Working for the Meltdown: Too Late to Lose the Weight You Used to Need to Throw Around?

by Eric Martin

For the first installment of the America's Defense Meltdown series, I thought it would be useful to review some of the history applicable to the evolution of America's military institutions as presented in the anthology itself.  That history provides a useful context within which to assess the range of options going forward, and perhaps appreciate some of the anachronistic aspects of our defense posture/industry that have long outlived their utility, passing from asset to hindrance.  The establishment of a permanent standing military force of considerable size over the past century, coupled with the gradual consolidation of war making authority by the Executive branch, has distorted the policy making process to detrimental effect, all at enormous cost.

Lt. Col. John Sayen (US Marine Corps, ret.) provides a summary of the overall picture:

Our military has broken its constitutional controls. Our Founding Fathers wanted no more than a very limited size and role for a federal military. They feared standing armies not only because they might be used against the American public, i.e. to establish military rule, but also for their potential to involve us in costly foreign wars that would drain our treasury, erode our freedoms and involve us in the “entangling alliances” that George Washington warned of in his farewell address. At that time our armies were composed mainly of state militias that the president needed the cooperation of Congress and the state governors in order to use. Today, we have one large all-volunteer federal Army, which for all practical purposes responds only to the president and the executive branch. It has engaged in numerous foreign wars, involved us in many entangling alliances, drained our treasury and eroded our liberties just as our Founding Fathers foresaw. It has enabled the president to take the nation to war on little more than his own authority. The recent repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 allows him to unilaterally use the military not only against foreigners, but against the American people as well.

While it is easy for children of the World War II/Cold War era who have grown accustomed to an enormous, permanent standing Army to assume that this was always the state of affairs, a closer look at the preceding decades reveals a different story.  At the time of this nation's founding, there was only a nominal national force - with most arms residing with state-based militias.  While this force was gradually augmented over time, even "as late as 1898 the Army was still authorized only 27,000 men."  It is that point in time that marks the dramatic break from past traditions. 

The state of military affairs prior to the turn of the 20th century reflected the prevailing political will: there was an overriding concern that a large standing Army could usurp representative government, exert outsized influence over that government and/or lead it into unnecessary adventurism through the seductive lure of martial power.  Rather than constructing a force that could pose a threat to the republic, or facilitate far-flung folly, US leaders by and large relegated the military to one overriding purpose: defense of the nation's homeland. 

A brief recounting:

Congress...established the relationship between the federal government and the state militias with two militia acts passed in 1792. The first gave the president the authority to call out the militia in response to foreign invasion or internal disorder. The second ordered that the militia consist of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. Each member would arm and equip himself at his own expense and report for training twice a year. The state legislatures would prescribe the militia’s tactical organization (companies, battalions, regiments, etc.). As time went on, however, and the nation grew more secure, militia service effectively became voluntary. Militia units began to resemble social clubs more than military organizations, but even as late as 1898 the militia could field five times more troops than the U.S. Army.

If the president wanted to take the United States to war, he would need a national army that, unlike the militia, could fight anywhere, not just within its home states. Unless the war was to be of extremely limited scope and duration, the regular U.S. Army would be too small. To enlarge it, the president would have to go to Congress not only to obtain a declaration of war, but also the authority and funding needed to call for militia volunteers. Assuming that Congress was forthcoming, the president would then issue a call for volunteers, ordering each state governor to raise a fixed quota of men from their respective militias. These orders were difficult to enforce and during the war of 1812 and the Civil War several governors refused them. However, those that complied would call on the individual companies and regiments of their respective militias to volunteer for federal service. The members of those units would then vote on whether their units would become “U.S. Volunteers.” Individual members of units that volunteered could still excuse themselves from service for health or family reasons.

Given that most militia units were below their full strength in peacetime, and that a portion of their existing members would be unwilling or unable to serve, they would need a lot of new recruits if they were to go to war. They would also need time for training and “shaking down.” Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1818 noted that the United States had no significant continental enemies and was essentially an insular power. Thus, the Navy could ensure that an invader could not land in America before the U.S. Volunteers had time to prepare. The system certainly made it harder to go to war.

The structure of America's military apparatus made it difficult to go to war on a whim, or for anything less than a cause deemed vital by enough actors across a broad swath of geography, class and ideology.  The warriors themselves had, in essence, veto power.  The results that stemmed from this were unsurprising: "In the first 100 years of its existence the United States fought only two significant foreign wars."

Under our current system, on the other hand, the military lacks the same level of autonomy or prerogative when it comes to making decisions.  Our modern day volunteer force receives orders, not ballots, when there is a call to arms.  Further, whereas multiple actors needed convincing prior to fielding an army in the past (from Congress, to sate governors, to militiamen themselves), increasingly, in modern times, there is only the President. 

...[T]he National Defense Act of 1916, passed in anticipation of America’s entry into World War I. In effect...transformed all militia units from individual state forces into a federal reserve force. The title of “National Guard” became mandatory for all militia units and, within the War Department the Division of Militia Affairs became the National Guard Bureau. Instead of the state titles that many had borne since the colonial era the former militia units received numbers in sequence with regular Army units. In addition, the act created a U.S. Army Reserve of trained individuals not organized into units and established a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in the colleges and universities.

...The political cost had been high. America now had the large professional standing army (with no counterbalancing militia) that our Founding Fathers warned us against. The president now controlled all of the nation’s armed forces in peacetime as well as in war. He would no longer have to beg either Congress or the state governors for troops.

Within a few years he would not have to ask Congress for a declaration of war, either. Yes, Congress still holds the purse strings but, as other chapters of this book will show, it has never gripped them very tightly...[T]he new U.S. Army was effectively accountable only to the executive branch of government.

With a new and powerful tool at its disposal, and with the removal of significant structural impediments, the executive branch began to use the US army more frequently, and in furtherance of objectives that bore an increasingly tenuous relationship with the primary mission of defense of the nation.  These overall trends reached their zenith, at least thus far, under the Bush administration (although the FDR administration, and others, went further in some respects).  The Bush team not only implemented tenets of the unitary executive model as none had before, thus assuming an even greater scope of military-related privilege for the executive branch, but also justified military action through the preventive war doctrine, thus loosening the already permissive standards for using force abroad. 

While many might recognize a situation run amok, the question remains, where do we go from here?  It would be next to impossible to turn back the clock to the state militia structure that dominated prior to World War I, and it is not even clear that such a move - were it possible - would be prudent.  That's a discussion for another time.  However, it is crucial that some semblance of balance is restored between the branches, and that some structural obstacles are reintroduced to make the decision to go to war more dependent on establishing a far reaching consensus, rather than the sole prerogative of the President.  The better to ensure that such decisions are rare and only made when necessary.

It would certainly improve the dynamic were Congress to reclaim its war-making authority.  It is not clear, though, that Congress has any desire to take back that decision making power - and the responsibility that flows from it - and to what extent such claims could withstand pressure from an Executive branch that has seen its war powers grow through legislative grants, as well as the laddering effect of precedent building on precedent, unchecked by an acquiescent or disengaged judiciary. 

Perhaps more importantly, the US government needs to bring the military closer to its original mission: direct defense of the nation.  In pursuit of this, we need to reduce the budget and revamp the spending priorities of a military establishment that is still stuck in a Cold War posture that began with the adoption of NSC 68 written by Paul Nitze back in 1950.  NSC 68 called for a vast and ambitious military buildup in peacetime, and emphasized military approaches over diplomatic ones, in order to confront the Soviet Union. 

Regardless of the wisdom of the Nitze approach to the Cold War, the hangover is unmistakable: despite the fact that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, we are left with an exceedingly expensive military behemoth that looks for causes to justify its existence, rather than realign its mission to the narrow task of defense and/or small scale action.  At the very least, we need to shift away from prioritizing the big ticket items more suited to large scale conventional war - a near moot endeavor with the demise of the USSR and, even where there are potential big power rivals, the existence of nuclear weapons.   

We should not expect the military bureaucracy to make such changes on its own - there are no incentives to take such measures, and many forces actively resisting such changes.  The military establishment is, by and large, more interested in maintaining the status quo than in making painful cuts or going through the complex and difficult task of shifting paradigms.  Further, the entire defense establishment (from contractors, to lobbyists, to journalists, to the officer corps itself), is busy selling the next weapons system, or seeking out the next Hitler, in order to maintain its relevance and ensure the continuation of business as usual - business to the tune of roughly $1 trillion dollars a year. 

Nor has been any pressure from the Executive or Congressional branches.  Rather, empowered executives - be they Democrat or Republican - have shown little interest in reducing the size and scope of a military that is increasingly under its sole purview.  Further, our legislators have grown accustomed to fighting for the dollars flowing from defense budgets rather than rethinking the big picture or wisdom of a given weapons system or conflict.

The net result is a military ill-suited to confront current exigencies, with failing equipment mixed in with exceedingly high tech systems that amount to overkill, all while neglecting the development and retention of enough free-thinking, high quality personnel.  This dysfunctional dynamic is not making us any safer, though it does come at exorbitant costs at a time when every last federal dollar is already spoken for, and then some - to the tune of trillions more.

In an era of hard choices, re-shaping the defense landscape is an easy one.

Comments

[woody]

Nor has been any pressure from the Executive or Congressional branches. Rather, empowered executives - be they Democrat or Republican - have shown little interest in reducing the size and scope of a military that is increasingly under its sole purview. Further, our legislators have grown accustomed to fighting for the dollars flowing from defense budgets rather than rethinking the big picture or wisdom of a given weapons system or conflict.

Well, dawg my cats ifn Prez.O aint promised to GROW the freaking military, expand the wars, and increase the budget?

Or diod I miss a subsequent memo?

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

At the very least, we need to shift away from prioritizing the big ticket items more suited to large scale conventional war - a near moot endeavor with the demise of the USSR and, even where there are potential big power rivals, the existence of nuclear weapons.

There's a lot to agree with here Eric, but not this bit IMHO. You may be too young to remember it, but during the 2nd half of the Cold War there was extensive debate over the risks implied by over-reliance on a nuclear deterrent vs. a larger conventional military. The latter needs to justify itself on rational grounds, but don't justify shrinking it below that level on the basis that we can always fall back on our nukes to protect us from conventional threats. That way lays the terminal nightmare of escalation from conventional to strategic arms in the event of a crisis.

Our strategic arsenal should have one and only one mission - to deter the use of similar weapons by others. It should be left completely out of the conventional equation altogether.

[otmar]

Pink Floyd, Animals.

That's what my brain spat back when reading the title.

[cleek]

Deaf, dumb, and blind, you just keep on pretending
That everyone's expendable and no-one has a real friend
And it seems to you the thing to do
Would be to isolate the winner
And everything done under the sun
And you believe at heart, everyone's a killer.

oh Pink Floyd, is there nothing you don't know about the world?

[Slartibartfast]

Dogs. So have a good drown as you go down all alone, dragged down by the stone.

From memory. Could be wrong.

I don't see much to argue with there, Eric. People like to gripe about acquisition budgets, but the truth is that acquisition and R&D together currently constitute something like 25% of the DoD budget. The rest is people, and infrastructure.

Probably there's a lot that could stand to be cut. There's going to be some gory oxen if it ever comes to pass, though.

[Gary Farber]

Just to fill in some gaps here, you seem to have skipped entirely over the inter-world-war years, Eric, in which the Army was reduced to a skeletal force that trained with broomsticks instead of guns, and trucks with signs saying "tank" on them, instead of tanks. It was a desire to not return to that level that was also a motivation for the post-WWII national security buildup.

And it should be noted that despite the start of demobilization, we still managed to invade Siberia and Murmansk-Archangel in 1918 with 10,000 troops, which is an aggression that few enough people still seem to be familiar with.

I'm not in any way saying that justifies anything that follows; I'm just saying it's a piece of relevant history that shouldn't be left out of a recounting.

Similarly: "While this force was gradually augmented over time, even 'as late as 1898 the Army was still authorized only 27,000 men.'"

This skips over the millions of men under arms during the Civil War. And fails to mention that the reason more troops were mobilized in 1998 was the Spanish-American War, which also led to 11,000 troops being sent to occupy the Phillipines, and to the resulting Phillipine-American War, which lasted 14 years, and is the war with the greatest parallels to the war in Iraq, including the torture debate, and specifically the debate over waterboarding.

"Rather than constructing a force that could pose a threat to the republic, or facilitate far-flung folly, US leaders by and large relegated the military to one overriding purpose: defense of the nation's homeland."

That "by and large" skips over the Mexican-American war, a war of conquest, not a war of defense.

"Under our current system, on the other hand, the military lacks the same level of autonomy or prerogative when it comes to making decisions. Our modern day volunteer force receives orders, not ballots, when there is a call to arms."

That's not just "modern day" -- it's post-1865. The Indian Wars of the 1870s were hardly "modern day."

And I'd also like to note the little-remembered fact that the Army mobilized 310,000 men to run the Civilian Conservation Corp in 1933.

No argument with your main points; I'm just a stickler for history. :-)

[Gary Farber]

"Well, dawg my cats ifn Prez.O aint promised to GROW the freaking military,"

No. He promised to grow the Army.

"expand the wars,"

No. He promised to send more troops to Afghanistan, and pull them out of Iraq.

"and increase the budget?"

No.

Other than being wrong on all three points, you're on target.

[Gary Farber]

"You may be too young to remember it, but during the 2nd half of the Cold War there was extensive debate over the risks implied by over-reliance on a nuclear deterrent vs. a larger conventional military."

Quite so. The "New Look" of the Eisenhower administration, which was a strategy of "massive [nuclear] retaliation," and the subsequent Mutual Assured Destruction policy of MacNamara and JFK.

These are not useful contemporary strategies to deter Russia of anything, absent a willingness to engage in all-out nuclear war.

In 1995, Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence was produced by U.S. Strategic Command, and has been the guideline strategy we've since worked under.

We really don't want to rely on nuclear weapons for anything. Very very very bad idea, as I'm sure you'll agree, Eric.

[Nell]

a skeletal force that trained with broomsticks instead of guns, and trucks with signs saying "tank" on them, instead of tanks. It was a desire to not return to that level that was also a motivation for the post-WWII national security buildup.

A motivation, possibly, but one far outweighed by Kennan et al.'s 'Grand Strategy' of taking over the role played by the British and European imperial centers.

It's very difficult for me to believe that, after fighting a global war, and getting a good look at the Soviet military capacity, the high brass had any real reason to fear they would return to commanding a skeletal that trained with broomsticks.

Geez, the naval power alone makes that a fantasy.

[Eric Martin]

This skips over the millions of men under arms during the Civil War

Not really. Those Civil War troops were state militias, and they disbanded post-war. That's how Custer was a Major General during the Civil War (rank from state militia), but died a Lt. Col (rank from US Army).

And it should be noted that despite the start of demobilization, we still managed to invade Siberia and Murmansk-Archangel in 1918 with 10,000 troops, which is an aggression that few enough people still seem to be familiar with.

Mentioned in the book FWIW.

And fails to mention that the reason more troops were mobilized in 1998 was the Spanish-American War, which also led to 11,000 troops being sent to occupy the Phillipines, and to the resulting Phillipine-American War, which lasted 14 years, and is the war with the greatest parallels to the war in Iraq, including the torture debate, and specifically the debate over waterboarding.

Again, mentioned in the book, but I don't see how that was necessarily crucial to my discussion. Though that event was part of the reason for the changes adopted circa WWI.

That "by and large" skips over the Mexican-American war, a war of conquest, not a war of defense.

The post mentioned two such wars, though not by name. I assumed that was one.

That's not just "modern day" -- it's post-1865. The Indian Wars of the 1870s were hardly "modern day."

But during that era, the vast majority of our fighting force was still relegated to state militias, that had voting rights.

[Gary Farber]

"Geez, the naval power alone makes that a fantasy."

Army and Navy = two very different things.

"A motivation, possibly, but one far outweighed"

Thus my "also."

[Gary Farber]

"Again, mentioned in the book, but I don't see how that was necessarily crucial to my discussion."

Thus my "Just to fill in some gaps here" and "No argument with your main points; I'm just a stickler for history. :-)"

[jrudkis]

"Rather, empowered executives - be they Democrat or Republican - have shown little interest in reducing the size and scope of a military that is increasingly under its sole purview. "

Clinton did make significant cuts to the military and budget...the active Army went from 750,000 to 480,000 soldiers.

[Eric Martin]

True, but he expanded on the notion of armed humanitarian intervention.

Beefed up activities in Somalia, then Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.

[Gary Farber]

The Somalia intervention was done by George H. W. Bush. Clinton inherited it. UNSOM I was established in March, 1992/UNITAF, almost a year before Clinton was president. Operation Restore Hope put U.S. troops in in December, 1992, before Clinton was sworn in. UNOSOM II was more an expansion in mission than in numbers.

[Eric Martin]

UNOSOM II was more an expansion in mission than in numbers.

But that's what I said:

"Beefed up activities in Somalia"

[Laura Vivanco]

At the very least, we need to shift away from prioritizing the big ticket items more suited to large scale conventional war - a near moot endeavor with the demise of the USSR and, even where there are potential big power rivals, the existence of nuclear weapons.

I've just seen this, on the whitehouse.gov website, about nuclear weapons:

Move Toward a Nuclear Free World: Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.

[HenryFTP]

I probably shouldn't rain on this parade, but with all due respect the notion of the United States reverting to its pre-World War I national defense structure is the sort of isolationism that led us to the precipice of defeat in 1941-42.

We still do not have a "large standing army" -- for Korea, we had national conscription and a call-up of the Guard and Reserves; Vietnam was largely fought with conscript soldiers; the force in Gulf War I required massive mobilization of the Guard and Reserves, plus a very large army of actual as opposed to "willing" Allies; and we have stretched the volunteer Army, including the Guard and Reseves, to the breaking point in Gulf War II.

Coups de main by our expeditionary forces (chiefly the Marines, and now supplemented by Army Airborne and Special Forces) were indulged in by Presidents both before and after World War II -- but there is comparatively little domestic political controversy over such activities, even lengthy interventions in Nicaragua and Haiti, then or now. Foreign wars are another thing entirely -- Korea and Iraq resulted in Truman and Dubya leaving office with rock-bottom approval ratings, and Vietnam drove LBJ from office. You are quite right in slyly suggesting that Congress's abdication of its warmaking powers may have much to do with wanting to shirk that responsibility, given the track record of how unpopular foreign wars remain.

I agree with the anthology's contributors that our existing 1950s-era force structure is nonetheless entirely out of whack, even if you remain an advocate (as I do) of US national defense beyond our shorelines. As they note, we have an Army configured to blunt a Soviet armored thrust into Germany, a Navy configured to refight the Battle of Midway, a Marine Corps configured to retake the Philippines, and an Air Force configured by Bomber Harris and Curtis LeMay, astounding as that may seem as we approach the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The resemblances between our defense chiefs and the French defense chiefs of 1936-1940 are rather striking (although I'm probably being unfair to the French -- their navy had modernized to meet the threat of the new Italian and German fleets and their main battle tank in 1940, the B1 bis, was better than anything the Germans had).

There is much to be done, but I don't think the starting place is reactivating the system of Coast Artillery fortifications. We need as sweeping a defense strategy review as was done by Truman, Acheson, Marshall et al. in 1947-50. I don't see the political will for it in Washington today, although people so conveniently forget how strenuously Truman and Acheson were opposed (and vilified) at the time by the Taft Republicans, even though it killed James Forrestal.

[Eric Martin]

I probably shouldn't rain on this parade, but with all due respect the notion of the United States reverting to its pre-World War I national defense structure is the sort of isolationism that led us to the precipice of defeat in 1941-42.

Interesting. Maybe that's why I said this:

It would be next to impossible to turn back the clock to the state militia structure that dominated prior to World War I, and it is not even clear that such a move - were it possible - would be prudent.

So, um, yeah.

[Eric Martin]

But the rest of your comment was interesting...

[mckinneytexas]

Eric says, "Perhaps more importantly, the US government needs to bring the military closer to its original mission: direct defense of the nation." Uh, defense from what? Invasion of Hawaii, Alaska or the 48 states? Sorry, but our coastline is just too long and vulnerable and we don't have the money to have a standing army of millions with millions more in reserve to provide a meaningful continental defense.

Or, maybe you mean something else by 'direct defense of the nation.' What exactly do you mean by that? Once we know what the mission is, I agree, force structure can be tailored accordingly.

[Eric Martin]

That was really short hand for "not so much adventurism around the world please." Military intervention - and the maintenance of the equipment and logistics to pull it off regularly - is expensive and doesn't really deliver much bang for the buck.

Do I think that the interventions in Iraq, the Balkans, Panama, Haiti and Somalia were vital and necessary to this nation's defense?

Not exactly.

[Gary Farber]

"Sorry, but our coastline is just too long and vulnerable and we don't have the money to have a standing army of millions with millions more in reserve to provide a meaningful continental defense."

Against whom? Who is going to successfully invade the U.S., exactly? And to your point, who is going to invade in a way that we can't provide a defense against?

[Eric Martin]

Sorry, but our coastline is just too long and vulnerable and we don't have the money to have a standing army of millions with millions more in reserve to provide a meaningful continental defense

Further, if that's the case, then how have we managed thus far to stave off invasion?

[Gary Farber]

Wolverines!

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

Sorry, but our coastline is just too long and vulnerable

From a strategic defense standpoint a long coastline is a feature not a bug, insofar as that coastline faces a large ocean. In order for an adversary to project significant force against much of our coastline, they would have to traverse long expanses of open ocean. In December 1941 that wasn't such a big deal, but with the sort of surveillance technology we have today any would be future Admiral Yamamoto's are going to have to shoot down more than a few satellites before trying something like the Pearl Harbor attack again.

Nations with long land frontiers have a lot more to worry about. The major powers of continental Europe have long faced the problem that mobilization of forces within the national territory of one of their neighbors poses a direct and immediate threat to them. One of the contributing factors to the chain of escalation in August 1914 was that very geographic problem - with the advent of high speed land based transportation, even mobilization in the interior of a neighboring country was an immediate threat.

The US in contrast is still something of an island fortress, so long as we stay on good terms with Mexico and Canada. Seen in the light of our fortunate geography, it is all the more curious that we are spending more of our national income on the military than did the pre-1914 major powers of Europe, as I summarized here
.

I submit that at least half of our current military is designed and intended for force projection in support of global hegemony, not national defense.

One other note – if current trends continue or accelerate (there may be positive feedback loops involved), via global warming induced drought and ecological stress we may succeed in doing to ourselves what the Japanese attempted to do during WW2 but were unable to accomplish – putting a torch to the forests of the Western US.

[Eric Martin]

I submit that at least half of our current military is designed and intended for force projection in support of global hegemony, not national defense.

Exactly. That's my overall point.

[Gary Farber]

And we're not even using balloons.

[HenryFTP]

Even if you take a pretty robust view of what the U.S. requires for "off-the-shelf" force projection, we still seem to be suffering from strategic overstretch that may even exceed Britain's in the 1930s.

However trite it may seem to repeat it, our national leadership appears to have forgotten Frederick the Great's maxim, "he who defends everything defends nothing." And while Presidents may be too tempted to use the force at their disposal, Congress has more than simply acquiesced -- the force structure, commitments and overseas bases have required express Congressional authorization and appropriation all along the way.

It's worth remembering that Charles I ended up in a civil war with Parliament not because Parliament was preventing him from using the armed forces but rather that Parliament refused to enact taxes required to fund the forces he needed to fight the wars he wanted to fight.

[jrudkis]

I would say that half of our military force is designed to allow the free flow of oil, and is essentially an indirect subsidy to the industry...preventing alternatives that can't compete with oil at the subsidized price.

And our oil subsidy is a tax that is paid only by americans, but the benefit of lower prices is seen world wide. So it is pretty dumb.

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

I would say that half of our military force is designed to allow the free flow of oil, and is essentially an indirect subsidy to the industry

Kevin Phillips has been making the same point in at least his last 3 books.

[Hogan]

It's worth remembering that Charles I ended up in a civil war with Parliament not because Parliament was preventing him from using the armed forces but rather that Parliament refused to enact taxes required to fund the forces he needed to fight the wars he wanted to fight.

Just think, if Charles I had thought to put armorers and shipyards and arsenals and army bases in enough MPs' districts, all that unpleasantness could have been avoided.

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

It's worth remembering that Charles I ended up in a civil war with Parliament not because Parliament was preventing him from using the armed forces but rather that Parliament refused to enact taxes required to fund the forces he needed to fight the wars he wanted to fight.

It didn't help that Charles I wanted to impose taxes (such as ship money) which were burdensome on those sectors of the economy which were heavily Puritan and low-church Anglican/dissenter sect Protestant in character. The English Civil War was to a significant degree a war of religion, dealing with issues left unresolved by the English Reformation.

[Gary Farber]

There's no really appropriate thread for this right now -- weekend open thread, please? -- but for the meantime: Supreme Court revokes ban on Arab parties from national elections: as was inevitable and predicted.