by hilzoy
I ordered my copy of Ron Suskind's One Percent Doctrine last night; and now that I'm done with my last post, I can write about some of the reviews it has gotten. (And yes, of course: Gary got there first.)
Consider this passage from the NYT:
"This book augments the portrait of Mr. Bush as an incurious and curiously uninformed executive that Mr. Suskind earlier set out in "The Price of Loyalty" and in a series of magazine articles on the president and key aides. In "The One Percent Doctrine," he writes that Mr. Cheney's nickname inside the C.I.A. was Edgar (as in Edgar Bergen), casting Mr. Bush in the puppet role of Charlie McCarthy, and cites one instance after another in which the president was not fully briefed (or had failed to read the basic paperwork) about a crucial situation.
During a November 2001 session with the president, Mr. Suskind recounts, a C.I.A. briefer realized that the Pentagon had not told Mr. Bush of the C.I.A.'s urgent concern that Osama bin Laden might escape from the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan (as he indeed later did) if United States reinforcements were not promptly sent in. And several months later, he says, attendees at a meeting between Mr. Bush and the Saudis discovered after the fact that an important packet laying out the Saudis' views about the Israeli-Palestinian situation had been diverted to the vice president's office and never reached the president.
Keeping information away from the president, Mr. Suskind argues, was a calculated White House strategy that gave Mr. Bush "plausible deniability" from Mr. Cheney's point of view, and that perfectly meshed with the commander in chief's own impatience with policy details. Suggesting that Mr. Bush deliberately did not read the full National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which was delivered to the White House in the fall of 2002, Mr. Suskind writes: "Keeping certain knowledge from Bush — much of it shrouded, as well, by classification — meant that the president, whose each word circles the globe, could advance various strategies by saying whatever was needed. He could essentially be 'deniable' about his own statements."
"Whether Cheney's innovations were tailored to match Bush's inclinations, or vice versa, is almost immaterial," Mr. Suskind continues. "It was a firm fit. Under this strategic model, reading the entire N.I.E. would be problematic for Bush: it could hem in the president's rhetoric, a key weapon in the march to war. He would know too much.""
If, in the runup to the war, the President didn't bother to read the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, then -- well, I just don't know what to say. Note that while Suskind calls this 'plausible deniability', it's quite different from what people usually mean when they use that phrase. Normally, the idea is that you decide on a basic policy, and then you are not told about some of the things that are done in implementing it, so that you can deny knowing about them. This is sleazy and wrong, but it's entirely different from not reading the information you need to know about in order to make your decision in the first place, so that you can then deny knowing about that. That's not just wrong; it's insane -- especially when you're making a decision as momentous as going to war.
Not reading the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq means not reading the intelligence community's best estimate of how great a threat Saddam Hussein actually was. Not taking that into account before you send men and women off to die is beyond irresponsible, as is not bothering to know things like: the fact that the CIA was worried that Osama bin Laden might escape from Tora Bora. The CIA briefer who realized that no one had told Bush about this is presumably the same one the Washington Post's review describes here:
" Three months later, with bin Laden holed up in the Afghan mountain redoubt of Tora Bora, the CIA official managing the Afghanistan campaign, Henry A. Crumpton (now the State Department's counterterrorism chief), brought a detailed map to Bush and Cheney. White House accounts have long insisted that Bush had every reason to believe that Pakistan's army and pro-U.S. Afghan militias had bin Laden cornered and that there was no reason to commit large numbers of U.S. troops to get him. But Crumpton's message in the Oval Office, as told through Suskind, was blunt: The surrogate forces were "definitely not" up to the job, and "we're going to lose our prey if we're not careful.""
And yet, oddly, we let the surrogates handle it, and bin Laden escaped. Gosh: how could that have happened?
Note something about this. In order not to know these sorts of details, it's not enough that people not tell you. If you're at all curious, or even just determined to do your job, you will ask questions like: how much of a threat is Saddam Hussein? or: how sure are we that we've blocked the exits out of Tora Bora? You might even go so far as to consult several people about the answers to these questions. If you're the President and you display even minimal curiosity, you will probably get those answers. But Bush didn't. And now Osama bin Laden is still at large, Iraq is collapsing, and 2500 soldiers are dead. Great.
Consider this passage, from the Post's review:
"The book's opening anecdote tells of an unnamed CIA briefer who flew to Bush's Texas ranch during the scary summer of 2001, amid a flurry of reports of a pending al-Qaeda attack, to call the president's attention personally to the now-famous Aug. 6, 2001, memo titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." Bush reportedly heard the briefer out and replied: "All right. You've covered your ass, now.""
This, of course, was back when George Tenet and Richard Clarke were running around with their hair on fire, trying to get some attention. No wonder they failed. But hey: a lot of brush got cleared.
A lot of people have cited this passage, from the same review:
"Abu Zubaydah, his captors discovered, turned out to be mentally ill and nothing like the pivotal figure they supposed him to be. CIA and FBI analysts, poring over a diary he kept for more than a decade, found entries "in the voice of three people: Hani 1, Hani 2, and Hani 3" -- a boy, a young man and a middle-aged alter ego. All three recorded in numbing detail "what people ate, or wore, or trifling things they said." Dan Coleman, then the FBI's top al-Qaeda analyst, told a senior bureau official, "This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality."
Abu Zubaydah also appeared to know nothing about terrorist operations; rather, he was al-Qaeda's go-to guy for minor logistics -- travel for wives and children and the like. That judgment was "echoed at the top of CIA and was, of course, briefed to the President and Vice President," Suskind writes. And yet somehow, in a speech delivered two weeks later, President Bush portrayed Abu Zubaydah as "one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States." And over the months to come, under White House and Justice Department direction, the CIA would make him its first test subject for harsh interrogation techniques. (...)
"I said he was important," Bush reportedly told Tenet at one of their daily meetings. "You're not going to let me lose face on this, are you?" "No sir, Mr. President," Tenet replied. Bush "was fixated on how to get Zubaydah to tell us the truth," Suskind writes, and he asked one briefer, "Do some of these harsh methods really work?" Interrogators did their best to find out, Suskind reports. They strapped Abu Zubaydah to a water-board, which reproduces the agony of drowning. They threatened him with certain death. They withheld medication. They bombarded him with deafening noise and harsh lights, depriving him of sleep. Under that duress, he began to speak of plots of every variety -- against shopping malls, banks, supermarkets, water systems, nuclear plants, apartment buildings, the Brooklyn Bridge, the Statue of Liberty. With each new tale, "thousands of uniformed men and women raced in a panic to each . . . target." And so, Suskind writes, "the United States would torture a mentally disturbed man and then leap, screaming, at every word he uttered.""
So let me get this straight. We decided that Abu Zubaydah was both comparatively insignificant and insane. The President, though he was briefed on this, says that Abu Zubaydah was an important al Qaeda operative. Since he didn't want 'to lose face', we tortured him until he began to tell us whatever he thought we wanted to hear. And then we sent "thousands of uniformed men and women" off to investigate whatever he said.
This is not the way a civilized country behaves. This is not, for that matter, the way a country with minimal standards of decency behaves. And it's also not the way a country that actually cares about preventing terrorist attacks behaves. Consider those "thousands of uniformed men and women": didn't they have anything better to do with their time? Might they not have been better employed connecting some of those unconnected dots, for instance? Was it worth pulling them off their jobs just so that the President didn't have to lose face?
Suskind's last book, The Price of Loyalty, was one of the most fascinating insider accounts of the Bush administration that I've read. When it came out, conservatives reviled Suskind and Paul O'Neill, but now that it has become clear that literally anyone who criticizes the Bush administration (with the possible exception of Pat Buchanan) gets called a liberal, some conservative readers might want to give it a second look. What's interesting about it isn't the anecdotes that got a lot of play at the time; it's the detailed portrait of the administration and how it functioned, and specifically the astonishing fact that the Secretary of the Treasury was out of the loop on economic policy. I really look forward to getting Suskind's latest.
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