by Eric Martin
While I'm usually the one complaining about the neverending string of stories telling of Moqtada al-Sadr's demise, which began in 2003 and continue to this day (with each new contribution showing little concern for the unbroken streak of error that preceded it), this piece by Andrew Lebovich goes too far in the other direction. Lebovich's conclusion:
Thus the surge cannot necessarily be said to have weakened militia groups in Iraq. Rather, we have succeeded in reworking the militia structure, inadvertently aiding the Sadrists both in the streets and in parliament by eliminating their rivals, while not posing a serious threat to the organization. They are still armed, and as-Sadr is still just as opposed to America's occupation of Iraq, and Iraq's current government. Ultimately, it is Iraq's political process that has shifted towards as-Sadr, not the other way around.
While I agree with Lebovich that the recent anti-Sadrist operations in Basra, Sadr City and Amarah don't pose a "serious threat to the organization" itself (the org. is too big with too, long a tradtion), the military campaign has proven to be a setback for the Sadrists both politically and with respect to their militia. And that is exactly what these campaigns werwe intended to achieve. They were undertaken with an eye on the upcoming election schedule (with local elections slated, tentatively, for this fall, and nationwide elections to be held in 2009).
First, the intention has been to weaken the Sadrists so that ISCI/Dawa can maintain its control of the local government machinery in the Shiite-dominated South, then ISCI/Dawa could use that position to ensure a strong showing (by hook or crook) in the national elections in 2009. Thus far, the anti-Sadrist operations have succeeded in supplanting the Sadrist presence in Basra and other parts in the south, while deposing the Sadr-friendly (or led) government n Amara.
While the Sadrists remain popular, ISCI/Dawa have attained a position to control the election machinery which is, arguably, more important. As Boss Tweed famously opined after an election in 1844, "The ballots [don't] make the outcome. The counters [do]." So, for the time being, ISCI/Dawa have muscled the Sadrists out of a position to "count" or even effectively "observe."
Further, the Mahdi Army militia (JAM) itself has taken heavy losses, as it always does when it goes toe-to-toe with the US military (see, ie, 2004 uprising). That doesn't, as some overenthusiastic commenters argue, mean that the JAM is defeated. But then, to state a truism, defeating an insurgency/guerilla movement is exceedingly difficult. It's too easy for guerilla movements to melt away, adjust, adapt and re-emerge to fight another day, another way. Gary Brecher (he of War Nerd fame), sheds some light:
The most recent and ridiculous take is that "Moqtada al Sadr is renouncing violence." Talk about naive! What led these geniuses to that conclusion is that on June 13, Moqtada al Sadr, leader of the biggest and toughest Shia militia, the Mahdi Army, sent out a big announcement: "From now on, the resistance will be exclusively conducted by only one group. ... The weapons will be held exclusively by this group." In other words, he's switching from a big, sloppy, amateur force to a select group of professional guerrillas.
Brecher sees this as a natural evolution, akin to the transformation undertaken by the IRA (no, not a perfect analogy - but it's not meant as that. There are definitely strong parallels though):
The trouble is, when po' folks organize, they have this fatal addiction to big, fancy titles and military fol-der-ol. It's easy to understand: It helps stomped-on people feel braver, have a little pride. So these groups always go for show, a lot of pomp and uniforms, and a traditional military organizational chart. Pretty soon the guy next door is a colonel, the clerk in the corner store is a four-star general, and they're strutting around in homemade uniforms feeling ready to take on Genghis Khan. Good for morale, but fatal to real urban guerrilla war. There are two reasons for that. First, these amateur armies get slaughtered when they go up against professional troops; and second, the traditional open organizational chart makes it very easy for the occupiers to identify everyone who's anyone in the insurgency. When an organization starts out fighting mobs from the enemy tribe, that's fine. So when the IRA tried to fight the British Army head to head in the 1970s, it got stomped; so did Sadr's militia when it went up against U.S. troops in April 2004.
Due to the JAM's popularity and community base, Brecher argues that the Maliki government and US forces have been able to take advantage of informants (sometimes tortured or coerced) to pick off JAM members, most of whom are well known to many if not most of the locals. So now, a shift:
Like Sadr just did, the IRA divided the "movement" into two parts. One would be a much smaller, more professional urban guerrilla armed wing divided into cells, not "brigades." Each cell would have maybe a half-dozen members, and if possible the members would be from different parts of Northern Ireland, so they wouldn't be obviously connected. Only the leader of the cell would know all the members, and that leader would only have contact with one guy from the main organization. That meant, to put it bluntly, that even under torture he couldn't tell enough to destroy the whole guerrilla movement.
Not only was this a safer way to fight, it was actually more effective than bigger paramilitary units in urban guerrilla fighting. The IRA had already found out the hard way that big, amateur "brigades" couldn't defend their neighborhoods against professional military attacks in the summer of 1972, during "Operation Motorman," when the British Army used Centurion tanks and other heavy equipment to smash through the pathetic barricades around "Free Derry" and the other "No-Go Zones" the IRA had tried to set up. Trivia point: As far as I know, this is still the only time MBTs have been used in military action within the U.K.
Sadr's "Mahdi Army" learned the same hard lesson when it tried to barricade Sadr City against the U.S. Army. The first blow came in April 2004, when Sadr ordered his amateur troops into the streets to fight the U.S. occupiers. They died like a Stallone comedy. Sheer massacre. That was lesson number one: Urban combat should be left to a few trained people, not amateurs with guns.
Then, after the surge, when we finally started applying commonsense counterinsurgency tactics, came hard lesson number two, the same one the IRA had learned: If you're running an open "army," it's very easy for the occupier to know who to snatch. In the past few months, U.S.-Iraqi forces have smashed their way into Sadr City and grabbed most of the Mahdi Army leadership.
The moral of the story being: Sadr and his movement have not been defeated, but it's hard to argue that they've been made stronger as Lebovich does. They've actually suffered some considerable setbacks. On the other hand, it's still easy for them, due to home field advantage and superior motivation, to adapt and come out with an effective political/military apparatus despite the losses. Eventually, they might even be stronger and more effective, but only as a result of being forced to cope with losing strategies. I'll let Brecher handle the closing ceremonies:
So Sadr has had a big slap in the face, and he's got to go into relaunch mode. [...]
Sadr's answer was clear, from that announcement he made in mid-June: He's going to divide the movement into two parts, just like the IRA did. There'll be a big-tent political party for the ordinary civilian supporter, backed by a small, well-trained urban guerrilla movement. And there'll be a firewall between the two groups, so Sadr can deny any armed operation that gets messy, just like Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein used to do when an IRA attack went wrong. The IRA provides Sadr with a perfect blueprint on how to do it. (It even had a slogan to describe its new tactics, saying it would win "with an Armalite in one hand and a ballot in the other.")
Now whose in for 100 years?
WTF are we doing there?
Posted by: Ugh | July 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM
Bringing freedom and democracy to the region.
Sort of like how Union Carbide brought life to Bophal.
Seriously, I have a 1960's National Geographic with a full page by UC making that ironic statement.
Posted by: Davebo | July 11, 2008 at 01:02 PM
Gary Brecher's analysis seems generally sound, but contains a curious flaw. It's not just the IRA that adopted this model; it's also Hizbollah and to a lesser extent Hamas. Indeed, Hizbollah seems to be both (1) a better model to understand what's going on and (2) a more likely model for Sadr to look to. Why Brecher stretches to the Troubles when a better comparison is sitting (nearly) next door.
Posted by: von | July 11, 2008 at 01:03 PM
Sorry, that last sentence should read "Why Brecher stretches to the Troubles when a better comparison is sitting (nearly) next door is unknown to me."
Also, I don't think that anything in Brecher's analysis supports (much less requires) a US presence for 100 years. To the contrary, the Iraqi government will probably be able to deal with disruptions at the level of the Troubles without US help. Even if we presume that the US really intends to be on the front lines every step of the way, the IRA model burned itself out in a generation. And, there are, of course, a lot of ways this thing could go, some quite positive and some quite negative. The example of Hizbollah in Lebanon should provide some encouragement, at least. (Yes, I'm very aware of Lebanon's current problems & history .... But achieving a Lebanonese-style state would be a huge step ford. Lebanon is doing quite well by comparison to most of its neighbors, after all.)
Posted by: von | July 11, 2008 at 01:09 PM
Also, I don't think that anything in Brecher's analysis supports (much less requires) a US presence for 100 years.
Oh I agree. My point was more along the lines of, why would we want/deem it in our interests to remain in such a situation for 100 years?
Using your analogy instead of Brecher's, Reagan recognized that getting out of Lebanon was wiser than sticking around.
Bush/McCain? Not so much.
Posted by: Eric Martin | July 11, 2008 at 01:44 PM
Also: In Brecher's defense, he does cite Hezbollah as a useful guide/model in certain respects.
Still, I think Hezbollah is actually less analogous because it tends to be more out in the open than the JAM 2.0 or IRA 2.0. And might not have followed such a similar evolutionary trajectory.
Posted by: Eric Martin | July 11, 2008 at 01:45 PM
Using your analogy instead of Brecher's, Reagan recognized that getting out of Lebanon was wiser than sticking around.
True enough, although Lebanon lacks Iraq's strategic position or reserves.
Posted by: von | July 11, 2008 at 01:50 PM
Reserves. Indeed. There is oil in Iraq isn't there. Fancy that.
Posted by: Eric Martin | July 11, 2008 at 02:03 PM
Reserves. Indeed. There is oil in Iraq isn't there. Fancy that.
Ya don't think that's worth considering? It may not be "all about the oooooiiiiilllll" but I damn well hope that it's "partly about the ooooooiiiiiiilllllll" or our foreign policy has been even more stupidly terrible than I thought.
Posted by: von | July 11, 2008 at 02:11 PM
Of course it's worth considering. And it was considered. It was likely the primary reason that we invaded (not taking the oil in a theft sense, but several issues related to Iraq's position as oil producer in that region).
But we screwed that pooch and it isn't taking to getting unscrewed. Pooches are like that.
And honestly, no matter what, one faction or another of Iraqis will pump the oil, and we will buy the oil. Oil has a way of making it out of the ground and into the market place. It's rather impatient like that.
What we might not get is a chance to exploit the situation, and box out others that would seek to get the pole position on development, etc.
I can live with that. The alternative is worse.
Posted by: Eric Martin | July 11, 2008 at 02:22 PM
Von --- regarding your question of choosing the IRA v. Hezbollah, I think Brecher's choice is one of catering to his audience. Americans as a whole are way, way, way more familiar with the IRA and will have far less of an emotional negative reaction to the mention of it than a mention and analysis of Hezbollah as a model of emulation.
Posted by: fester | July 11, 2008 at 04:19 PM
Eric, an excellent post. I've been wondering what we have been doing in Iraq. I still don't know, but this gives me some understanding of what is actually happening there. One sure can't find out from the MSM.
Does this give any clue as to what "Victory" might mean? That's the other part of this "war" that leaves me completely in the dark.
Posted by: Oyster Tea | July 11, 2008 at 05:55 PM
Is JAM still the biggest social services provider in Sadr city? Doubtful. Does anybody in Basra miss Sadr. Apparently not. Has Sadr's stripped down elite Ninja force launched any successful attacks against coalition forces. Not so much.
Sadr's power seems to be limited to incredulous journalists who need him to explain away the success of the surge.
Posted by: Mr. Forward | July 12, 2008 at 03:15 PM
"Does anybody in Basra miss Sadr. Apparently not."
Uh, what are you talking about? Moktada Sadr's forces have never been in control of Basra. So it would be hard for anyone to "miss" them.
Posted by: Gary Farber | July 13, 2008 at 12:01 AM
Uh, what are you talking about? Moktada Sadr's forces have never been in control of Basra. So it would be hard for anyone to "miss" them.
Mr. Forward said nothing nothing about Sadr's forces being "in control" of Basra. It also doesn't follow that Sadr had to have been in control of Basra for him to be "missed" by the population.
I assume Mr. Forward is referencing the Iranian-brokered plan by which Sadr's militia in Basra agreed to disband and cede control to government forces in return for amnesty.
Posted by: von | July 13, 2008 at 07:45 AM
"BASRA, Iraq, July 8 (Reuters) - The Shi'ite Mehdi Army militia is finished as a fighting force in Iraq's oil rich Basra province and upcoming provincial elections should pass without violence, the province's governor said on Tuesday.
Mohammed al-Waeli said an Iraqi security offensive against the Mehdi Army of anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr as well as other militias had cut violence in the southern province by up to 90 percent since April.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki launched a crackdown on Shi'ite militias in late March, breaking the stranglehold gunmen had over the province and its capital, Basra city.
The Mehdi Army initially put up fierce resistance, forcing the U.S. military to step in with air and ground support.
A week into fighting, Sadr ordered his militia to lay down their arms.
"I think the militias are over in the province of Basra. I really think the Mehdi Army is finished," "
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL08394316
"Security is better without the Mahdi Army," said a 42-year-old
resident who wanted to be identified only by his nickname, Abu
Israa. "We don't want them back."
Most residents do not seem to miss the Mahdi Army, and the
U.S. and Iraqi governments hope that sentiment sticks. So Sadr
City is witnessing a flurry of public works projects - part of an
effort to build confidence in the government and make it more
difficult for the extremists to return."
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews+articleid_
2387256&title=On_the.html
Posted by: Mr. Forward | July 13, 2008 at 10:02 AM
Has Sadr's stripped down elite Ninja force launched any successful attacks against coalition forces.
This is not true. There was that targeted bombing in Sadr City that took out US military and diplomatic personnel. They were attending a meeting to oust a local council leader and appoint a new, Non-Sadrist official in his place.
There have also been other such targeted killings in recent weeks.
Is JAM still the biggest social services provider in Sadr city? Doubtful.
Not just Sadr City, but throughout much of the Shiite south. They are still very much seen as the go to guys.
Sadr's power seems to be limited to incredulous journalists who need him to explain away the success of the surge.
Nonsense. That is the same foolish attitude that the US adopted since the invasion itself. Hasn't worked out too well.
ISCI isn't brash enough to underestimate Sadr, and neither is Iran. You should learn from their appreciation of the situation.
Posted by: Eric Martin | July 14, 2008 at 10:16 AM