The Iraq Block

by Charles

This post is a collection of observances from people who are (or were) there.  First, some excerpts from Michael Yon, who was earlier embedded in Mosul and has since been to Baghdad and elsewhere:

Often the most dangerous places in Iraq are at the front gates of bases where suicide attackers roll in. Outside the wire—and often inside the wire—is bad-guy country. A block away from a base might as well be a hundred miles away. We rolled out in humvees for what would be about a 1,225 mile trip inside Iraq, and another portion to Germany and back.

On the 18th, we drove from Baghdad to Ramadi for a “Transfer of Authority” from the 1st Brigade 1st Armored Division, to the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

Geraldo Rivera was there. He’s got a cool mustache. Monte Morin of Stars & Stripes was there. Monte’s a serious war correspondent. Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno was there. Odierno is a serious general who runs a huge portion of this war. Next time Odierno comes on the news, it can be good to stop and listen.

I've seen Odierno's name mentioned quite a few press reports. Good to know.

With the odometer running over many embeds, Mellinger has taken me about 4,000 miles (total) up and down Iraqi roads, visiting units from north to south, east to west, showing that the military truly opens their doors to writers who will stick it out. They don’t even have to like you: my fights with the Army are well-known, yet they continue to open their doors. There’s a lesson in there. I wrote that Iraq was in a civil war shortly after covering the first elections. I wrote about commanders who did poorly, and ISF units that couldn’t shoot straight, and I wrote about the veneer of victory in Afghanistan cracking under the weight of a poppy-fueled Taliban resurgence. Yet they still let me in.

It’s a reminder of why I am so proud of my country, despite our many problems. It’s also a caution about why we must stick with our people who have been mostly abandoned at war. I understand the position of the journalists. Especially the ones who get blown up or shot at fairly regularly, but the informed interest of ordinary Americans is critical to the outcome of this war. And the truth is that our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of whom rarely (if ever) see a writer, are abandoned by default.

Yon watches troop morale closely and mentions the following:

There’s a lot of talk back at home that morale among American forces is low here. While writing this, I called Rich Oppel from the New York Times, who is in Baghdad, to ask him how morale looked from his vantage. Rich said that a lot of the soldiers are not happy with the extensions of their tours, something I have heard soldiers complain about also. However, I watch morale very closely. More closely than all else. Low morale in a particular unit can be the result of poor leadership in that unit, or just not getting mail, for instance. But gauging morale is not a simple affair of asking a few soldiers. A person has to live with them across Iraq. Having done so, my opinion is that overall troop morale is good to high. (If their morale could be bottled, it would probably would sell like crack, then be outlawed.)

During this latest loop around, we visited American and Iraqi soldiers, and people in very different kinds of locations. Most of the things I saw, heard and smelled will never find their way into any particular dispatch. But they will be added to the near mountain of background facts that shape the context that allows me to speak with a little authority. Just a little. If morale starts to sag, I will be one of the very first to know. I’ll know it even before most of the troops know it. And if I see morale sagging, I’ll write about it.

I get the sense from Yon that the quality and character of our soldiers in Iraq are also good to high.

Next. The Small Wars Journal blog is an informative resource, and one of the more recent entries is from Bing West, a warrior-scholar who was in Iraq last month. The first part:

Overview. What is shaping up in Iraq? There are four ongoing wars. 1) Shiite mafias in the south, 2) Anbar Sunni extremists 3) Shiite ethnic cleansing around Baghdad 4) Sunni extremist car bombings in Baghdad.

1. In the South the U.S. is doing little. The energy sector funnels billions to corrupt officials, criminals, militias and insurgents. The Brits weren’t able to impose control. The hope is that the south remains a long-term mafia-type mess, and does not spill north to Baghdad.

2. In Anbar about 60% of the tribes are tilting toward the Marines and fighting the al-Qaeda types. Police ranks are swelling with tribal members. Anbar is improving, but how the Sunni tribes will work with the Iraqi Army, let alone the central government, is moot.

Prognosis for the next six months: Progress but no breakthroughs. The central government has to woo the sheiks and offer terms, figure out how police chiefs and Iraqi army commanders share power in the cities, and crack down on the insurgents captured in Anbar (put them away for life). Jails in Anbar are filling up, and the central government is not stepping up.

3. In Baghdad, as the Shiite ethnic cleansing advances, the front lines are easily marked by the blocks of abandoned houses. Checking the cleansing can be done by military means – barriers, patrols and the like. The Americans are likely to stop this and turn around the trend.

4. Also in Baghdad, the Sunni extremists strike with suicidal murderers and car bombs. It is unlikely, given a million cars, that a technique will be developed to curtail this inside six months. In most countries, bombers are stopped by effective policing and spy networks, and Iraq is years away from that. This is the Achilles Heel. No matter the progress on other fronts, the persistence of gore and Shiite mass deaths is likely to continue to fuel hatred.

What, then, is the biggest problem? How the Americans can infuse into the Iraqi army and police in Baghdad a sense of mission and even-handedness such that the Americans can withdraw from neighborhoods in eight to twelve months without backsliding.

Existing American military tactics and techniques are adequate to staunch the ethnic cleansing; to transfer those conops or to design substitute techniques that the Iraqi army and police can use – and to meld the army and police into a unity of effort – is a far more problematic task. On the other hand, I’ve seen enough examples of tough Iraqi leadership at the battalion and police chief level to believe that some leadership is emerging. Right now, though, the glue is the presence of the American troops. They have to be out on the streets first, then the Iraqi forces fall in behind them.
The places in Baghdad where I saw clean streets, open shops, and guards on every corner were the Shiite areas. It’s too early to tell whether we’re dealing with a rope-a-dope feint by the Shiite politicians. It is in their short-term interests for them to help us purge bad elements, and restore order and services. But whether they believe a compromise with the Sunnis is possible or necessary – who knows?

The Sunnis--or at least the suicide-bombing terrorist variety--aren't helping. It's pretty clear that al Qaeda inspired Sunnis are doing their utmost to murder as many Shiites as possible and take out as many American soldier as they can. The Sadr-inspired Shiite militias are holding back for the most part, and it doesn't hurt that Sadr has stayed out of the limelight. Bing West caught my attention a few months ago with his Road to Haditha piece in the Atlantic, which I wrote about here.  Also in the SWJ blog is a link to a Vanity Fair piece on Rumsfeld and the six retired generals who dissented.

Bill Roggio has been putting together dispatches in the Weekly Standard blog, and his latest daily entry here. In his latest weekly segment, Roggio remarks on the Iraqi military and the adjustments made:

The have been significant changes in Iraqi Army policy for the Baghdad deployment, including adjustments to training and the liberal-leave policy. All Iraqi troops deploying to Baghdad are receiving two weeks training in urban operations at the Besmaya Range south of Baghdad. The leave policy, which often causes Iraqi combat battalions to be undermanned by as much as 30 percent, has been changed. Soldiers deployed to Baghdad will not be able to take leave during that 90-day period, after which the battalions will be rotated out of the city.

The Baghdad Security Plan is working to professionalize the Iraqi Army by teaching them to conduct long-term deployments. "They're learning about how to deploy their forces," said Lieutenant General Odierno. "They understand now what it takes to get them here at a certain amount of strength. And we're seeing significant improvement in that as we continue to move forward," he said.

In his March 3rd post, Roggio mentions manpower:

Baghdad has been relatively quiet over the past few days, with only one major suicide bombing, yesterday's attack in Sadr City. Much of the Iraqi and Coalition operations and insurgent attacks have occurred in the provinces. The Pentagon said upwards of 7,000 additional logistics troops would be needed to support the 21,500 soldiers and marines being sent in the 'surge.

Meanwhile, in Anbar:

The New York Times profiles Sheikh Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, the powerful tribal leader of the Risha tribe in Ramadi and leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, the grouping of 26 of Anbar's 31 tribes that are cooperating with the Iraqi government and U.S. military to fight al Qaeda in Iraq. Azzam looks at how Mahmoud al-Fahdawi, the leader the of the Dulaimis in Tarmiya, Dhaloiya, Balad, and Taji, has turned against al-Qaeda. The Dulami tribe is one of the largest in Iraq. What the articles miss is that the Anbar Salvation Council also includes former insurgent groups that have decided to fight al Qaeda. The battle in Amariya is but one example of this.

Sheikh Sattar is forming 8 battalions of tribal militias which are called Emergency Response Units, which will eventually become a provincial police force. Stars and Stripes looks at the successes of the 1st ERU, which is patrolling in the Jazeera region north of Ramadi. Three battalions are currently deployed, and Sheikh Sattar wants the ERUs to secure Ramadi.

Emphasis mine. This is an under-reported story: 26 of 31 sheiks have turned their backs on al Qaeda and are putting together their own security forces. Also in the Weekly Standard blog is Michael Goldfarb's piece on the role of airstrikes under the new COIN strategy:

The Petraeus Doctrine for fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations may be the best chance of success for U.S. forces in Iraq, but not everyone is thrilled with the COIN manual Petraeus recently coauthored with Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James F. Amos. John A. Tirpak, executive editor of Air Force magazine, writes that "Petraeus and Amos damn airpower with the faintest of faint praise." The Air Force, Tirpak says, "wasn’t thrilled about the Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency document, which the service said gave short shrift to airpower’s capabilities." Here's what Petraeus and Amos wrote:

In a counterinsurgency, airpower is mostly useful as a means of hauling around ground forces while keeping an eye on the bad guys. Air strikes are probably too blunt an instrument to be of much value, and ground commanders should think twice before asking for them. If air strikes are used, though, a ground forces commander definitely should control them.

The authors further warned that "commanders [should] exercise exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role," because even when those strikes are justified it still "works to the insurgents’ benefit."

Said one Air Force general, if airmen had written it, it would be "different."

The idea that the Air Force would prefer a different counterinsurgency strategy than the one set forth by the Army and Marines, aka the guys who actually do the fighting, is pretty absurd. Of course the Air Force would prefer a more prominent role in Iraq, and the increased funding that would accompany it, but it's hard to argue with Petraeus's logic: "Inappropriate or indiscriminate use of air strikes can erode popular support and fuel insurgent propaganda. For these reasons, commanders should consider the use of air strikes carefully during COIN operations."

B-52s will have their place, but it's clear that airstrikes in Iraq will be much more restrained. Another boot on the ground, so to speak, is Omar of Iraq the Model, a Sunni Baghdad resident and correspondent for PajamasMedia.  He's posted several times about Operation Imposing Law and notes that there is a trickle of residents returning to the city, violence has decreased, more checkpoints are in place, and new traffic controls are being implemented (the Economist has similar observations, IraqPundit is seeing Baghdadis return, and the Mudville Gazette reports a Brian Williams sighting in Baghdad).  However, the new Baghdad security plan has only been in place for three weeks and only about a fifth of the 17,500 new troops are deployed in the city.

On the political front, there have been some recent political advances, one of the most important being the new hydrocarbon law. Also important is al-Maliki's announced cabinet reshuffling and Iraq's participation in a summit with its neighbors.

Disclaimer:  None of the above should be construed as a lack of awareness that bad things are still happening in Iraq.

Comments

[Anarch]

Gotta run, but I think you've got some runaway bolding in the middle there...

[OCSteve]

Charles: Nice roundup. I especially enjoy Yon’s reporting and wasn’t aware he had new stuff up so thanks.

[Charles Bird]

Thanks Anarch. For some reason, I can't toggle between the "compose" and "edit HTML" modes and it's futzing up my editing.

[john miller]

Charles, good post. Actually your third in a row.

No doubt there are some signs of progress, but they all come with big ifs. If the Iraqi Army can do its job, IF the iraqi police can do their jobs, etc.

BTW, it has been known for a long time that many of the Sunni tribes in Anbar have a strong dislike for al Qaeda. Unfortunately, up until fairly recently, the US has not worked with them all that much.

This is why I believe if we left Iraq, al Qaeda would have a hard time surviving there.

[Jesurgislac]

So, once again, the situation in Iraq is turning the corner.

How many times is this now? Aren't we at least one and a half times round the block?

[Steve]

Michael Yon is a good egg. Always brings a valuable perspective.

I'm not sure who this Bing West guy thinks he is though, disagreeing with the Vice-President about the state of affairs in the south.

[ThirdGorchBro]

I haven't commented on The Surge yet, but I guess this is as good a time as any. It seems to me that these stories are passing over two critical points.

The first point is that, although US troops can achieve a measure of security (especially with smart counter-insurgency tactics) wherever they are present, there are still not enough troops to secure all the critical areas of Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle.

The second is that all the brilliant counter-insurgency in the world cannot achieve peace in Iraq. A political solution that is acceptable to Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds is still necessary. Right now, that doesn't seem to be in the cards. It feels like Bosnia circa 1992, where the factions would rather fight than talk.

It's good that the Sunnis are turning against al Qaeda. But if they start using their new militias for retaliatory strikes against Shiites, what's the difference?

I don't have a solution to offer. I still believe that the day US troops leave Iraq will be the day massive, open civil war begins, with ethnic cleansing and a lot of new mass graves. But with the current sectarian climate and our low troop levels, I don't see how we can make things permanently better by staying. And the American people's patience is running out fast.

[au pair]

Geraldo Rivera was there. He’s got a cool mustache.

Uh, yeah. Really edifying. Buhbye now.

[Donald Johnson]

Not sure what to make of this , but I'd like to know more. How common are these women's experiences?

[julian]

Any chance you could cross-post this at Redstate?

[Joshua]

Very interesting stuff. It shows that there's potential for making something not-completely-disastrous out of the situation, if we pursued sensible policies.

Unfortunately, we're picking a fight with Iran and pouring more American troops into Baghdad when the problem has nothing to do with lack of American manpower and everything to do with lack of Iraqi manpower and training.

And then, of course, there's the still-extant religious conflict between the Shiite government and the Sunni population. That the Sunnis in Anbar are turning on Al-Qaeda is good news, but is there any indication that they intend to work with Maliki? Or that Maliki intends to do anything but stab the Sunnis in the back as soon as we're not looking, for that matter?

So it's encouraging that there are small glimmers of good news here and there, but it's still a fucking mess in general

[Bernard Yomtov]

One small data point about counterinsurgency: I just spoke with a friend whose son is a Marine lieutenant in Iraq. Part of his job, which includes patrolling an area, is to become acquainted with the locals - actually to talk to them, etc.

He seems to have received no training in Arabic - not even some basic phrases. He did try to learn some on his own from a CD-based course he bought, and this has apparently proven helpful. Wouldn't a couple of weeks spent on this help the troops with this sort of assignment enormously?

[Anderson]

Odierno is also a bit of a thug; see Ricks's Fiasco.

[ScottM]

Thanks for a solid post Charles.

[Charles Bird]

Any chance you could cross-post this at Redstate?

I did, at the same time as this post, julian. I put it in the blog section and it was ignored.

Wouldn't a couple of weeks spent on this help the troops with this sort of assignment enormously?

Most definitely, Bernard, and we're not just talking about the Army or Marines. The SWJ blog has another entry on the problems at DIA, and the shortage of Arabic speakers is an issue.

[Jon H]

"It feels like Bosnia circa 1992, where the factions would rather fight than talk."

No doubt they'll keep fighting, as they try to push the other guys out of various areas and enlarge their areas of control.

At some point, they may feel content with their holdings, or they may reach a stalemate from which they cannot move the lines anymore.

In the meantime, I'm sure each side will try to use us as leverage to help them move the lines a bit. ie, if the Shiite militias are hiding from the US, then they won't be around to defend a neighborhood from the Sunnis. And vice-versa.

Charles writes: " The SWJ blog has another entry on the problems at DIA, and the shortage of Arabic speakers is an issue."

Which gets back to the gay Arab linguists cast into outer darkness.

You know, it just occurred to me. Gay Arabs might well be our *best* potential military recruits.

They'd have language and cultural skills, they'd probably be Christian, secular, or moderate Muslim, they'd have a big incentive to foster moderate, non-theocratic governments in the region, and if the recruiting of gay Arabs were done openly, Islamists would probably not want to join up in order to infiltrate and undermine the effort. Or if they did join up, they might not be able to keep their shit together, thus blowing their cover early on.

WHY AREN'T WE RECRUITING THEM?

[Jon H]

Um, just to be clear, when I say "Gay Arabs might well be our *best* potential military recruits." I mean in terms of Arabs, especially natives, not "the best potential recruits among all humans living".

[Jesurgislac]

WHY AREN'T WE RECRUITING THEM?

Because gays aren't allowed in the US military: and probably also because the deputy undersecretary of defense, and who knows how many of his underlings, believes that Muslims are idol-worshippers and Satanists, as we know because he said so openly without apology.

As you knew. But it's still a good question. Why is someone allowed to be deputy undersecretary of defense at a time like this when he thinks Muslims are idol-worshippers and Satanists and says so? Why does the US military keep kicking out good soldiers because they're lesbian, gay, or bisexual?

[ajay]

Jes: because the US military believes that there are more important things than winning wars.

[SomeOtherDude]

It looks like Bush and the Republican Party will be holding the troops hostage until the next election.

[ds]

I'd be interested to know more about the Brit's failure in the South. Is it now accepted that the Brits failed to deliver?

[gfw]

you mean "stanch" not "staunch" methinks.

[Jon H]

"because the US military believes that there are more important things than winning wars."

Such as making sure that the regulation US-34198-P423 Penis, Human is used only with the regulation US-987223-V77 Vagina, Human.

Rumor has it the US-987223-V77 spec. replaced the V76: Vagina, Human, Virginal, when it was found to be an untenable regulation.

[jpe]

A constant righty talking point is the "contrary to what we hear, moral is high." Yet I can't recall any claim to the contrary. My hunch is that this is an invented claim so that some kind of counter-MSM point can be won.