by Eric Martin
As Marc Lynch reports, today's scheduled vote in the Iraqi parliament to determine the rules governing the provincial elections slated for October has been postponed until Thursday. Thursday is overly optimistic as well, however. The final vote on the vote, so to speak, will likely face further delays which will, in turn, push the date of the elections themselves back. Lynch thinks this is actually a good thing:
It isn't clear yet whether this will mean the postponement of the provincial elections, as the UN facilitators have warned. But hopefully it will: the consequences of these elections will be enormous, and it would be foolhardy to rush into them with half-baked, politically controversial rules simply to meet an artificial deadline.
The issues raised by the provincial election law cut to the heart of competing visions of Iraq's political future. [...]
After early skepticism, I've long since been persuaded of the importance of these elections, mostly by the stock placed on them by Iraqis. But that only increases the importance of taking the time to get the rules right and to not be stampeded by an artificial deadline.
It is precisely the magnitude of the stakes involved, however, that should engender pessimism regarding the possibility of a positive outcome even with the delay. At the root of the need to postpone the vote on the election law lie controversies that have, in some form or another, led to the many overlapping conflicts that have beset Iraq for the past 5+ years.
Those issues include, but are not limited to: (1) the status of Kirkuk (with implications as to the autonomy and economic viability of Kurdistan, strength of the central government, ethnic/sectarian tensions); (2) the use of open lists/closed lists (closed lists restrict voter options to parties not individuals, and favor the established UIA/Kurdish brands at the expense of would-be outsiders, which serves to strengthen sectarian paradigms - not to mention ther fact that the Sadrists won't be permitted to run as a party thus limiting their prospects); (3) the use of religious symbols/iconography; and (4) the possibility of voting rights, if any, for the roughly 5 million internally and externally displaced Iraqis (which is relevant to questions of the composition/stability of the country going forward).
The problem is that extra time hasn't been able to untangle these conundrums thus far. For example, settling the status of Kirkuk has been such a thorny subject that its resolution has been kicked down the road so many times that the can resembles a silver dollar. First, it was agreed that a decision would have to wait for the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution. Then, in order to secure passage of that Constitution, the Kirkuk issue was tabled - putting off the decision for a referenudm to be held years down the line. Then the deadline for that referendum came last year, and went, with no vote. So the deadline for the referendum was extended to June 2008. Again, that already-extended deadline came and went with no vote. And now: more delays.
The reason for time's inadequacy as a facilitator of resolution stems from the stubborness of the convuluted and cross-cutting matrix of conflicts that continue to plague Iraq: various groups of Iraqis are battling to determine the political future of their country (unitary state vs. fragmented state, Islamist vs. secular, etc.), to dictate their roles in it (various ethnic/sectarian groups vying for safety, survival, economic and political power) to determine the level of foreign occupation/involvement (American, Iranian, etc.) and to redress crimes and injustices both recent (5 million internal/external refugees, hundreds of thousands dead, etc.) and historical (Shiite/Kurdish suffering at the hands of Saddam). How does more time to discuss the various positions/demands undo that? The answer is, generally, it doesn't.
Thus, just as in the case of Surge enthusiasts, Lynch's optimism (though obviously well meaning) is based on a misread of symptom for pathology. With respect to The Surge's objective, the basic strategic error lies in the fact that the various warring parties were not battling each other because there was no period of lessened violence that they could use to forge political accord. Rather, there was no period of lessened violence because of the difficulty in reaching that same political accord.
Similarly, while some combination of calendar extensions and punting on sensitive issues might eventually lead to an election law that parliament approves, there are no ways to, as Lynch put it, "get the rules right." The rules are just a superficial manifestation of the more important subterranean tectonic clashes. Right for some on the rules will be wrong for others, and the major issues will remain.
So the wars rage on, even if in slow motion for all.
When were the last elections in Iraq of any consequence? December, 2005. 2 1/2 years and they cannot get organized for provincial elections. When will there be national elections again? How can they be conducted without a great deal of violence?
Posted by: dmbeaster | July 15, 2008 at 04:45 PM
The next nationals are supposed to be in 2009.
Posted by: Eric Martin | July 15, 2008 at 04:53 PM