Bend, Break and Head Fake

by Eric Martin

Anatol Lieven makes an excellent point regarding the stress that our US-centric policies in Afghanistan/Pakistan are putting on Pakistani political life.  The short story is that, in pressuring the Pakistanis to take on the Taliban, we are asking the Pakistanis to act in a way that runs counter to: (a) public opinion in a democracy; and (b) Pakistani national security interests by urging the Pakistani government to assail a former and potential ally in Afghanistan (the Taliban) in order to ensure the dominance of an Indian ally (the Karzai government) in a territory (Afghanistan) viewed by Pakistan's security establishment as vital to Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India:

The problem is Pakistan. As the new [Obama administration] strategy recognises, [Afghanistan and Pakistan]are now hopelessly interlinked, with a Taliban insurgency rooted in the Pashtun populations of each raging on both sides of the border. Putting greatly increased US pressure on the Afghan Taliban will indeed be immensely difficult if this is not accompanied by real help from the Pakistani state and military against Taliban support on their soil.

Yet the US may well have no choice but to proceed without Pakistan. Here, it seems to me, the Obama administration still does not fully recognise the depths of the problem it is facing, or the tremendous risks it will run by trying to bend Pakistan to its will over the Afghan war. For as both opinion polls and my own research on the ground have made abundantly clear, the truth is that a large majority of ordinary Pakistanis are bitterly opposed to Pakistan helping the US, especially if this involves the Pakistani army fighting the Taliban.

It is true that calculations by the Pakistani security establishment and intelligence services also play a part in limiting Pakistani actions against the Taliban; but the basic problem is a democratic one. A democratically elected government cannot afford simply to defy a public opinion this strong. Nor indeed can an army that has to recruit its soldiers from Pakistani villages – not from Mars or Pluto – and ask them to risk their lives. As a Pakistani general put it to me last year: “We can survive without American money and arms if we have to, though of course we don’t want to. But we cannot survive without the loyalty of ourjawans [men].”

In a sense, the messy, democracy-related hindrances are reminiscent of the Bush administration's difficulties in securing long term basing rights and free reign in Iraq going forward: the Iraqi people weren't on board with that game plan, and thus the Maliki government was not in a position to comply absent massive voter backlash.  Of course, it's also likely the case that the Maliki government preferred greater autonomy and wasn't really all that interested in the terms of the SOFA as initially proposed by the Bush administration (with US control of Iraqi airspace, immunity even for contractors, carte blanche in terms of troop increases, movements and actions, as well as the right to launch military operations from Iraqi soil - both internally and externally, etc.).

In a similar vein, while Lieven is right to emphasize the democratic aspect of the problem which doesn't get the attention it deserves, the resistance from the Pakistani security establishment should not be underestimated.  As in Iraq, Pakistani politicians will likely make a big show of how their hands are tied by popular will - which is true for what it's worth.  But regardless of the pleas of impotence to act as the US desires, those factions of the Pakistani government holding the brief on security aren't really ruing the fact.  Which is a nice segue to Lieven's recommendations:

If the Obama administration wants to have any hopes of transforming such public attitudes in Pakistan then it will need to fund Pakistan to a vastly greater degree than is envisaged in its new strategy, in ways that will visibly transform the lives of many ordinary Pakistanis. This requires above all massive investment in infrastructure – especially relating to water – in ways that will also generate many jobs. At $1.5bn (€1.1bn, £1bn) a year, the new US aid that is promised sounds like a lot – until you remember that Pakistan now has about 170m people. Eight dollars per head is not going to transform anything much in the country. More-over, the US statement emphasises that the aid will be made conditional on Pakistan’s help to the US against the Taliban. This is a recipe for constant hold-ups, congressional blockages and the wrecking of any consistent, long-term programmes. [...]

If on the other hand Washington thinks that it can play Pakistani governments like a fish on an aid hook in order to extract much greater help in the Afghan war, then it will undermine and finally destroy those governments, as it did that of Pervez Musharraf. Even more importantly, if it does succeed in forcing the Pakistani army to do things that its soldiers detest, it may destroy the army. This would be a catastrophe for the US that would dwarf even defeat in Afghanistan.

There is a potential for a vastly increased amount of economic aid to assist our efforts - to the extent that such aid can be funneled to militant groups to woo them away from al-Qaeda type international terrorists, and otherwise to sway public opinion.  The problem is, however, that the Pakistani government (with its myriad moving parts often working at cross-purposes) may not be fully on board with that agenda, and thus the aid might not get to the intended parties (if our experiences funneling aid through Pakistan to the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet campaign are any indicator, there are reasons to be concerned as the ISI siphoned off money and arms for themselves, and favored those factions most amenable to their interests, not necessarily ours). 

This effort will be made especially problematic because, as Lieven notes, making the aid conditional has its own drawbacks, which leaves few options outside of writing checks and banking on the good will - and unified purpose - of a dysfunctional government pushed to act against its interests.

Color me skeptical.

Comments

[KXB]

It is interesting that when the Pakistani military is urged to combat the Taliban, they say that Pakistani public opinion limits their options. Pakistani public opinion was also opposed to handing the Swat Valley over the the Pakistani Taliban, but in that case, the leadership ignored public opinion.

Pakistani public opinion is also opposed to the military controlling the commanding heights of their economy, reserving the best farmland for military cronies, and setting up special banks just for military men. Yet, once again, Islamabad is able to disregard Pakistani public opinion.

Pakistani public opinion is in favor of breaking up large landowning families, yet the government depends on such families - so once again public opinion is cast aside to serve the interests of the Pakistani elite.

[woody]

Pakistani public opinion is in favor of breaking up large landowning families, yet the government depends on such families - so once again public opinion is cast aside to serve the interests of the Pakistani elite.

While true, it is also true that all governments mainly exist to serve the interests of their elites, not least the 'democracy' of the USofA...It is utterly without doubt that the Obamanistas have chosen to side with the bankers--the elites--agains the rest of us...

[Observer]

Building a sustainable infrastructure in Afghanistan I understand. There the warlords and imams are the closest thing to social structure and by definition we have to co-opt them into a system that will eventually age out out.

But the same approach in Pakistan will fail - "incentive money" will simply drain into highly organized cesspools of corruption without realizing our goals.

The Pakistani military econ machine will always protect its interests. Since the citizens are heavily interwoven it is pretty much up to them to realize when their "pet" extremists are no longer affordable.

The Taliban was not given the time to realize sheltering extremists was a suicidal move. The Pakis have had plenty of time and have been equally well rewarded for not cleaning house. Paying them still more is not the silver bullet.

The model for Pakistan is much closer to that of House Saud. I'm personally not interested in winning the hearts and minds of Pakistanis and Saudis. It's a bottomless money pit to people who already are well up the Malthusian chain.

US/India/Af pressure on the borders increases the pain on the military machine. It destabilizes the corrupt Pakis, forces them to pay a real price. Keeping incentives in place for factional opposition provides the release valve. But a release valve is not what drives an engine.

[Mary]

Very good post - here as well as Lieven's.

KXB - What's the support for Pakistani public opinion being against allowing the Taliban to control SWAT? I'm not saying you are wrong, but I have seen very contradictory things about this. Obviously, the large numbers of families who have left were not in favor.

In any event, the Pakistani parliament was nearly unanimous in making the recommendation to Zadari to sign off on the Islamic law deal and he's done it now.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090413/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan

Pakistan's pro-U.S. president signed a regulation late Monday to put a northwestern district under Islamic law as part of a peace deal with the Taliban, going along after coming under intense pressure from members of his own party and other lawmakers.

Asif Ali Zardari's signature was a boon for Islamic militants who have brutalized the Swat Valley for nearly two years in demanding a new justice system. It was sure to further anger human rights activists and feed fears among the U.S. and other Western allies that the valley will turn into a sanctuary for militants close to Afghanistan.

Whatever criticism may come, Zardari can claim some political cover — the National Assembly voted unanimously Monday to adopt a resolution urging his signature, although at least one party boycotted. Earlier, a Taliban spokesman had warned lawmakers against opposing the deal.

[spockamok]

Only the opinions of people willing to kill for them matter in the Pakistani environment. Opinion without a way to enforce it is meaningless. The insurgent advantage is that it is more capable of singling out those who oppose its opinions for punishment than US SOF, US drones, or any official Pakistani military force. So despite the higher technology of the latter, the insurgents are better at coercion when and where it matters.

Remember insurgent advantages simply reflect their superior ability to repress people, it does not reflect any "will of the people" or more morally compelling argument from their side.

[spockamok]

Pakistan probably could use some politics divided along the class vector instead of the ethnosectarian & regional vectors as well.