Pakistan and Other Stuff

by Charles

Dan Darling put together a couple of good posts.  The first urged Americans to send aid quickly to Pakistan in the wake of last weekend's quake, obviously for humanitarian purposes but also to lessen the influence of MDI ("Markaz ud-Dawa wal Irshad, a Wahhabi organization founded in 1987 by Zafar Iqbal and bin Laden's mentor Abdullah Azza"), the social services wing of terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba.  Like Hamas, LeT has a subsidiary that is more politically palatable.

His earlier post made the case that democracy is not a panacea for terrorism.  It's a bit of a straw man because I'm not sure who made the case that free and democratic societies are cure-alls for terrorism.  The ideology and its practitioners remain a root cause and they still have to be fought.  Killed if need be.  The post includes a pretty good strategy for defeating terrorist networks, posited after the London transit terrorist attacks.

While on the topic of Pakistan and terrorism, the Zawahiri letter comes to mind.  Some of these excerpts are familiar but the al Qaeda strategy bears repeating:

So we must think for a long time about our next steps and how we want to attain it, and it is my humble opinion that the Jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals:

The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq.

The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power.

There is no doubt that this amirate will enter into a fierce struggle with the foreign infidel forces, and those supporting them among the local forces, to put it in a state of constant preoccupation with defending itself, to make it impossible for it to establish a stable state which could proclaim a caliphate, and to keep the Jihadist groups in a constant state of war, until these forces find a chance to annihilate them.

The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

Removal of American forces from Iraq is now an al Qaeda cornerstone in its declared war against the United States.  In effect, al Qaeda has adopted its own flypaper strategy.  Zawahiri pays fleeting attention to the first stage, using our surrender in Vietnam as a basis for his rationale:

You might ask an important question: What drives me to broach these matters while we are in the din of war and the challenges of killing and combat?

My answer is, firstly: Things may develop faster than we imagine. The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam-and how they ran and left their agents-is noteworthy. Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them. We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us, wherein our lot would be to merely resist their schemes.

Zawahiri's spends quite a few words on Iraqi public opinion, desiring a jihad that has the widest popular support.  This explains why he asked Zarqawi to cool it on the videotaped beheadings and the bombings of Shiites and Shiite mosques.  He also suggests that al Qaeda infiltrate government in addition to conducting military operations, all toward the end goal of establishing a religious tyranny.  At some point the violence will abate, but Iraqis and Americans still have to remain diligent if al Qaeda members start running for office.  Zawahiri also understands that this is an information war:

However, despite all of this, I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us. And we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don't need this.

Zawahiri knows that media gravitates to the sensational, and that it can backfire on him and his jihad.  Interestingly, the final two pages finds him hawking his books and audiotapes.  All in all, the 13-page Zawahiri letter is thoughtfully written and coherent.  Too bad he's bought into such a repugnant doctrine.

Update:  Several folks have questioned the authenticity of the Zawahiri letter.  It comes across as authentic to me, and it doesn't strike me as plausible that someone made this up.  Courtesy of Liberal Japonicus, Michael Penn of the Shingetsu Institute penned a proper and more thorough analysis of the Zawahiri letter than I could muster, and he concludes that Zawahiri is the most likely author.  On the other hand, I'm pretty sure that this response from Zarqawi is not legit.

Comments

[Paul]

All in all, the 13-page Zarqawi letter is thoughtfully written and coherent.

Obviously, he never wrote for the Texas Bar.

[Jackmormon]

Charles, in that last sentence, do you mean "Zawahiri letter"? I'm a bit confused.

[Charles Bird]

Ack! I was thinking Zawahiri but my fingers tapped out Zarqawi. Typo fixed.

[John Thullen]

O.K. We need to invade Iraq again.

[Jon H]

Gosh, who would have thought Al Qaeda would love to trade remote Afghanistan for convenient Iraq as a base of operations convenient to all their targets.

Oh, me. That's who.

[Jesurgislac]

Removal of American forces from Iraq is now an al Qaeda cornerstone in its declared war against the United States.

Well, under George W. Bush's leadership, al-Qaeda tends to get what it wants.

[Anderson]

Note that the removal of the U.S. from Iraq is both an end and a means; its recruiting value is immense, Zawahiri notes, in the course of his complaining that Arabs won't unite for battle except against an America or an Israel.

Whatever his delusions---I can't imagine a Shia state friendly to al-Qaeda---you're right that Zawahiri is evidently no dummy.

[CharleyCarp]

Zawahiri is evidently no dummy

I guess I can agree with this in a relative sense -- compared to Zarqawi, for example. He's no General Giap, though.

The point Dr. Z makes about beheadings, though, applies just as well to bombs that kill Londoners of Pakistani descent. Or Italian-American firefighters in NYC.

Ask yourself WWGGD? In this circumstance, 'driving the US out' is no more difficult than toning down operations and allowing the Shia theocracy into power, unmolested. There will be time enough to deal with heretics and apostates once the Crusader has left the scene.

[Jackmormon]

Dan Darling's musings about cutting ahead of Lashkar-e-Taiba in providing aid to the Pakistanis affected by the earthquake seem rather, well, unseemly. I remember a lot of similar talk after the tsunami, and even some after that awful quake in Iran that destroyed Bam. I understand better now why Iran refused international aid after the Bam earthquake.

I guess foreign policy types in the US should be making cynical calculations about influence in such a way--it's just that, with all the armchair strategists writing all over the internet, we're doing so more openly than ever. And we shouldn't think that the people whose reactions we're trying to calculate have every reason to become every bit as (if not more) cynical about our motives.

Not only do I fear diminishing returns on our good actions, I wonder whether swooping in from a world away in order to cut out local (ideologically suspect) organizations isn't even couter-productive in our long-term goals of encouraging stable institutions. I don't really have any special knowledge here, just a growing sense of unease about the trend of using humanitarian aid for strategic goals in such a transparent way.

[freelunch]

I'm not sure who to believe, since this letter plays into both the propaganda of al Qaeda and the propaganda of the Bush administration, but there are news reports that some web sites generally friendly to al Qaeda have been saying that the letter is a fake.

[cleek]

some web sites generally friendly to al Qaeda have been saying that the letter is a fake

hmmm, Rove does have a history of stealing letterhead...

[Jesurgislac]

I'm not sure who made the case that free and democratic societies are cure-alls for terrorism.

Certainly not anyone who thinks free and democratic societies are a menace to be fought with terrorism.

[Ugh]

have been saying that the letter is a fake.

You know I thought that too, given that I think the first public report or acknowledgement of the letter came at the same time Bush made his "major" WoT address at 7am pacific time a few weeks ago, mainly because it sounded like the letter was repeating talking points that were in the speech (though I suppose it could be vice versa).

[Ugh]

though I suppose it could be vice versa

And I can't believe I've come to the point where my first reaction is to think that the letter was fake and released to help Bush's speech. Maybe I should take a deep breath.

[cleek]

Ugh, it was my first reaction, too.

Bush does little to inspire trust in those without a stake in the success of the Republican party.

[Ugh]

Bush does little to inspire trust in those without a stake in the success of the Republican party.

Or those with a stake, if they think a little.

[stickler]

Bush does little to inspire trust in those without a stake in the success of the Republican party.

Or those with a stake, if they think a little.

Depends on where they want to thrust that stake.

[liberal japonicus]

Pardon the long quoted comment here, but this is from a newsletter that I get that discusses aspects of the Japan-Arab world relationship and this discussion of the Zawahiri letter was quite informative. The author is Michael Penn, who runs the Shingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations.

WHAT WE LEARN ABOUT ZAWAHIRI AND AL-QAIDA

Part of the real excitement of this letter is that we finally get a credible account of how the Al-Qaida leadership views the "War on Terrorism" and the Iraq War at a private level. Of course, we have long had Bin Ladin's speeches on Al-Jazeera, but those we aimed at the general public, and could thus not be expected to be fully candid. Now, at last, we can really get into the heads of the Al-Qaida leaders and see how they think. This opportunity is long overdue.

Broadly speaking, we learn that Ayman al-Zawahiri is no mere fanatic, as he is often portrayed in popular culture. Certainly, he is committed to his religious ideology and sees things through that particular lens, but at the same time he is pragmatic and cognizant of the realities of the world. Indeed, one of his main points in this letter is to advise the Iraqi Al-Qaida leaders not to let ideological purity blind them to larger political realities. He writes: "I do not want us to repeat the mistake of Jamil al-Rahman, who was killed and whose organization was shattered, because he neglected the realities on the ground." He also suggests repeatedly that his own advice should be judged in light of local circumstances, which the commanders on the ground know better than he.

We get enough hints in the letter to understand that Zawahiri (and presumably Bin Ladin) is in Pakistan, but are isolated and on the run. It would appear that they have abandoned the appliances of modern life like cell phones, internet, and television in order to avoid electronic detection by the US and its allies. While this is certainly wise, it also means that the effective reach of the Al-Qaida central leaders is very short indeed. In fact, Zawahiri even admits that "the real danger comes from the Pakistani army" and that "if I could find a way to you, I would not delay a day." All of this suggests that we should not be entirely surprised if the news hits us one day that Pakistan has captured Bin Ladin and Zawahiri. It is a distinct possibility.

We learn some interesting points about Al-Qaida ideology that confirm earlier reports. First of all, if the Americans and Japanese call this conflict the "War on Terrorism," from al-Qaida's point of view it is the "New Crusader War." Zawahiri draws some of his analogies to the medieval period of the Crusades, and mentions Islamic heroes of that period such as Nur al-Din, Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin), and Baybars. While this analogy is nothing new in the Arab world (which has long asserted, for example, that Israel is analogous to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem), it clearly shows that al-Qaida has a symbolic and emotional vocabulary that can be just as persuasive to ordinary Muslims as Bush's rhetoric about "freedom" can be to ordinary Americans.

However, Ayman al-Zawahiri does not think only in terms of the history of Islamic civilization, because he also tries to draw lessons from events that are well outside of that tradition. He speaks explicitly at one point about the Vietnam War, writing that, "the aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam, and how they ran and left their agents, is noteworthy." In other words, Zawahiri seems to be suggesting that when the US finally gives up on Iraq, the end may come quickly, and so political preparations must be in place: "We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli on our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us, wherein our lot would be to merely resist their schemes."

More subtly, we can also see the influence on Zawahiri of various strains of Marxist and revolutionary thought. He speaks at one point of a "jihadist elite." There is nothing in the purely Islamic tradition that should give rise to that sort of notion. Clearly, this is an Islamicized version of the Marxist "Vanguard of the Revolution." This is less Muhammad and the Rashidun, and more Antonio Gramsci and Che Guevara. Other passages also betray these kinds of influences:

"We will see that the strongest weapon that the mujahedeen enjoy is popular support from the Muslim masses... In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows... our planning must strive in involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahed movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them... I repeat the warning of separating from the masses, whatever the danger."

One could even detect a curious mirror-reflection of the Neoconservative ideology of Leo Strauss when Zawahiri notes: "The Muslim masses do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy."

That Zawahiri is a man of the 21st century becomes clear in his observations about "the malicious, perfidious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and fabricated media." He even shrewdly notes that, "we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma."

The reason why the American Director of National Intelligence was willing to release this letter in full probably relates mostly to Zawahiri's comments about the political goals of al-Qaida in Iraq. It is in this respect that the Bush Administration gains its mileage from Zawahiri's letter.

The Bush Administration has been arguing that simply pulling out of Iraq is not a viable solution to the crisis. Zawahiri's letter strengthens their case. He sees events playing out in four stages of "fierce struggle with the foreign infidel forces":

1) Push Americans out of Iraq
2) Establish an Islamic Emirate in Iraq
3) Extend the Jihad to neighboring countries
4) Clash with Israel

He also states that, "the mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding sway over us. Instead, their ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic state, and defend it, and for every generation to hand over the banner to the one after it until the Hour of Resurrection." In other words, Zawahiri counsels a permanent revolution.

This is the part that the Bush Administration will play up. However, proving that this letter is not a Bush Administration forgery are the sections dealing with sectarian conflict, which don't necessarily play into the Neocon agenda very comfortably.

The Sunni-Shia civil war has already begun as far as Zawahiri is concerned. He notes bluntly, for example: "People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent of danger to Islam of the Twelver School of Shiism." (Statements like this certainly put the lie to any Bush Administration assertions that Iran and al-Qaida are working together as allies!). He also analyzes the current sectarian conflict in Iraq in the following manner: "the awakening of the Sunni people in Iraq against the Shia would not have had such strength and toughness were it not for the treason of the Shia and their collusion with the Americans, and their agreement with them to permit the Americans to occupy Iraq in exchange for the Shia assuming power (this interpretation of the origins of the current Iraqi civil war - which are actually quite convincing - do not put US Iraq policy in a favorable light).

One aspect hidden in Zawahiri's letter that is somewhat curious are the signs of Arabocentrism and a concern for local nationalism, which, in theory, should have no place in purely Islamic thought. He states, for example, that, "It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq." He describes Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia as "far-flung regions of the Islamic world," and clearly sees the conflicts in those places as a sideshow to the main event "in the heart of the Islamic world." It seems to me that in an entirely Islamic framework, it should make little difference where Muslims live. Zawahiri's concept of the "heart" of the Islamic world may betray a touch of Arab chauvinism. I doubt, for example, that Al-Qaida's old Taliban allies would feel that Afghanistan was just a sideshow.

More pragmatic is Zawahiri's concern for the effect of Iraqi nationalism. He asks, "Can the assumption of leadership for the mujahedeen or a group of the mujahedeen by non-Iraqis stir up sensitivity for some people? And if there is sensitivity, what is its effect?" This part should be seen less as an ideological flaw in Zawahiri's thought than as a prudent acknowledgment of political reality.

All in all, it is clear that Ayman al-Zawahiri is a sharp and intelligent man. Although he is fully committed to his beliefs - and is shaped by them to a great degree - he nevertheless retains a sense of pragmatism and flexibility that gives his program a degree of plausibility. Although I seriously doubt that Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is up to the challenge that he has set before them (what about the Neo-Baathists?); nevertheless, in the chaos that the Bush Administration has created in Iraq, they perhaps have an outside chance of making it part way.

[freelunch]

Thanks for the quoted analysis, lj. From the things I do know about the problems there, the analysis seems very sensible and the reasons for believing that the letter is genuine are fairly good.

[Tim]

I'll stick with Juan Cole's take that the letter is probably bogus. The timing is also way suspicious.

[liberal japonicus]

Another interesting take on the letter and the ME is here

Here's the Juan Cole post about the letter. His idea that this is an Iranian forgery is really mind-blowing (not saying that I disbelieve it, just that thinking about this brings back all those discussions about Chalabi being an Iranian agent)

[Phil]

The author is Michael Penn, who runs the Shingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations.

And I have all his albums!

[dmbeaster]

The thing looks fake.

Juan Cole's textual analysis seems pretty solid for the forgery conclusion, but it also seems odd to forge such a long letter.

Even if real, it is weird that it is so long. I simply can't imagine a security minded terrorist on the run penning such a thing. It reads more like a jihadi manual than a letter. And it also contains textual clues to there possible location adn situation; again, it is hard to imagine this guy putting such things down on paper that would be subject to capture.

The more interesting question is the probable source of the forgery.

[Slartibartfast]

Cole's analysis looks as good as it can look, given that I'm a guy who knows absolutely nothing about the topic. Assuming he's a great deal more careful in his area of expertise than out of it, he may have something there.

If we're brainstorming, I think it's a mistake to confine oneself to the either/or choice between it being US psyops or an Iranian forgery; couldn't it be both? Surely we have Iranian expats or agents in our employ... In any case, I'd want to see a second opinion on this.

[liberal japonicus]

Thanks for the shout out Chas, Penn sent out a second note after Cole's post. After noting that Cole's CV makes Cole's analysis much more credible than his, he argues his case as follows:

In analyzing "Zawahiri's" phraseology, Cole was particularly struck by the opening salutation which he believes would not be used by one hardline Sunni to another. However, he does note: "Because of the cultural influence of Shiism in South Asia, one does find that form of the salutation in Pakistan and India among Sunni Muslims." I would speculate that perhaps living in Afghanistan and Pakistan for some years may have rubbed off a little on Zawahiri, and that may explain the "discrepancy." I'm sure that living in Japan for eight years has altered the way I speak English to some degree. Perhaps Zawahiri has unconsciously picked up some of the local language as well.

The other ground upon which Cole questions the letter is in that it refers to Zawahiri and Zarqawi hanging out together in the distant past, when in fact they were enemies until recently. This raises a curious point: Why does the media keep insisting that Zarqawi was the direct recipient of this letter? Near the end of the English text is written the following sentence: "By God, if by chance you're going to Falluja, send greetings to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."

Say what? If this letter was in fact sent directly to Zarqawi, then why would he say that? Obviously, the intended recipient of the letter was not Zarqawi himself, but rather a close mutual colleague. I have no idea why the mainstream media thinks this letter was sent to Zarqawi -- people must not be reading it carefully.

But the real grounds why I think this letter is the real thing is because of the political logic involved. This letter is precisely what I might expect Zawahiri to privately write to a friend in Iraq. On the other hand, if we presume that it was written by US black-ops or a Shia group, it just doesn't work.

Let me give one example. Consider this passage: "the awakening of the Sunni people in Iraq against the Shia would not have had such strength and toughness were it not for the treason of the Shia and their collusion with the Americans, and their agreement with them to permit the Americans to occupy Iraq in exchange for the Shia assuming power."

Why on earth would either a US or Shia forger include such a passage in the letter? Zawahiri's analysis here would resonate strongly with most Iraqi Sunnis, and is in fact a serviceable account of what has actually happened in Iraq in the last couple years. However, a Shia forger would not write in such clear-cut terms about their own "treason" and "collusion with the Americans." That's too much of a sore spot to bring up like this. Likewise, an American forger would not highlight how cooperation with the regime in Baghdad constitutes "treason" and how big a role the US has played in bringing about the Sunni-Shia civil war.

To me, there's only one political logic that works here: Zawahiri wrote the letter to a friend in Iraq, and never dreamed that it would fall into American hands. I think that this letter is exactly what it is being billed as -- with the only exception being that Zarqawi was not the intended recipient.

I am a scholar, and I make mistakes. If some new information comes to light that proves Dr. Cole's instincts to have been correct, and mine to have been false, then I will cheerfully own up to it in the name of truth and better understanding. However, for the time being my analysis remains unchanged: I think that this letter is the real deal.

[Slartibartfast]

And then there's this:

Hmmm, indeed. Like IraqPundit said, I have no idea whether this actually is "psy-ops" or not. I'm more concerned with Cole's assertion quoted above regarding the language of the blessing.

Cole says that he googled the English transliteration (perhaps because his Arabic is not free of colecisms). Well, I did it in Arabic (even though I don't have a perfect Najafi accent), and, among the various results I found that would deflate Cole's categorical assertion, this one in particular stood out. It's the "minbar at-tawḥīd wal-jihād," a Salafi website. The greeting at the very top reads "waṣ-ṣalātu was-salām 'ala rasūli l-lāh wa ālihi wa ṣaḥbihi wa man wālāh." (Emphasis mine.) In other words, it's the exact same wording as the one in the Zawahiri letter. What's more interesting about this site is that it has a link dedicated to Islamist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi's former teacher!

Again, I have no idea whether the thing is authentic or not. Moreover, I'm not an expert on Islamic sects, nor do I speak Urdu at home or hang out with mainly Muslim Indians in Lucknow and Delhi, but this wouldn't be the first time we've been entertained by Cole's philology involving Salafi diction. After the London attacks, when Cole was busy making a fool out of himself, shooting from the hip, he informed us that Salafis would never use words like "baṭal" ("hero") in conjunction with "mujāhid." Of course, he was wrong, and I linked to a statement by Maqdisi, using the terms together! So there goes that!

Interesting, if true. Others have noted Cole's tendency to extrapolate the entire Middle East from Egypt, and this is another argument of that sort. Only with interesting facts to bolster it.

[Gary Farber]

"Dan Darling put together a couple of good posts. The first urged Americans to send aid quickly to Pakistan in the wake of last weekend's quake, obviously for humanitarian purposes but also to lessen the influence of MDI...."

So much for that.

"It's a bit of a straw man because I'm not sure who made the case that free and democratic societies are cure-alls for terrorism."

Who could that obscure person be?

I'm sure I recall you speaking of the Second Inaugural of The President with near-awe, Charles. Funny you don't seem to recall it: "The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies’ defeat."

"This explains why he asked Zarqawi to cool it...."

Does he? And then asks Zarqawi to say hi to himself if he runs across himself?

Me, I have no idea if the letter is genuine or fake, but since you directly assert the letter is to Zarqawi, Charles, and feel confident in discoursing upon Zawahiri's views, without even the faintest hesititation or caution or indication of even the leastest, remotist, possibility of doubt, and then you re-affirm your utter lack of doubt, you clearly are very firm in your views, based, I assume, upon your expertise on Zawahiri or Arabic or somesuch source of knowledge, could you enlighten us as to the source of your surety, perhaps?

[Charles Bird]

I'm sure I recall you speaking of the Second Inaugural of The President with near-awe, Charles.

Thanks for distorting my views, Gary. BTW, your first link failed. I've consistently said that, in my view, there are two root causes to Islamist terrorism. Free and democratic societies are a primary solution, but so is going on the offensive against the ideology and its militant practitioners. I've advocated more than one "cure", so your insinuation that I believe freedom and democratic is a "cure-all" is a false one.

Your other misapprehension is of my "utter lack of doubt" about the authenticity of the Zawahiri letter, since my actual statements did not reflect such a level of certainty. Another distortion by you.