Obsidian Wings

The Emerging Democratic Majority

by G'Kar

A few thoughts on an interesting piece in the Washington Post, below the fold for those who prefer to skip on past.

Comment Junk

If you are still getting problems with the spam filter, let me know.  I've been trying to work with Typepad about it, and they assure me that it is doing better. 

Otherwise, open Christmastime thread. 

Military Musings

by G'Kar

Inspired by some recent reading, both here and elsewhere, I wanted to address some matters military. Since this post is somewhat meandering and since I'm just a guest here, I'll put the post below the fold so readers can skip past to the more important stuff.

The Lesson of 2007: Be (Better) Prepared

by publius

Looking back at Year One of Reid/Pelosi, I realize that my view of the Democratic leadership has been schizophrenic. On some days, I prefer a Kossian pitchfork. On other days, I sympathize with the formidable challenges of dealing with vulnerable members and legislative minorities with veto power. In this sense, I embody the fault line described in Matt Bai’s book. (ed. You mean you’re a billionaire or an establishment player or a blogger that matters? Um, no, that’d be a different sense there johnny).

Bai’s book (surprisingly good, though not without periodic flares of wanker) got me rethinking some of this stuff, and I hope to write more in the days ahead. But regardless of where you fall along the compromise-to-“no surrender” spectrum, everyone can hopefully agree that the leadership is failing (rather miserably, rather Gephardtedly) to look more than one move ahead on the political chess board. Developing strategy and tactics is tough stuff – especially considering that subjective ideological differences necessarily inform those choices. But planning ahead is not tough. It should be done, and the leadership isn’t doing it.

Throughout the year, the Dems have grappled with issues that fall right along what I’ll call Bai’s Fault Line (i.e., where it isn’t clear whether to compromise or go nuclear). These issues include FISA, All Things Iraq, telecom immunity, spending, AMT, SCHIP, and the energy bill, to name a few. The general pattern here was strong initial opposition (voiced in “no surrender” rhetoric) followed by either compromise or capitulation, both of which seemed meeker in light of the initial uncompromising language. Understandably, progressives vary on what the appropriate strategy and tactics are for each issue.

I won’t presume to have answers to these difficult questions – I’ve struggled with them all year, often inconsistently. (I’m just a caveman). But one thing I do know is that, regardless of which path the Dems ultimately choose, they need to plan ahead and adopt tactics consistent with that particular strategy. For the new year, I’m not necessarily asking the Dem leadership to compromise less (or more). My more humble request is that they just frickin’ figure out what they’re doing ahead of time, and plan accordingly.

The reason why planning is necessary is that both strategies call for very different tactics. For instance, the “no surrender” strategy essentially recognizes that no legislation will pass. Maybe strong stands will lead to a breakthrough here or there, but the ultimate result is generally stalemate. The point then of this strategy is not so much to persuade the opposition and to win in the short-term, but to scare them and win in the long-term. The aim is to politicize the issue and tee it up for the next election. In this context, the post-vote strategy is more important than the pre-vote strategy.

An alternative is what I’ll call the compromise strategy. This strategy actually envisions some form of final (if flawed) legislation, and thus calls for a different set of tactics. For instance, if compromise is your preferred strategy, you should avoid scorched-earth tactics that will chase away potential allies across the aisle. Similarly, if you know you’ll ultimately “settle,” you should lower initial expectations by refraining from promises and threats that everyone knows are non-credible (e.g., pretty much everything Reid says about Iraq spending).

Both political strategies are perfectly reasonable – appropriate in some circumstances, inappropriate in others. But both come with their own respective “tool kit” of tactics. That’s what the Dems aren’t recognizing. If they adopt a “no surrender” strategy, they must understand that the underlying point is politicization. They must understand that the “no surrender” strategy is almost always going to lose as things stand today. But that’s ok, assuming they’ve explicitly planned for that contingency. And if they haven't, the no surrender strategy is a dumb move.

Take Iraq spending. If you’re going to start with a “no surrender” strategy, you need to be simultaneously planning the PR rollout for the inevitable stalemate. Vulnerable Republicans should get blanketed with “he/she supports endless war” ads before, during, and after the debate. There should national media strategies, etc.

Even better, these individual arguments should fit within some broader narrative (again, one that requires advance thought). For instance, one such meta-theme might be that Republican filibusters are blocking popular measures that would improve Americans’ lives (it obviously needs Luntzian wordsmithing, but that’s the idea). Then, each filibuster would be exposed not only to a narrowly targeted attack on the merits, but would reinforce a broader political argument that Republicans are impeding progress, etc.

The Dems, however, aren’t big fans of chess. By only thinking one move ahead at a time (usually reactively), the Dems too often hit the sweet spot, by which I mean the worst of all possible worlds – i.e., a no surrender strategy devoid of no surrender tactics, resulting in excessively and unnecessarily flawed “compromises.” Because Dems don’t think through the endgame, they come out with guns blazing, promising to stand down the Republicans and bend them to their will. When Republicans rudely fail to oblige, the Dems flail about and – visionless – begin to splinter and get picked off. Rather than leveraging inevitable “defeat” to gain political traction, they cave and look even more pathetic than if they had adopted an “across-the aisle” compromise strategy from the start.

So that’s my free advice for the 2008 – listen to the Boy Scouts and be prepared. Whether it’s no surrender or compromise or a little of both, some advanced planning would sure go a long way.

And One More Thing...

by hilzoy

The Army's unwillingness to accept openly gay soldiers has always struck me as not just bigoted, but incredibly dumb. Placing heterosexism ahead of national security looks even dumber than ever at a time when the Army is having a lot of trouble recruiting and retaining people. But it's not just gays the Army doesn't want. It's not even gays and transgendered people. If you actually read the Army's Standards of Medical Fitness (pdf), you'll discover that the Army seems to have a truly bizarre devotion to the idea that only men and women with absolutely, completely normal genitalia and reproductive systems can possibly defend us in time of war. Among the people who do not meet its standards:

• Women who experience unusually heavy menstrual bleeding, or bleeding at irregular intervals, or no periods at all.


• Women born without a uterus.


• In men, "Current absence of one or both testicles, either congenital (752.89) or undescended (752.51) is disqualifying."


• And, for both men and women: "History of major abnormalities or defects of the genitalia such as change of sex (P64.5), hermaphroditism, pseudohermaphroditism, or pure gonadal dysgenesis (752.7) or dysfunctional residuals from surgical correction of these conditions is disqualifying."

Undescended testicles??? Unless I am very, very wrong about what exactly service in the military involves, I can't see that an undescended testicle would affect a soldier's ability to perform his duties. I checked to see whether undescended testicles might lead to some more severe problems later; apparently, they reduce fertility, which is hardly the Army's concern, and increase the odds that one will get testicular cancer. But since the Army accepts smokers, I can't see that this explains why they disqualify recruits with undescended testicles. As far as I can tell, the only remotely plausible explanation is that the Army has decided to constitute itself as a Defender of Binary Gender Norms. And that seems like a pretty stupid thing to do during wartime. Or ever, for that matter.

"Last year, the Army had to grant waivers to nearly one in five recruits because they had criminal records." If they're willing to overlook criminal records, I imagine that they're probably granting waivers to people with undescended testicles as well. But that's only a stopgap measure: the real question is: why on earth does the Army care whether or not its soldiers have undescended testicles in the first place? Why not just ask whether a soldier is physically able to do his or her duty, and leave it at that?

This Is Your Army, Breaking

by hilzoy

We hear a lot about how the war in Iraq is "breaking the Army." But while I have used that metaphor, I've never been comfortable with it. It's not as though one day we will hear a loud snap and find the Army broken in two. We will not get up one morning, flip a switch, and discover that the Army doesn't work any more. We will not have to hire a tow truck to drag it off to war. Whatever goes wrong with the Army, it won't be like that.

For one thing, there is no sharp, discontinuous transition between an "unbroken" Army and a "broken" one: the kind that happens when a plate shatters, a fuse blows, or a motor finally gives out. For another, a "broken" Army will still be able to function, more or less. It's hard to imagine circumstances in which virtually no one could be induced to join the Army, not even by very large recruiting bonuses; and as long as there are people willing to serve, we can expect that they will show up to work, more or less follow orders, and stand ready to fight if asked. So there is no sharp contrast between an "unbroken" Army, which works, and a "broken" Army, which doesn't.

What we are doing to the Army is less like breaking something, and more like slowly degrading its ability to perform its tasks to an unacceptable level. It's a gradual process, one that does not provide us with clear points at which we can look at the Army and say: well, now it is well and truly broken. It's not like breaking a chair or a statue. It's more like this (h/t Kevin Drum):

"Young officers (...) are leaving the Army at nearly their highest rates in decades. This is not a short-term problem, nor is it one that can simply be fixed with money. A private-sector company or another government agency can address a shortage of middle managers by hiring more middle managers. In the Army's rigid hierarchy, all officers start out at the bottom, as second lieutenants. A decline in officer retention, in other words, threatens both the Army's current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its long-term institutional future. And though many senior Pentagon leaders are quite aware of the problem, there's only so much they can do to reverse the decline while the United States maintains large numbers of troops in Iraq.

In the last four years, the exodus of junior officers from the Army has accelerated. In 2003, around 8 percent of junior officers with between four and nine years of experience left for other careers. Last year, the attrition rate leapt to 13 percent. "A five percent change could potentially be a serious problem," said James Hosek, an expert in military retention at the RAND Corporation. Over the long term, this rate of attrition would halve the number of officers who reach their tenth year in uniform and intend to take senior leadership roles.

But the problem isn't one of numbers alone: the Army also appears to be losing its most gifted young officers. In 2005, internal Army memos started to warn of the "disproportionate loss of high-potential, high-performance junior leaders." West Point graduates are leaving at their highest rates since the 1970s (except for a few years in the early 1990s when the Army's goal was to reduce its size). Of the nearly 1,000 cadets from the class of 2002, 58 percent are no longer on active duty.

This means that there is less competition for promotions, and that less-able candidates are rising to the top. For years, Congress required the Army to promote only 70 to 80 percent of eligible officers. Under that law, the rank of major served as a useful funnel by which the Army separated out the bottom quarter of the senior officer corps. On September 14, 2001, President Bush suspended that requirement. Today, more than 98 percent of eligible captains are promoted to major. "If you breathe, you make lieutenant colonel these days," one retired colonel grumbled to me.

The dismay of senior leaders at this situation pierces through even the dry, bureaucratic language of Army memoranda. In an internal document distributed among senior commanders earlier this year, Colonel George Lockwood, the director of officer personnel management for the Army's Human Resources Command, wrote, "The Army is facing significant challenges in officer manning, now and in the immediate future." Lockwood was referring to an anticipated shortfall of about 3,000 captains and majors until at least 2013; he estimated that the Army already has only about half the senior captains that it needs. "Read the last line again, please," Lockwood wrote. "Our inventory of senior captains is only 51 percent of requirement." In response to this deficit, the Army is taking in twenty-two-year-olds as fast as it can. However, these recruits can't be expected to perform the jobs of officers who have six to eight years of experience. "New 2nd Lieutenants," Lockwood observed, "are no substitute for senior captains.""

An organization like the Army, which cannot replace losses from its officer corps by raiding other firms' managers, cannot survive these kinds of problems without paying a very heavy price. Officers who should have been passed over for promotion will instead be given command responsibilities they cannot perform. They may endanger their troops, or lead people under them to quit in frustration, or, at worst, actually lose wars:

"But the greatest concern is how the exodus of the best and brightest will affect the Army's long-term capacity to win wars, counter threats, and keep the peace. Today's lieutenants and captains are the pool from which three- and four-star generals will be chosen twenty years from now. If the sharpest minds aren't in that pool, we could wind up—to put it bluntly—with a senior leadership of dimwits."

People sometimes talk about "doing what it takes in Iraq", or "giving the surge a chance", as though such choices had no actual downside; as though letting George W. Bush have his way on Iraq policy was like letting your child pursue some wildly improbable but ultimately harmless dream. "Why not let him try?", they say, as though he were a teenager hoping to become a movie star, or me trying to make the NBA. This is obviously crazy: nothing about Iraq is harmless. Our soldiers are dying in Iraq; our money is being spent there; our resources are being diverted away from places like Afghanistan, where they might have done a lot more good. And, to top it all off, we are doing damage to our Army that will take decades to undo, and that might prevent us from responding adequately the next time we face a real threat, rather than one that exists only in Bush and Cheney's imaginations.

Jayson Blair Kaus

by publius

If Mickey Kaus wants to use Slate -- a professional, well-regarded political "magazine" -- to parrot the National Enquirer's "story" on John Edwards, shouldn't Slate fire him if this story turns out to be wrong? I mean, if a reporter from Kaus's hated NYT ran with something like this, he or she would certainly be risking their career on it. Seems like what's good for the goose is good for the gander. If Kaus wants to be journalistically reckless (like Drudge), he should get his own blog.

Slate should understand that it too is now running this ridiculous story. And there should be consequences for doing so.

Let Your Edwards Work For You

by publius

Posts like this reinforce my growing view that Edwards is in a much stronger position in Iowa than the polls show. Specifically, Edwards benefits from the 15% threshold in a couple of ways: (1) he’s the most popular “second” choice; (2) his rural organization makes it less likely that he’ll come in under 15% in many precincts.

At the same time, I’ve noticed that Edwards is currently valued at around $5 on Intrade, compared to Obama’s $36 and Clinton’s $58. So here’s some free advice – if you’ve got some money burning a hole in your pocket, bet on Edwards right now. There’s risk, sure. But it’s a great value. If he wins Iowa, his price will at least temporarily multiply and you can sell before he flames out in the later states. Please send me a 10% commission if you win – and leave me alone if you lose.

On an aside, I think I might abandon law and become a political futures day trader instead. After all, blog junkies should have significant informational advantages in these particular markets. Take me for instance. I’ve repeatedly shown my political genius with such posts as “Why Kerry Will Win.” I should be able to exploit that type of Nostradamus-esque insight for some serious cash.

Some Thoughts on Huck Mania

by publius

I’m still catching up on the news, but I have a few quick thoughts on the rise of Huckabee (and the fascinating conservative backlash – see Steve Benen for a roundup).

First, regardless of what you think of Huckabee’s over-the-top religiosity, it’s shrewd politics. The knock against Huckabee has been that he lacks the organization and infrastructure to mount a serious campaign. For that very reason, I predicted (and I think I was early on this) that Huckabee would do little more than steal Romney’s thunder in the early states, thus handing the nomination to Giuliani.

What I overlooked, however, is how quickly Huckabee could assemble a viable infrastructure by becoming the evangelicals’ “guy.” Politically speaking, the great thing about social conservatives is that they come to politics already organized. Long before any candidates start organizing precincts, these people belong to churches, youth groups, choirs, etc. – i.e., permanent organizations with a great deal of trust and adhesion. For instance, if a few respected people within an Iowa Baptist church get excited about Huckabee, it’s easier to get the rest of congregation on board as well. And if these people have neighbors who attend a different church – e.g., the Methodist church down the street – well, you could see how Huck Mania could spread virally within a given religious community.

Bottom line, it’s much easier to take advantage of pre-existing infrastructure than to construct it yourself. And that’s what Huckabee seems to be doing. If he can solidify this support, it could continue delivering solid pluralities so long as multiple candidates remain in the race splitting the non-evangelical vote. [On an aside, this is precisely why union support is so vital to the Democratic Party (and why some level of “pandering” to unions is justified – it ultimately advances progressive policies).

Second, the fact that Huckabee is preaching the good news (code for “the gospel” for you godless heathens out there) doesn’t explain why he’s caught fire. Brownback, after all, pitched the same message, but never got off the ground.

I think there are a couple of explanations. For one, it’s a reflection of frustration. Evangelicals distrusted the entire first tier, and pinned their hopes on Thompson. Being the savvy, fiery campaigner that he is, he instantly pissed them all off with some careless words on abortion (for a GOP primary candidate). With Brownback out, Huckabee is the last (good) man standing.

But the more interesting explanation is that evangelicals see Huckabee as a more politically viable option than say Brownback. It’s a fascinating contrast of perspectives. As I’ll explain below, some Republicans are terrified of such an openly-religious candidate being the nominee. From their perspective, he’s too Brownbacky. But from the evangelical perspective, Huckabee is a lot more viable than someone like Brownback. Huckabee gets along with the press, appears on Bill Maher, is very personable, has executive experience, and so on. In short, they’re seeing Clinton while others are seeing Brownback. In this sense, Huckabee is like the image that is simultaneously a young pretty woman or an old hag depending on your perspective.

Third, the conservative blogger backlash to Huckabee has also been fascinating. Steve Benen has a great rundown of the various explanations for the backlash. One of these explanations comes from Kevin Drum who thinks the conservative establishment (being urban gingerbread latte drinkers themselves) is just as afraid of social conservatives as liberals are:

I think this brand of yahooism puts off mainstream urban conservatives every bit as much as it does mainstream urban liberals. They're afraid that this time, it's not just a line of patter to keep the yokels in line.

I don’t really agree with this though, largely because it gives mainstream urban conservatives too much credit. Sure, they’re not crazy about fundamentalism, but I don’t think they’re actually scared of it. In fact, I think they’re largely indifferent to it. To the extent they actually care about these social issues in the first place, they know that Huckabee’s fundamentalism will never command legislative supermajorities. And even if it did, most of them live in places (and with incomes) that keep them and their children safe from things like birth control bans or abortion restrictions. Let the poor 14-year olds in rural Mississippi fight that battle.

No, the fear is not of fundamentalism itself. The fear is losing. On some level, they know that these positions freak out mainstream America. That’s why Bush fumbled about on Roe v. Wade during the 2004 debates and could only bring himself to speak in code (“Dred Scott”). The backlash shows that these people – like much of the GOP establishment – are ashamed of this coalition. They're happy to make out with them behind the football bleachers on Saturday night, but ignore them in the lunchroom on Monday.

But still, the GOP needs them. And so the deal has been that “the crazies” stay below-radar in return for below-radar policies (e.g., judges, denying funding to international organizations who don’t believe in abstinence-based policies). Huckabee is a threat because he violates the terms of the unspoken deal.

The Big Boys on Hardball

by publius

I'm almost finished grading finals, so posting should be more regular soon. But in the meantime, political junkies might enjoy this Hardball debate among the three big-shot Democratic campaign managers -- Axelrod (Obama), Penn (Clinton), and Trippi (Edwards). (Via Politico).

A few notes here -- first, Mark Penn really shouldn't be on TV. I could almost smell him through my computer screen. To see what I mean, check out the exchange beginning at 3:50 (specifically, at 4:14). Penn, pretending to backtrack from the Obama drug allegations, goes out of his way to throw the word "cocaine" out there. Trippi rightly calls him out though. Penn's tactic here is hardly novel (see, e.g., Edwards praising Cheney's love for his lesbian daughter in the debate), but Penn is so transparently phony that it doesn't work.

Second, check out the exchange beginning at 5:30. The look that Trippi gives Penn at about 5:45 is priceless. It's quick - but it's just pure disgust. I thought it was hilarious.