I Value Them but I Won't Cry If the Time Was Wiped Out

by Eric Martin

Robert Farley flagged this from the BBC:

Ethiopia is prepared to withdraw troops from Somalia even if the interim government is not stable, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has said. [...]

He told the UK's Financial Times paper that financial pressures had to be taken into account and said the commitment was not open ended. [...]

"The operation has been extremely expensive so we will have to balance the domestic pressures on the one hand and pressures in Somalia on the other and try to come up with a balanced solution," Mr Meles told the Financial Times. 

Farley adds:

Given that piracy has skyrocketed since the displacement of the ICU (including a spread to the Gulf of Aden), and that Ethiopian and Somali "government" forces still control only a bare patchwork of the countryside, I'd say that this has been a pretty big disaster...

Disaster?  That depends on who you ask.  Ethiopia can't be that displeased.  On the one hand, the Meles government would have preferred to have maintained a troop presence to maintain leverage over a would-be proxy government in Somalia.  With that goal becoming increasingly unlikely, at the very least, Ethiopia will leave Somalia more destabilized, weakened and wracked than when it invaded. 

That's a feature, not a bug, as one of Ethiopia's stated policy objectives vis-a-vis its neighbor Somalia is to keep Somalia weakened so as to forestall a Somali bid for the disputed Ogaden territory (geographically a part of Ethiopia, but ethnically Somali).  The fact that we would actively support Ethiopia's "magnanimous" invasion of its long time rival - sold on the pretense that Ethiopia was looking out for Somalia's best interest - is either a sign of the Bush administration's ignorance or cynicism.

With respect to the United States, Farley is correct to label the operation a disaster.  Actually, he's overly generous in that he kindly omits many of the costs.  As I mentioned in a prior post, the ledger is as follows:

Low-to-non-existent benefits in terms of neutralizing known al-Qaeda operatives while the region has been further radicalized and support for al-Qaeda has surged locally [ed note: indeed]. There is increased instability and violence that allows al-Qaeda and other terrorists to move about, and conduct business, freely (the ICU had provided stability to the capital of Mogadishu which has since evaporated). There has been an increase in the number of dead from the flaring of the conflict, massive refugee flows and widespread humanitarian crises befalling the beleagured Somali people. Our overt support for anti-democratic and belligerent elements has led to a sharp upswing in anti-Americanism as we have become closely identified with the brutality of Ethiopia and the TFG.

Speaking of the "brutality" of the Ethiopian occupation, that provides a segue to discuss an interesting corrolary to the discussion on the tendency to view war as the inherently strong option (even if it backfires in terms of the objectives), as well as morally righteous if the underlying intentions are noble (regardless of the actual outcomes in terms of human suffering). 

There is also a prevalent current of thought amongst serial war supporters that we are not brutal enough in our conduct of war.  That is, if it weren't for the human rights groups that force us to restrain our tactics for fear of bad PR from killing innocents - and the media's willingness to show images of civilian casualties - we would be succeeding in places like Iraq.  That this belief coexists side-by-side with the belief in the moral superiority of war supporters that advocate for war as a means of helping the targeted population (whose safety we should disregard) doesn't seem to create much dissonance.

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was supposed to prove these theories correct.  We - especially us liberal do-gooders - would learn a lesson about the preferability of unrestrained brutality in war.  The Ethiopians, it was argued, were going to teach the Americans how to fight an insurgency.  I've posted excerpts of these arguments before, but with news of Ethiopia pondering withrawal despite failing to achieve the stated objectives due to ongoing difficulty and expense, they are worth revisiting:

Maybe we can learn something from the Ethiopians in Somalia? [Cliff May]

…I can’t read the news today and keep from wondering whether we should airlift a few Ethiopian battalions into Baghdad. [John Miller]

Why are [the Ethiopian forces] achieving what American forces…in Iraq today apparently are not? [Cliff May]

The lack of a large media presence - and the relative inattention of human rights groups - would show how both play a detrimental role in the effort to wage war and in their absence, how smooth things would go. 

There may be lessons for the United States in Ethiopia’s success. Abdiweli Ali, an assistant professor at Niagara University who is in contact with transitional government military commanders on the ground, says that Ethiopia has less concern than the U.S. about civilian casualties. There is no reliable estimate of civilian deaths, but the number is believed to be in the hundreds. “We’re fighting wars with one hand tied behind our backs,” Professor Ali says. “In Iraq we’re trying to be nice, thinking we’ll give candy to people on the streets and they’ll love us. But people will understand later on if you just win now and provide them with security.” [Daveed Gartenstein-Ross]

One difference between the Ethiopians in Somalia and the Americans in Iraq is that the former aren’t fighting with one hand behind their back just in case some EU ally or humanitarian lobby group or fictitious Associated Press source leaks some “war crime” or other to the media. In fact, the Ethiopians have the advantage of more or less total lack of interest from the Western media. So they’re just getting on with it. [Mark Steyn]

A second lesson relates to the media. The Ethiopian government is generally less sensitive to media criticism than the U.S. government-and is likely to encounter far less criticism in the first place, since the press traditionally gives short shrift to coverage of Africa. [Daveed Gartenstein-Ross]

Imagine the implications.  Perhaps the perfidy of liberals, the media and human rights groups did not lead to failure in Iraq.  Why, it's even possible that if we had adopted the brutality of Saddam in order to liberate the Iraqis from the...brutality of Saddam, they would have embraced us with the same level of affection that they held for...Saddam.  Without the homefield advantage of course.

I think Cliff May said it best: "Maybe we can learn something from the Ethiopians in Somalia?"  Indeed, we can.

Comments

[Chris Crawford]

The fundamental error of the warmongers in this situation is their belief that other people are cowards who will knuckle under if you just kick 'em hard enough. While this is true of most people (who are more prudent than cowardly), kicking people in the teeth always incites a few to respond in kind. My counterquestion to these types of arguments is, "If a foreign invader treated Americans like this, would you expect Americans to respond in the manner you suppose that foreigners will respond to American behavior?

[Stephen Stralka]

It's not exactly news that people like Mark Steyn and Cliff May are monsters, but damn. There's really not much daylight between what they're saying and just baldly stating that the righteousness of any war correlates directly to the number of innocent civilians killed. I suppose it's some kind of indication of mental health that I'm still nauseated by this stuff even after eight years of it.

[Ken]

It was a huge mistake to allow ethiopiam army to invade somalia.

It is even worse for us to be associated with it.

[Nell]

OT but related to war's brutalizing and lie-producing nature:

Remember the right-wing screechfest last summer when soldier Scott Beauchamp wrote a pseudonymous article for The New Republic in which he related incidents of casual brutality by members of his unit, such as running over dogs with Bradleys and disrespecting Iraqi remains? The Army brass, members of his unit, and eventually TNR hung him out to dry.

Now it turns out that at the very time Beauchamp's company members, including one Sgt. John Hatley, were denouncing his account as fabrication, at least seven of them were aware that Hatley and two others under his command had murdered four bound Iraqi prisoners and dumped their bodies in a canal in southwest Baghdad a few months before.

But hey, they'd never kill any dogs, man.

[Ugh]

Jeebus. What a bunch of sick fncks.

[mikesdak]

hmmm....financial pressures had to be taken into account.....the commitment not open ended......yes,we can learn something from them.

[Nell]

one of Ethiopia's stated policy objectives vis-a-vis its neighbor Somalia is to keep Somalia weakened so as to forestall a Somali bid for the disputed Ogaden territory (geographically a part of Ethiopia, but ethnically Somali).

Huh. Almost screams "oil", doesn't it?

Yes. Yes, it does.

[Eric Martin]

There you go with your conspiracy theories again Nell ;)

[Clarence Wilmot]

Nice Shins reference.

[Eric Martin]

Clarence wins the t-shirt!

[von]

Eric, 'tis true that the Islamic Courts provided the appearance of stability for the brief period -- what, 2-3 months? -- that they enjoyed the support of the warlords and key tribes. The rest of the time, of course, they were fighting a bloody civil war and consilating power. Nor is it particularly suprising the TFG (which had the backing of the African Union, the EC, the UN, and the US) was and is unpopular among many an armed groups. The TFG is fractious and, by design, is not built around a warlord. Without guns, a consistuency has been hard to find.

But, again, I'm still at a loss regarding your (and others, particularly MY's) take on this issue. You act as though we couldn't stopped Ethiopia from acting -- or the US boldly acted alone. That's not correct. No US administration would have stopped Ethiopia from acting in Somalia. Ethiopia had directly warned the Islamic Courts not to attack the last refuge of the TFG, which was protected by Ethiopian and AU forces. The Islamic Courts attacked. Ethiopia's reacton, particularly given its history with Somalia, was predictable.

You also write as though we went out on some limb or took some unusual stance. The (very) limited support we provided to Ethiopia and the TFG was matched or exceeded by our European and African allies. Yes, there were a few (very few) actions by US special forces. But they are getting an undue amount of play.

I'm also troubled by the suggestion that the Islamic courts were some sort of wonderful unifying force for the country.
And I'm not just troubled because the IC fought a bloody civil war and started imposing Sharia law. Had the IC consolidated power, it almost certainly would have lead to a wider regional confrontation with Ethiopia: recall that one of the IC's specific proposals was to invade Ethiopia.

Aside from your decision to ignore history of this dispute and all complicating factors, I also question whether an unstable Somalia is really worse than the alternatives from the perspective of the US. A stable Somalia under the IC almost certainly meant a much larger war.

Not everything is black and white -- and it's wrong to try to make it so.

[Eric Martin]

You act as though we couldn't stopped Ethiopia from acting -- or the US boldly acted alone.

No, I do not. I act as though we could have objected to this move.

No US administration would have stopped Ethiopia from acting in Somalia.

Would or could? We give Ethiopia an enormous amount of military and financial aide. More than any other African nation save Egypt. If we had threatened to vastly reduce, or cut off, that aid, Ethiopia would have listened.

You also write as though we went out on some limb or took some unusual stance. The (very) limited support we provided to Ethiopia and the TFG was matched or exceeded by our European and African allies. Yes, there were a few (very few) actions by US special forces. But they are getting an undue amount of play.

Actually, we increased our already substantial levels of aid, conducted numerous air strikes (these airstrikes are ongoing in fact) and provided on the ground support in terms of SF. We have long been Ethiopia's patron in the region. If we don't like being viewed that way, we should stop acting that way.

I'm also troubled by the suggestion that the Islamic courts were some sort of wonderful unifying force for the country.

I'm troubled by you putting words in my mouth.

recall that one of the IC's specific proposals was to invade Ethiopia

Von, as I've told you before on this, that is the proposal of just about every major armed faction in Somalia for the past 30 years. They want Ogaden. They had zero means to act on it.

Aside from your decision to ignore history of this dispute and all complicating factors

Von, look in the mirror. You ignore Ethiopia's long held goal of keeping Somalia destabilized. You ignore the fact that the IC was in no way alone in wanting Ogaden back. You ignore the years of substantial aid given to Ethiopia. You ignore Ethiopia's own horrific record on human rights.

Not everything is black and white -- and it's wrong to try to make it so.

I do not. Backing Ethiopia on this was a mistake though.

A stable Somalia under the IC almost certainly meant a much larger war.

No, there were other means to affect the situation. What a lack of imagination to think that backing Ethiopia's invasion was the only way to achieve a positive outcome. Which it hasn't.

[novakant]

Not everything is black and white -- and it's wrong to try to make it so.

Wrong.

Torture, rape, mass expulsion and summary executions are black.

[Eric Martin]

I also question whether an unstable Somalia is really worse than the alternatives from the perspective of the US

Let's see: Anti-Americanism has spiked dramatically in the region. Counter-terrorism experts from Jamestown to Rand are claiming that al-Qaeda is more popular now, has more range of motion and is closer to establishing a working relationship with Somali groups.

Why is that better?

[Gary Farber]

About Scott Beauchamp, by the way. (Or did Hilzoy already link to this? I'm too spacy to remember or check.)

[Nell]

Gary, that link is in the blog post (mine) linked in my comment, but it's worth featuring on its own. No one's mentioned it in a main post that I know of -- anywhere, except Spencer Ackerman himself at Attackerman.

[Nell]

Except for my including it in a main post at A Tiny Revolution. I don't post very often, so hope a bit of blog whoring will be tolerated.