as well). You would be hard pressed to get any politician who cares about his, or his parties future to take such a risk.

[Eric Martin]

Al Qaeda didn't just supply money (which, in any case, the Taliban can raise easily from heroin sales) - they supplied foreign fighters to the Taliban ranks.

But the Taliban tended to view the foreign fighters as cannon fodder. In fact, during the anti-Soviet campaign, the ISI tended to funnel money to the non-foreign fighters because they were a lot more adept and skilled. The foreign fighters tended to be novices with little battlefield impact.

Many Talib commanders wanted little to do with them for these reasons.

Incidentally, I'm reading Rashid's book now, so I'll check in again with his views as applicable.

[Russ]

I've been reading this blog for years and usually agree. In the Looming Tower, Wright also writes, (p.194) Why did our former friends in Afghanistan turn on US? A Crusade mentality, going back to the gates of vienna 1683 , the king of Poland turned back muslim armies. Also, until the very end, under threats, Omar sided with Bin Laden. I think we're making the right decision and even the Afghans want the Taliban out, except in parts of the south, maybe.

[Eric Martin]

I think we're making the right decision and even the Afghans want the Taliban out, except in parts of the south, maybe

Well, the Taliban in Afghanistan are Afghanis, so it's not correct to say the Afghans want the Taliban out. Some Afghans want the Taliban out, some Afghans ARE the Taliban

[Pithlord]

Most Afghans want the Taliban out.

If we let the Taliban win, then they hardly have any reason to continue to be scared. Why wouldn't they let al Qaeda use Afghanistan as a base?

And it makes no sense to say that because you can have terrorist attacks without a state refuge, a state refuge is not a serious asset. You can make fire with sticks, but it's better to have a flamethrower.

And finally, why should we give the lives of Western commuters infinite value and those of Afghan women no value? Where's the moral calculus there?

[Pithlord]

Most Afghans want the Taliban out.

If we let the Taliban win, then they hardly have any reason to continue to be scared. Why wouldn't they let al Qaeda use Afghanistan as a base?

And it makes no sense to say that because you can have terrorist attacks without a state refuge, a state refuge is not a serious asset. You can make fire with sticks, but it's better to have a flamethrower.

And finally, why should we give the lives of Western commuters infinite value and those of Afghan women no value? Where's the moral calculus there?

[Eric Martin]

And it makes no sense to say that because you can have terrorist attacks without a state refuge, a state refuge is not a serious asset.

True, but I didn't say that. What I said was that it wasn't worth several trillion dollars and the rest of the resource expenditures. I said that, in part, because even if we eradicate a safe haven, they can simply set up a new one.

And, ultimately, it's not the difference between rubbing sticks together and a flame thrower. Plenty of deadly terrorist attacks have taken place without use of a safe haven. Apartments in Western Europe have filled in quite nicely, unfortunately. Terrorism's like that.

And finally, why should we give the lives of Western commuters infinite value and those of Afghan women no value? Where's the moral calculus there?

Why don't you give the lives of North Korean women and children value? Why don't you want to invade North Korea? Where's your moral calculus?

(PS: Are you suggesting that the US hasn't killed Afghan women?)

[Gary Farber]

"And finally, why should we give the lives of Western commuters infinite value and those of Afghan women no value?"

Why do we give the lives of Burmese women, and Somali women, and the lives of the women of Congo, and the lives of Sudanese woman, and the lives of Rwandan women, and the lives of Zimbabwean women, and the lives of North Korean women, no value? Why are we not invading these, and my other countries where women and men live in dire straits?

[russell]

You know, if the Afghans really and truly want the Taliban, then I'm not sure we have any standing to say otherwise.

All of that said, the Talibs are murderous bullies. That's true whether they have any association with Al Qaeda or not.

Not saying it's our job to change anyone's mind in Afghanistan. Just saying it's worthwhile to call a spade a spade.

[Point]

A lot of good counterpoints here, so I'll just add:

At what point does giving aid and comfort to an organization intent on killing as many Americans as possible become an annoyance, as supposed to, say, an act of aggression against the US?

And if this isn't aggression, how does getting sweet palaces in any rational way compensate for taking the risk that they would succeed?

[Point]

Thought in general here:

The idea that it's not worth a trillion dollars to deny a safe haven to Al Qaeda is worth looking at.

First, it's been laid out how important Afghanistan's safe haven was to bringing about 9/11, the most serious attack by the international organization -- granted, there are few to compare it to, but I'm pretty sure disasters of this magnitude are what we're focused on preventing. Pointing out that local terrorist cells can do damage without safe havens is really more of a non-sequitur in this context (though a real threat, nonetheless).

Second, to the idea that Al Qaeda can simply find sanctuary in another country if it loses Afghanistan and Pakistan seems, to be frank, odd -- especially if it's somehow also the case that the Taliban has been convinced by our actions not to do so itself.

If the Taliban are dissuaded, wouldn't other potential Osama allies be as well? And wouldn't their dissuasion be more likely if the Taliban were, at the very least, denied a return to power?

[Eric Martin]

Pointing out that local terrorist cells can do damage without safe havens is really more of a non-sequitur in this context (though a real threat, nonetheless).

These aren't "local cells" in the sense that they've been dispatched from AQ central in Af/Pak. These are local start-ups. Self-starters. The point is that safe-haven denial is not an efficient use of resources in some instances (where the proposed way of doing so is multi-decade, multi-trillion dollar nation building) since safe haven denial doesn't eliminate the threat of terrorism.

Second, to the idea that Al Qaeda can simply find sanctuary in another country if it loses Afghanistan and Pakistan seems, to be frank, odd -- especially if it's somehow also the case that the Taliban has been convinced by our actions not to do so itself.

First, I'm not saying that we shouldn't seek to convince the Taliban to sever ties with al-Qaeda. We should indeed. My piont is that such convincing either won't require a multi-decade, multi-trillion dollar nation building effort, and if it does, then it's not worth it.

Keep in mind, al-Qaeda already lost the Afghanistan safe haven, so they moved to Pakistan. Are we going to militarily occupy Pakistan now? If not, then what would we accomplish in Afghanistan by denying a safe haven long term?

al-Qaeda came to Afghanistan from Sudan (at least, Osama and his cohort). They might be able to relocate to Somalia or Yemen, where the locals might be more desperate for the money (despite the risks), more amenable to the presence of, well, Yemenis like Osama, and/or less familiar with the wrath of the US military.

Keep in mind, also, that AQ doesn't need a hell of a lot of room to operate. To the extent that they need extensive training camps, we can disrupt them from afar via missile strike.

Further, it should be pointed out that their current "safe haven" in the Pakistani hinterlands hasn't enabled them to pull off many spectacular attacks due to increased US countermeasures and attention. The latter wouldn't have to cease even if we decided against multi-decade, multi-trillion dollar nation building in Afghanistan.

[Russ]

You make some persuasive points, but the power and danger posed by the terrorists in that part of the world, make our effort worth it. There may be less expensive strategies though. Rory Stewart, who lives there, seems to think the troop build up is a mistake. This article in WaPo tells some of what is a stake.

This region, considered "terrorism central" by U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, is now a fully operational al-Qaeda base area offering a wide range of services, facilities, and military and explosives training for extremists around the world planning attacks. Waziristan is now a regional magnet. In the past six months up to 1,000 Uzbeks, escaping the crackdown in Uzbekistan after last year's massacre by government security forces in the town of Andijan, have found sanctuary with al-Qaeda in Waziristan.

[Point]

To Eric and other readers, let me sincerely apologize for my vagueness in my previous post, and offer some clarification --

On the first point, saying "safe haven denial doesn't eliminate the threat of terrorism" is a non-sequitur when your talking about preventing subway bombings, and I'm pretty sure we're more interested in preventing another 9/11 or worse (attacks with WMD, etc.) -- safe havens do play a pivotal role, if 9/11 is any indication*, for these level of attacks.

(more to come)

*At the risk of repeating myself unnecessarily -- yes, 9/11 does stand alone in this analysis, so there's not a lot to compare it to.

[Turbulence]

I'm pretty sure we're more interested in preventing another 9/11 or worse (attacks with WMD, etc.) -- safe havens do play a pivotal role, if 9/11 is any indication*, for these level of attacks.

I don't think this makes any sense. It would be helpful if you adopted more specific language rather than referring to the vague WMD.

If you're talking about nuclear weapons, I don't see why a safe haven like Afghanistan is useful. Safe havens like that tend to be isolated and easy to monitor: we know a great deal more about what is happening in Waziristan than we do about what is happening in the slums of Lahore. Moreover, the industrial services needed to prepare even a simple nuclear weapon are much more common and much easier to obscure in a large third world city.

If you're talking about chemical weapons then I don't think you understand much. Chemical weapons can be made anywhere and moreover are not particularly more effective than conventional explosives.

Finally, if you're talking about biological weapons, there's no evidence to suggest that terrorists in Afghanistan had the capacity or the interest in spending years of lab work building a weapon that was more likely to kill them than any American.

[Point]

On the second point -- my point was more a sense of contradiction in Eric's post than any kind of recommendation or analysis. I apologize if that wasn't clear or if it seemed inappropriate.

As to the current "safe-haven" in Pakistan, it seems, at least to me, to be very different from what they had in Afghanistan -- the government is, for all its qualifications, at least keeping pressure against Osama and his allies (hence no "sanctuary", and certainly no "aid and comfort").

This is because of the other tools of our foreign policy (diplomacy, aid, etc.) that can easily bring any legitimate government to take sides against such an organization. In conjunction with a foreign policy that uses these tools to make sure that no country (like Somalia or Yemen) is desperate* enough to make the Taliban's mistake.

And, all this aside, let me ask -- if I'm right about the importance of sanctuary level safe haven being necessary to such a large terrorist attack, and assuming for the sake of argument that Al Qaeda can't set up shop anywhere else -- at that point, is preventing another 9/11 scale incident worth "a multi-decade, multi-trillion dollar nation building effort"?

[Point]

(note to last post) *

*Even saying "desperate" seems odd -- its hard to imagine anyone on the planet, by this point, not " familiar with the wrath of the US military". Plus -- and this becomes more true the weaker we make the Taliban -- isn't saying someone's "desperate enough" to give sanctuary to Al Qaeda, at this point, like saying their "desperate enough" to make a nuclear first strike against a fellow power?

[Point]

Turbulence

I apologize for the vague terminology in using the term "WMD" -- you do seem to be right about the irrelevance of chemical and biological weapons in the context of this thread.

But as to a nuclear terrorist attack -- the trick of pulling off a nuclear material is more than just making the bomb; it also requires getting enhanced uranium (very difficult), getting said bomb into target country (also difficult), and, to top it off, finding a local cell to pull off the attack.

In other words, to create a terrorist incident comparable to 9/11, you'd need 9/11 level planning and coordination -- which, again, if 9/11 itself in any indication, you pretty much need safe haven to achieve.

[Turbulence]

But as to a nuclear terrorist attack -- the trick of pulling off a nuclear material is more than just making the bomb; it also requires getting enhanced uranium (very difficult), getting said bomb into target country (also difficult), and, to top it off, finding a local cell to pull off the attack.

This is my point: a nuclear attack really doesn't require or benefit from having a staging ground like Afghanistan.

In other words, to create a terrorist incident comparable to 9/11, you'd need 9/11 level planning and coordination -- which, again, if 9/11 itself in any indication, you pretty much need safe haven to achieve.

You mean like Hamburg? Because I'm pretty sure we're not going to be invading Germany any time soon. It seems that Hamburg was far more useful for planning and coordinating the 9/11 attacks than Afghanistan was. Do you disagree?

[Point]

"It seems that Hamburg was far more useful for planning and coordinating the 9/11 attacks than Afghanistan was. Do you disagree?"

Short answer -- yes I do.

It was, for example, that KSM found institutional support for putting his plan into practice. The institution (Al Qaeda) needed a safe haven for that meeting to even take place. By the time the Hamburg cell was formed, each was already a member of AQ.

In other words, to pull off a major terrorist attack, you need a reliable global network; and such a network to function, at least reliably enough for something like 9/11, you need a safe haven.

That is why we invaded Afghanistan, and not Germany.

[Turbulence]

In other words, to pull off a major terrorist attack, you need a reliable global network; and such a network to function, at least reliably enough for something like 9/11, you need a safe haven.

But AQ has held meetings in many countries around the world. If you want to hold a meeting, Cairo or Jakarta or Lahore are quite convenient and a good deal more comfortable than Waziristan. I do not understand why you say that AQ needed a safe haven for the meeting to take place.

In other words, to pull off a major terrorist attack, you need a reliable global network; and such a network to function, at least reliably enough for something like 9/11, you need a safe haven.

There are many transnational criminal organizations that function perfectly well without requiring a safe haven like Afghanistan.

That is why we invaded Afghanistan, and not Germany.

Really? I thought it was because we insisted on seizing Osama Bin Ladin and the Taliban refused to turn him over to us.

[Point]

"If you want to hold a meeting, Cairo or Jakarta or Lahore are quite convenient and a good deal more comfortable than Waziristan."

Somehow, I don't think they'd be so comfortable to someone with as large a price on his head as bin Laden; I can't see someone heading such an organization lasting a day under the jurisdiction of Egypt or Indonesia.

"There are many transnational criminal organizations that function perfectly well without requiring a safe haven like Afghanistan."

And I'm sure they're very good at getting a case of cocaine across the border; but that doesn't mean they can murder thousands of people in a single blow.

[Point]

"And I'm sure they're very good at getting a case of cocaine across the border..."

Reading my last post, I realize I actually have no idea what the unit for cocaine is -- I've heard the use of "kilos" on the news, and "packages" elsewhere, but "a case of cocaine" probably makes no sense.

My bad.

[Jesurgislac]

Point: In other words, to pull off a major terrorist attack, you need a reliable global network; and such a network to function, at least reliably enough for something like 9/11, you need a safe haven.

Actually, I think what you need is some reason - some stimulus - to found the group. Once the group is founded, no "safe haven" is needed for the group to continue to function and communicate.

But what you need is something like the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where what might have been an Afghan-v-Soviet conflict had been turned by US funding into an Islamist-v-secularist conflict. That's hypothetical: I don't know if you need something like that war to start something like al-Qaeda.

We just know for a fact that the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s was where al-Qaeda was founded; that the attraction of a war that was presented as a war between Islam and Communism, where the Islamists were getting arms and funding and training from a global superpower, is what seems to have transformed Osama bin Laden from a wealthy playboy to a radical Islamist.

The US invaded Afghanistan because there was a national outcry after 9/11 to punish another nation - no matter whether the Afghans killed had any responsibility for September 11.

Marc Herrold figured out, early in 2002, that at least 3000 Afghans had been killed by the US attack of Afghanistan. His methods were adopted by the Iraqi Body Count project, which has been shown to provide a count about 10% of the actual casualty rate. So, in all probability, about thirty thousand Afghans were killed when the US attacked Afghanistan. For revenge: no other reason.

If lessons are to be learned from 9/11, one of them would be "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" is bollocks. Alternatively: "Do not arm and train violent religious terrorists and then act all surprised and resentful when they turn around and attack you." Alternatively again: "Do not lie about a planned invasion of Islam's holiest country in order to have an excuse to plant infidel military bases there."

Turbulence: Really? I thought it was because we insisted on seizing Osama Bin Ladin and the Taliban refused to turn him over to us.

Really? I thought it was because Americans wanted to see their bombs falling on another country, and in order to give them what they wanted quickly and be able to move on to the invasion of Iraq, Bush set up a smash hit on Afghanistan with complete indifference to the welfare of the Afghans or whether that would actually get Osama bin Laden into US custody.

[Eric Martin]

if I'm right about the importance of sanctuary level safe haven being necessary to such a large terrorist attack, and assuming for the sake of argument that Al Qaeda can't set up shop anywhere else

I'm not so sure you are. Further, it seems like AQ could glom on to any failed state/state of war (Iraq, post invasion, for example), to establish a haven if by haven all you mean is: locus for meetings, congregation and some training.

[Pithlord]

State power is an asset to a terrorist organization. That's just a fact. Removing an asset from an enemy is a useful strategic objective, although perhaps not a cost-justified one. I don't think the cost is as great as would be necessary if Afghanistan was abandoned to its fate

The "What about Burma?" Argument is obviously fallacious. You do what you can where you can. If non-intervention in Burma is justified by the risks of intervention there, then it is irrelevant to Afghanistan. If intervention is justified in Burma, then the argument begs the question. NATO has no obligation to be even-handed among tyrannies.

[Gary Farber]

"We just know for a fact that the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s was where al-Qaeda was founded"

Al Qaeda was founded in 1994; this has been pointed out to you many times.

"that the attraction of a war that was presented as a war between Islam and Communism, where the Islamists were getting arms and funding and training from a global superpower, is what seems to have transformed Osama bin Laden from a wealthy playboy to a radical Islamist."

The U.S. didn't fund Osama bin Laden in any way, and what support the U.S. gave to Pakistan to give to muhajedin groups didn't transform Osama bin Laden in any way. This is nonsense.

"So, in all probability, about thirty thousand Afghans were killed when the US attacked Afghanistan. For revenge: no other reason."

This is also a completely unnecessary stretch of a point to the point of being untrue. If you said revenge was involved, you'd have an arguable case. No other reason? That's just silly. The war in Iraq was unconnected to responding to September 11th. The war in Afghanistan was to disrupt al Qaeda, which was deeply interwined with the Taliban.

You're often right about so much, Jes, but too often you just have to reach for a point too far.

[Point]

I want to apologize to Eric if my question, to which he last responded, seemed inappropriate or unclear*; it was a sort of hypothetical.

"And, all this aside, let me ask -- >if< I'm right about the importance of sanctuary level safe haven being necessary to such a large terrorist attack, and >assuming< for the sake of argument that Al Qaeda can't set up shop anywhere else -- at that point, is preventing another 9/11 scale incident worth "a multi-decade, multi-trillion dollar nation building effort"?"

I understand that we disagree as to whether the assumptions of the question are true or not -- I've attempted to make the case that we can take steps, and to a degree are taking steps, to make sure no state, failed or otherwise, will be inclined to leave the organization unmolested, which is itself, I have also argued, key to such an organization being able to carry out large scale attacks.

My sole reason for asking this hypothetical was so I could know if these points, >if< I could manage to prove them, were a sufficient defense of the war. I again apologize if it seemed any different.

*(I'm still figuring out things like italics)

[Prup (aka Jim Benton)]

I have been reluctant to dove in to the various Pakistan debates here, because every time I start I start foaming at the mouth and smoking at the ears. (And because, helf the time, Typepad won't run my comments.)

But this is too much. It is reminiscent of the sort of realpolitik discussions on arguments for and against supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa during the eighties that I would have read -- in NATIONAL REVIEW.

Listen to yourselves. "There are other evil regimes, we aren't going after them, why go here?" And 'they might be helpful against our enemies, we can't fight them."

Now there are legitimate questions as to how we should act, and the military option, while part of our strategy, would be disastrous if carried on alone. We have to work towards creating a viable nation somehow in that region, despite the difficulties history shows u. (We might consider Pakistan in this context. 30 years ago it was almost a 'failed state' barely existing on subsidies from exported workers, trying in some fashion to establish a 'true Islamic polity." (See Naipaul's AMONG THE BEDLIEVERS.) But slowly, despite the twin kleptocracy of Bhutto and Sharif, a middle class -- more interested in money than in Islam -- formed and kept an anchor on the state as Musharraf fought the Islamicizers.

Can we, somehow, affect Afghanistan and shove the country in the proper direction? Not if the Taliban is anywhere near the center of power.

And I disagree that having an ultra-religious group supporting them is not a benefit for Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is very vulnerable on it's "Islamic side." Many Islamic groups have pointed out his errors, but having the Taliban behind him makes it much harder to attack Bin Laden on these grounds. (There is a tradition in Islam of not attacking fellow members of the faith except for 'heresy,' and having the half-educated seminary students of the Taliban defending them is a cover.

But most of all, have we forgotten what the Taliban was like in power, the burkhas, the attacks on women? Some regimes, like the apartheid regime, like Idi Amin and the Shah, like Pinochet, and like the Taliban, cannot be supported on grounds of Realpolitik.