by Eric Martin
Jeffrey Goldberg is rather taken by the argument put forth by Amnon Rubinstein as to why Iran would be willing to launch a nuclear attack on Israel despite the likelihood that such an act would constitute "national suicide." According to Rubinstein, the penchant to commit national suicide is a particular trait of Islamist regimes - in fact, so unique that the examples he cites are "unprecedented" in history:
• The first case is that of Saddam Hussein, who in 2003 could have avoided war and conquest by allowing UN inspectors to search for (the apparently non-existent) weapons of mass destruction wherever they wanted. Yet Iraq's ruler opted for war, knowing full well that he would have to face the might of the US.
• The second case is that of Yasser Arafat in 2000, who after the failure of the Camp David and Taba talks had two options: continue talking to Israel - under the leadership of Ehud Barak, this country's most moderate and flexible government ever - or resort to violence. He chose the latter, with the result that all progress toward Palestinian independence was blocked. The ensuing loss of life, on both sides, testified to Arafat's preference for suicide over compromise.
• The third case is that of the Taliban. Post-9/11, their leadership had two options: to enter into negotiations with the US, with a view to extraditing Osama bin Laden, or to risk war and destruction. The choice they made was obvious: Better to die fighting than to give up an inch.
This argument is so full of holes it's hard to know where to begin with the spade and mortar. First of all, these incidents are hardly unprecedented. I would encourage Mr. Rubenstein to familiarize himself with the story of Masada. Start there and work your way through the rest of history - from "Live Free or Die" to Imperial Japan.
Second, and importantly, neither Saddam nor Yasser Arafat are "Islamists" - nor are the regimes they led. They were actually quite secular, relatively speaking, and frequently drew the ire of Islamists for it. That could easily end the discussion of those two examples, but they are otherwise so unsuited to serve Rubinstein's argument that the flaws are worth exploring.
Regarding Saddam, Rubenstein argues that he could have avoided war by allowing weapons inspectors into Iraq, but chose not to. Which is a good point other than the fact that it's not true. Saddam did let weapons inspectors in (Hans Blix anyone?). Blix took his team all over Iraq following the tips from US intelligence agencies on all of the alleged WMD sites. Blix found nothing, and despite his requests to keep searching, Bush ordered them out so that he could commence the invasion.
Further, as we now know through the release of internal Iraqi documents, Saddam thought early on in the process (and for quite some time afterward) that Bush was bluffing, and that a spate of cruise missile strikes would be the sum total of the stand off. He didn't think Bush would actually invade, and then we he realized the danger, he opened up for inspectors to seek to avoid the confrontation. Some bid for redemptive suicide.
As for Arafat, as Rob Farley notes:
Arafat didn't believe he was committing national suicide; he was perhaps incorrect in his assessment of the situation, but mistaken and suicidal are entirely different concepts. This isn't hard to understand, and again I'm befuddled that anyone not intentionally obtuse would by into the logic.
Not only that, but the eventual outcomes stemming from Arafat's decision have not risen to the level of "national suicide" - as tragic as they've been. National suicide would be something more cataclysmic one would imagine.
Finally, we have the Taliban. A few things to consider here: Farley, again points out that the Taliban had a plausible reason to believe that they could survive an attack by the US. After all, the USSR wasn't able to take and hold Afghanistan, so why not just wait out the US assault. Speaking of which, the Taliban happen to still be alive and kicking - making gains and reconstituting in various regions. Rumors of their glorous national suicide have been greatly exaggerated.
There are some other important distinctions as well. None of the above examples are of a group launching an attack that it believes worth the costs despite the fact that it will result in national suicide. All of the above examples are defensive in nature, or at least represent a willingness to resist pressure and attack from outside forces. Further, none anticipated "national suicide" of the scale that nuclear war would bring. More like, "national struggle and hardship," not nuclear annihilation.
Yet (tabling the obvious flaws in the examples as mentioned above), Rubenstein would have us believe that such a readiness to sacrifice in the face of aggression is analogous to a willingness to launch an unprovoked nuclear assault that would result in the complete and utter destruction of a land and people.
This is two part monger of the "fear" and "war" varieties. A frequent coupling in fact. Here is Rubenstein's closing admonition:
Israel, as well as the West, should be prepared for a long, irrational and costly war, unlike any other fought in the past.
Well, at least we agree that it would be long, irrational and costly. The difference being, I see that as a reason to abstain.
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