by Charles
[Updated at the end]
Last January, I wrote that I would give the surge 'til November (later changed to year end), and if there was no discernible progress, I would opt for Plan B, which would be an orderly, phased unilateral withdrawal of American forces. From what I've seen, I think we should stick with Plan A. December was another month of low civilian casualties...
...and the three month moving average also illustrates this favorable trend.
And military casualties are following that trend as well.
The improved security situation has contributed to higher oil production. Also surging is confidence in the Iraq economy. Last month, in its report to Congress, the Dept. of Defense summarized the situation, and following are some excerpts:
More below the fold...
The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. This report measures progress towards, and setbacks from, achieving that goal during the reporting period (September through November 2007). There has been significant security progress, momentum in reconciliation at the local and provincial levels and economic progress. However substantial the security progress made since the last report, sustained and durable progress depends on further progress in attaining political and economic objectives. The United States, its Coalition partners and others in the international community remain committed to assisting the Government of Iraq (GoI) in capitalizing on this progress.
The continued implementation of the New Way Forwardstrategy combined with the surge in overall force levels in Iraq has considerably improved overall levels of security during the past quarter. Improved security is beginning to achieve momentum that, if maintained, may lead to sustained stability. The "tribal awakening" movement has grown as an increasing number of sheikhs—Sunni and Shi’a—have chosen to stop resisting the Coalition. They are instead working together with the GoI and the Coalition, including with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, to improve security and economic conditions at the local level. “Concerned Local Citizen” (CLC) programs have been established through which members of communities work with Coalition and Iraqi forces to protect their neighbor-hoods and critical infrastructure, with greater than 75% under U.S.-funded contracts. This program enhances the ability of Coalition and Iraqi forces to interact with local residents and obtain information on insurgents and illegal militia activity. The CLC movement is proving crucial to the counterinsurgency effort and will require continued support. Efforts to transition these CLC personnel to regular positions in the army or police or to provide other employment opportunities are underway but these efforts are moving slowly. The pace of integrating the CLC members into GoI institutions, lack of alternative employment and fears by the Maliki government that these forces may return to violence or form new militias are of concern.
The number of security incidents has fallen significantly and is now at levels last seen in the summer of 2005. Although ethno-sectarian violence continues to be a concern, overall civilian casualties, enemy attacks and total improvised explosive device attacks have decreased markedly over the reporting period. For example, the number of high-profile attacks in Iraq declined by over 50% since March 2007. The overall reduction in security incidents can be attributed to several factors, including the continued decrease in capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and militia extremists, increased tribal initiatives against AQI and other extremists, Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire order to his Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, the increased capability of the Iraqi military and police, the separation of Iraq’s previously mixed sectarian communi-ties into homogenous neighborhoods and the sustained presence of Coalition and Iraqi forces among the population.
Coalition forces continue to transfer responsibility for security to the GoI. Karbala Province transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) on October 29, 2007, bringing the total number of provinces for which the GoI has lead security responsibility to eight of eighteen provinces. In particular, Anbar Province continued to show significant improvements in security. Despite AQI’s assassination of Sheikh Abd al Sattar Biziah Fitikhan al Rishawi on the first day of Ramadan, the Sahawa al Iraq (SAI) movement, under the leadership of his brother Sheikh Ahmad, continued its opposition to AQI and Sunni resistance elements. In the southern provinces, Iraqi forces have taken a more assertive role in the security of Basrah City in preparation for the transition of Basrah to PIC in December 2007.
While the GoI’s lack of progress on key legislation has been disappointing and has hindered “top-down” reconciliation, “bottom-up” reconciliation initiatives gained momentum as tribal and local outreach efforts expanded during this quarter. The Council of Representatives (CoR) passed an important pensions law, which has been signed by the Presidency Council, and some legislative progress has been made on the de-Ba’athification law (now known as the Accountability and Justice Law), which received two readings in the CoR. In addition, Iraq and the United States signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relations of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America on November 26, 2007, which establishes a framework for continued bilateral cooperation. Following this, the GoI signed the United Nations Security Council Resolution renewal letter, which is consistent with the road map laid out in the Declaration of Principles.
On the international front, on November 2-3, 2007, Turkey hosted the second Iraq Expanded Neighbors Ministerial Conference, which concluded with a commitment to establish a temporary office in Baghdad to support the Neighbors Process, the reiteration of broad international support for Iraq’s efforts to achieve political reconciliation, support for an expanded United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and recommitment to the International Compact with Iraq (ICI). As part of its expanded mandate, UNAMI has committed to providing technical assistance and personnel to help staff the Neighbors Process support office. Since the last report, Iraq has made progress in implementing the ICI economic initiatives.
The Iraqi economy continues to improve and overcome many challenges to stability and growth. Estimated nominal gross domestic product (GDP) is US$60.9 billion. Real GDP will increase by an estimated 6.3% in 2007 as growth in the non-oil sector continues. The inflation rate has continued to decline due to the Central Bank of Iraq’s tight monetary policy implemented through appreciation of the Iraqi dinar. Year-on-year headline inflation as of October 2007 is 20.4%, which is down from 52.8% one year ago and year-to-date inflation is 4.2%. Iraq has maintained satisfactory performance on its Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and has a Board date on December 19, 2007 for a new SBA program that is likely to be approved. Crude oil production and oil exports are higher than during the same period in 2006. State-provided electricity outputs for September through November 2007 averaged 107,581 megawatt hours, a 14% increase over production rates for the same period in 2006. Although the GoI will probably not fully execute its capital budget prior to the end of its fiscal year, Iraq has dramatically improved capital spending and, based on August data, has already executed the amount spent 2006. As of this writing, the CoR has held two readings of the draft budget law. Although the budget process is ahead of last year’s timeline, the CoR’s early December recess will delay approval of the budget until after the start of Iraq’s fiscal year on January 1, 2008.
As for development of the GoI’s security forces, the military and police continue to expand in number and improve in capability. Iraq’s basic combat and basic police training facilities continuously operate at or near capacity. As of November 15, 2007, the Coalition and the Ministry of Defense have generated 117 army battalions that are conducting operations at varying levels of capability; another 42 are currently in or planned for force generation. Ten divisions, 34 brigades, and 108 battalions have the lead in counterinsurgency operations in their areas of responsibility. Many elements of the Iraqi Army are now capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations, but most also remain dependent on Coalition enablers. Coalition advisors report steady but inconsistent improvement in the abilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to perform key ministerial functions; develop and implement plans and policies; and provide direction and oversight to intelli-gence, personnel management, acquisitions, logistics, communications and budgeting. U.S.-funded programs and advisory efforts continue to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi forces but internal sectarian biases, commissioned and non-commissioned officer shortfalls, logistics deficiencies and a depend-ence on the Coalition for many combat support functions continue to hinder the Iraqi forces’ ability to operate without Coalition assistance.
In summary, tactical and operational momentum has been achieved, and there have been notable overall improvements in the security situation. These improvements, combined with an increase in provincial government expenditure rates, have contrib-uted to improvements in the delivery of essential services and other key programs to the Iraqi people. Cooperation with Iraqi and Coalition forces by tribal leaders—both Sunni and Shi’a—has advanced “bottom-up” reconciliation and assisted in countering extremism. The numerous “tribal awakening” movements and the CLC program are making progress at the local level, but challenges remain at the national level. The key to long-term success will be the GoI’s ability to capitalize upon local gains, pass key legislation and promote national reconciliation.
As far as summaries go, it's a bit long, but I think it paints a fair picture. Aside from progress on the national stage, one of my other major concerns is the training of Iraqi forces. The DoD report to Congress has the detailed information, but Bill Roggio has a summary and a helpful graph table.
The most important column is C1/C2, which is quantifies the number of forces that are independent or in the lead. The more Iraqi troops at C1/C2, the fewer American troops needed, and the more American troops able to go home (or deploy to Afghanistan).
The national government is barely moving forward, and there are still many dangerous areas, but I think we're moving in the right direction, and this isn't to say that things couldn't move backward in the coming months. Lots of things could go wrong. Do I think we're winning? For me, it's still too early to tell. We'll need more time to see how Iraqis respond to this progress.
Update I: A hat tip as usual to Engram for the graphs. The civilian casualty figures are based on data from the Iraqi Coalition Casualty Count, which gets its data from independent media reports. Oh, and I forgot to link to this interview with General Petraeus, the man who should've been Time's man of the year. Here's what Petraeus sees ahead:
In the year ahead, we'll continue to focus on security for the population, living with those we seek to protect. You can't commute to this fight.
"Over time in the new year, we'll continue to thin our ranks as Iraqi forces take on more tasks. In many provinces, Iraqis already are completely in charge; in some areas, in fact, there are no coalition forces at all.
"The past year also underscored the importance of keeping the pressure on al Qaeda and the other extremists. We'll seek to sustain that this year to prevent them from reconstituting and recovering from their losses.
"We and our Iraqi partners will also continue to look beyond the security realm to help the Iraqis improve basic services, revitalize local markets, repair damaged infrastructure and create conditions that allow displaced families to return to their homes. Local stakeholders are the best insurance against the return of extremists."
On the political situation.
"Iraqi leaders all agree that political progress in Iraq has been insufficient; nonetheless, there have been some steps forward in the past couple of months. While progress on the so-called benchmark legislation has been slow, actions that will flow from those laws are already being taken.
"Particularly noteworthy is the distribution of oil revenues: generally in the way envisioned by the oil-revenue-sharing law - in the absence of agreement on that law.
"We should remember that Iraq's political system is still in its early stages of development. Its leaders are trying both to establish a government in the midst of what is still considerable violence and trying to resolve truly fundamental issues."
Update II: Foreign Policy magazine interviewed General Petraeus and here's what he said about future troop levels and the political situation:
We have already begun a reduction, and we’ll reduce another number over the course of the next seven months. We do that with a reasonable degree of confidence because our surge is taking place and the Iraqi surge is taking place as well, and it amplifies what we have done. In fact, the Iraqis have formed 160,000 police, soldiers, border police, and other security force elements during the past year. To be sure, there’s an uneven nature to their quality, to their capability, and to their level of training and equipping, but they’re significant in quantity. And quantity does mean quality in counterinsurgency operations, because you’ve got to secure so many infrastructures against the terrorist and insurgent and militia elements. We think that what we have been handing over has been winnowed down in terms of the nature of the problem in a way that they can handle it. And only when they can handle it we will have this transfer.
[...]
They will be the first to tell you they want to make more progress and make it more rapidly than they have done to this point. There have been accomplishments, especially in recent weeks. They approved a pension law that extends pension rights to tens of thousands Iraqis who were left out, cast off. They agreed to the Security Council resolution extension, which gives us our mandate. They have debated accountability and justice, which is the de-Baathification reform legislation. The budget for 2008 should come up for a vote very soon after they return from Eid and the hajj. So, the progress has been halting, but there are a number of encouraging signs on the horizon.
Just to add to an already long post, here's the State Department's latest weekly update.
It's good, that after years of failure, the Bush Administration was willing to try what the generals recommended in the first place, a large enough occupation force to make a difference. Too bad that we waited so long that we can no longer be sure that the people who govern Iraq will take advantage of the lull.
Posted by: Free Lunch | January 01, 2008 at 10:32 PM
Yes: now civilian casualties in Iraq are down to almost the same low, low levels as in... June 2005.
Then again, in June 2005 you were hailing the noticeable signs of progress in Iraq. I suppose if the number of civilans confirmed killed by reliable media sources has fallen to 902 in December 2007 - including 33 civilians confirmed by media reporting killed by US forces, of whom 6 were children - that is a "sign of progress". Of a sort.
For comparison's sake, the IBC count of civilians killed in the first year of the war was 6332. In the second year of the war, it was 11312. Your magic graphs never refer to those figures: for you, "progress" is always reckoned from the third year of the war. (And of course we know from the Lancet reports that the IBC body count represents about one-twelfth of the actual deaths in the Iraq war...)
Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 01, 2008 at 10:49 PM
I'd agree that these graphs show substantial
progress--but only away from what was exponential movement towards hell-in-a-handbasket. It would indeed be useful, and I think more honest, to make your plots start when the invasion did.
Posted by: DCA | January 01, 2008 at 10:55 PM
Statistics? Uh-oh.....
Posted by: gwangung | January 01, 2008 at 10:59 PM
None of the combat-related statistics have any lasting significance, because the aim they were supposed to support is a complete failure. There is no viable national government in Iraq, and there won't be. The Iraqi people hate us and wish us gone - with excellent reason, because we are torturers and mass murderers, villains running an occupation that compares meaningfully with what the Nazis and Soviets did to Poland in every regard sort of calculated genocide. But they don't agree on anything else and there's no obvious reason why they should put forth effort into a government that wouldn't be allowed to govern if it tried. The strategic goal is a failure, precisely as it was obvious from the outset it would be; nothing else matters for very long in light of that failure.
Posted by: Bruce Baugh | January 01, 2008 at 11:12 PM
Charles, thanks for your update. I think most of the folks here are aware of your basic stance (that things are getting better), and at the micro level, I think that's undeniably true. Indeed, I think that everyone here (and everyone who can be generally categorized as a 'naysayer' on the war) agrees that a dropping casualty rate is a good thing. The numbers you bring forward on a regular basis help prevent ObWi from becoming an echo chamber.
The question, though, has always been one of the final goals and the likelihood of achieving them. What you're describing is exactly what pretty much everyone -- pro and con on the subject of the surge -- agreed would happen. It remains to be seen what will happen to Iraq's cauldron of civil, ethnic, religious, and political conflicts when we're unable and unwilling to maintain an occupational force of the current size.
As recently as a few months ago, many who support the continued occupation said that the country would dissolve into hellish civil war and genocide if we pulled out. Is that still a threat? Will it continue to be a serious threat, preventing us from declaring victory and withdrawing for some time? If so, I'm not sure we can say that the surge is doing anything strategically save buying time until the US Presidential elections.
Posted by: Jeff Eaton | January 01, 2008 at 11:36 PM
CB says things are getting better. Again.
Wow.
Yawn.
Wake me when someone intelligent comments.
Posted by: dr ngo | January 02, 2008 at 12:25 AM
The quote
is a facially legitimate statement that could be, and could have been (and, in fact, has been), issued at a number of points in this now-longer-than-WWII endeavor.How about we try the "are we losing; how would we know" question again. Can you please point me to a post of yours at any time in the past that lays down the bottom-line conditions, without which you will be unable to maintain a wait-and-see approach? What, short of the U.S. being required to evacuate embassy staff from the embassy roof via chopper, would constitute an unacceptable state of affairs for you?
I go here again not because I see us as being closer to that state of failure today than we have been in the past, but because we might be more likely to get that statement today than in times past.
This is important to get (not as much from you personally, but from serial another-Friedman-unit pundits generally), because to have productive conversations about this they need to be conversations where: that baseline and alternative baselines A and B and C are clear; the "objective reality on the ground" has been argued to a reasonably-close muddle; the "actual costs" of the policy have been argued to a reasonably-close muddle; and the conversation begins to bear just the slightest resemblance to accountability.
I am of the opinion we haven't gotten there yet, but I'm willing to listen, again. I hold out hope that your "baseline" is something I'll hear.
[If this posts twice, I apologize but blame Typepad. The first attempt has not posted at the time of this second attempt (after closing out and returning). Please feel free to delete any duplicate posts - and this paragraph.]
Posted by: CMatt | January 02, 2008 at 12:28 AM
Aren't there genuine logistical difficulties with continuing the surge at present levels? Wasn't the whole deal here that the thing had to be temporary, and that it would be a failure if political structures weren't put in place that would continue the lowered pace of attacks? But isn't a major component of our current strategy arming/paying/working with groups that will undermine any structures set up by the national government?
Doesn't Sadr's strategy of waiting out the surge make these statistics seriously misleading?
On the other hand, can we declare victory and go home now?
Posted by: CharleyCarp | January 02, 2008 at 12:47 AM
The Democrats don't have the will to end the $190 billion a year Iraq porkfest before Bush leaves office...and not even Queen Hillary will end it until after Iraq's December, 2009 elections.
Well played, Halliburton, Blackwater & Co.
Yeehaw!
Posted by: alphie | January 02, 2008 at 01:46 AM
OT:
I'd just like to mention that Thomas H. Crown, in his farewell address to RedState, takes a moment to thank the whole crew here at this far-left wing moron factory called Obsidian Wings for sending waves of cretins over there.
That's one classy guy.
Posted by: Johnny Pez | January 02, 2008 at 02:06 AM
Aren't there genuine logistical difficulties with continuing the surge at present levels? Wasn't the whole deal here that the thing had to be temporary, and that it would be a failure if political structures weren't put in place that would continue the lowered pace of attacks?
Yes and yes, which means that when the surge ends, as it must, all these purported gains will likely vanish. And the Iraqis will pay the price for our hubris.
Posted by: Incertus (Brian) | January 02, 2008 at 02:48 AM
The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror.
What if the Iraqis don't want to be unified, democratic, or federal?
What if they aren't interested in being our ally in the war on terror?
We'll need more time to see how Iraqis respond to this progress.
What if the Iraqis respond to this progress by saying, "We'd like you to go home now"?
Thanks -
Posted by: russell | January 02, 2008 at 04:21 AM
What if the Iraqis respond to this progress by saying, "We'd like you to go home now"?
They've been saying that for some time. Bush pays no attention.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 02, 2008 at 05:51 AM
Wake me when someone intelligent comments.
For anecdotal stuff, I'd suggest checking out LT Nixon, or even Andrew.
Posted by: DaveC | January 02, 2008 at 07:13 AM
Better yet, Baghdad Burning.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 02, 2008 at 08:49 AM
Excellent summary, Charles.
Aren't there genuine logistical difficulties with continuing the surge at present levels? Wasn't the whole deal here that the thing had to be temporary, and that it would be a failure if political structures weren't put in place that would continue the lowered pace of attacks? But isn't a major component of our current strategy arming/paying/working with groups that will undermine any structures set up by the national government?
Each point that you raise is valid, Charlie, which is why anyone who claims victory -- or even that the surge is "successful" -- does so prematurely. There would have been a drawdown in the next few months, regardless of how Iraq was doing. That said, I think that your third point is the key one, and I don't know that it's clear that our policy of coopting indigious armed groups (for lack of a better term -- we're talking non-al Quada, non-foreign fighter groups) will inevitably result in a revolt against a central civilian government.
A lot will depend on the next few months, including whether we see a professional, nonsectarian officer corps begin to arise in the Iraqi Army. The ideal model may be something like the Turkish experience although we are a very long way from that model at this point (and it's not clear that we'll get there).
Posted by: von | January 02, 2008 at 09:01 AM
Anyone know what - if anything - has changed since November last year, when it was made clear to Congress that public statements by the Defense Department "severely distorted the true nature of Iraqi force development in ways that grossly exaggerate Iraqi readiness and capability to assume security tasks and replace U.S. forces." cite
Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said a year ago that the Pentagon's Aug. 31 status report, which was sent to Congress, lists 312,400 men "trained and equipped" among the Iraqi army and national and regular police. But it adds that "no one knows how many . . . are actually still in service." At the same time, he writes, "all unclassified reporting on unit effectiveness has been cancelled."
From Cordesman's December 2007 report:
Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 02, 2008 at 09:54 AM
anyone who claims victory -- or even that the surge is "successful" -- does so prematurely
But that's just it, von -- maybe there's "progress" -- so what? At this stage, with this amount of lives and treasure sunk down the hole in Iraq, it's too late for claims of "progress" to have any meaning. And as other point out above, the lack of a political solution -- the goal of the surge, for which we as a nation were supposed to endure the higher casualty rates -- means that this so-called "progress" is temporary at best.
(And also as other have pointed out -- "progress" of lowering the casualty rate to the rate of 2005? Big deal.)
I don't think anyone doubted that a temporary "surge" in military forces would have some short-term effect. But the benchmarks the surge was supposed to provide the breathing room to achieve are nearly a total failure. As I predicted at the time, the surge has actually achieved its purpose vis-a-vis the Republican Party -- it didn't achieve its stated goals at all, but it did provide some "progress" General Petraeus -- and now, you -- could point to to argue for punting this failure of a war in the lap of the next, probably Democratic, President.
Then, let the dolchstosslegende begin.
Posted by: Gregory | January 02, 2008 at 10:09 AM
Charles' graphs show clearly that the violence had peaked *before* the troop surge. We know also that the strategy of both Sunni and Shia leaders had changed earlier in the year. Thus to attribute the decline to the surge is a non-sequitur. It is especially silly to argue that declining violence is a reason to keep troop levels high - would Charles be arguing that troop levels should be reduced if violence had increased?
Posted by: skeptonomist | January 02, 2008 at 10:26 AM
Charles' graphs show clearly that the violence had peaked *before* the troop surge. We know also that the strategy of both Sunni and Shia leaders had changed earlier in the year. Thus to attribute the decline to the surge is a non-sequitur. It is especially silly to argue that declining violence is a reason to keep troop levels high - would Charles be arguing that troop levels should be reduced if violence had increased?
Posted by: skeptonomist | January 02, 2008 at 10:27 AM
von: A lot will depend on the next few months, including whether we see a professional, nonsectarian officer corps begin to arise in the Iraqi Army.
And whether a professional, nonsectarian officer corps can be retained in the US Army. (The Army's Other Crisis)
Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 02, 2008 at 10:31 AM
Maybe this time, Charles will respond to the point many people make about the surge strategy being non-operable for more than, at best, another year.
Maybe this time, Charles will explain to those who have asked him repeatedly how the surge can fix the apparently unresolvable political differences between the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds that are the root problem in Iraq and which the surge to date has not yet fixed.
Maybe this time, Charles will admit that his surge statistics are patently dishonest, considering that even by his own reckoning the casualty decreases begin before the surge starts, and that he uses an artificially shortened timeframe to make things appear rosier.
Maybe this time, Charles will actually address the basic point that the Iraqi civil war has by this point eliminated or segregated most of the mixed-ethnicity neighborhoods which were the flashpoints for strife in Iraq, and that the sole benefit of the surge is that it's temporarily preventing the all-out war that's the likely next step in this bloody conflict.
...nahhhhhhhh...
Posted by: mightygodking | January 02, 2008 at 10:37 AM
It would indeed be useful, and I think more honest, to make your plots start when the invasion did.
I'm copying and pasting a graph, DCA. I see no dishonesty in that. Personally, I'm more interested in how the current surge strategy is doing in comparison to the failed strategy of the pre-Petraeus era. No one is stopping you from plotting out all the prior months.
Can you please point me to a post of yours at any time in the past that lays down the bottom-line conditions, without which you will be unable to maintain a wait-and-see approach?
I already did, Charley. If there wasn't discernible progress by year-end, I would have advocated a change to Plan B, full stop. The main point here is that the administration finally worked its way to a strategy that I've urged for quite some time, as early as April 2004. I wanted the administration and Congress to give the COIN strategy a fair chance to succeed or fail. It's been given that chance (grudgingly), and based on how things are going, I think Petraeus has earned the additional time to see it continue forward. Successful counterinsurgency strategies take time, usually five to ten years. To see results this quickly is surprising.
That's one classy guy.
Thomas leaves, then Charles writes two front-page posts at RS in two days. I think I see a connection, Johnny.
Posted by: Charles Bird | January 02, 2008 at 11:19 AM
Personally, I'm more interested in how the current surge strategy is doing in comparison to the failed strategy of the pre-Petraeus era.
And plainly, you're not that interested even in "how the current surge strategy" is doing, since you've been cut-and-pasting these graphs without noticing that the decline in casualties pre-dates the surge in troop levels.
The main point here is that the administration finally worked its way to a strategy that I've urged for quite some time, as early as April 2004.
The main point for most of us is that you have never once written a post about Iraq without claiming that "progress is being made". It's true that in the infamous "loser-defeatist" post of November 2005, you did urge more US troops in Iraq - but only four days later, you asserted American Forces Should Withdraw in Six Months - that is, on November 21 2005 you claimed "There will be troop reductions in 2006, and why not. By August of next year, there will be 270,000 trained Iraqis to do it."
You were wrong then. You've always, without exception, been wrong in every guess you've made about the future of Iraq, and every guess you've made has always been along the same lines: Progress is being made! Give it another six months, or another year, and you'll see! You were claiming this two years ago. You will doubtless be claiming this right up until January 2009, assuming a Democratic candidate is elected and gets to take office then, and even after, if a Republican gets into the White House again.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 02, 2008 at 11:35 AM
Backing up skeptoconomist: the surge is obviously not responsible for the drop in violence. It's pretty easy to find the real causes:
1) Petreus surrendered to the insurgents. He gave them political control of the Sunni provinces, and paid tribute in the form of weapons and money. Obviously they mostly stopped shooting at us, and now they are able to establish basic anti-criminal control to cut back on civilian violence.
2) The Brits surrendered to the Shia in Basra. They just left, no tribute, but apparently that was enough.
3) The ethnic cleansing in Baghdad is now largely complete. http://thinkprogress.org/2007/09/06/sunni-shia-baghdad/
The success of Petreus' surrender and the British departure shows we should have gone home years ago. For us, for the Iraqis, for justice, and for peace. The biggest problem for the Iraqis has been the US Army shooting at de facto governments like the Sunni insurgents and the Mahdi Army, resulting in anarchy and the usual attendant horrors. If the US had left or even stayed in its barracks that part would not have happened. The ethnic cleansing and civil wars between the various de facto governments were probably inevitable once the US invaded, but they got fought out anyway in spite of the US presence.
The surge was a typically sophisticated PR ploy by the administration. They knew the civil war was going to wind down by looking at the effects of ethnic cleansing on violence levels. Then they wasted a lot of money, lives, and happy families sending extra troops over to disguise their real strategy, surrender, so they could keep posing as manly men. The disgusting part is that the MSM, and consequently the general populace, seems to be falling for it. Bleah.
Posted by: Curt Adams | January 02, 2008 at 11:46 AM
(No Free Lunch) It's good, that after years of failure, the Bush Administration was willing to try what the generals recommended in the first place, a large enough occupation force to make a difference.
No. The "surge" isn't even close to what was needed for that. We needed about 400,000 - well over twice what we had in the "surge". We would also have needed to be able to communicate effectively with the civilian population on a platoon level, and that's never been available either.
A large force might have been able to support the Iranian puppet regime we're supporting into complete control of the country. But the force we're providing isn't large enough for that, and the basis for the "success" we're seeing is that the US has largely stopped supporting the Badr brigades' attempt to take over the country by attacking their rivals.
Yes and yes, which means that when the surge ends, as it must, all these purported gains will likely vanish. And the Iraqis will pay the price for our hubris.
No, the gains are a result of our soldiers doing *less*, not more. This is basic Hobbes - anarchy is worse than almost any government, and our soldiers have been shooting at the governments. Things will improve further as we withdraw.
Posted by: Curt Adams | January 02, 2008 at 12:00 PM
"To see results this quickly is surprising."
What results?
Seriously. Sure there has been a drop in violence to the level of 2 years ago, which was at that time unacceptable. But that is only partially due to the surge.
The only results that have meaning in a COIN strategy is assimilation into the mainstream government or at least stoppage of opposition to it.
Neither has occured here. And all the talk about meetings, etc, have turned out to be just that, talk only. There has been no positive action showing either the assimilation pointed out above or even lessening of opposition.
Without the non-surge related ativities, which were taken advantage of by Petraeus, but not initiated by him, there would have been minimal if any drop of violence.
To wit:
The so called "Anbar Awakening" was started by local sheikhs without any assistance form the US until they had already started to achieve something tangible.
Sadr's draw back was not in response to the surge, and in fact started before the surge. It was in reaction to some rogue elements in his militia going beyond what he wanted and was an attempt to regain control. In fact, there is some speculation that he was basically leaving the rogue elements out to dry and be picked off by the US.
Certain areas that were hotbeds of resistance in the past are now "safe", but others have become hot. And watch out for Kirkuk to explode.
The point is that going in was a mistake, and not because it was mishandled. It was a mistake because Iraq was never a threat to us and would never, under Hussein, have colluded with Al Qaeda, which has not even gotten involved, except through proxies, since we entered Iraq.
The central government has less control, due to the "bottom up" process you mention than it ever did. And there is nothing we can do to strengthen it.
The different factions have refused to take advantage of the lessening of violence and have not even made any serious movements toward conciliation. I refuse to use the word reconciliation as it implies that something existed in the past which really never did.
I appreciate your efforts, CB, but I really don't see the progress you are talking about.
Posted by: john miller | January 02, 2008 at 12:03 PM
Thank you Charles. That wasn't a trivial post. I still think it was a mistake to go in and it's still being very poorly conducted from a strategic standpoint, but ignoring signs of progress, of whatever sort, doesn't help anyone. We're supposed to be the reality based community. We should take all the information available and work with that.
Posted by: femdem | January 02, 2008 at 12:31 PM
"I appreciate your efforts, CB, but I really don't see the progress you are talking about."
The only meaningful "progress" in Iraq would be "progress" in developing a representive, accepted, competent, partially non-corrupt, Iraqi government.
It's not a subject Charles is willing to discuss, so far as I can tell.
I literally have been unable to get Charles to address the topic, either here or in e-mail. He simply responds to questions about the Iraqi government with answers about what the U.S. government says, does, or thinks, or says he's not interested in talking about it.
I invite him to do otherwise, and write a post about the Iraqi's "progress" in becoming a "unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally."
How's that unification coming? How's that being our "ally" coming, when Iraq was the only Arab country unwilling to come to Annapolis to talk about Israel and Palestine?
That's all that matters.
Von says: "I don't know that it's clear that our policy of coopting indigious armed groups (for lack of a better term -- we're talking non-al Quada, non-foreign fighter groups) will inevitably result in a revolt against a central civilian government."
Progress! We don't know for sure there will be an inevitable revolt. Who doesn't want to cheer?
Posted by: Gary Farber | January 02, 2008 at 12:33 PM
Oh, boy! Groundhog Day came early this year. I guess some adjustment is in order with regard to the meaning of Punxsutawney Phil's reaction to his shadow. Winter can't possibly end this soon.
Posted by: hairshirthedonist | January 02, 2008 at 12:44 PM
How can you claim Petreaus should have been Time's man of the Year and in the same post quote this.
"We should remember that Iraq's political system is still in its early stages of development. Its leaders are trying both to establish a government in the midst of what is still considerable violence and trying to resolve truly fundamental issues."
That is simply not a true statement. Iraq's "leaders" are jockying for position for the post occupation. Unless you mean Petreaus should have been man of the year for the type of reasons Putin was chosen.
I fear next year Condi will begin efforts to replace the current Iraqi leadership. A move that will only make matters worse IMO.
But there's no other choice. The administration needs a scapegoat for this mess and history shows they aren't about to take responsibility.
So while I appreciate Charles' effort to put lipstick on this pig, I won't be kissing it.
Posted by: Davebo | January 02, 2008 at 01:05 PM
This post consists essentially of an un-analysed and uncritical reproduction at length of a DoD report to Congress which, for understandable reasons, is itself far more rosy than direct statements of commanders in the field. Charles tells us that "Successful counterinsurgency strategies take time, usually five to ten years. To see results this quickly is surprising", but I don't see any reference to the principles of counter-insurgency or the relevant precedents to back up this assertion.
The goal of counter-insurgency is to impose your preferred political solution through military means. Every day that the US has more than, let's say, 50k troops in Iraq is a day that they are losing the war. In that sense, reinforcements ('the surge') are a step backwards, a step backwards taken in the hope that it will allow two steps forward. Short-term operational successes are easily achieved when a technologically-advanced counter-insurgency possesses sufficient force and a reasonably coherent tactical plan (which the US amazingly lacked until this past year). Yet those two steps forward must occur on the strategic level, and their absence history has shown time and again that operational gains are fleeting.
The surge is a gamble, for these operational gains have been achieved at the cost of making the security situation even more dependent on US forces. Lacking an improved strategic position, when those forces are reduced in number you may find yourself in a worse situation than when you began, i.e. you've taken one step backwards without the two steps forward.
Statistical quibbling aside, the missing graph here is that showing US force strength, daily mission totals, aerial support dailies etc.. That graph has obviously risen greatly, perhaps it is at its apex now, which the opposite of where it needs to be. You win a counter-insurgency when your soldiers leave, and the political solution you desired remains in place. You cannot at all assess the success of your counter-insurgency when your military efforts are at their maximum.
The irony is, therefore, that the surges opponents like to stress that non-surge factors account for the reduction in violence, not realising that this is in fact the strongest argument available that the strategic situation is improving (not convincing to my mind, just the strongest available argument). That is why, when you parse the statements of Petreus and his commanders you will see that they walk a discursive tightrope, needing to stress that their operational efforts are effective (surely with a mind that history will testify that the army at least did its job), without being too effective, since this would mean that in fact strategic objectives are drifting further away.
So the final irony, I guess, is that the now-legendary six month timeframe is perhaps, for the first time, actually the relevant waiting period.
I would add that I agree with the statements above with regard to caving in to local authorities. If validating and abetting the authorities of regional groups was not contrary to America's original strategic goals, it could have been done 3 years ago. I suspect that strategic goals are in flux - there may be an element of Washington hedging against a future antagonistic relationship with the central government in Baghdad. Although that's probably attributing too much strategic vision to this administration.
Posted by: byrningman | January 02, 2008 at 01:11 PM
The main point for most of us is that you have never once written a post about Iraq without claiming that "progress is being made".
Factually false, Jes, and that's just one example. You can do better than making such wrong assertions. You've done this sort of smear before, so consider this a posting rules warning.
He simply responds to questions about the Iraqi government with answers about what the U.S. government says, does, or thinks, or says he's not interested in talking about it.
Not true, Gary. This was my last comment on the subject. Perhaps you missed it.
Posted by: Charles Bird | January 02, 2008 at 01:19 PM
Factually false, Jes, and that's just one example.
Gosh, Charles, I guess you forgot the third paragraph you wrote in that post you just linked to. It said, to remind you:
You can do better than making such obviously wrong assertions. Please don't try to turn a factual reference to your past posts into claims that I'm "smearing" you by pointing out what you actually said.Posted by: Jesurgislac | January 02, 2008 at 01:25 PM
"Not true, Gary. This was my last comment on the subject. Perhaps you missed it."
I didn't miss it, Charles. I responded here. Perhaps you missed it.
Could we discuss the Iraqi government now?
Let's go back to this: It remains perfectly true that "the Iraqi government's belief and policy is that the 'awakenings' are arming the Sunni enemy for future civil war against the Iraqi government," does it not?
If you mention anything about America, or an opinion of an American, I swear I'll scream. I'm not asking you about America, or anything about any American, or anything any American has ever said or done, or ever will say or done. I don't want to know a freaking thing about anything related to America in this discussion. I want to ask about Iraq, Iraqis, and the Iraqi government. If could please -- given that I've literally asked you this over eight times now -- be responsive, and confine your discussion to Iraq, Iraqis, and the Iraqi discussion.
So, if you might finally answer the question?
And then maybe we might finally talk about Iraq, rather than America.
Posted by: Gary Farber | January 02, 2008 at 01:42 PM
Charles, are yu in favor of a tax increae to pay for the war? Are you in favor of continuing to cut taxes for the rich during the war? If you decide to rationalize that we can afford the war without a tax increase, would you please specify want other expenditures can be cut to offset the costs of the war. Please only list expendidtures which actually can be cut, given political realities.
Or are you just going to leave it to your children to pay for this?
BTW sincepakistan has real rterrorists, some of whom are in thier military and their intelligence services, and since Pakistan has nukes, and do you favor an innvasion there?
Posted by: wonkie | January 02, 2008 at 02:08 PM
It's a nice looking graph and seems promising for the current situation in Iraq. However, the graph is incomplete. The war started in 2003 and it only goes back to 2005. Presumably, the number of civilian deaths also decreased between 2003 and 2005. Is there any reason to think that this is anything more than the bottom of the sine wave, just before the next big explosion (whether due to al Qaeda, locals outraged at what US troops/the Iraqi government/whoever else are doing, or other reasons)? And the military deaths don't show so much a trend as a pattern of random variation. I'm skeptical that this represents any real breakthrough, though I'd be pleased to be wrong.
Posted by: Dianne | January 02, 2008 at 03:00 PM
But that's just it, von -- maybe there's "progress" -- so what? At this stage, with this amount of lives and treasure sunk down the hole in Iraq, it's too late for claims of "progress" to have any meaning. And as other point out above, the lack of a political solution -- the goal of the surge, for which we as a nation were supposed to endure the higher casualty rates -- means that this so-called "progress" is temporary at best.
I don't know whether Charles is making the claim that, all things equal, the current progress (such as it is) justifies the invasion of Iraq. I'm not. I am not even certain that I was wrong to oppose the surge (as I did; see here: http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2007/01/the_surge.html and here: http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2007/02/yugoagogo.html). But I do think that measurable progress is being made and I am certainly open to the idea that I misjudged the surge, and that it really was the best of a series of bad alternatives. Indeed, I rather hope that I was mistaken about it.
Posted by: von | January 02, 2008 at 03:02 PM
All this is well and good, but we still lack an exit strategy. The Bush 50-year plan seems right on track for implementation. Big fat embassy, dozens of little military bases and walls dotting the country, plans for troop draw-downs that never actually result in troop withdrawl, no political reconciliation a la N./S.Korea, and a Vietnam-like insistence that we have to "stay till we win" against enemies we repeatedly claim to have beaten.
If Petraeus can cut this shit sandwich in half before Jan '09, then fantastic. Good for him. But after going down a $1 trillion in the hole for this war, I don't see the benefit of sinking another $1 trillion over another four more years, because we feel like we owe somebody something.
Posted by: Zifnab | January 02, 2008 at 03:09 PM
So Charles
...are we back to pre-invasion oil production?
...are we back to pre-invasion civilian casualties?
...are we back to pre-invasion electrical production?
...are we back to pre-invasion food production?
...are we back to pre-invasion civil infrastructure.
Did we find the smoking gun..er..eh..Nukes yet?
Did we find the peace and stability we were promise.
Enough Charles, whatever happens now, will never atone for the sins of those who supported this war.
Here's a letter to the editor of the NYT of mine from Monday, June 02, 2003.
Show me what you were writing back then and compare.
----- Original Message -----
From: sb12
To: [email protected] ; [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Sent: Monday, June 02, 2003 12:01 PM
Subject: Strong exception to William Safire's article of 2 June 2003
Dear Editor,
I must take strong exception to William Safire's article of 2 June 2003.
Mr. Safire in a column published on 2 June 2003 tries to morph a concern of some parties, into the objections of all who opposed the war in Iraq when he says "That presumption of a bloody, last-ditch defense was also the basis for objections to the war". This is a straw man argument if there ever was one. This was certainly not the paramount argument for the vast majority of those who objected to the war. Additionally, those who were against this war were not then, nor are they now "the opponents of this genocidal maniac's removal" Just as I would suppose that Mr. Safire's not calling for timely U.S. military intervention in Rwanda, would not indicate his support for the genocide 700,000 or so souls, I would ask that he extend the same courteously to those who believe the Iraqi war unwise.
Having served in the U.S. military I was sure of our swift military victory, we are the best, how could it not be, we spend approximately 400 times more on our armed services than Iraq. Rarely, if ever, has a nation been so outgunned. No Mr. Safire, those who objected to the war had other objections.
On the off chance that the argument "last-ditch defense was also the basis for objections to the war" was advanced based on ignorance, I list the following reasons to object to the Iraqi war for Mr.Safire's edification: Distraction from our war on terror (where on earth is Osama?), There are not now, nor have there ever been any meaningful links between Osama and Sadam (there is far more evidence against Pakistan's Musharif...regime change anyone?), Budget (Mr. Safire might not have noticed the record deficits, but recent events do prove conclusively that Democrats are the fiscally conservative party), Chaos in the aftermath (conservatives suddenly want to start nation building, see Mr. Safires columns on Kosovo), Wars of Aggression (see Nuremberg), Finally, there is a moral obligation to do the least harm in obtaining our nations goals. Was war and its attendant consequences the only route or did it simply provide better photo ops and sound bites for an administration beset by economic failure and an inability find and destroy Osama's minions?
As for Mr. Safire's argument on chemical weapons (what happened to the nuclear weapons?), did Mr. Safire really mean to argue that U.S. military expended this much effort to go after a couple empty trailers? C'mon Bill, I'd rather have the CIA plant something, than to go forward with this laughable farce. Chemical weapons leave chemical traces, you don't have to spend your life in Anniston, Alabama to understand this.
Now we come to the least credible of Safire's arguments. We wanted to spare the people from the cruel rule of Sadam. This would be a noble cause were it not for the fact that there is a rather long paper trail that links the U.S. Government, and in particular, the Reagan/Bush Sr.administration to Sadam. Did not the Reagan/Bush Sr. Administration materially support Sadam in his war against Iran? Why were conservatives strangely quiet when the Sadam gassed the Kurds back in 1988, or for that matter when Sadam killed the crewman of the U.S. Navy Frigate Stark? Could it be that Republicans didn't mind the killing in Iraq as long as Sadam served our purposes? As for the killings in 1991, it was Bush Sr. who initiated that action, by publicly encouraging Shiites in the South and Kurds in the North to rise against Sadam and then denying them the material support they so desperately needed. I have yet to hear President Bush II utter a word of condemnation against his feckless father. No, it is Bush Sr. whose hands will forever bear the stains of that massive bloodbath. Those who did not support this war, have nothing to do with that massacre, let's get that straight Mr.Safire!
Americans, are said to have a short memory, as to whether that is true I am unsure, however, I am certain Mr. Safire must have thought the Nation has developed dementia to have been so caviler with his misapplied arguments.
Posted by: S Brennan | January 02, 2008 at 07:31 PM
Charles,
Though I'll happily take the mix-up as a compliment, you were responding to me here and not CharleyCarp:
Your actual quote from January 2007:What. Ever.
I figure I have no one but myself to blame, though. Here's the intro to January's piece again:
Posted by: CMatt | January 02, 2008 at 08:50 PM
Sorry, bad post on my part.
The what-ever comes from the objective standard for success/failure being, "We've not failed until I tell you we've failed". Disdain for the "The most important thing" lead-in comes from that thing being, apparently, domestic politics.
Posted by: CMatt | January 02, 2008 at 09:01 PM
Another entirely predictable feature of these periodic things from Charles is that there's no consideration of all of the real criteria for successful counter-insurgency work. It probably bears some repetition that according to the US Army's own manual on the subject, the US occupying force in Iraq meets none of the major criteria. Not enough people, not enough trained people, not enough attention to infrastructure, and of course not enough attention to justice - no protection from capricious arrest and capricious killing by authorities, no punishment of the authorities for such things, no system of justice open to the locals and administered by people they have any reason to trust, and so on. Indeed, on this count, just the opposite - the US is moving farther away from the most basic accountability, and no matter how much our media authorities lie about it and help cover it up, the people we're occupying know full well what they're subject to.
We've disqualified ourselves from ever winning hearts and minds, and the only alternatives are capitulation to local authorities (however good or bad they may be, whether Iraq has the next Gandhi or the next Idi Amin) and brute-force occupation in the manner of Hitler, Stalin, Tojo, and the like. All of Charles' blather about stability in the absence of attention to the basics of law and justice is implicitly an endorsement of the latter, the expression of the hope that we can be brutal enough to do the job and the belief that this is a good thing for us to be. If he were at all serious about wishing anything better, he'd have to give sustained attention to whether we occupy with anything that might be called a conscience, and that's just off the table for the War Party.
Posted by: Bruce Baugh | January 02, 2008 at 10:30 PM
Isn't the general right-blog position now that iraq is working, they were right all along, there's nothing to discuss?
And anyway, getting out of a war when there are signs of progress is like selling a stock when it's rising. That's as bad as buying when the stock is falling, and nobody would do either one except half the people in each trade.
Posted by: J Thomas | January 03, 2008 at 12:49 AM
Mr. Bird, I don't think you understand the deepest problem with your graphs. They reflect estimates only, and thus some part of the improvements you cite may simply reflect a change in the estimation methods. Plenty of highly credible professionals, publishing in peer-reviewed journals (Lancet and John's Hopkins), have suggested that the US DOD has grossly underestimated the civilian death toll, so those curves may represent largely statistical noise. And those problems clearly exist, but you analysis has a different, more central problem.
I have family in Northern Ireland, and I have no doubt that the record of some of their experiences during the Troubles exists as numbers in a graph somewhere; indeed, some Pentagon briefer has probably plugged the numbers into a PowerPoint presentation on the prospects for counter-insurgency warfare.
But to my family, that history has meaning that numbers cannot convey. We know its significance in our own bodies, in our own blood. If you read about the hunt for the Bismarck in World War II, you can learn the tonnages, the death tolls, but when Ted Briggs, last of the "Hood" survivors, tells his story, his voice has notes in it I think only a shipwreck survivor can truly comprehend.
And since numbers cannot convey what these deaths, this nightmare have meant to the families of Baghdad and the rest of Iraq, so they cannot help up predict, either optimistically or pessimistically, what will happen to the political process that you need going forward.
The signposts do not look good; the political progress has not taken place yet, and the Troubles in Northern Ireland paralyzed the political process for a full decade after the end of active combat. But we can still hope that the Iraqis, having stared into an abyss more terrible than any in the recent history of Ireland, will decide to compromise.
Posted by: John Spragge | January 03, 2008 at 02:03 AM
You can do better than making such obviously wrong assertions.
Jes, the overall tenor of the post was of no progress or reversal. That's why it was a tough month, hence the title. The signs of small progress were overwhelmed by the casualty figures and the violence, so please stop trying to cherry-pick and weasel around. Oh, and here's another post on our lack progress. Here's a hint:
One other thing. Because of your past lies and mischaracterizations of my writings and views, I told you that I was going to stop dialoguing with you, and you agreed that you would stop dialoguing with me. There was no expiration date on that agreement, nor should there be given your latest offering. So please do us all favor. Be a woman of your word and live up to your end of the bargain.
Gary, asked and answered. The Iraqi PM supports the arming of Sunni tribes, provided the requisite controls are in place. Al Maliki represents the Iraqi government, so that's what the Iraqi government thinks. Why would al Maliki be accepting of something if he thought that such acts would foment civil war?
They reflect estimates only, and thus some part of the improvements you cite may simply reflect a change in the estimation methods.
John, the civilian casualty figures are facts, verified by indendent press reports. I encourage you to go to the ICCC site and see for yourself. The military casualty figures are also facts, taken straight from DoD by ICCC. The studies from Lancet are estimates, not facts. I don't discount that there will continue to be sectarian tensions, and the Golden Mosque bombing sparked a considerable amount of it. But pre Feb-2006 (but less so today), there were plenty of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad and other cities with mixed populations, living together. I suspect that most everyday people are OK with living among other types of Muslims, Christians, Turkmen, Uzidis, etc., but there is an ongoing problem with both Sunni and Shiite religious extremists.
Enough Charles, whatever happens now, will never atone for the sins of those who supported this war.
I'm not asking for atonement, Brennan. I'm most interested in finding the best approaches for turning the situation around, or at the least making the best of a poorly conceived and executed situation. To answer your non-rhetorical questions, oil production and electricity are at or exceeding Saddam-era levels. U.S. military casualties are at an all-time low. I don't know the answers to food production and civilian infrastructure. My guess is that the food supply is OK since we're not hearing MSM tales of starvation and malnutrition. The civilian infrastructure was pretty bad before we invaded, so I would think that it's likely better but not by much.
Posted by: Charles Bird | January 03, 2008 at 11:22 AM
Aren't there genuine logistical difficulties with continuing the surge at present levels?
The strategy is ongoing, Charley, and Petraeus answers troop-level questions in my second update.
Wasn't the whole deal here that the thing had to be temporary, and that it would be a failure if political structures weren't put in place that would continue the lowered pace of attacks?
The troop manpower levels are temporary, but the strategy is not. Successful COINs can take up to 10 years, and a key to sustaining the plan is the training of Iraqi forces to C1/C2 levels. The Iraqis initially set a political timetable that was unrealistic. We've now had three months of relative calm, so I'm willing to give the strategy a chance to continue.
But isn't a major component of our current strategy arming/paying/working with groups that will undermine any structures set up by the national government?
I believe that's one of the issues the national government will have to decide, specifically, how much power is held by the national government and how much is accorded the provinces.
Doesn't Sadr's strategy of waiting out the surge make these statistics seriously misleading?
I believe the strategy gets partially credit for motivating Sadr to stand down. That, and the fact that he lost control of his paramilitia at Karbala last August. If he's trying to wait out the strategy, it's going to be awhile.
What if the Iraqis don't want to be unified, democratic, or federal?
Then they'll have to rewrite their constitution, Russell. I've seen no indication of their wanting to do that.
What if they aren't interested in being our ally in the war on terror?
I'd rather not speculate.
What if the Iraqis respond to this progress by saying, "We'd like you to go home now"?
Then we should go home. However, last month the government made an agreement with the U.S. to have our forces in Iraq for the time being. There's no doubt they want us to leave, but not in a manner that will degrade the situation.
Maybe this time, Charles will respond to the point many people make about the surge strategy being non-operable for more than, at best, another year.
I did respond, MGK. The strategy and troops levels are two separate issues.
Maybe this time, Charles will explain to those who have asked him repeatedly how the surge can fix the apparently unresolvable political differences between the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds that are the root problem in Iraq and which the surge to date has not yet fixed.
All we can do is create the best possible environment for political progress to occur. Beyond that, your question is unanswerable because none of us has a crystal ball and none of us can foresee how political events will happen. I'm not going to make any forecasts, and I don't know if enough political progress will take place that we can say Iraq is a success.
Maybe this time, Charles will admit that his surge statistics are patently dishonest, considering that even by his own reckoning the casualty decreases begin before the surge starts, and that he uses an artificially shortened timeframe to make things appear rosier.
I won't admit dishonesty because there is nothing dishonest with cutting and pasting a graph which takes its data from independent press reports. I also linked directly to that data source. Because of that, I wholly reject your smear.
Maybe this time, Charles will actually address the basic point that the Iraqi civil war has by this point eliminated or segregated most of the mixed-ethnicity neighborhoods which were the flashpoints for strife in Iraq, and that the sole benefit of the surge is that it's temporarily preventing the all-out war that's the likely next step in this bloody conflict.
The flashpoint for the sectarian strife was the Golden Mosque bombing, followed by Shiite paramilitia death squads and their going after Sunni military age males, coupled with al Qaeda suicide bombings. I'm unconvinced that "all-out war" is an inevitable endpoint.
Petreus surrendered to the insurgents.
Curt, the coalition had been talking to the Sunni tribes for quite a while about joining forces against al Qaeda, and they finally agreed in Dec-2006. That's a diplomatic and military success, not a surrender. On your second point, the Brits did surrender Basra. On your third point, Baghdad neighborhood are now more homogeneous than before, but we're starting to see a net return of the internally displaced. We'll see if that trend continues.
The surge was a typically sophisticated PR ploy by the administration.
So this manual is also part of the ploy? The general is going by the book that he wrote.
Posted by: Charles Bird | January 03, 2008 at 12:29 PM
Charles Bird,
"Iraq's oil production has yet to reach levels attained before the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 as the country struggles with sectarian fighting and attacks on its energy infrastructure."
To contact the reporter on this story: Mark Shenk in New York at [email protected] ; Nesa Subrahmaniyan in Singapore at [email protected]
Last Updated: January 2, 2008 16:02 EST
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=aqVlMdAxVyzM&refer=canada
Posted by: S Brennan | January 03, 2008 at 12:55 PM
...but I don't see any reference to the principles of counter-insurgency or the relevant precedents to back up this assertion.
I don't believe I'm obligated to link to the COIN every I time a post on the strategy, byrning, but here it is.
The goal of counter-insurgency is to impose your preferred political solution through military means.
I don't see that goal anywhere in the manual. Here's a relevant excerpt:
Charles, are yu in favor of a tax increae to pay for the war?
At this time, no, Wonkie. As a percentage of GDP, our deficit is OK.
Are you in favor of continuing to cut taxes for the rich during the war?
No.
Or are you just going to leave it to your children to pay for this?
Like we've done 39 out of the last 40 years? Yes.
BTW sincepakistan has real rterrorists, some of whom are in thier military and their intelligence services, and since Pakistan has nukes, and do you favor an innvasion there?
No, because Pakistan has 60 atomic bombs and 165 million people, to name just two reasons.
Posted by: Charles Bird | January 03, 2008 at 01:09 PM
Charles: "Al Maliki represents the Iraqi government, so that's what the Iraqi government thinks."
Let's discuss this further. As I said (many many many times), I'd like to discuss the Iraqi government with you, without bringing anything related to America into the discussion, as best as possible.
Is it your understanding, then, that Maliki is a dictator of sorts? Everything that Maliki says is gospel as a commitment for the Iraqi government? All Maliki has to do is speak, and whatever he says is authoratively representative of the Iraqi government?
It's not clear to me that you agree with any of those statements, so if you could clarify in fuller sentences your opinions of the above, that would be a next step.
Next I'd ask if you believe there are any other sources of power in the Iraqi government, and if so, who and what they might be? Does Maliki have to deal with any sort of contention?
"Why would al Maliki be accepting of something if he thought that such acts would foment civil war?"
That's a good question, Charles, to which I take it you genuinely have no thoughts?
Is it possible that other parties might have any ability to pressure the Iraqi government?
Is it possible any other governments might have a very large amount of leverage with the Iraqi government?
Can you perhaps think of two possible such candidates?
Might one be a neighbor of Iraq, and another a very large superpower with a very large military?
Do you think that one of those things might conceivably be related to your question?
I look forward to your getting back to me, and our proceeding from this small start to our conversation about the Iraqi government. Thanks!
Do you believe that progress on this is proceeding: a) not very much at all; b) minimally sufficiently; c) adequately; d) well; e) terrifcally? Please feel free to write a whole few sentences, or even paragraphs, on this question, if you feel at all inclined. Whoa, whoa! All your posts on Iraq are speculation. They're all about What We Should Do For The Future. You argue that "I think we should stick with Plan A" because you point to "trends" you believe you see, and from which you speculate that sticking to Plan A is a good idea.Is it your argument that "What if they [the Iraqi government] aren't interested in being our ally in the war on terror?" is an unimportant question and issue?
This won't do at all, Charles. You're doing nothing but making forecasts of "trends" and using them to justify why you "think we should stick with Plan A."You can't write monthly posts on "trends," projecting them, and advocating policy based on them, and then claim you're "not going to make any forecasts," because, you know, that's just not true. Saying it would be stating a falsehood: you are making forecasts and advocating policy from them.
Here's the big question: if you "don't know if enough political progress will take place that we can say Iraq is a success," then why, precisely, should America proceed as if it's a likely possibility?
If you can't answer that, all the facts and figures in the world about some other issue DON'T MATTER.
Challenge, Charles: write a front page post about your views on the Iraqi government, and the future of "reconciliation." Let's talk about it from there.
Posted by: Gary Farber | January 03, 2008 at 01:13 PM
"Counterinsurgents, in turn, use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging."
"[A]ll instruments of national power" includes "military means." "[T]o sustain the established or emerging government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging" is "to impose [the Iraqi government's] preferred political solution."
I'm not clear how you thought you were disagreeing. Or why.
You're opposed to deficit reduction?Thanks for your patience in dealing with so many questions!
Hope you had a fine New Year, by the way.
Posted by: Gary Farber | January 03, 2008 at 01:22 PM
Challenge, Charles: write a front page post about your views on the Iraqi government, and the future of "reconciliation."
Gary's challenge is a fair one, and if accepted would be extremely worthwhile, both for you and the audience at home. I would like to second it.
Posted by: spartikus | January 03, 2008 at 01:26 PM
Brennan,
There's a graph in this link. Iraqi oil production peaked in 1989 and again in 1999 at just over 2.5 million barrels per day. The latest State Department weekly update reported that Iraq is producing 2.5 million barrels per day, "which are back to pre-2003 levels."
Posted by: Charles Bird | January 03, 2008 at 01:28 PM
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