My Occupation's Known, but Not Why I Occupy

by Eric Martin

In a recent post, I took issue with Andrew Exum's claim that counterinsurgency (COIN) practitioners are reluctant to endorse undertaking COIN-based missions - a skepticism that stems from their first hand knowledge of the enormous costs and decades-long timetables involved, and of the uncertainty of achieving successful outcomes despite the considerable investments. As Fester recently wrote at Newshoggers:

COIN today promises the same type of inputs [as efforts in Vietnam and Algeria] --- ten to twenty year wars, operational costs of one to two points of annual GDP at a time of structural deficits and domestic fiscal crisis --- with the same type of outcomes --- weak, client states in need of continual support in secondary or tertiary areas of interest. 

What's not to love?  While Exum is perhaps accurate in describing the position held by most COIN gurus with respect to new missions calling for the use of the military, many of the most prominent COIN practitioners tend to show a willingness - enthusiasm even - for applying COIN to ongoing military engagements such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Here, Exum might chide me for confusing "operational doctrine with strategy": COIN doctrine merely informs as to the best methods to conduct a military engagement, not whether or not the engagement makes sense/is worth it from a strategic point of view.  Thus, COIN practitioners are telling us how to best conduct our current operations, not whether or not it's strategically wise to continue those operations.  However, in practice, the majority of COIN experts are rarely, if ever, sticking to the strictly "operational" side of that equation. 

For example, in that earlier post, I linked to a CNAS report written by four of the leading COIN scholars arguing why a 5-10 year military/diplomatic commitment in Afghanistan was necessary.  It wasn't about operational doctrine - it was a strategic argument for maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan and warning of the outcomes if their plan is not followed.

In that same post, I examined certain claims made by one of the CNAS report's authors - David Kilcullen - in response to Andrew Bacevich's critique of Kilcullen's book, The Accidental Guerilla.  In defense of that book, Kilcullen pointed out that he warned that pursuing military intervention as counterterrorism policy "plays into the hands of the[e] [al-Qaeda] exhaustion strategy" that is designed to bleed us of resources by getting us to overreact by using military force in response to terrorist attacks/threats.  Further, in response to Bacevich's claims to the contrary, Kilcullen wrote in favor of "containment strategy" over attempts by the US to transform other societies. 

Yet those concerns are not evident in Kilcullen's counsel as to the ideal way forward in Afghanistan now. The Kilcullen who took umbrage with Bacevich's review seems to be at odds with the Kilcullen who co-wrote the January CNAS report which happens to bear the title: "Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan)."  Furthermore, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early February, Kilcullen staked out an even more ambitious agenda, with a longer timeline, than that set forth in the aforementioned CNAS report:

We need to do four things – what we might call “essential strategic tasks” – to succeed in Afghanistan. We need to preventthe re-emergence of an Al Qaeda sanctuary that could lead to another 9/11. We need to protect Afghanistan from a range of security threats including the Taliban insurgency, terrorism, narcotics, misrule and corruption. We need to build sustainable and accountable state institutions (at the central, provincial and local level) and a resilient civil society. Then we can begin a phased hand-off to Afghan institutions that can survive without permanent international assistance [ed note: Oh is that all!!!]. We might summarize this approach as “Prevent, Protect, Build, Hand-Off”. Let’s call it “Option A”.

Given enough time, resources and political commitment, Option A is definitely workable. But we need to be honest about how long it will take – ten to fifteen years, including at least two years of significant combat up front – and how much it will cost. Thirty thousand extra troops in Afghanistan will cost around 2 billion dollars per month beyond the roughly 20 billion we already spend; additional governance and development efforts will cost even more; in the current economic climate this is a big ask. The campaign will cost the lives of many American, Afghan and coalition soldiers and civilians, and injure many more. There are also opportunity costs: we have finally, through much blood and effort, reached a point where we can start disengaging some combat troops from Iraq. We need to ask ourselves whether the best use for these troops is to send them straight to Afghanistan, or whether we might be better off creating a strategic reserve in Central Command, restoring our military freedom of action and, with it, a measure of diplomatic credibility in the Middle East. [emphasis added]

As evident in Kilcullen's recitation of the four "essential strategic tasks," his testimony was not solely concerned with "operational doctrine." It was an effort to advocate for a particular strategy. However, one of the larger assumptions underlying that strategy - the notion that long term military occupation is an efficient means to deny terrorists room to operate and prevent attacks - is dubious at best, and mostly rejected by Kilcullen himself in his book.

As Kilcullen the author warns, it is an exceedingly expensive undertaking in terms of both blood and money. Steve Hynd grabs for the back of the envelope for some rough calculations in response to Kilcullen:

The DoD actually spends $2.7 billion a month in Afghanistan right now, but what's a few hundred million either way, right? Over fifteen years that bill comes to $846 billion while "additional governance and development efforts will cost even more." Basing some conservative guesstimates on what the ratio of military to reconstruction and other spending has been, those efforts will cost somewhere in the region of $35 billion, with at least another $17.5 billion to pay VA benefits for the inevitable toll in blood. Add in the $173 billion already spent and the $285 billion or so in debt servicing all that deficit spending will cost and the grand total will come to a cool $1.3 trillion. That's $1,300,000,000,000 for those who like to see all the zeroes. [...]

And how about that cost in blood? Well, so far the war in Afghanistan has cost 667 US soldiers their lives. But the pace of casualties has been accelerating. 155 of those deaths were in 2008 alone and 2009 is set to be even deadlier. Afghan civilian casualties have been accelerating too - up over 40% in the last year - and somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 have already died, along with more tens of thousands wounded or simply displaced as refugees.

Extend those casualty rates onward for another 10 to 15 years. That's the butcher's bill.

To state the obvious, terrorist attacks on US civilians are horrible, horrible events that we should seek to prevent. Disrupting terrorist safe havens is a legitimate and worthwhile objective. But like all such objectives, the costs cannot be ignored. Again, that's stating the obvious, but then, the obvious is frequently absent from our foreign policy discourse.

Considering that the economic costs and death toll from even the most horrific of terrorist attacks (9/11) were lower and comparable, respectively, to the projected costs associated with ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the argument to pursue this strategy doesn't make much sense from a strictly cost-benefit computation. Some possible rejoinders are that the next attack could be bigger, attacks could occur more frequently with a safe haven in place and there is a value to the peace of mind of the civilian population that should be factored in (as a resident of lower Manhattan, I'm certainly sympathetic to the last prong).

But those responses all operate under some doubtful assumptions: (1) that there is no way to deny a safe haven absent the Kilcullen approach; (2) that terrorists require a safe haven as a base from which to launch attacks; (3) other than Afghanistan/Pakistan, there are no viable safe havens; and (4) despite our increased focus on the threat of terrorism, a safe haven in Afghanistan would enable future large scale terrorist attacks on US soil.

(1) There are other options worthy of discussion - but they would require more space than this already lengthy post allows and I will instead attempt to address some in follow up pieces (though part of my response to #4 will address a couple of the applicable issues).

(2) Would-be terrorists do not require a particular "safe haven" to carry out attacks. As Marc Sageman points out in Leaderless Jihad, the most recent wave of terrorists are mostly from a diffuse group of "wannabes" spread out over the globe and linked together, at least initially, through the Internet. That's the insidious beauty of terrorism: it's the low-tech, low cost alternative to large scale military operations, and thus its devotees can make-do with only limited room to operate (like those groups that conceived, planned and carried out operations while "based" in England, the United States, Spain and Germany, i.e.).

So, even if we succeed in eradicating all terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan (against long odds after 10-15 years), we could still suffer terrorist attacks from the decentralized "leaderless jihad."  Granted, a sanctuary complete with extensive training facilities and unfettered range of motion would help the efficacy of terrorist operations, there is reason to believe that we can disrupt such an ideal version of a safe haven from afar via air strikes even if we can't make the region 100% terrorist free.

(3) Not only can terrorists operate without a safe haven, but even if we seal off Afghanistan/Pakistan from would-be terrorists, the world offers other prime real estate: say, Somalia or Yemen. Are we really going to commit to a series of decades-long societal transformation efforts at a trillion a pop in every locale that al-Qaeda attempts to set up shop? Again, I ask, is that the most efficient use of resources?

(4) We should not underestimate the fact that our increased focus on the threat of terrorism post-9/11 has made America a much harder target to hit. Our intelligence operations, law enforcement capacity, increased international cooperation and general awareness are the most effective means to prevent attack. Unlike during the 1990s, when Clinton was dealing with Congressional push-back and concerns over creating international incidents by targeting al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, the US can and will be much more willing to use military strikes to destroy those camps should they spring up in the future.

While we might not be able to eradicate safe havens altogether in so much as al-Qaeda operatives will be able to hide out in the rugged frontier lands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it should be noted that al-Qaeda operatives are currently hiding out in those same regions, and that level of "sanctuary" hasn't led to a series of attacks on US soil.

Finally, we should not ignore the fact that our presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan will aid the recruitment efforts of al-Qaeda, even if we adopt ideal COIN practices. Our presence in Afghanistan/Pakistan radicalizes elements of the local population (creating "accidental guerillas" as Kilcullen calls those motivated by our military presence to pick up arms against us), attracts recruits from afar inspired by the call to defensive jihad, and motivates those third wave self-starters that Sageman described. With respect to Pakistan, our heavy-handed, US-centric interference is not stabilizing the situation by any stretch, but rather tainting leaders amenable to US interests and boosting the popularity of those that oppose us. So while we might be making life harder for extremists groups in some respects, we are also providing boons in other areas.

Given the costs, the requisite dedication of time and resources, the grandiosity of the goals and, relatedly, the uncertainty of the outcomes, as well as the inefficiency of the long-term occupation model as a means of preventing subsequent terrorist attacks, I'm tempted to simply quote Andrew Exum: "No one who really understands COIN wants to do it." Seriously. So maybe we shouldn't.

[UPDATE: As usual, Spencer Ackerman's got more - with some great links to some pieces relevant to the ongoing discussion.]

Comments

[Gary Farber]

"Are we really going to commit to a series of decades-long societal transformation efforts at a trillion a pop in every locale that al-Qaeda attempts to set up shop?"

Anyone who has bothered to actually read bin Laden's writings knows that's exactly his strategy: to suck the U.S. into endless local wars, not just to inflame the Islamic world around the globe, but to drain the American empire dry financially, and bring it down, just as the Afghan-Soviet war helped bring down the Soviet Union.

[Andrew]

If you have never heard of Sarah Chayes, she is someone who our President should be taking advice
from on this issue. Excerpts:

"Afghanistan, once thought of as the “good war,” is on the brink of being lost. But the failure of the US and international effort there is not a foregone conclusion. A thoughtful, wide-ranging shift in strategy on the part of the Obama Administration can still avert Afghanistan’s likely fate as an irrevocable – and dangerous – failed state, with ominous implications for the region and the rest of the world.

Such a shift ought to include the following components.

I. The concept

The United States should redefine its objectives in favor of the Afghan people, not the Afghan government. In a counter-insurgency, the people are the proverbial prize. It is only by supporting the Afghan people – not abusive powerbrokers – in their effort to reconstitute their social, economic, institutional, and cultural fabric, that stability in Afghanistan can be achieved, and the country be durably denied as a sanctuary for terrorists.

[...]

II. Governance

And so, the most critical element of a new approach to Afghanistan must be an urgent focus on good governance. For, the above analysis indicates a paradox. While international officials, especially in the UN, tout the Afghan government as “legitimate” and “democratically elected,” Afghans experience the opposite. They say that the United States imposed the
current government officials upon them. And that it is therefore our responsibility to provide some means of recourse against their depredations.

[...]

III. Security

If the US objective is redefined as above – and if the prize in any counterinsurgency is indeed the people – then certain precepts must guide security operations.

 Do no harm. Despite orders from ISAF HQ, there are still too many escalation of force incidents, or indirect fire, or uses of air assets, in which Afghan civilians are killed. Officers must start considering a rule of thumb: every civilian killed results in 3-5 new Taliban. This calculus may make them realize that it is usually preferable not to engage Taliban at all than to engage them at the price of civilian lives. When civilians are killed, the officer responsible must take personal responsibility, and where possible, engage with the families of the victims.

[...]

IV. Diplomacy

The government of Pakistan has proven to be a powerful force for instability in south Asia. Overwhelming evidence indicates that since the fall of the Taliban, Pakistani officials have not just been turning a blind eye to the re-constitution of the fundamentalist militia, they have been actively orchestrating it.

Currently, the government of Pakistan is bifurcated, engaged in a struggle against itself. On the one side is the military, which for long periods has actually run the state and which is deeply enmeshed in all aspects of Pakistani life. On the other side is the new and still fractured civilian authority, which came to power in the wake of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and thanks to the dynamism of creative and tenacious civil society opposition to the Musharraf regime.

The military will not relinquish its domination of Pakistan’s government and much of its economy easily. There are indications that it is actually manufacturing threats – such as helping mastermind the Mumbai terrorist bombings so as to provoke an Indian reaction – to serve as a rational for its continued hold on de facto power."

There's more, and it is worth reading. Sarah Chayes has written and interviewed often on this topic, and I highly recommend reading more on the ideas of someone who has been living and working in Afghanistan since this war began.

[jrudkis]

I think it is time for a War on COIN.

[Eric Martin]

At least on the view that COIN is anything close to the panacea presented.

[liberal japonicus]

The United States should redefine its objectives in favor of the Afghan people, not the Afghan government. In a counter-insurgency, the people are the proverbial prize.

The reason why I am not opposed to the way Obama is shifting resources from Iraq to Afghanistan is the above statement. It is not about denying a safe haven to AQ, it is about making sure that the Afghan people have the opportunity to live under a government that is at least minimally responsive to their needs. And the Taliban was not that government. I understand when some get upset because Osama has not gone whole hog isolationist, but I have interpreted his actions as saying that the US has an obligation to somehow rebuild Afghanistan society while it doesn't (or at least shouldn't have had to) in Iraq.

[jrudkis]

COIN sucks. Nobody wants to do it (on the actual military side). It is hard, difficult to measure, takes years (which also subjects the effort to significant home front turbulence), and has a high failure likelihood.

As the post points out it is a way to meet a strategic aim.

In my opinion, the strategic aim had better be vital, rather than nice to do, to try it.

I don't think Afghanistan is vital, and we should find other ways to contain whatever brew is bubbling there.

Maybe legalizing opium products and giving Afghanistan a monopoly? It would provide a market, jobs, and money to Afghanistan.

Could the social costs of legal opium here be any worse than the economic costs of 15 years of occupation follwed by likely failure?

[Andrew]

While I do have an original thought now and again, Chayes addresses opium production in the link I posted, as well, so I will just quote her again:

"Financial support for licit agriculture. Direct financial assistance should be offered to Afghan farmers to help them grow something that is not opium. Contract farming of products for which there is a known international market is one among several tools that should be wielded simultaneously. Another example: a massive re-treeing effort could be launched, via private smallholders, who should be offered fruit tree saplings, and should be paid the amount of money they
would earn from the produce of the mature trees for the first five years, while the trees are growing. Fruit brings in significantly more revenue to farmers than opium, but the vast majority of Afghan landowners cannot afford to take large portions of their land effectively out of production for several years. Trees are a better alternative to opium than annual crops such as grain, as opium cannot grow under mature trees, and farmers would be loath to dig them up once they are producing."

[Eric Martin]

LJ: I'm not necessarily opposed to shifting resources to Afghanistan, depending on the underlying mission.

I'm not a "whole hog isolationist" or even a "half hog isolationist." Not even a "Strip of Bacon Isolationist." Isolationism is an anachronism in this day and age.

But the question is not whether or not we have a moral obligation to "rebuild" Afghan society. The questions are:

1. Can we?
2. If so, can we afford it?

As I'm sure you've noticed, we don't exactly have an extra couple of trillion laying around to use on nation building in far away lands.

I would also note this: We didn't break Afghan society, so I'm not so sure we have an obligation to rebuild it. I mean, it wasn't exactly "built" when we invaded in 2002. It was already badly broken.

But I'm not advocating wholesale abandonment. Just moderating our goals, and tempering our grandiose delusions about our ability to accomplish such feats, and pay for them should our ability exceed my expectaions.

[Jon]

You occupy because you care about those you've invaded, Afghans and Iraqis right now. You get spirals of violence and the failure of reasonable government when you don't, or if you get lazy on the job like Rumsfeld, Franks, and so many neocons did. It IS, in fact, a "[redefinition of] its objectives in favor of the Afghan people, not the Afghan government."

I do care about them. I think Afghans and Iraqis are people too, with aspirations and worries of their own, who deserve good treatment just like you and I do.

Plenty of successful occupations have been carried out in the past, and plenty will be in the future. Think we shoulda stayed home after WWII, and let Western Europe undergo the kind of cycle of violence Iraq's seen?

Yeah, they're certainly expensive, take many years, and are hard on our soldiers' lives and fatal to some of them, no question. And, plenty have failed - it IS a risk, especially where Bush II's ship of fools've been at work.

[Eric Martin]

Plenty of successful occupations have been carried out in the past, and plenty will be in the future.

Successful counterinsurgencies? Really? I can think of only a small handfull, with many more on the "failed" side of the ledger.

Which successful counterinsurgency operations are you thinking of?

Think we shoulda stayed home after WWII, and let Western Europe undergo the kind of cycle of violence Iraq's seen?

We did not maintain a counterinsurgency operation in Western Europe after WWII, so I'm not quite sure what you're asking. If you recall, no one in Western Europe was shooting at our soldiers, our soldiers were not fighting a multi-headed insurgency that enjoyed the support of large swathes of the underlying population, etc.

[Jon]

You titled your post "My Occupation's Known, but Not Why I Occupy," so that was the question I answered.

And, in fact, it happens to be the right question when talking about COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because the Bush Admin had ruled we didn't need a real occupation, Petraeus could hardly talk about all the occupation-like things done under his orders as occupation, could he? So, COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan has become, in effect, codewords for occupation 101 stuff.

Of course, I'm sure Petraeus didn't mind the resulting boost to CIN's legitimacy. And, COIN IS sexier to sell in the military than telling everybody they're doing military police duty, for whatever reason a looked-down-on kind of duty in the military.

There was a Nazi insurgency in postwar Germany, by the way, but of course its extermination was one of the smaller matters. Though I'd guess the existence of a well-planned occupation also ground against said insurgency.

[Eric Martin]

You titled your post "My Occupation's Known, but Not Why I Occupy," so that was the question I answered.

Fair enough Jon! I'm a slave to my lyrical allusions, and so I sacrificed a tad of accuracy for my poet's license.

There was a Nazi insurgency in postwar Germany, by the way, but of course its extermination was one of the smaller matters.

Yeah, I think you'd be hard pressed to really compare either the Iraq or Afghan insurgencies to the post-war German insurgency. How many US soldiers were killed by that insurgency? I'm asking because I don't know.

So, COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan has become, in effect, codewords for occupation 101 stuff.

Again, the occupations of Japan and Germany were much different animals than Afhganistan and Iraq. Both are closer to COIN than police/typical occupations.

[dmbeaster]

COIN has become the cure-all for those unwilling to give up the warmongering ways of the Bush die-hards and neo-cons. In other words, we can allegedly keep on being bellicose because this is the sure-fire way to win these things. Keep on fighting because we can use COIN! It is utter rot.

COIN first depends on a political goal that is desired by a large majority of the people in the region -- COIN describes how to fight most effectively to bring about that goal. Using COIN tactics on behalf of a goal not widely supported is futility -- COIN cannot fix the misguided politics. For example, COIN doctrine would have been useless in Viet Nam since the larger political goal -- propping up a corrupt post-colonial dictatorship, was an unwinnable political goal. No amount of COIN would have brought about success.

There presently is no larger political goal supported by a large majority of Afghans. Yeah, most do not seem to want the Taliban, but they also do not want Karzai or any other version of central government that we are trying to prop up. The best we can do is communicate that anyone allowing terrorists in their midst is going to get a pounding, but otherwise there is little we can still do to shape the Afghan future. That opportunity ended long ago.

[liberal japonicus]

Sorry, I just wanted to say that I wasn't accusing you of being isolationist on this, just pointing out what I think is the dynamic involved. Some are accusing Obama of wed to the idea of an imperial US because he is not withdrawing with all due speed from both Afghanistan and Iraq, and it's those people who I think have a strong isolationist strain. I agree that we should look realistically at what we can accomplish. dm's point is excellent, but I've always thought that the ideal political goal is not to assure that Afghanistan is a pliant client state (an infeasible political goal) but to provide some level of stability and security to the Afghan people so they have the opportunity to develop some larger political goal. This may be impossible, but I think we have to attempt it.

[Acharya]

One needs a carrot and stick policy. Legalize opium and similar substances. But tax the stuff in the US and other user economies, The income of the opium growers will go down. Then offer money to grow food, fruit and nut trees. And for those communities which are interested subsidize schools with part-time madrasahs which will not preach hatred. And gradually withdraw the military presence. Without opium the Taliban will be emasculated!