NATO

by hilzoy

In this post, I want to develop an argument I've been making sporadically in comments.

I think it is a wonderful, wonderful thing that it has become unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe. It wasn't always that way: certainly not in the immediate aftermath of World War II; arguably not until the 70s or so. And while there were many things that led it to become unimaginable, NATO protection is surely one of them.

I supported the expansion of NATO to include Eastern European countries back in the 1990s. I did so because I thought that this would secure those countries' independence from Russia, and that this was a wonderful thing to do. I did not, of course, imagine that Russia would not be able to harass them in various ways -- of course it could. I just thought that the US should do what it could to take invasion, in particular, off the table. I was, of course, aware that Russia did not want NATO to expand, and that it might reasonably (if wrongly) feel threatened by the entry of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO. But I thought that locking in their independence was worth it. Similarly, I supported some of the later expansion, though I think it was probably excessive. (Albania?)

The reasons why I support some expansion of NATO, but not all possible expansions of NATO, ought to be obvious. First, the sort of change in the world that occurs when it becomes unimaginable to invade a country takes time. It also involves a serious commitment to defend that country, and since we have finite resources, it's really not possible to realistically commit ourselves to the defense of the entire globe, all at once. This sort of thing therefore has to proceed bit by bit. Moreover, if the goal is to convince one country that it should not regard invading those you've taken under your protection, then it matters not to give that country reason to feel encircled or threatened.

This last bit, I imagine, will be criticized by some conservatives. Ooh, they might say: so solicitous of Russia! Eager not to give offense to an amoral, dubiously democratic country that apparently does not blink at invading its neighbors! Any moment, you'll be suggesting we all sit down and sign 'Kumbaya' together -- after we finish the Russian group therapy sessions, that is!

To which I say: oh, please. I think of dealing with countries like Russia in sort of the same way I think of dealing with some unpleasant person at work who has a considerable amount of power to make my life and the lives of others miserable. I think it would be wrong to decide never ever to do anything that might annoy such a person, but it would be insane to decide that it was never worth thinking about what that person thought, and how she might react. (And even more insane to think, as some conservatives seem close to thinking, that it would be good policy to provoke her for no reason at all, just to show how tough we are.) If there are two ways of doing something, one of which will really anger her and one of which will not, of course you choose the one that won't. Moreover, even when there's only one way of doing something and it will anger her, you need to ask whether doing that thing is worth the cost. This is especially true when, as in this case, you are not the person most likely to suffer from her anger.

This seems to me to be pure common sense.

If I thought it was never worth doing anything that would really upset Russia, I would not have supported the expansion of NATO. If I supported some sort of 'spit in their faces whenever possible' policy, I suppose I'd be for offering NATO membership not just to Georgia, but to any bit of Russia that wanted it. (Chechnya, anyone?) I try to take an intermediate view: Russian reactions are real consequences of our actions, and should be weighed along with everything else, but they are not necessarily (or even often) decisive.

This is especially true in the case of NATO expansion. Again: the point, as far as I'm concerned, is to take invading certain countries off the table for the foreseeable future; to make invading those countries unimaginable, the way it is now unimaginable that Russia should invade, say, the Netherlands. That absolutely requires (among other things) Russia's coming to believe that the independence of those countries is not a threat. And that means that I cannot just not pay any attention to what Russia thinks. Changing what Russia thinks is part of the point.

So: the reason I do not support expanding NATO to include Georgia isn't just that Georgia has outstanding territorial disputes with Russia and a leader who is willing to start wars over those disputes. That would be enough of a reason:

"Nowhere in what I have read of the comment on this small but important war has it been explained why neither Georgia nor Ukraine should belong to NATO. They carry with them ready-made wars that NATO neither can nor should be expected to deal with. They are both ethnically and culturally divided nations whose histories are of struggle between or among their component parts.

In Georgia it is between the linguistically distinct enclaves that in the past were Russian and wish again to be Russian, and the majority of Georgians who want to be part of the West, but are also determined to dominate their rebellious territories.

If they would peacefully renounce those territories, an ethnically and culturally united Georgia would have every right to demand NATO membership. But as things are now (or were, until the last few days), Mikheil Saakashvili wants his country inside NATO to protect him from the consequences of forcing those dissident territories to remain under Georgian domination. NATO has no business doing such a thing, and as Russia supports the rebel enclaves, NATO membership for Georgia has war with Russia built into it. As we have just seen."

But I also think that allowing Georgia to join NATO, under any circumstances that remotely resemble the present, would make people wonder: are the United States and the other NATO countries really willing to go to war to protect Georgia? And the reason it would make people wonder is that it is not, in fact, even the least bit clear that we would, still less that we should. And that means that admitting Georgia to NATO would badly damage NATO's status as a credible defensive alliance.

It's really important to recognize this. If one does not, one might think: why not take a chance for Georgia? But if the cost is: damaging NATO's status as a credible defensive alliance, then we need to recognize that that's a cost will be borne by the other countries that are NATO members, and that are close to Russia. It is NATO that protects them. And it is NATO's status as a credible defensive alliance -- which means, other people's belief that if some NATO member were invaded, we would go to war to defend them -- that allows that protection to take the form of not being invaded, rather than the much less desirable form of having us roll in the tanks in response to a Russian attack.

Likewise, someone who didn't recognize the costs of admitting Georgia to NATO itself might be inclined to think: hey, why not extend NATO membership to Georgia, and gamble on the proposition that if Georgia were a NATO member, Russia would not invade? That line of thinking is not just (imho) inexcusably cavalier about the prospect of a shooting war with Russia; it also neglects the extent to which we cheapen our promises by overextending them. If we made a promise that it seemed very unlikely that we would follow through on, it would not carry anything like the weight it would have had we given it out more sparingly. And, as I said before, to the extent that similar promises are protecting other people, by degrading our word, we also harm them.

So I completely reject the idea that my unwillingness to support Georgian membership in NATO means that I am insufficiently sensitive to the need to protect Russia's neighbors. On the contrary: I worry not only about getting into a shooting war with Russia, but also about the credibility of the protection we have offered to other Russian neighbors. My disagreements with the people who say these sorts of things do not concern our views about the importance of protecting small countries with large neighbors, but our beliefs about the options we have available to us, and the consequences of various courses of action we might take.

Judgments about foreign policy are often high-stakes judgments with enormous amounts of risk. If I am wrong on this one, then by simply offering NATO membership to Georgia, we could protect it against invasion, and start the process by which it too might become a country it's just unimaginable for Russia to invade. But if people like John McCain are wrong, then letting Georgia join NATO would not only risk getting us into a war with Russia (and a war in which it would have a huge logistical advantage); it would also put at risk the peace and stability of Russia's other neighbors, and the survival of NATO as a credible defensive alliance.

These are very serious costs. They are worth discussing seriously. Reflexive statements about the need to stand up against Russian aggression and the "weakness" of whoever does not agitate the loudest are not serious, and do our country and our allies an enormous disservice.

Comments

[Nell]

an amoral, dubiously democratic country that apparently does not blink at invading its neighbors!

Eagerness or not aside, sometimes it's difficult to avoid giving offense to such a country...

[Nell]

Those countries that don't blink at invading others in "self-defense" are particularly touchy about being crossed. Or so I understand.

[hilzoy]

Nell: I didn't mean to imply that we were not, etc.

[von]

I think it is a wonderful, wonderful thing that it has become unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe. It wasn't always that way: certainly not in the immediate aftermath of World War II; arguably not until the 70s or so. And while there were many things that led it to become unimaginable, NATO protection is surely one of them.

It became unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe sometime in the 1970s? Is this some sort of "in retrospect" analysis (in which case you're overstating your case) or are you saying that at the time it was unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe (in which case you're crazy wrong).

The fact that bad thing X did not happen is not proof that it could not have happened. Even in retrospect, it's not at all "unthinkable" that a weakening Russia -- as we now know Russia was in the 1970s -- would do something rash and stupid to maintain its dominance. In the words of an old punk rock spiritual "there's danger in a desperate man / watch yourself, I'm panicking."

As for the rest: Your analysis of the situation in Georgia has been off-base and so full of pro-Obama spin that it's difficult to digest. This one has less spin but is no less off-base. International disputes are not comparable to interpersonal annoyances in the workplace. Completely different factors are at play.

I do agree that it would be a mistake to extend NATO membership to Georgia, however. But there may be advantage in motioning in that direction.

[von]

The fact that bad thing X did not happen is not proof that it could not have happened.

Put another way, would the situation turned out nearly as well as late as the 1980s had Gorbachav not taken charge? Getting Gorby in the Kremlin was a tremendous bit of luck for the world (including Russia, for that matter). And, yes, it was partly luck: there was nothing inevitable about his rise.

Sorry, I'm having real difficulty coming to terms with this initial assessment. Things can go terribly wrong as easy as they go right. A lot of work goes into trying to get it right. It's as if that work is meaningless to you -- that everything was destined to turn out OK.

[Surly Duff]

I think my post got eaten! I guess the crux of my earlier post, which was much longer, but filled with historical context, cogent arguments, and intelligent discourse, was why is there still a need for NATO? I agree that including Georgia would be a mistake, but personnaly, I feel NATO is a cold-war remnant mainly provides a forum for like-minded countries to discuss security and counterterrorism efforts. There have been few military operations with NATO, the U.S. has funded a dispraportionate amount of the costs for NATO, and has become less important and necesarry with the continuing expansion and strength of the EU. Of course, a dissolution of NATO might render the need for U.S. military might in Europe obsolete (or maybe just less justified), and it might really hinder our efforts to establish the unsuccessful missle defense system. Other than that, is NATO really necessary?

[hilzoy]

von: I call it as I see it. I was around at the time. I do think the USSR was very unlikely to invade after sometime in the 70s, largely for economic reasons. Obviously, this does not mean that I think things would have turned out the same in other respects, or: nearly as well, had some other leader been in power.

Since a lot of the point of this post was to say: look, O people who want to do some crazy thing in support of Georgia, you are overlooking the very hard work that goes into making it true (a) that NATO functions, and (b) that it is unthinkable to invade some countries, I find the idea that I'm overlooking hard work odd. I mean, the whole point is: this stuff takes time, and you cannot do all of it all at once if you intend to do it at all.

I'm sorry if that was unclear.

[CharleyCarp]

Von, plenty of us knew by the 70s that it was in fact unthinkable, by people paying attention, that the Soviets would attack Western Europe. There were people who couldn't/wouldn't accept this, and they made a big show of fear, for domestic political purposes. There was even a close call in the early 80s where the Soviets thought we were acting provocative enough that it might mean we were going to start something.

Finally, though, even Reagan saw that Nixon etc had been right, and that there was a way out. How lucky we all are that the wall finally came down with GHWB in the WH and Baker at State.

[hilzoy]

Surly Duff: I think it's necessary for the reason I said in the post: to expand the zone in which military action by Russia is unthinkable, over time.

That being the case -- and this is something I wanted to say in the post, but forgot to -- I think that a lot of the time, even when it looks as though NATO is doing nothing, it is doing something immensely important. Namely: prolonging the time in which various countries have not been invaded, and getting us (if we don't screw things up) closer to a world in which it will be unimaginable to invade them.

[Ara]

I disagree with von and agree with Hilzoy. It's a silly threat, because if I'm Russia, I call the bluff.

Think of it this way.

What have we done today in an effort to defend Georgia?

Not much. And that's exactly what most people in the US and world community are comfortable with.

Now what happens if we had a treaty obligation to defend Georgia? Suddenly, we have manufactured a very real reason to enter a war that we would otherwise not at all be comfortable entering.

In other words, the surest way to secure the integrity of NATO is to only admit nations towards which we would otherwise have the motivation to take the same sorts of actions. Nobody wants to fight a war only on account of a treaty.

If I am Russia, I might roll the dice. There is simply no way we are fighting a war with Russia over Georgia. So I, as Russia, would let Georgia become a member of NATO and then invade it. And forever destroy the credibility of NATO.

There are only really three outcomes here, if we admit Georgia and similarly situated nations into NATO. Either (1) the Russians respond to the credibility of the threat and find themselves boxed in or (2) the Russians call our bluff and shred NATO or (3) we find ourselves in a WWI-like situation where everyone mobilizes for a war nobody really wants to fight, drawn into it by premature alliances.

I will concede to the hawks this: (1) is probably most likely, but it is idiocy to risk (2) and (3), given how small the benefit of (1) is, how horrible the consequences of (2) and (3) are, and how very real the chances are of their coming to pass. Particularly when the only thing that needs to happen to slide from good outcome 1 to bad outcomes 2 or 3 is Russian action. That's right: all that's needed to get from a good outcome to a bad outcome is an event that you have absolutely no control over, but your adversary does.

Now, to add to the folly, McCain on CNN just spoke of admitting *Ukraine* to NATO as well.

[byrningman]

It became unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe sometime in the 1970s? Is this some sort of "in retrospect" analysis (in which case you're overstating your case) or are you saying that at the time it was unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe (in which case you're crazy wrong).

Actually, you're wrong. "Unthinkable" is obviously an exaggeration, but certainly nobody expected it. The Cold War in Europe settled into static pattern after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 -- which is why the Kennedy administration tacitly welcomed the wall's construction. Before that, Berlin was a crisis point, after that the frontiers of Europe were tacitly agreed on by all parties. You'll note that during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, NATO was not especially concerned that this was the prelude to an invasion further West, nor did NATO make any effort to intervene in support of the Czechoslovaks.

So a NATO-Warsaw Pact ground war in Europe was not "unthinkable" -- because obvious many people dedicated entire careers to thinking about it -- but it was not especially likely. American strategic planners were far more considered with the possibilities of the Soviets moving South to Afghanistan/Iraq etc., further afield into Africa, or in a more general sense, they were concerned with rapid growth of the Soviet navy and strategic nuclear arsenal.

By this time, in fact, the USSR and the rest of the Warsaw Pact had began very substantial trade relations with the West, and the countries of Eastern Europe were starting to fall into massive debt owed to Western governments and banks.

The most tense moment since 1962 came in the early 80s, largely fueled by Soviet concern about US involvement in Afghanistan. As we have been reminded in the past week, the Russians are very sensitive about what they call the 'southern tier', as this is where their energy resources, Muslim population, nuclear arsenal and transport links to the Far East (the northern chunk of Siberia being frozen all year round) are concentrated. Germany was defeated at the Stalingrad, the gateway to the Caucasus, because Hitler was making a mad dash to cut the Soviets off from their oil fields and access to the Black Sea. That gambit having failed, WW2 in Europe was largely determined.

[hilzoy]

byrningman: yeah, 'unthinkable' is obviously not literally true, given all those defense planners. But Russia invading Europe was, I think, well into the 'just not going to happen category.

I don't think this was true as of 1961: I think these things take time, and care, to stabilize in place.

[Adam]

Not to continue to flog this particular dead horse, but we should keep in mind that there are quite a few people (many of them advising John McCain's campaign) who have a direct interest in expanding NATO and in starting a shooting war. The latter would be an ancillary benefit to them, but the point is that they have almost zero reason to advocate restraint because they're simply not subject to the same costs as everyone else.

[byrningman]

By the way, I mentioned in another thread that i thought the 'cyberwar' accusation was not credible. Apparently professionals have actually looked into it and shown that it's simply a case of politically-motivated hackers, not some governmental project. Since this comes from the former Chief information security officer for the Israeli government, I hope that even the armchair generals now signing up for honorary Georgian citizenship will concede the point.

[Slartibartfast]

Von, plenty of us knew by the 70s that it was in fact unthinkable, by people paying attention, that the Soviets would attack Western Europe

It took nearly a decade for Congress and State to catch on, apparently. Pershing II contract was, evidently, awarded despite the fact that anyone paying attention knew that they weren't needed.

[Jay C]

Excellent find, hilzoy: Pfaff puts his finger on the main point which has worried me a great deal since the Russo-Georgian conflict started:

"They carry with them ready-made wars that NATO neither can nor should be expected to deal with."

I think this fundamental (mis)conception lies at the heart of the debate about Georgia. At least in the US, anyway, from what I've seen in the blogosphere and the MSM.
For all the high-minded blather about what a fine bunch of pro-Western democratic freedom-lovers Georgia and its government are (which may even be true) - and how they are so much our "allies" - I have yet to see any sort of coherent argument being put forth as to exactly why our "alliance" with the Georgians - or what exactly they have "contributed" to us - or why we "owe" them so much - should obligate the US (or European countries) to militarily support them -in their petty local wars. Which, despite the overheated atmospherics emanating from the Right, the South Ossetia conflict essentially is.

@ von: "pro-Obama spin"? Really? If you (or hilzoy) are opposed to letting Georgia into NATO, you're on the opposite side from both him and John McCain! (The correct side AFAIC, but contrary nevertheless.

[Surly Duff]

Hilzoy - "Namely: prolonging the time in which various countries have not been invaded, and getting us (if we don't screw things up) closer to a world in which it will be unimaginable to invade them."

I don't think that this argument holds water. It is the same as the administration saying (I will take some liberties in my paraphrasing), "Look, there hasn't been another terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. This proves The Department of Homeland Security is an effective organization and we are winning the War on Terror".

Saying NATO is somehow prolonging a time when Russia could possibly invade is not measurable and is merely a guess. I believe that without NATO there enough of a disincenetive from other countries to prevent Russia from simply invading otehr countries. And I do believe that there is some purpose for NATO (if it was structured differently), but NATO is not a cure-all organization that would be able to prevent invasion just based upon sheer presence. Just my opinion though.

[byrningman]

yeah, 'unthinkable' is obviously not literally true, given all those defense planners. But Russia invading Europe was, I think, well into the 'just not going to happen category.

Yes, I knew what you meant, I wasn't disagreeing. I just meant that if we were going to parse things very literally then 'unthinkable' would be too strong for it; but I think the prospect was closer to 'unthinkable' than a 'pressing concern' that kept Europeans awake at night.

[Nell]

hilzoy: I didn't mean to imply that we were not, etc.

Oh, of course not; I wasn't responding to you so much as to the conservatives whose imagined objection you were addressing.

[Adam]

To be more blunt about this: why are we even talking about expanding NATO? Scheunemann, Bruce Jackson, and Charlie Black were the three guys who hooked us up with Chalabi, funded the INC, and created the Committee to Liberate Iraq -- and that was after they'd been pushing NATO expansion for a good five years or so.

Why in the world am I being expected to take their sudden commitment to international institutions seriously? Where was this "we must have solidarity" nonsense when we were going it alone in Iraq? I'd like to hear a plausible case explaining why Georgia has to be admitted into NATO before we can reasonably commit to defending them if it's necessary.

[hilzoy]

Surly: yeah; that's what makes foreign policy tough: all these judgment calls that can never be verified.

I don't mean that NATO alone would do it; what needs to happen (imho) is for a period of time to elapse in which there are no invasions, and everyone gets used to this fact, discovers it's OK, and learns to live with it, meanwhile (hopefully) developing things like trade ties with the countries in question, which provide additional disincentives. But you need for invasions not to happen during that period.

[Nell]

hilzoy: [expanded, continued NATO] getting us (if we don't screw things up) closer to a world in which it will be unimaginable to invade them.

Wonder what could develop to make it unimaginable that the U.S. wouldn't invade country X, Y, or Z as the fancy struck?

The imperial character of post-1990 NATO is either overlooked altogether or assumed to be a good thing in this post.

[hilzoy]

And von: if you'd tell me which parts of what I've said are off-base and full of pro-Obama spin, it would help me avoid similar mistakes in the future.

[Ara]

Wait. Is this pro-expansion stuff all just about increasing arms sales to Georgia?

One more thing: When NATO was started, the military strategy for defending Western Europe in case of an attack was quite clear. Ask yourself how on earth we are going to defend Georgia, given its geographical position, and given the fact that Russia can (and has) cut the country off in a matter of hours.

I know people dislike to admit this but countries of the size of Russia do have a kind of natural sphere of hegemony, if only because in a lot of cases we can't credibly defend those nations at their borders. It might be possible in Eastern Europe, because of the contiguous bloc of allies. In the Caucasus, I can't imagine. What are we going to do? Roll tanks from Turkey to Georgia through Armenia? March north from Iraq? Keep permanent bases in Georgia on the Russian border? Good luck.

[Ugh]

And von: if you'd tell me which parts of what I've said are off-base and full of pro-Obama spin, it would help me avoid similar mistakes in the future.

The correct parts.

[Ara]

Where on earth is the pro-Obama spin given that hilzoy disagrees sharply with Obama?

[Adam]

If I may clarify that last comment -- I agree with hilzoy as a general matter. I think that the fact that NATO is even on the table in the middle of an actual shooting war is absurd, though it's a testament of certain persons' abilities to shape our foreign policy discourse.

If it was really so important to defend poor little Georgia there'd be no reason to wait on NATO admission (even if their MAP had been approved in Bucharest it probably wouldn't be active yet) -- we'd just do it. For neoconservative interventionists to even put that issue on the table right now speaks volumes about their commitment to the interests of humanitarianism as opposed to the interests of the defense lobby.

[Nell]

What have we done today in an effort to defend Georgia?

We've arrived with a C-17 full of something (unspecified) that we describe as "humanitarian aid", and made rumbling noises about the sanctity of the airspace and ports.

We've raised the stakes for Russia and ourselves.

And "we" are apparently doubling down in this way at least partly for political reasons. McCain is dispatching Graham and Lieberman to Georgia in a transparent campaign stunt. No one at the WH or State is discouraging him publicly.

Did you know Saakashvili attended a conference in Yalta at which Rove, informal McCain adviser and Freedom's Watch consultant, was a speaker (on Caucasus-future-in-the-next-administration) that took place only a few days after Rice met with Pres. S in Tbilisi in July?

But surely politics would play no role in a belligerent foreign policy in this administration!

[Jeff]

A friend suggested admitting Russia into NATO. They certainly wouldn't feel encircled then. But what happens if one NATO member attacks another?

[Adam]

Wait. Is this pro-expansion stuff all just about increasing arms sales to Georgia?

Yes, yes, a million times yes. I'm not going to link to my discussions of this for a third time (linking to my own blog just seems tacky), but it's almost painfully clear (to me, at least).

[freelunch]

Deterrence works when it is believable. Clear statements only work when the person you are trying to deter believes you. The Soviets believed that the US would defend Western Europe during the Cold War (and they didn't mind that we had troops in W. Germany, their historic foe, either). Invading Western Europe wasn't exactly unthinkable, but the Soviets appear to have expected a full-blown WWIII to be the result. They had to decide under what circumstances they would do this and throughout the existence of the Soviet Union, the cost was never considered worth it.

Georgia is a different problem. Like the USA with Cuba, Russia was willing to tolerate the existence of this thorn-in-the-side, but if Cuba decided that its territorial integrity needed to be protected by destroying any foreign military bases, our commitment to boundaries would also disappear -- and we wouldn't just reclaim Gitmo.

[Nell]

Pershing II contract was, evidently, awarded despite the fact that anyone paying attention knew that they weren't needed.

As if that isn't the basic story of huge hunks of our "defense" program.

[CharleyCarp]

Pershing II contract was, evidently, awarded despite the fact that anyone paying attention knew that they weren't needed.

It's a good thing we live in a democracy, where no government expenditures are made other than those actually needed.

[Adam]

Slarti, do you think the NATO-expansion/arms-export rationale is defensible?

[Nell]

Like the USA with Cuba, Russia was willing to tolerate the existence of this thorn-in-the-side

Yes, we certainly had a magnificent tolerance for the existence of the Castro government (the 'thorn'). An invasion (that I admit was hamstrung from the start, and probably done as much as anything else to embarrass Kennedy), followed by another ten years of assassination attempts, economic sabotage, and terrorism -- including blowing up civilian airplanes. But who's counting?

[Nell]

I'll quit after this, I promise, but the massive sense of imperial entitlement is getting to me. The U.S. "reclaim" Guantanamo from Cuba?? It belongs to Cuba. If we ever grow up as a nation enough to abandon that wretched place, it will be reclaimed by the Cubans.

[jack lecou]

Slarti- That seems an extremely odd response.

Pretty clearly Hilzoy is not implying that NATO forces in W. Europe could have packed up and gone home in the '70s. NATO is a military alliance, and to the extent that it worked to make Soviet invasion 'unthinkable' would in turn have to be in large part due to the existence of powerful NATO military forces, including theater nukes in Germany.

US/NATO arms escalation as required to match Soviet escalation and maintain the credibility of the NATO force is absolutely in line with Hilzoy's argument.

(The extent to which a new medium range missile in the '80s was actually necessary for this purpose is probably debatable, but it's a completely separate debate.)

[Jacob Davies]

I'm not really sold on the basic problem identified in this posting, which is that NATO members, having admitted Georgia (which would involve settling its territorial disputes and ensuring a sane government first), might not act to defend it in the event of a Russian incursion.

Here's what I think:

1) Russia would never do that to a NATO state, because

2) NATO would come down like a ton of bricks in defense of any member, no matter how junior or how far east.

Also, when the major threat is Russia, adding additional countries to the NATO ring does not necessarily imply that we could be "stretched". Russia only has so many troops and tanks and helicopters; it couldn't attack Georgia and Estonia and Ukraine all at once, or if it could it would be the one being stretched, not NATO.

There are advantages to circling Russia with untouchable NATO members that I think haven't been recognized in this post. Preventing Russia from treating neighbours as playthings is a desirable goal in itself; some countries only seem to learn that they shouldn't do something when they find that they can't do it. Never starting a shooting war also means that such a war can never escalate.

The major reason, though, is that if we do have some kind of security guarantee to these non-NATO members, as Georgia seems to have thought (and as I think might turn out to be true if Russia pressed on to Tbilisi) we should make it 110% clear to Russia before the fact. NATO membership draws a line in the sand with very little ambiguity. Russia can make better decisions when it knows exactly what the response will be.

Against that, there is the pressure-cooker model of Russian actions: by constraining and circling them, will we push them to act? Obviously this is a pretty important question! But I'm not sold on the idea that letting them rampage all over Georgia etc. is going to lead to less rampaging in the future. Rather, such "successes" might encourage them to push their luck. It's hard to say, but even though the pressure-cooker analogy seems plausible, it'd be good to understand whether or not there's any reality to it first.

[Adam]

Something else interesting in the WaPo article:

As a private lobbyist trying to influence lawmakers and Bush administration staffers, Scheunemann at times relied on his access to McCain in his work for foreign clients on Capitol Hill. He and his partner reported 71 phone conversations and meetings with McCain and his top advisers since 2004 on behalf of foreign clients, including Georgia, according to forms they filed with the Justice Department.

The contacts often focused on Georgia's aspirations to join NATO and on legislative proposals, including a measure co-sponsored by McCain that supported Georgia's position on South Ossetia, one of the Georgian regions taken over by Russia this weekend.

Another measure lobbied by Orion and co-sponsored by McCain, the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2006, would have authorized a $10 million grant for Georgia.

Why is a 2006 Act giving $10M to Georgia called the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act? Clearly they weren't and aren't a NATO member, right? I want to read this Act.

[bedtimeforbonzo]

Interesting that we've done a better job at getting aid to Georgia than we did to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Priorities.

[Adam]

Curiouser and curiouser. The Act just mentioned grants $10M to Georgia, more than it grants to Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia combined -- for arms purchases.

Even stranger is that, if you look through the history in the bill, Georgia stands out from every other country admitted to NATO because its membership was never raised at a NATO meeting -- Georgia proposed it unilaterally and NATO agreed to open a dialogue; that's it. (In late 2004, notably, a few months after Scheunemann was brought on board as a lobbyist.)

I'd been wondering when membership had been brought up because I couldn't figure out which summit it was attached to -- well, turns out that's because it wasn't brought up at a summit.

This just gets worse and worse the more I look into it.

[Ugh]

Interesting that we've done a better job at getting aid to Georgia than we did to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Getting aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina didn't have the potential to create an international bogeyman to scare the american people into voting for Republican MBFs.

[bedtimeforbonzo]

Jacob Davies: "But I'm not sold on the idea that letting them rampage all over Georgia etc. is going to lead to less rampaging in the future. Rather, such 'successes' might encourage them to push their luck."

Indeed, why should we think otherwise that Putin doesn't feel emboldened right now?

Davies: "Russia can make better decisions when it knows exactly what the response will be."

Hasn't this always been the case w/ Russia? And why should it be any different now?

Putin is running the Russian Federation, to the point where he essentially fixed its last election, not Gorbachev, who is more respected in our country than he is in his own, where many consider him to be a fool.

[Nell]

Adam: Why is a 2006 Act giving $10M to Georgia called the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act? Clearly they weren't and aren't a NATO member, right? I want to read this Act.

Here you go.

[Nell]

D'oh. Well, some value in my link for those geeky enough to want to know how to make permalinks to THOMAS: Substitute the session and bill number, and make sure to include the final colon.

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

There are only really three outcomes here, if we admit Georgia and similarly situated nations into NATO. Either (1) the Russians respond to the credibility of the threat and find themselves boxed in or (2) the Russians call our bluff and shred NATO or (3) we find ourselves in a WWI-like situation where everyone mobilizes for a war nobody really wants to fight, drawn into it by premature alliances.
I will concede to the hawks this: (1) is probably most likely, but it is idiocy to risk (2) and (3), given how small the benefit of (1) is, how horrible the consequences of (2) and (3) are, and how very real the chances are of their coming to pass. Particularly when the only thing that needs to happen to slide from good outcome 1 to bad outcomes 2 or 3 is Russian action. That's right: all that's needed to get from a good outcome to a bad outcome is an event that you have absolutely no control over, but your adversary does.

What Ara said, with the additional proviso that a slow motion admission process also creates a perverse incentive for Russia to attack Georgia now rather than waiting and biding their time.

Leave aside quibbles about exactly when it became almost unthinkable for Russia to launch a full scale invasion of Western Europe (I’d say mid 1980’s, post Able Archer at least), I see one major omission in hilzoy’s analysis. The expansion of NATO was not something that happened as a result of purely structural factors in our relationship with Russia. It was something that happened in a very specific historical context, during a period of extreme Russian weakness (social, political, economic and military) in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire. We were able to expand NATO when we did, and as much as we did, because at the time there basically wasn’t a darn thing the Russians could have done to stop us, even if they had wanted to.

That state of weakness has now passed. Putin’s Russia is not the same thing as Yeltsin’s Russia, and any realistic account of both our past and future relationship with that country will need to take this historic waning and waxing of their strength into account. We may not like that Putin is now flexing Russia’s geopolitical muscles and seeking to take back power and control over regions which were “lost” during the 1990s, but we should not be surprised that it is happening. That it is happening at a time when the geopolitical power of the US is at a low ebb (heckofajob, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney!) is also no accident.

That is one of the reasons why any additional NATO expansion into Russia’s “near abroad” is so dangerous, because compared with the last phase of expansion we are weaker and they are stronger, so it is entirely predictable that they will react forcefully to any moves we make and will seek to roll back or break NATO, insofar as they perceive NATO to be a threat to them or to be an unacceptable competitor for patronage and influence in areas that they regard as belonging within their historic sphere of influence.

Now is the time to staunchly defend what we have already gained in the preceding phase of NATO expansion, not to be grabbing for more in a way which is certain to trigger a confrontation with Russia with the sort of destabilizing effects (both on NATO and on global security more generally) mentioned above by various contributors to this thread.

[Jacob Davies]

bedtimeforbonzo: "Hasn't this always been the case w/ Russia? And why should it be any different now?"

Can you clarify this? I'm not sure whether you're agreeing or disagreeing with what I said about Russia making better decisions when the lines are more clearly drawn, or if you mean something else entirely. And I hate to accidentally wind up arguing against people who agree with me...

I don't think the lines have always been clearly drawn, but I do think that history shows that Russia does not step over clearly marked lines. Take West Berlin, for instance. Conversely I think the line in regards to Georgia was extremely fuzzy and that it invited them to do what they just did.

[byrningman]

A friend suggested admitting Russia into NATO.

a) Because Russia wouldn't join it
b) Because that makes no sense, since NATO is not-so-secretly designed to contain Russia.

How does this effort to rebrand NATO as some kind of post-Soviet generalised peacekeeping/security enhancing organisation make any sense, given that the enormous elephant in the Eurasian room is Russia, with extensive force projection capabilities, borders with nearly every state in the region, and enormous ethnic and linguistic ties to virtually every country?

If the Bush administration has been so concerned with Eurasian security for the past 7 years, don't you think they would have tried to get Russia to participate in some kind of regional framework? Unless of course, you have decided that Russia is the regional problem.

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

Also, when the major threat is Russia, adding additional countries to the NATO ring does not necessarily imply that we could be "stretched". Russia only has so many troops and tanks and helicopters; it couldn't attack Georgia and Estonia and Ukraine all at once, or if it could it would be the one being stretched, not NATO.

Jacob Davies,

The threat from Russia is not exclusively or even primarily military. Russia wields considerable economic power right now, both over our allies in Europe directly via the leverage Russia has over their energy supplies, and globally in terms of their ability to cause mischief in energy markets and currency markets. Russia is one of our significant creditors. They might not be able to swing it purely on their own, but in conjunction with others they might be able to do us what we did to the British during the 1956 Suez Crisis, i.e. to cause a currency crisis involving a crash in the value of the US dollar which would severely impair our ability to fund foreign adventures in the Caucasus and elsewhere (unless of course our troops don’t plan on eating or getting paid, and our weapons manufacturers will donate all of the necessary equipment and supplies).

That is one of the big problems with our foreign policy discourse in this country today. Because we have such a large military, we seem to have forgotten that military power is ultimately founded on economic power. We seem to think that they have become decoupled and we can throw our weight around the world in a crisis without regard to the fact that we need to borrow money on a very large scale from multiple different sources in order to pay for any of the things we wish to do, and few of our creditors have their geopolitical interests as closely aligned with ours as we like to think. We are setting ourselves up for a fall by ignoring this reality.

The solution to this problem isn’t easy, but it is obvious – raise taxes and get our budget back into surplus, then pay our debts down. Our dilemma right now is that the very same people on the right who are most eager for the US to throw its weight around on the international stage (right now! this very minute!) are adamantly opposed to doing precisely what we most need to do if we wish to regain the freedom of action we have lost by going so deeply into debt.

[Jacob Davies]

NATO's sole reason for existence is to contain Russia. Since Russia spent half the 20th century dominating half of Europe, and while somewhat defanged still shows ambitions in that direction, I think this idea that a stronger and more aggressive Russia would lead to a weaker NATO is a little strange.

NATO is a deterrent. NATO is about saying to the Russians, you cannot mess with us one at a time. As such, a renewed Russian interest in messing with its neighbours one at a time would seem to indicate more need for such statements, not less. Europeans are not stupid, they have a much more hands-on feel for what Russian aggression means than do Americans.

The very last thing I want is for NATO to fight Russia, but I don't understand why ruling out NATO membership for places bordering Russia is supposed to reduce that likelihood. This isn't about hawkishness at all, this is about protecting countries from renewed Russian aggression and restricting Russia's freedom of action so they don't start getting any ideas. It's also about making concrete security guarantees that are probably implicit anyway; if Russia invaded Ukraine I think we'd wind up fighting them anyway, so why not make it crystal clear in advance?

Of course this also means making sure that such new members avoid confrontations with Russia, and avoid responding to provocation. But then I think that Russian provocation would be substantially decreased by NATO membership.

[bedtimeforbonzo]

Jacob,

I agree w/ everything you've said and, unlike me, you have been very clear. Thanks.

[Jacob Davies]

Economic power: sure, yes, but in what way would halting NATO enlargement reduce Russian economic power? They seem orthogonal.

And I'm not sure that's a card they can play. Any such economic warfare would cripple the Russian economy too. If it comes down to betting on who'd be worse-hurt by a shutoff of energy supplies to Western Europe, or by an attempt to trash the dollar, my money would not be on Russia's rather fragile economy coming up on top. Americans, after all, have just had a major dollar devaluation without too much ill effect - in fact most of them probably didn't notice - and I think the damage that could be done to the dollar by any one creditor is somewhat limited.

Also, Western countries control the currency markets and could potentially take actions to negate the effects of a Russian currency attack. The rest of the world has a very strong vested interest in their dollar reserves maintaining their value and in the US economy remaining strong, I don't think they'd be sitting on their hands. After all, the Euro would surely be next.

The major fear here seems to be what Russia would do in response to the provocation of NATO enlargement. I guess my fear is what Russia will do without the restraining influence of NATO enlargement, and what happens after that.

[curtadams]

I'm going to disagree and say that NATO is still useful and that Georgia should be a part, although there are some serious technical obstacles in the form of the separatist regions.

Russia *is* a threat outside its borders. Russia was critical in the massive ethnic cleansing of Abkhazia where literally hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians - originally the majority of the province - were driven from their homes. They are still mostly refugees in what's left of Georgia. That was in 1993, and all Russian regimes since have enthusiastically supported the Abkhazians. More to the point, Russia has eagerly used its oil power for political and economic purposes against current EU and NATO members. They have been pretty shameless in seizing assets at really low prices from Western oil companies too. Invasion, no, economic blackmail, yes.

Given that Russia can and does wield its oil power against Europe, we do need defense against this blackmail. Georgia is important as a critical link in the only western-friendly oil pipeline out of Central Europe. That means Georgia is an important part of defense against a Russia that has shown hostile intent against Europe.

The technical problem, of course, is the separatist regions. Georgia is in the right on Abkhazia, but the problem isn't solvable without basically a Russian concession. Georgia is never going to consent to surrendering Abkhazia, not when 6% of the population is refugees from Abkhazian ethnic cleansing, so we have a standoff. In South Ossetia, Georgia is in the wrong, as Ossetians are a very different group with a very different language, centuries of hostility with the Georgians, and the overwhelming majority there. Georgian ruling Ossetia is like England ruling Ireland in 1920 - not acceptable. In principle Georgia might renounce that claim but I can't see with Abkhazia an open sore.

So there are certainly risks for sticking up for Georgia and inviting them into NATO. But there are big risk to leaving Georgia at the mercy of the Russians, too. The Russians might do the same thing to Latvia that they did to Abkhazia - ethnically cleanse the current majority population. Or, perhaps, do the same in Kosovo. If they have enough of a stranglehold on Europe's oil and gas, Europe will have to go along with it. You could perhaps rely on Putin being more ethical than Yeltsin and voluntarily refrain - but I really don't think that's a good idea.

Georgia provides Europe an important defense against a real threat.

[von]

Von, plenty of us knew by the 70s that it was in fact unthinkable, by people paying attention, that the Soviets would attack Western Europe.

I have no doubt that you, CharlieCarp, and Hilzoy you couldn't conceive of the possibility of the Soviets attacking Western Europe in the 1970s. I also have no doubt that you knew lots of people who thought that they were "paying attention" and agreed with you. I don't dispute your honesty and good faith.

Nor, if you read my prior comments, would you see me say that it was likely that the Soviets would attack Western Europe. But the world is full of people who confuse a failure to imagine all the possibilities with "unthinkable".

[von]

byrningman: yeah, 'unthinkable' is obviously not literally true, given all those defense planners. But Russia invading Europe was, I think, well into the 'just not going to happen category.

Now I'm confused.

If you agree with me that "unthinkable" is an exaggeration, what does "just not going to happen" mean? If it just "wasn't going to happen," could we have cut our forces in Europe in half in the 1970s? Could we have stopped placing nuclear weapons? Could we have stopped training? Wargaming? Could we have ignored Turkey? Let Greece slide into the pro-Soviet group (I'm not defending the military dictatorship, by the bye)?

Do you think that a Soviet invasion of Western Europe "wasn't going to happen" on its own? Or was it not going to happen because we did a whole bunch of things to make sure it didn't happen, not all of which were particularly pretty (e.g., Greece)?

[Slartibartfast]

As if that isn't the basic story of huge hunks of our "defense" program.

If you think that defense makes its living off of pulling the wool over the eyes of Congress, well, Congress just might be that stupid. But I've never met anyone in DoD, and I've met quite a few, that didn't absolutely believe in what they were doing.

Clearly, it's some people's jobs to think the unthinkable, and clearly (to me, at least) our military presence in Western Europe was a major influence on making Soviet expansion there unthinkable.

So, no, USSR wasn't going to do anything untoward so long as we maintained a significant presence there. What do you suppose might have happened had we simply pulled everything back to our own borders back in, say, the early 1960s?

Hence, my mentioning of Pershing II. But I thought that was obvious.

[Slartibartfast]

I swear, von and I are not IMing right now.

[hilzoy]

von: the difference between 'literally impossible to think', which is of course falsified by the existence of people thinking about it, and. well, what 'unthinkable' means in ordinary speech.

[Adam]

If you think that defense makes its living off of pulling the wool over the eyes of Congress, well, Congress just might be that stupid. But I've never met anyone in DoD, and I've met quite a few, that didn't absolutely believe in what they were doing.

With all due respect, it seems to me that the problem here is that defense -- and lobbyists who are specifically dedicated to NATO expansion and who stand to profit from all the NATO member countries whenever there are new admissions -- seem to be making a business of pulling the wool over John McCain's eyes specifically.

Do you not find it worrisome that McCain's foreign policy team is filled with Lockheed folks? I would be less concerned if they were more evenly distributed, but they're not. McCain took heat when he handed the tanker plane contract to EADS/Grumman over Boeing, and to me the concern there is not that someone got the contract (I'm not categorically opposed to defense spending) but that McCain has lots of advisors who were registered with EADS/Grumman and almost none who were registered with Boeing.

How do you distinguish between spending that falls in the "Pershing" category and vs. legitimate defense expenditures?

And how does the assessment change when it involves people who've been pushing conflict with Russia for so long that they've clearly had ample opportunity to create the problems we're now supposedly deterring?

[liberal japonicus]

If you agree with me that "unthinkable" is an exaggeration, what does "just not going to happen" mean? If it just "wasn't going to happen," could we have cut our forces in Europe in half in the 1970s? Could we have stopped placing nuclear weapons? Could we have stopped training? Wargaming? Could we have ignored Turkey? Let Greece slide into the pro-Soviet group (I'm not defending the military dictatorship, by the bye)?

Yes, no, no, perhaps, perhaps

It seems that the weight you are putting on the word 'unthinkable' is rather pedantic, especially when it is preceeded 'it has become'. It's as if I said it has become unthinkable that swimmers from countries that don't have access to the new swimsuits can win a gold medal and you say 'unthinkable! I can imagine the new swimsuits might suddenly shrink, choking the swimmers in the water and Eric Moussambani from Guinea would win easily'

There is a reason why Slarti says that it is some people's jobs to think the unthinkable and it seems that if you were consistent, you would rail at those folks and tell them "how dare you say you are thinking the unthinkable? Don't you know that if you can think it, it isn't unthinkable?"

[Slartibartfast]

seem to be making a business of pulling the wool over John McCain's eyes specifically

Well, you'd be hard pressed to find me mentioning John McCain at all in this thread, so I'm not quite sure where that came from. John McCain was not in government in the late 1970s, I shouldn't have to point out.

Do you not find it worrisome that McCain's foreign policy team is filled with Lockheed folks?

I hadn't heard that. Who, specifically? I'm not sure what that means in the context of the whole tanker fiasco, either. I am a Lockheed Martin employee, just to make that clear.

How do you distinguish between spending that falls in the "Pershing" category and vs. legitimate defense expenditures?

I'm not sure why you might think that I hold Pershing to be an illegitimate expenditure. I haven't said that, and I don't think that.

Overall, your response to my comment seems better directed toward someone else, possibly, because it seems to assume some positions for me that I don't occupy.

[Slartibartfast]

FWIW, I think the next-to-last sentence in von's 8:41pm comment may align rather well with my 8:41pm comment, but I am not von, and he may have been going in a different direction.

[Adam]

I hadn't heard that. Who, specifically?

Charlie Black and Randy Scheunemann, now. Doug Davenport and Eric Burgeson before they were forced to resign. A number of major fundraisers, too.

Black and Scheunemann are both close to Bruce Jackson, who was a Lockheed VP and at Martin Manietta before that. Scheunemann and Jackson have been on or founded a number of pro-NATO-expansion groups.

I'm not sure what that means in the context of the whole tanker fiasco, either.

Well, that was Northrop-Grumman/EADS, not Lockheed. But I think it's related because those are also big NATO clients, and because McCain has 3 or 4 advisers affiliated with EADS and none with Boeing -- it indicates to me that the lobbyists are driving the train, and that's a problem.

I am a Lockheed Martin employee, just to make that clear.

I don't have a problem with Lockheed Martin. They make neat stuff. :) I do have a problem with trading on NATO expansion and the mixed motives at work here -- i.e., with the fact that the interests of the lobbyists aren't necessarily aligned with the interests of the company. In fact, I think it's very important to separate the issues; my worry is that the opposite is happening.

Lockheed is just one of the nexuses that relates Black, Scheunemann, Jackson, et al. -- I don't care if Lockheed supplies contracts under NATO or if NATO admits Georgia, but I think the two decisions should be made independently. The Pershing problem seems to demonstrate the problem with allowing defense interests to drive foreign policy rather than the other way 'round.

[Slartibartfast]

While I'm considering the rest of your response, Adam (and thanks for responding), what do you mean by the "Pershing problem"?

[Slartibartfast]

Scheunemann was a lobbyist hired by LM. Ditto Black and Davenport. I don't see a Burgeson connection.

The Bruce Jackson connection is troubling, though, as is the plethora of lobbyists advising McCain.

[Adam]

While I'm considering the rest of your response, Adam (and thanks for responding), what do you mean by the "Pershing problem"?

On second or third thought, I may have misread you, but I understood your point to be that the pragmatic decision whether or not to deploy missiles in Europe wasn't fully comprehended by Congress, regardless of the tactical wisdom of the choice.

I read the initial claim as: the military value of the decision shouldn't be read strictly against the political conditions that enabled it to be made. I agree, though I think it's important to emphasize that the pragmatic wisdom of the decision turns in part on whether it can be made independent of politics in the first place.

[Adam]

Part of the reason Scheunemann and Black trouble me is because of Jackson.

When Jackson was tapped by Hadley to create the Committee for Iraqi Liberation (because of his handling of NATO issues), he brought Scheunemann on board because Scheunemann authored the Iraqi Liberation Act when he was working for Trent Lott. And they all knew each other because they both worked on NATO expansion.

Likewise, Black was hired by the INC (Chalabi's group that the ILA funded) at around the same time.

I don't like the fact that they all lobbyed for or worked for Lockheed, seemingly at similar times and in similar areas of expertise -- like I said, that could just be one of their connections or how they met -- but that's not my sole concern. And frankly, I'd rate Black as a lesser concern behind Jackson and Scheunemann.

But given that Lockheed, EADS, and other companies they're affiliated stand to benefit so heavily from NATO expansion, I think that the policy-politics nexus here is an issue worthy of serious concern, and it's an even more serious concern in relation to John McCain specifically, given the number of people advising him that are connected to these issues and how little clue he seems to have about it personally.

[Slartibartfast]

To be fair, I think the broad PNAC cross-connection is more credible than the LM-lobbyist connection. Those firms also lobbied for a number of other large corporations, but I don't think that many of those other clients were members of PNAC.

I understood your point to be that the pragmatic decision whether or not to deploy missiles in Europe wasn't fully comprehended by Congress, regardless of the tactical wisdom of the choice.

This refers back to my initial wool-pulling comment? I don't really think Congress is really that stupid, although that shouldn't be construed to mean that I think they are/were particularly wise.

[Adam]

To be fair, I think the broad PNAC cross-connection is more credible than the LM-lobbyist connection.

Again, I agree that the LM connection is secondary, but it's at least emblematic of a specific and very problematic conflict of interest. NATO interoperability requirements mean that new additions to the alliance are worth billions to various defense contractors with extant agreements, and if for the sake of NATO and US credibility those expansion decisions need to be isolated from transnational procurement obligations.

I agree PNAC is a more diffuse brand of craziness. My personal opinion is that the broad PNAC agenda is the answer to a lot of different peoples' questions, and some of those people are better than others. Cheney, for example, seems to represent the "not good" end of that spectrum.

I'm not opposed to a strong defense poicy by any stretch of the imagination -- in fact I'm a bit hawkish at times -- but I do believe in the importance of isolating civilian and military functions. The way our NATO policy has been conducted since the Cold War ended hasn't upheld that principle sufficiently, to my mind -- shills like Jackson and Scheunemann and their relationships to politicians like McCain are a large part of the reason for that.

[Dr Zen]

Expanding NATO to include Poland was a fucking stupid idea and expanding it to include Georgia is even fucking stupider, whatever the fate of its renegade provinces. Saying to Russia "we think you are so humbled that we can expand our empire right up to your doorstep" is something I think only an American, unreflective, uninterested in how the rest of the world sees the world, could ever contemplate.

And btw, I am European, and Russia's invading Western Europe in the 1970s was unthinkable.

[Carleton Wu]

von,
Put another way, would the situation turned out nearly as well as late as the 1980s had Gorbachav not taken charge?

Not to speak for hilzoy, but obviously she wasn't ruling out a Russian invasion at any point in the future. Moment to moment in the 80s, there was never a time when a Russian invasion seemed like more than a remote possibility. A great deal of which has to do with what we were doing at the time.
Of course, iirc around 1986 the idea that the Warsaw Pact countries would be freed from the Iron Curtain within a decade was also pretty unthinkable. :)

Jacob,
I don't think the lines have always been clearly drawn, but I do think that history shows that Russia does not step over clearly marked lines.

I think that a great deal of this has to do with the fact that the people drawing clear lines have always drawn them far enough away from what Russia considered to be vital interests. Do not make the mistake of thinking that this means that those lines are uncrossable.
Drawing that line too close (on our part) or crossing it (on theirs) risks the END OF THE WORLD. So let's not get all eager to box the Russkis in just because the magic marker looks all-powerful.

[Nell]

@Dr. Zen: I agree heartily with your comment and hope you'll stay around -- but you've got to choose another form of emphasis than f---ing to do so.

Version in para above acceptable, as at least part of the point is to avoid making difficulties for readers with filters.

[OCSteve]

It became unthinkable that Russia would invade Western Europe sometime in the 1970s?
…
plenty of us knew by the 70s that it was in fact unthinkable, by people paying attention, that the Soviets would attack Western Europe.

This seems to me like viewing history through rose colored glasses. What’s unthinkable, or rather unbelievable, is that it did not happen. The Warsaw Pact held the upper hand in terms of conventional forces until at least the late 80’s. They had the advantage in theatre nuclear weapons until Pershing II was deployed.

US involvement in Vietnam in the 70’s meant less conventional support for NATO. NATO ground forces were in terrible shape in the early 80’s. There was no realistic conventional deterrent. Any number of political events would have triggered a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe: Loss of control of their satellites in Eastern Europe, any number of possible confrontations in Berlin, problems with China, etc. – pick one. Soviet military doctrine of the time boiled down to “the offensive is the main type of combat” (and still is today as we have seen just this week). They had detailed plans to quickly take Western Europe and drive NATO out. Even without a “trigger” event, their intent was always to gain control of Western Europe. They even believed that they could successfully follow up a limited (in theatre) nuclear exchange with a conventional offensive to drive NATO out of Europe.

Unthinkable? In terms of both conventional and theatre level nuclear assets 1982-1983 was the single most dangerous time for Western Europe since the end of WWII.

And those portraying the Pershing II program as some kind of unneeded defense industry gravy train or the like are also forgetting some history. They forget that it was Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who asked that NATO come up with something to deter the SS-20 threat. It was not a new provocation or defense gravy train – it was a logical (in terms of MAD anyway) response to an existing Soviet threat. Pershing II and GLCMs were deployed at the request of, with the approval of, the desire even, of NATO Ministers and the governments of Western Europe. And it led directly to the INF Treaty. Seems like money well spent to me.

[hilzoy]

OCSteve: yes, they had the advantage in conventional forces in Europe, so it wasn't unthinkable because of e.g. an inadequate army. Nor do I doubt that they had detailed plans for invasion, or for that matter that we did.

That said, at the time Russia was crumbling from within economically, and its military spending was a huge burden on it. (Full disclosure: in 1982 I was doing research on the economic impact of military spending in Sweden, and knew about as much about that as it was possible to know from unclassified sources. Which wasn't as much as one would like, given that there was no decent pricing system in the USSR -- when they can set the price of e.g. their raw materials, if they say that all the components of a modern fighter jet cost, oh, ten cents, how exactly do you correct for that? -- but it was still something.)

Moreover, their control of their satellites seemed to me likely not to last -- all force and no genuine allegiance is a setup that is really hard to maintain over the long run. And conquering new countries that would be even harder for them to maintain control over, and that would tax them even further, seemed to me very unlikely.

Shorter me: it wasn't their military inferiority it was the politics and economics of it that made me think it was unthinkable. Though I also think -- one of the points of the post -- that getting to that point, after WWII, required a serious defensive alliance. I mean, part of it was getting to the point where it would seem, to more and more Russians, that while NATO had a lot of power, the USSR really did not have to worry about, say, Germany deciding to embark on another round of conquest. That would have been impossible for quite some time after WWII.

[Xanthippas]

Likewise, someone who didn't recognize the costs of admitting Georgia to NATO itself might be inclined to think: hey, why not extend NATO membership to Georgia, and gamble on the proposition that if Georgia were a NATO member, Russia would not invade? That line of thinking is not just (imho) inexcusably cavalier about the prospect of a shooting war with Russia; it also neglects the extent to which we cheapen our promises by overextending them. If we made a promise that it seemed very unlikely that we would follow through on, it would not carry anything like the weight it would have had we given it out more sparingly. And, as I said before, to the extent that similar promises are protecting other people, by degrading our word, we also harm them.

I think mere membership in the organization is more of a deterrent than you seem to think, such that it's not really a "gamble" to think that membership alone would be a deterrant to Russian military action, regardless of whether Russia is certain that we would act in Georgia's defense or not. I suppose the credibility of membership would eventually be degraded by permitting a large number of states to join who we would certainly NOT protect, but I don't think admitting Georgia would bring those circumstances about.

That being said I'm not really in favor of a strategy of encircling Russia with states that are members of NATO (and I think doing so would degrade NATO's credibility) but I think the deterrent effect on Russia as pertains to Georgia still exists.

[Slartibartfast]

Shorter me: it wasn't their military inferiority it was the politics and economics of it that made me think it was unthinkable.

hilzoy, I don't think that OCSteve is saying that USSR was militarily inferior; I think he's saying that Western Europe had to militarily balance out the presence of USSR in Eastern Europe, and that's what kept them contained. PII was just another counterweight in the balance.

Possibly.

There are people who will also claim that it was that process of balancing that sapped the Soviet economy to the crumbling point you described, but I haven't seen much more than opinionation in that direction. That'd be a nice, tidy explanation, for sure, but tidiness doesn't make it correct. We can't ever know for sure whether USSR would have advanced further west in Europe without that counterbalance, but I think there were lots of people who didn't want to gamble in that regard.

[hilzoy]

Slarti: sorry, I wasn't clear. I thought that OCSteve was responding to me saying that the USSR was not going to invade by saying (among other things): No, actually had a stronger conventional military. So I meant to say: yeah, but I wasn't arguing that they wouldn't invade Europe because they were militarily weaker, but because of political and economic reasons. So I was just trying to clarify my own view.

Personally, I think that time was on our side as far as the USSR was concerned. Their economic system didn't work, over the long run, and eventually it would have given way. I do not mean, in saying this, to obscure the very, very different forms that "giving way" might take, or how bad some of them can be. (I mean, I think the same thing about North Korea: in the long run, it cannot survive in its present form. That doesn't mean that things can't get really, really ugly in the interim.)

I agree with you about not gambling; that was sort of my point. (Though not about PII in particular; I don't know enough abut missiles to say.)

[hilzoy]

In the above: "No, actually had a stronger conventional military." = "No, actually they (USSR) had a stronger conventional military."

[Slartibartfast]

I don't know enough abut missiles to say.

As it happens, I have more than a passing familiarity with Pershing II, its subsystems, and its flight test history. I'm too young to have been involved in the design, so I hesitate to call myself expert, but I spent a few months studying the system.

Which means I know almost enough to be dangerous, I suppose. PII was the real deal. It even had a warhead that went to 11.

Which is not to say that everything surrounding it was completely squeaky-clean, just that it worked as claimed. I'm very glad we never needed to prove that in battle, I shouldn't have to add.

[Jacob Davies]

I'm still a bit unclear here on how the lack of NATO states on Russia's doorstep is going to lessen the chance of various bad outcomes. Again, this doesn't come from a reflexive desire to confront Russia, in fact it's the reverse: I very much do not want us to be in a shooting war with Russia, ever, or for that matter for anyone else to be in that situation.

Russia has demonstrated its willingness to militarily interfere with its close neighbours. This has been proven to be the case from about 1939 (Baltic states, Poland, Finland) through to the immediate post-war period (occupation of Eastern Europe, installation of puppet regimes), through Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, and here we are seeing the same thing again in Georgia. It's a pattern. I appreciate that the Soviet regime is gone, but Putin's hardline nationalists are obviously reading from the same script.

(Now, the US pattern has a few similarities to this too, but one problem at a time here...)

I tend to want to nail down complex combinatorial scenarios like this so that at least we know what we're talking about. Apologies if the following is tedious, obvious, or redundant, but:

Here are our goals:
1) Avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia.
2) Protect other countries from Russian aggression where possible.
3) Change Russia's attitude so that it can be trusted to peacefully co-exist with its neighbours.

And here are the choices we're talking about:
A) Leave Ukraine, Georgia, and other Russia-bordering but Western-looking states out of NATO.
or
B) Bring Ukraine, Georgia, etc. into NATO.

We have two potential sets of Russian actions:
K) Do not interfere with Georgia, Ukraine, etc.
or
L) Do interfere with/invade Georgia, Ukraine, etc.

And we have two potential sets of NATO/US responses to Russian interference:
X) Let them do what they want, with our response limited to verbal scolding.
or
Y) Respond militarily and/or economically at a level constituting economic warfare.

Here's my take on hilzoy's upside scenario:
A - Leave them out of NATO
resulting in a reduction of Russian paranoia, resulting in
K - No interference.
This satisfies 1, 2, and 3.

I have two problems with the plausibility of this: firstly, Russia has just demonstrated that they aren't peaceful, admittedly with the possibility of NATO members on its southern border maybe involved in pushing it to act. It's hard to say what they might have done if Georgia was not moving toward NATO. Then again, given their history of interfering with nations well-within their sphere of influence, I'm not convinced they would not be invading Georgia anyway. And secondly, I'm not at all sure that we would stay out of a conflict that started, regardless of whether Georgia and Ukraine were in NATO. I think the evidence for that is clear too - look at Bush's response to even the limited incursions by Russia in Georgia, and I think the mood in Western Europe is headed that way too.

Here's my two downside scenarios for option A:

A - Leave them out of NATO
resulting in Russia feeling free to
L - Interfere with Georgia/Ukraine/etc
which we then
X - Ignore.

Achieves goal 1, fails goals 2 & 3. More likely in my opinion is this:

A - Leave them out of NATO
resulting in Russia feeling free to
L - Interfere with Georgia/Ukraine/etc
resulting in a US or NATO
Y - Military or serious economic response.
This fails 1, 2, and 3.

Now, let's look at option B, bringing them into NATO. Here's my take on hilzoy's two downside scenarios for this option:

B - We bring Georgia/Ukraine/etc into NATO
resulting in increased Russian paranoia and aggression, resulting in
L - Interference with Georgia or whoever
resulting in
X - No NATO response
This would obviously be pretty disastrous. It achieves goal 1, fails at 2 & 3, but by demonstrating that NATO mutual-defence is optional, it seriously undermines international security.

Worse, though is:
B - We enlarge NATO
resulting in increased Russian paranoia and aggression, resulting in
L - Russian interference
resulting in
Y - A NATO military response
Fails 1, 2, and 3.

How plausible is that? Well, it all hinges on whether you think NATO membership is the sort of thing that might provoke a Russian military response. I, obviously, do not, or rather I think it's a lot less likely than the A-L-X or A-L-Y scenarios I mentioned above, where Russia acts because the lines are fuzzy. I think NATO membership provides a very clearly-marked line for Russia that they have and will continue to respect.

So my upside scenario is:
B - Enlarge NATO
resulting in Russian respect for the possibility of a NATO response, resulting in
K - No interference
That achieves goals 1 and 2. What effect it has on 3, changing the Russian mindset, is debatable. Would being surrounded make them more paranoid, or would it be more like peer pressure to join the world community? I don't know that that answer is clear there.

Pick your poison. My take is that the Russians will invade bordering states at will if they think they can get away with it, and that making it unclear whether they can get away with it poses a serious risk of escalation. NATO is more like MAD: you can't ever fire that first shot in a war with a NATO country, because the response is known to be a NATO response.

[hilzoy]

Jacob Davies: "Here's my take on hilzoy's upside scenario:
A - Leave them out of NATO
resulting in a reduction of Russian paranoia, resulting in
K - No interference.
This satisfies 1, 2, and 3."

Fwiw, I did not object to having NATO states on the border with Russia. I supported the accession of the Baltics, for instance. In what follows, I'll omit consideration of Georgia's recklessness, etc., for the sake of argument.

I was thinking something more like this: If we take them into NATO, we decrease the credibility of our guarantees to all NATO countries, both because Russia might ask itself 'will they really go to war for Georgia?, but also because we do not have the resources to make this sort of serious commitment to this many countries at once. This would probably not risk e.g. an invasion of Denmark, but might well leave some of the E. European countries, especially the Baltics, at greater risk. By raising the likelihood that Russia will suspect that our guarantees are worthless, we heighten the risk to everyone, as well as the risk to ourselves of having to get into a war with Russia.

We would also increase Russia's fears by some margin above and beyond the degree to which they were increased by the accession of the states already in NATO, decreasing the likelihood that we will get to my 'unthinkable to invade' state any time soon. We might also increase the likelihood of invasion of one of the more exposed states, if Russia decided e.g. to try to pick off Georgia.

In both respects, we make the situation of Eastern Europe generally more vulnerable than it would be if we consolidated the present situation. We risk two unacceptably bad outcomes: war with Russia, and the destruction of NATO. Best, it seems to me, to be more cautious, since we really could lose it all.

[wj]

In any discussion of the perils of expanding NATO until it borders Russia (e.g. by including Ukraine and Georgia), you have to ask on question. If NATO is not expanded, will Russia expand when and as it can, until it comes to the borders of NATO, wherever they are? The answer, on the evidence, is yes, Russia will. Maybe not today. Almost certainly not all at once. Probably with some setbacks (.ike Afghanistan was). But expand they will.

At which point, the question of Russia's reaction drops out. The only question is then the willingness (and ability) of NATO to come to the defense of the potential new member. Which rules out Georgia, for the moment -- the US has its forces committed already elsewhere, and the Europeans are constrained by their dependence on petroleum from Russia.

[extarbags]

You make some good points in this piece, but the issue is honestly a lot simpler than you're making it: this is a logic problem, or rather, two separate ones. These premises are true for either one:

A. Georgia is a Friend of the West (tm).
B. It is in our (our being both the US and NATO) interest to have friends among former Soviet states.
C. Russia desires to reabsorb at least the European former Soviet States, and will happily do so by military force if allowed to.
D. Russia is currently far weaker than either of the top two NATO member states, and certainly astronomically weaker than NATO as a group.
E. Given Russia's obvious desire to project their power in every way they can get away with, it is very much *not* in our interest for Russia to become more powerful than they currently are.

And this one is the variable:

F. Russia {will|will not} risk armed conflict with NATO forces in order to accomplish C.

I believe that the correct blank-filler for F is "will not," because it just doesn't make any freaking sense. If that's the case, then the right play is to offer Georgia (along with Ukraine and any and every other former Soviet state that wants it) NATO membership, immediately. Doing so will accomplish our goal of maintaining good relations with many former Soviet states, and it will limit Russia's ability to build power. There's no other choice, in this case.

I gather that many people, including yourself, are of the mind that "will" is a more accurate reflection of reality for the blank in F. Fair enough; states don't always act rationally. So if that's the case, most of the points in the above post are true; inviting Georgia and other nations in the region to join NATO would be an intense provocation of Russia, who would then seek to assert its power by immediately invading some of them (most probably Georgia and Ukraine). We'd be at war with Russia, a thing to be avoided by anyone's reckoning. But here's the thing: if this assertion is true, and Russia really is willing to take on NATO tomorrow despite being at a serious disadvantage, they're not going to be *less* willing to take us on as they consolidate power more. There's also no reason to think that Russia would stop taking over countries any time soon; it's well accepted at this point that this is partly a test case for an upcoming invasion of Ukraine, after which Russia would mop up and retake all former European holdings minus Finland at *least*. And then... oh wait, I guess three of those are already NATO members, so bang, that's war between NATO and Russia, right there. If Russia is willing to fight NATO (which, again, I find highly unlikely; the Russian psyche of power projection only works if they *win*), then that conflict is unavoidable and it is therefore desirable from our point of view to engage them at their weakest point, i.e. right now. Therefore, the right play if Russia is willing to engage NATO is *also* to accept Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, protecting them from Russian control and preventing Russia from becoming stronger than they currently are before they clash with us.

So yeah, the big unknown here doesn't even really matter. NATO membership for Georgia and Russia's future targets is the only thing that makes sense regardless.

[bedtimeforbonzo]

Jacob Davies: "My take is that the Russians will invade bordering states at will if they think they can get away with it, and that making it unclear whether they can get away with it poses a serious risk of escalation."

With all due respect to Hilzoy, I think the fact that Putin's Russia has already snubbed its nose at the so-called cease-fire underscores much of what Jacob is submitting.

In any case, the passion both of you bring to your arguments makes for good reading and demonstrates there are no easy answers to these new overseas challenges that Barack Obama (I hope) will face.

Another reason, I feel, Obama would be well-served by having a Joe Biden at his side. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan are four more.

[byrningman]

Russia has demonstrated its willingness to militarily interfere with its close neighbours. This has been proven to be the case from about 1939 (Baltic states, Poland, Finland) through to the immediate post-war period (occupation of Eastern Europe, installation of puppet regimes), through Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, and here we are seeing the same thing again in Georgia. It's a pattern.

So your pattern is that country R has a history of conflict with its neighbours? Astounding. Could I add a few other countries to this 'pattern', sticking even to the same timeframe? China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Africa, Argentina, Vietnam, Indonesia, Armenia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan.....

Probably none of these countries has been engaged in as many military conflicts as the United States over the same timeframe, all of them by definition wars of choice because unlike the above countries, and basically any other country, the United States has the ability to fight wars very far away from home.

[byrningman]

Of course, if being the neighbourhood bully is Russia's grave crime, do I even need to point out the USA had intervened militarily, paramilitarily or through covert ops in nearly every country in the Western hemisphere since WW2 alone?

[Jeff]

If NATO is not expanded, will Russia expand when and as it can, until it comes to the borders of NATO, wherever they are? The answer, on the evidence, is yes, Russia will.

and

Russia desires to reabsorb at least the European former Soviet States, and will happily do so by military force if allowed to.

don't make any sense to me. Russia was content to leave Georgia alone until Georgia tried pushing it. Even now, Russian tanks are NOT in Tbilisi; Georgia is still a sovereign country (unlike Iraq), although reduced in size; there are no Russian troops pouring into Ukraine.

Considering that Russia can't pull Chechnya back into its control, does anyone think they're going to try military adventures against Ukraine, Armenia, or any other relatively strong former SSR?

If so, why?

[Nell]

C. Russia desires to reabsorb at least the European former Soviet States, and will happily do so by military force if allowed to.

I don't think that's at all clear. They desire for Georgia to cede control over the breakaway territories, and have shown no sign at all of wanting to take over Georgia by military force.

As for Russian "spurning" of the cease fire: they're in the process of destroying Georgian military installations within a Gori-distance buffer area of the Ossetian border. These are military installations that Georgia would have had, still functioning, for its legitimate defense if they'd foregone their stupid offensive.

If, that is, they'd taken Condoleeza Rice's suggestion to put a no-use-of-force-to-retake-Ossetia proposal on the table, rather than take the U.S. joint exercises as an invitation to launch an offensive.

[extarbags]

How did Georgia "push it," exactly? Those are Georgian territories, and you might have noticed that in a matter of two whole days, Russia was past them and into Georgia proper. You say "even now" as though this has been a prolonged conflict and the Russians have shown remarkable restraint... it hasn't even been a week!

And Chechnya *is* under Russian control. They haven't been able to pacify the separatist movement there, but believe me, it's very much under Russian control. It's been well established that Russia has its sights on Ukraine, and for years they've been cutting Ukraine off from gas and other resources as punishment for pro-western policies.

So here's why they'll try military adventures against other former SSR's if this one succeeds: they can. Russia's entire power structure right now is about projecting their power into the world so they don't feel quite so bad about how quickly they plummeted from their position during the Cold War. This is, as I said, a test case; if they find out that they're allowed to do whatever they want in Georgia, they'll know that they're free to do whatever they want on any of their former turf.

[extarbags]

"I don't think that's at all clear. They desire for Georgia to cede control over the breakaway territories, and have shown no sign at all of wanting to take over Georgia by military force."

Besides rolling tanks through undisputed Georgia and taking over cities, you mean?

[Jacob Davies]

Is it really true that Russia was content to leave Georgia alone until Georgia pushed it? Does "leaving alone" include "occupying fairly large parts of" and "arming paramilitaries in"? I'm not saying Georgia hasn't been extremely, suicidally rash, but it's not as if Russia only noticed Georgia last week. Russia has been real busy down there too.

byrningman, your point about the US's behaviour and that of other countries is of course well-taken. However, I do think Russia merits special attention: it has been one of the most aggressive states during the 20th century, far more so than any of the others you list, and far more effectively, and it seems to be ready to keep that up; it's still a nuclear superpower so direct military confrontation is off the table in dealing with it; and because of that the stakes in addressing things before they turn into shooting wars (that we don't want to get involved in) are very high. I think it's badly mistaken to think of Russia as being like any other country, looking at their history of behaviour and their military capacity.

Of course I think that they're vastly better than the Soviet days, and what I would really love is for Russia to just chill out and integrate into the Eurasian economic and political system. I think that would be good for them and good for everyone else. I really hoped Russia was going to do that once the Soviet system collapsed, and I'm really sad that they didn't. (And I think we contributed to that failure by pushing radical economic liberalization on them instead of making a smoother transition.) Whatever we can do to help them go that way would be good.

I'm just not sure that giving them freedom of action in their backyard is the right way to achieve that. Is that freedom of action ours to give and take away? Is it arrogance? Well, I think that NATO carries a lot of moral legitimacy in that regard, more than the US does alone. NATO has not been aggressive or (violently) expansionist, and has pretty much stuck to defending people who are its willing members. So yeah, I kind of do think that if Ukraine & Georgia want to join, and NATO wants them to join, that Russia's desire to have them as satellites is not something we need to indulge.

[ThatLeftTurnInABQ]

There is a common thread running through much of the analysis* I’m reading here which I think is problematic. Too many of you are talking about the issue of NATO vs. Russia as a purely structural problem, as if the problem this year is the same as an identical problem 10 years ago or a future problem 10 years from now.

This seems to me to be a fundamentally flawed approach because it is ahistorical and fails to take into account the degree to which a collective security alliance like NATO is a product of a shared culture and history which has changed and developed over time**. The issues of Poland belonging to NATO, Ukraine belonging to NATO, and Georgia belonging to NATO are not merely a compound of their respective geographic*** proximity to Russia (or lack thereof) and the logistical and military factors associated with that geography. They also have much to do with the history of Polish nationalism vs. Russia domination, the relationship between Poland and the other countries in West-Central Europe who were prior members of NATO, etc. And ditto that for all the other countries.

I would be much more impressed with arguments about the pros- and cons- of admitting Georgia to NATO (or not) if those arguments were grounded in the rather lengthy prior history involving the mutual interactions and relationships between Georgia, Russia, and the West in a country specific manner (and note that in Georgia’s case some of that history bears a rather close resemblance to current events, specifically the mid-19th involvement of Great Britain in the power politics of the Black Sea and Caucasus region), rather than treating Georgia as if it was simply another space on the chessboard and we are contemplating whether moving our Knight to G7 is a good move or not.

In light of recent results obtained in the Middle East, it seems blindly obvious to me (at least) that US foreign policy needs to do a much better job of taking into account the specifics of the history and geography of a particular region where we want to influence events rather than just wading in with a more general set of ideas for how to proceed and then finding out the hard way that all the little details do matter very much, but YMMV.

* From multiple commentators, so I don’t want to pick on one person using quotes, and quoting everybody equally would be tedious

** Ditto the problem of Russian aggression, defensiveness, and perceptions and likely responses to what we choose to do. There is much significant continuity between the behavior and attitudes of Putin’s Russia and the behavior and attitudes of 18th-19th century Tsarist Russia which we should be looking at in detail if we wish to do a good job of evaluating Georgia as a potential NATO member.

*** And some of the commentary here is also eliding geographic distinctions as well, as if having NATO border Russia from the west is exactly the same as having NATO border Russia from the south. I strongly suspect that the Russians don’t see it that way.

[Nell]

Nell: [Russians have] shown no sign at all of wanting to take over Georgia by military force.

extarbags: Besides rolling tanks through undisputed Georgia and taking over cities, you mean?

It's as if you stopped reading my comment right there. I went on to say:

they're in the process of destroying Georgian military installations within a Gori-distance buffer area of the Ossetian border. These are military installations that Georgia would have had, still functioning, for its legitimate defense if they'd foregone their stupid offensive.

The Russians are not taking over Georgia. Period.

[bedtimeforbonzo]

Jeff said "even now, Russian tanks are NOT in Tbilisi."

Which is true.

But they are NOT that far from Tbilisi.

Just a stone's throw away, according to the NYT and BBC.

[extarbags]

Well I guess if you say so, I'll believe you.

[byrningman]

for years they've been cutting Ukraine off from gas and other resources as punishment for pro-western policies.

It's worth pointing out that the Russians provide gas to many countries like Ukraine at far below market prices, so their position is that if these countries are not acting like Russia's friends, they can bloody well pay the full price. Obviously it's hardball, I'm not defending it, but bear in mind that the United States did the exact same thing with food assistance to the developing world throughout the 60s and I think also the 70s. Getting the gas cut off in winter is terrible, getting the food cut off any time of the year in India and other places is pretty terrible too.

[byrningman]

I do think Russia merits special attention: it has been one of the most aggressive states during the 20th century, far more so than any of the others you list

I don't think that's really true at all actually. On a purely statistical basis, that's certainly the USA. China, Germany also come to mind (although the latter's all came in one big war).

[byrningman]

To say that Russia has been an extremely aggressive state is mostly an expression of ideology. All large, powerful states interfere in lesser states' affairs, especially those near them. Maybe we should keep in mind the number of countries that have attacked Russia in the past century (several of them multiple times) - Britain, the USA, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Japan, China.

[Jeff]

treating Georgia as if it was simply another space on the chessboard and we are contemplating whether moving our Knight to G7 is a good move or not.

Only if we remove the Russian Rook at G8 (the elephant is carrying trade goods, right?).

But they are NOT that far from Tbilisi.
Just a stone's throw away, according to the NYT and BBC.

Good grief. Georgia is smaller than South Carolina. Anywhere in SC is a "stone's throw" from anywhere else in SC! It's 235 miles across the entire state, so the distance that the tanks are from Tbilisi needs to be better defined than "a stone's throw".

Remember that the Russians captured Gori 5 times before they captured it.

[byrningman]

Actually, I could add several more countries to that list.