by hilzoy
The reason I've been writing posts on Iraq is that I've been trying to figure out what I think of it all, and I wanted both to get a few large topics out of the way and to think it through as I wrote. In this post, I want to try to figure out what we can still achieve in Iraq, and whether it's worth it. To state the obvious: I am not an expert on Iraq. I am just trying to work this out for myself. Everything I say could be completely wrong. However:
I think we are long past the point where we can talk about "success" in Iraq. Whatever we do now, we have undone decades' worth of work containing Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, destroyed any air of invincibility that we had after the first Gulf War, bogged down our army, destroyed our moral authority both by allowing the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere to occur and then by not holding anyone high up in the military or civilian leadership accountable, done enormous damage to our alliances and interests, and on and on and on. I take all of this as a given.
I also think it is pointless to think about constructing any kind of model democracy for the Middle East. That was always a very long shot; to bring it off we would have had to plan meticulously, and then have everything break our way. We didn't; it didn't; as a result, I think this possibility has gone glimmering.
My modest goals now are two. First, we should, if possible, prevent the outbreak of a full-scale civil war. (In the comments to my post on militias, several people noted that there is already a civil war underway in Iraq. They are, of course, right. But it's a civil war within certain limits, of which more later.) Second, we should, if possible, prevent Iraq from becoming a failed state like Afghanistan, both because failed states are very bad for the people who live under them and because failed states are important to terrorists.
As I see it, Ted Kaczynski proved that you can be a terrorist without much assistance or infrastructure. But two things help a lot: money and a secure base of operations where terrorists can set up training camps and live unmolested. Non-failed states would have to be nuts to allow Osama bin Laden the latter. But failed states, which cannot enforce the law within their own borders, have no choice in the matter. A failed state is, therefore, not just a disaster for its own people but a danger to others.
The question is: can we prevent Iraq from becoming a failed state and/or having a full-blown civil war? And can we do so without instituting a draft, which we seem to be unwilling to do?
As I said, I believe that Iraq is now in a state of civil war. It is a civil war that we allowed to develop, not just by failing to provide security after the fall of Saddam, but by making it clear that the militias could operate freely so long as they did not attack us.
I think that this is a lot more ominous, over the long run, than the insurgency. (The insurgency is the militia (or: group of militias) that's dangerous to our troops. All the militias are dangerous to Iraq.) It is conceivable that if we left, the insurgency would stop, or (if not) that it might be defeated by a united Iraqi government. It is much less likely that a number of large private armies can be defeated by a government whose army, police force, and parliament they have already largely taken over.
Given the number of troops we are prepared to commit, we cannot defeat the insurgency, and we certainly cannot defeat all the militias currently operating in Iraq. What we can do, and are now doing, is keeping the civil war contained in certain respects. If the combatants attack us, we will attack them. Therefore, many do not. They can (apparently) work with foreign powers like Iran, but they cannot drag those foreign powers overtly into the civil war -- e.g., by allowing them to send troops. (We also deter Turkey from moving against the Kurds.) Moreover, the parties associated with them have to go through the political process we have set up while they simultaneously maneuver for power on the ground in anticipation of our eventual departure.
If we leave, all bets are off as to whether any or all of these limits remain in place. The worst-case scenario involves the entry of other countries, not simply through the provision of aid (which is happening now), but with their armies. Turkey could come in to crush the Kurds; if, say, Syria entered on behalf of the Iraqi Sunnis, Iran would presumably come in on behalf of the Shi'a, and so forth. Any of these would be a catastrophe.
And it's a catastrophe that becomes more likely if the other limits on the civil war are removed. As things stand now, the fights between the various militias are ugly, but not nearly as ugly as they would be if, say, the Badr brigade launched a full-bore attack on the Sunnis. In that case, foreign intervention on behalf of the losing side would, I think, become much more likely.
So that's one reason to stay: we are keeping a lid on the Iraqi civil war. The civil war is horrible for Iraqis. It is not at all clear to me that in terms of not being abducted, tortured, and killed for no reason, the average Iraqi man is better off that he would have been were Saddam still in power; the average Iraqi woman is clearly worse off. But while whether people are better off now than they would have been had we not invaded is very relevant to one's views on the wisdom of invading, it is beside the point for present purposes. What matters now is whether the Iraqis would be better off if we left. And if our leaving would precipitate a full-blown civil war, I think the answer is 'no'.
Moreover, as long as we remain, we can at least prevent al Qaeda from setting up shop in Iraq. And that is also a good thing.
***
If what I've said so far is right, then there's something to be said for staying: namely, that as long as we stay, the two really, really bad possible outcomes of the invasion will not materialize. The next question, I think, is: will there ever come a point at which Iraqis can prevent these two outcomes on their own, or do we have to stay there indefinitely if we want to avoid them? If Iraqis will eventually be able to do this on their own, then staying for these reasons looks like a decent idea. But if we'd have to stay there for the foreseeable future to avoid these outcomes, then looking for some other way to avoid them starts looking a lot more attractive.
This, of course, depends on the political process, and also on the nascent Iraqi army. Starting with the political process: as I see it, the various political turning points have followed a pattern. Whenever we can do something by an act of will (e.g., hand over sovereignty), it gets done. Whenever we have to plan and execute a complicated task (e.g., prepare for the election), it is done badly. Whenever something depends on the Iraqi people themselves (e.g., the election), they step up to the plate. And whenever Iraqi politicians have to agree on anything, it gets done, if at all, only after interminable squabbling and under heavy American pressure. It took them three months to agree on a government; Sunni participation in the process of drafting the constitution was an on-again, off-again matter until just weeks ago; and now they are having a lot of trouble agreeing on a constitution.
Moreover, the progress they are making seems to be occurring at the cost of excluding the Sunnis:
"A potentially more intractable problem in the long run was the disaffection of Sunni leaders, who have been largely excluded from the deliberations during the past week. The constitution has been written almost entirely by Shiite and Kurdish leaders, who said they had decided to leave the Sunnis out because they were being too inflexible.The support of the Sunni leaders is not necessary to complete the constitution. Because the Sunni community largely boycotted the election in January, it has only a handful of legislators in the 275-member National Assembly, which has authority to approve the document.
On Sunday, Sunni leaders complained of being locked out of the drafting process. They demanded that they be included and, if they were not, that the constitution be defeated. "There is still no active and serious coordination so far," 15 Sunni leaders said in a joint statement. "This constitution needs to be written by consensus, not simply a majority vote."
The agreement of the Sunni participants is viewed as crucial in helping to placate the larger Sunni Arab population, which formed the backbone of support for Saddam Hussein's government and provides the bulk of the manpower for the guerrilla insurgency. Sunni Arabs make up about 20 percent of Iraq's population."
The Shi'a and Kurds had promised that the constitution would be agreed on by consensus, not majority vote, in order to allay Sunni fears of being outvoted at every turn. So the move to exclude them is problematic. Moreover, if the draft constitution is very unpopular with Sunnis, they could block its passage. The Transitional Administrative Law, which currently governs Iraq, says that "The general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it." (Art. 61, Sec. E) There are, as I understand it, three majority Sunni governorates. If the draft constitution fails to get a third of the votes in those three provinces, it fails, no matter how many votes it gets elsewhere.
Suppose, however, that a draft constitution is agreed on and adopted, the next round of elections is held successfully, and a new government is formed. What then? The answer to this question, I think, depends on the Iraqi army. I am very, very worried about it. It's not just that it's not yet clear how many Iraqi units are either willing or able to fight on their own, or that we seem to have set them up to be dependent on American air power. It's that they have, by all accounts, been heavily infiltrated by the militias.
The ultimate point of an Iraqi army, surely, is to provide the Iraqi government with a force that it can use to counter any military threats that it might face. By far the likeliest military threat comes from the militias. That the Iraqi army has been infiltrated by some militias will not, of course, prevent it from moving against militias that have not infiltrated it in large numbers, like (I believe) the Sunni insurgents. But it will make it extremely difficult to use the armies to establish control over those militias that have infiltrated it. And this means that it will, in all likelihood, be useless as far as bringing either the Pesh Merga or the Shi'ite militias under control.
It will also make it very, very difficult for ordinary Iraqis to trust it to represent the government as a whole, rather than some narrower interest. Sunni Arabs, in particular, will have no reason to regard it as their army, or to trust it to protect them.
As long as the army (and the police) are heavily infiltrated by militia members whose primary loyalty is to their militia or their party, not to the Iraqi state, then it cannot bring the militias into line, and will not command the trust of many ordinary Iraqis. This is very bad news, and it means that as long as this is true, the Iraqi army will not be useful in ending the current civil war, nor will the Iraqi government have anything like a monopoly of force.
For this reason I tend to regard the political process we have created as hovering, in a sort of detached way, over a country in which people are fighting for power by non-political means (which is to say: violence.) The Kurds are trying to establish control over Kirkuk; the various Shi'a factions are fighting amongst themselves, and enforcing their version of Islamic law on people who do not want to abide by it; everyone is maneuvering for position; and meanwhile, this slightly unreal set of negotiations proceeds as though the state it is setting up will be able to function like a normal state, and in particular to enforce its decisions on recalcitrant parties. To me, this looks like an illusion.
However, illusions can have their own power. Many of the rights in our own constitution were fictions, as far as many of our people were concerned, for over a century; and yet the fact that we had that constitution, and believed in those rights, was not meaningless or without (eventual) effect. (Obviously, that this eventually made a difference would not have been much comfort to the people who lived and died without ever enjoying those rights. I'm not saying that the effect came nearly fast enough; just that, eventually, it did come.)
The Iraqi people seem to want a democracy. If a constitution is ratified, they will have the form, or the semblance, of a democracy. It will be merely a form as long as the Iraqi government does not have the power to enforce its decisions within its borders, and as long as other groups control the facts on the ground. But it is not inconceivable that it might, over time, acquire substance.
That, however, seems a long way off, and a gamble in any case. A more optimistic near-term possibility is this: at some point, the fact of a constitution itself might come to play some part of the restraining role now played by the US military. If the various militias and the groups that control them establish something like clear territories, and if they agree to operate within those territories without inviting intervention by foreign powers, then they might exercise control over their territories without launching an all-out civil war of the sort we want to avoid.
On this model, at a certain point the territories held by the various parties become clear, and meanwhile the government continues its detached, somewhat free-floating existence, making decisions on some matters, but generally playing two quite different roles. First, it serves as a fig leaf obscuring the de facto partition beneath. So, for instance, because the Kurds would control their territory without annoying interference from the central government, they could have what amounts to independence without provoking the Turks by actually declaring independence. Second, it constitutes a barrier that the various parties might feel obliged to show some respect for, since both the US and the Iraqi people might not look kindly on their violating it.
On this model, the various factions, and not our army, would have to prevent al Qaeda from setting up shop in their territories. This is least likely in the case of the Sunni Arabs, but as luck would have it they are one of the few groups that the Iraqi army could actually be deployed against with some prospect of success, since they have not infiltrated it heavily. It is most likely in the case of the Kurds and the Shi'a, neither of whom have any affection for al Qaeda anyways. The Shi'a would probably be a lot less reluctant to support Hezbollah, however; and it's not clear that we could stop them if we left.
And maybe the constitution would be transformed from a useful fiction into a reality, eventually. That is: the second possibility could lay the groundwork for the first.
A third possibility, of course, is that this feeble restraint just gets blown to bits as soon as we leave. That is a standing danger.
***
When I started writing this series of posts, I really didn't know what I'd end up saying. But now I think the following: the two things we must prevent at all costs are an all-out civil war and a failed state. Our presence in Iraq prevents these things. It is conceivable that, over time, the situation might stabilize to the point where our presence is no longer needed. It is also conceivable that it won't. But gambling on this is our only option if we are not prepared to institute a draft.
However, it is not necessary to keep as many troops in Iraq as we now have. I really, really hate to say this, but I think that Daniel Byman's 'drawdown option' (pdf; quoted extensively by Brad Plumer, where I found it) might be best. It involves a significant drawdown of US troops and a narrowing of their mission:
"The division would help back up Iraqi forces and deter Iraq’s neighbours from meddling – but it would rarely see combat on its own. These forces would act as a force multiplier... More important, the force would symbolise the US commitment to Iraq’s external security... The division would also inhibit a coup...The primary mission of the special operations forces and Marine battalions would be training. ... The United States might at times also use massive firepower on suspected [insurgent] bases...
The United States also should work to identify local warlords who are most able and willing to defeat the jihadists. These leaders, in turn, would receive additional US funding, training and, if necessary, intelligence and arms. We should have no illusion about many of these allies. Although ideally they would be both militarily capable and liberal democrats, in reality many of them will be traditional notables or thugs who have little patience for democracy...
The United States would also be able to prevent al-Anbar province and other Sunni areas from becoming foreign jihadist centres, as happened in Afghanistan. Such a prospect is perhaps the greatest disadvantage of a full withdrawal from Iraq.
Distinguishing between the foreign jihadists and Iraqi insurgents is vital here. The groups fighting the US presence and the interim government in Iraq today are a motley mix of ex-regime elements, foreign fighters, Iraqi Islamists (both Sunni and Shi’a) and nationalistic Iraqis. Iraqis fighting the United States and the Iraqi government who desire to preserve Sunni prerogatives, expand Shi’a power, or who are angry over the US troop presence in their country are of great concern in Iraq but – in contrast to the jihadists – are not likely to attack US forces around the world or strike in the US homeland. Thus, the United States should emphasise the jihadist danger over the local one.
The United States should make it clear to all local fighters that the United States will ally with their rivals if they work with foreign jihadists. Such an alliance would consist of training and supplies from US forces, money via intelligence officers and, if necessary, direct assistance from elements of the division. Given that most jihadists in Iraq are at best allies of convenience for local fighters, such a deal should not be hard to accomplish. Moreover, the foreign jihadists are located primarily in urban areas, where they are highly vulnerable if the local population turns against them in conjunction with local fighters."
Notably absent from this list is any mention of confronting the non-Jihadist insurgents.
As Byman says, it's really important to be clear about these narrower objectives:
"Drawing down without recognising the need to narrow objectives would be exceptionally dangerous. If the United States simply declares victory and reduces its presence, the remaining troops will have too many missions to carry out effectively with little sense of prioritisation. Moreover, the United States will not be prepared for some of the inevitably nasty results of a drawdown if it rosily pretends that Iraq has turned the corner."
The good news: we secure my two goals. We greatly alleviate the strain on our military. We prevent al Qaeda from being able to announce that it drove us out of Iraq. And while God knows this is as about far as you can get from being a sure thing, it's not inconceivable that a genuinely free Iraq might eventually emerge, and if we find something that a smallish force of highly trained soldiers could do to help, we can do it. The downside:
"Such a shift would entail considerable costs for Iraq, of course. The crime and security situation would get worse, as the limited policing mission performed by some US soldiers would end. Sectarian strife would probably increase, as communities looked inward for security. ... [T]he potential for Iraq to slide from civil strife to civil war is real. The implications for democracy would be considerable, as security in Iraq would depend far more on the goodwill of local leaders and warlords, few of whom are true democrats. Iraq’s ‘democracy’ would look more like Afghanistan’s.... Some of these costs, however, are already being paid. Crime and strife are rampant now. Several of the most popular political groups ... are groups that established themselves through their guerrilla role, not because they are strong peaceful political movements. A US drawdown, nevertheless, would accelerate these already unfortunate trends..."
Brad Plumer says that this plan "comes down to the Afghanization of Iraq", and he's right. It does nothing to ensure that the Iraqi people actually enjoy any of the freedoms we promised them. It relies on control by thugs. In the Shi'a and Sunni regions, the rights of women would be jettisoned. I am already furious that we left Afghanistan in this condition; I am not the least happy about recommending it for Iraq.
But that, I think is where we are: in a position where this might actually be the least horrible option available to us.
Two last thoughts. First, we had many, many better options available to us earlier. That we squandered them, and that our soldiers and the Iraqi people will pay the price, is something for which I will never forgive George W. Bush and his administration. The sheer irresponsibility with which we conducted this war is, in my view, criminal.
Second, to anyone who even begins to think that I enjoy saying any of this, that I want us to lose, that I'm just being defeatist for partisan reasons, that if we lose it will be not the fault of the people who botched this beyond repair but of people like me, or any of that, let me just refer you to the last paragraph of this post by the Poor Man.
***
P.S.: Of course, we should also do a bunch of smaller things, most notably announcing that we have no interest in permanent bases in Iraq.
Good post hilzoy. I think you are a little too optimistic, but if it were possible to salvage anything in Iraq it would probably be your program.
Posted by: Frank | August 22, 2005 at 03:09 AM
"As I said, I believe that Iraq is now in a state of civil war. It is a civil war that we allowed to develop, not just by failing to provide security after the fall of Saddam, but by making it clear that the militias could operate freely so long as they did not attack us."
This was the key mistake very early on with Sadr. He showed that we were unwilling to confront militias even if they attacked us so long as they made a public show of ceasing to attack us every so often. We would have been much better off crushing him and his militia brutally the first time--it is far easier for civilians to stomach one month of ferocious fighting rather than two years of medium-intensity crossfire. By the time we decided to take him seriously, he had already illustrated the model to use against us.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | August 22, 2005 at 03:14 AM
the two things we must prevent at all costs are an all-out civil war and a failed state. Our presence in Iraq prevents these things
I think you're being optimistic - not that I blame you.
Not that I disagree with your analysis. But the problem with it, as the problem with all intelligent, rational analyses of the situation in Iraq from March 2003 to the present day, no matter what the political complexion of the person doing the analysis - and I mean this from Tacitus and Sebastian Holslaw all the way through to the Plaid Adder - is that it presumes that the Bush administration wants to achieve something positive in Iraq.
(We still don't know why the Bush administration wanted to invade and occupy Iraq, as all their public reasons for doing so have proved to be lies. So it could be that their private reasons are in fact being accomplished...)
But there's nothing to suggest that this has ever been a goal of the Bush administration (with the exception of the usual hot air from Bush & Co: speeches don't count, action does).
I think the two most likely courses for the Bush administration are to move the goalposts, declare victory in Iraq to be whatever the current situation is, and pull out completely: or to just keep things going as they are, on the basis that American don't care enough about the number of US soldiers getting killed in Iraq to vote against them, and don't care at all about the number of Iraqis getting killed in Iraq, especially if it's possible (as it is) to keep that number fuzzy by refusing to engage in any official count of Iraqi casualties - and let the next administration have the problem of figuring out what to do.
Look at how the Bush administration has left Afghanistan, and how their supporters will still routinely claim that Afghans are better off now, because that's what they're told and it's not as if there are many reporters willing to go outside Kabul to report on conditions under the warlords: or as if the dreary truth is exciting enough for US media to pay attention to it. Afghanistan, if you're a Bush supporter, still counts as a success story.
Iraq, if left in the same state as Afghanistan, will count to Bush supporters as a success story. Unless, of course, a Democratic President wins the election in 2008, in which case I imagine, from January 21 2009, it will become legitimate to assert (a) Iraq is a failure (b) it's a failure because of the decisions of the current President.
I'm posting this on my livejournal, tagged in Memories as "Cassandra".
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 22, 2005 at 04:03 AM
The problem with the idea of crushing the Mahdi Army and killing Sadr is that al-Sistani, SCIRI, and al-Dawa would likely have turned against the coalition. Not so much from out of love for Sadr, but simply b/c Sadr still holds the loyalty of millions of poor, urbanized Shia in Baghdad and the south. Sistani sees Shia unity as being the only way that the Shia can finally take and hold power in Iraq, and without Sadr there would be no unity.
Beyond that, the original sin of militia toleration should not begin with not crushing the Mahdi Army but rather allowing the Kurdish parties to seize and hold power in the north and doing the same for the Badr Brigades (and the Mahdi Army) to do so in the south. But we didn't have the troops to hold the country without them --- back to Shinseki, Rumsfeld, et al.
Posted by: Ckrisz | August 22, 2005 at 04:07 AM
Excellent post, hilzoy. If this is optimism, just shoot me.
....
I read some recent analysis that guessed on best evidence that Sadr was sent into Najaf on orders from Khameini in Iran. Two results were possible: the one that ckrisz states in his first paragraph above, and what actually happened.
And it appears what actually happened was that Sistani and Da'wa (Jaafari and other exiles) somehow lost political ground to Sadr, SCIRI, and Iranian sympathizers. Reference the mayoral replacement, who should have been Da'wa but ended up SCIRI. This was the expected and more desired result, a weakening of Sistani. Even tho the opposite appeared the case at the time.
Iran is seriously grabbing control of that country.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | August 22, 2005 at 04:49 AM
I couldn't disagree more with Byman's choice of emphasis here. What influence do foreign jihadists have on Iraq's democracy or security prospects? We don't know how many such jihadists there are. Most reckonings tally them at being a very small proportion of the insurgency, let alone the militias. We don't know what the political influence of these foreign jihadists is, if any. Plus, if you take Rumsfeldian reports of foreign jihadists at face value, our intelligence on their numbers and whereabouts is poor. It's easy to imagine that, with such misguidedly clear and gameable terms on the table, we'd open ourselves up to being manipulated. I remember reading about a number of scenarios in Afghanistan, where we were conned by local warlords into fighting regional battles for them on spurious intelligence that they themselves provided.
My worry about a drawdown is this: I'm really not sure Iraq right now has enough organization to mount a full-scale civil war. It's simply unclear how quickly alliances would form and how quickly fighting would spread. I say this because while it's becoming clear that Iraqis have sectarian and ethnic identities, it's not clear that they yet have a corresponding infrastructure (there's no state to their imagined nation).
Right now, intermilitia fighting is probably perceived as an lose-in-all-outcomes proposition. I can only speculate as to the reasons. Maybe because of the risk that US forces might intercede. Maybe because most regional militias are still waiting to see how things shake out above them. Maybe they are still learning the tricks of the trade of asserting control over their own region, as we're still very young in the life of the political organization of the new Iraq. But they've been patient, perhaps betting on a proximate US withdrawal. A drawdown to a long-term presence might induce someone to test that committment. Could scaled back forces prevent fighting between militias? My worry is that this is the more likely threat than a full-scale civil war between Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis. This kind of sporadic regional fighting could keep turn areas into perpetual terror zones, but its combatants would be, once again, not a well-organized enough force to either decisively defeat or decisively impose terms of surrender upon. This fighting could be ubiquitous, and yet not centralized enough such that there would be any one enemy our troops could move against.
I don't know if we could prevent ubiquitous fighting between militias now, let alone at reduced troop levels. So I guess the question to consider is whether this outcome should be put on the table, along beside the specter of full-scale civil war.
Posted by: Piscator | August 22, 2005 at 05:04 AM
Jes:
Iraq, if left in the same state as Afghanistan, will count to Bush supporters as a success story. Unless, of course, a Democratic President wins the election in 2008, in which case I imagine, from January 21 2009, it will become legitimate to assert (a) Iraq is a failure (b) it's a failure because of the decisions of the current President.
I think you hit the problem here: too many things in Iraq depend on US politics.
I think things can only get better after a change of government in Washington; perhaps a Dem. President with a Rep. Congres will be forced to be less partisan.
Posted by: rob | August 22, 2005 at 07:11 AM
I think the big problem with that proposal is that if the Iraqi army proves out to be worthless and a full-scale civil war starts, that single division is a goner. You're ceding the entire country to the militias, and you can't count on any of them staying friendly to the U.S.
You are also essentially telling the Iraqi army that they are the designated cannon fodder while the U.S. is just hanging around to bomb cities. How long could that situation remain stable?
Posted by: Tim | August 22, 2005 at 07:41 AM
So your proposing to tell the Iraqi's that we don't intend to have permanent bases while at the same time having your 'force multipliers' established in what, "indefinite timeframe" bases.
I think that the two suggestions are mutually exclusive.
The tactic of the insurgents will be to try to goad the US into attacks on civilians. This is the way these things work.
Posted by: ed_finnerty | August 22, 2005 at 09:27 AM
I don't think it is accurate to say that any one 'lost' this war in any conventional sense. It was unwinnable in terms of its war aims of creating a greater US/Iraq/M.E. Jeffersonian Democracy co-prosperity sphere with a unified Iraq at it's core. Nothing anyone could have done would have made this possible. Democracy doesn't happen this way.
Winning in any kind of rational sense was never possible. (for the US that is, Iran is a different story).
In the sense that it was "The War for Bushs Re-election" it is already won and it is time to move on. Of course it will also be known as "The War that established Bush in the Presidential Hall of Shame"
Posted by: ed_finnerty | August 22, 2005 at 09:39 AM
In the sense that it was "The War for Bushs Re-election" it is already won
Using the same criteria you have (what's actually happened), I've leaned toward "The War for Liberating Loot from the US Treasury (and Forwarding it to Favored Friends)."
We have freed the dollars. They are now securely stored in our military contractors' bank accounts.
Posted by: notyou | August 22, 2005 at 09:47 AM
as long as we remain, we can at least prevent al Qaeda from setting up shop in Iraq.
Right here is where I get off the bus. As long as we remain, Zarqawi/AlQ-linked terrorists will be tolerated, because they attack U.S. troops and Iraqi police/army(often via suicide explosions). If we go, Iraqis will no longer tolerate their presence, and jihadists will not be drawn into the country to join them.
I see no evidence at all that U.S. forces have the capacity to prevent jihadists from setting up shop now, or to dismantle their 'shops'.
Posted by: Nell | August 22, 2005 at 10:31 AM
Sebastian:
Your point about Sadr overlooks one big fact. At that time, it was already policy to tolerate large militias as long as they did not openly challenge the US. The Sadr lesson was that it was stupid to challenge the US -- the game is about preserving militia power to use against hostile Iraqis, and not US troops. The Sadr militia was too stupid at first to follow that lesson (although Sadr himself was "stupid" on purpose). They have since then.
Crushing Sadr back then would not have changed the current dynamic at all. If the point was to teach miltiias not to challenge US military power, most were already on board at the time. If the point was to force Sadr to cease his challenges to US military power, the point was made amply. The Sadr militia is not one of the the bigger more powerful ones, so crushing it back then would not have made much difference now. It remains marginal in relation to the other militias.
Your point: By the time we decided to take him seriously, he had already illustrated the model to use against us. No, he illustrated that his strategy was a good way to get your militia wiped out by US military power. Sadr's ploy gave himself power by being the one that would "stand up" to the US, but since then, he has kept whatever he gained from belligerence and followed the same path as the other militia -- its a waiting game to grab power once the US ceases to rule the roost.
Posted by: dmbeaster | August 22, 2005 at 10:38 AM
Dmbeaster
"its a waiting game to grab power once the US ceases to rule the roost."
exactly. Forget Afghanistan - this will be Lebanon. Afghanistan is a rural country. The Iraq civil war will be fought mainly in urban areas.
One year or one thousand years of occupation - it won't make a difference. When the US goes the militia war starts in earnest.
Posted by: ed_finnerty | August 22, 2005 at 10:50 AM
hilzoy:
Sneaky evasion of the posting rules by that link to the Poor Man, though he put it best on that one point.
Well, this post says over 90% of what I think -- especially about how the civil war is already on low simmer but that it can get a whole lot worse, and that militias have always been the wave of the future for Iraq.
I would emphasize that trying to build up an Iraqi army separate from such militia politics is impossible. The same factions struggling for control of Iraq politically are backed by large militias, and as they gain control politically they will be certain to utilize political control to also dominate the Iraqi miltiary. It will simply become another militia no matter what --- who is going to prevent it?
But I think one further point needs to be stressed, although I am certain it occupies an important part of your thinking though not discussed much in your post.
As a democracy, we are asking soldiers to go and be killed/maimed in Iraq.... for what?
To avoid a mess from becoming an even bigger mess? This seems to be the logic, and its an awful thing to require soldiers to die for that. What is even worse is that Bush will continue to lie about the alleged goal of the mission, so we are basically sending troops to be killed/maimed for a lie, even if accidently their presence does serve some other marginally useful purpose.
As a democracy, it is horribly corrosive to be doing this with our soldiers, even if their presence does prevent a mess from being a bigger mess. I agree with the analysis that the current force strucutre is preventing a bigger mess from developing, and is useful in that context, but morally is that sufficient grounds to send US soldiers to be killed/maimed? That's the question that keeps troubling me.
Posted by: dmbeaster | August 22, 2005 at 10:56 AM
hilzoy:
Sneaky evasion of the posting rules by that link to the Poor Man, though he put it best on that one point.
Well, this post says over 90% of what I think -- especially about how the civil war is already on low simmer but that it can get a whole lot worse, and that militias have always been the wave of the future for Iraq.
I would emphasize that trying to build up an Iraqi army separate from such militia politics is impossible. The same factions struggling for control of Iraq politically are backed by large militias, and as they gain control politically they will be certain to utilize political control to also dominate the Iraqi miltiary. It will simply become another militia no matter what --- who is going to prevent it?
But I think one further point needs to be stressed, although I am certain it occupies an important part of your thinking though not discussed much in your post.
As a democracy, we are asking soldiers to go and be killed/maimed in Iraq.... for what?
To avoid a mess from becoming an even bigger mess? This seems to be the logic, and its an awful thing to require soldiers to die for that. What is even worse is that Bush will continue to lie about the alleged goal of the mission, so we are basically sending troops to be killed/maimed for a lie, even if accidently their presence does serve some other marginally useful purpose.
As a democracy, it is horribly corrosive to be doing this with our soldiers, even if their presence does prevent a mess from being a bigger mess. I agree with the analysis that the current force strucutre is preventing a bigger mess from developing, and is useful in that context, but morally is that sufficient grounds to send US soldiers to be killed/maimed? That's the question that keeps troubling me.
Posted by: dmbeaster | August 22, 2005 at 10:58 AM
so we are basically sending troops to be killed/maimed for a lie,
What does it say about the state of the world when everyone knows that Bush is a liar, but everyone permits him to run amuck?
We know we are sending our kids to die for a lie? Should we not all be marching in D.C. as we speak if this is the truth?
The Europeans know it is all a big lie. Why do they not unite against the evil empire?
What does this say about the many who know that he is such a liar? Are they truly just dispirited and impotent? Could they be doing more?
Is there no one with the moral authority who is willing to stand up to the Bush cabal?
Or is just as simple as saying it's the fault of the mindless masses?
Posted by: DDR | August 22, 2005 at 11:12 AM
My apoligies. I just realized that's way off topic on this thread. If I could delete it I would.
Posted by: DDR | August 22, 2005 at 11:13 AM
Sorry for the typos, too.
Posted by: DDR | August 22, 2005 at 11:15 AM
Ed and bob are right. Iraq will be Lebanon, and Iran will play the part of Syria - a regional power whose control of Iraq will be tolerated because it brings stability. We've bought a Shi'a super state, and a better chance for Iran to develop nukes. We now have to hope that the Iranian regime, which we were previously committed to helping to overturn, stays successful and stable.
This, I think, is the optimistic view.
Posted by: SomeCallMeTim | August 22, 2005 at 11:19 AM
DDR:What does it say about the state of the world when everyone knows that Bush is a liar, but everyone permits him to run amuck?
We know we are sending our kids to die for a lie? Should we not all be marching in D.C. as we speak if this is the truth?
Well, I voted against him twice and marched, along with many of my friends, in protest of the idea of this war (before it was launched).
I don't know what else you expect. Having the moral authority to stand up to some one is not the same as having the "real" authority to take action.
What does this say about the many who know that he is such a liar? Are they truly just dispirited and impotent?
No, we're outraged and furious. I'm as disgusted with the democrats for giving Bush the authority to do this as I am with the admin. for doing it.
Posted by: Bobzilla | August 22, 2005 at 11:26 AM
Or is just as simple as saying it's the fault of the mindless masses?
they're not mindless; they're just slow learners. Bush's approval rating has dropped into the 30s.
Posted by: cleek | August 22, 2005 at 11:27 AM
cleek:
Slow learners, or else what Lincoln said about political deceivers that have some success in fooling some of the people some of the time.
____
It must be the time for this sort of thing -- Juan Cole has a similar analysis and suggestions about the utility of phased withdrawal. Maybe the conservatives should read this post and decide whether or not he is as unhinged as they claim.
I agree with a lot of Cole's thinking about phased withdrawal, and in particular the redefinition of the mission in that withdrawal. The key is to "soft cushion" the transition to blunt the possibility of an all-out civil war.
What a pathetic state of affairs.
By the way DDR, what do you think about sending your children (if you have them like I do - 16 and 18) to die for such crap? Do you like the idea of them dying for Bush lies?
Posted by: dmbeaster | August 22, 2005 at 12:06 PM
"What does it say about the state of the world when everyone knows that Bush is a liar, but everyone permits him to run amuck?"
Doesn't that pretty much describe the state of international affairs with respect to all sorts of things for the past 50 years? That is the diplomatic world--you know one thing, pretend it isn't true, and don't do anything about it anyway.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | August 22, 2005 at 12:13 PM
dmbeaster,
Yes, I do have a son. And like myself I hope he choses working in the military as a career.
But I know of no lies that have been told by Bush. I doubt you were talking about the lies the people lieing about lies.
Posted by: DDR | August 22, 2005 at 12:18 PM
DDR: But I know of no lies that have been told by Bush.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 22, 2005 at 12:25 PM
Bush will end up as the Republican's Carter...only the die hards will see the Christian love in his heart...all others will see a blind fool who uses his Christian love as an excuse for horrible vision.
Posted by: NeoDude | August 22, 2005 at 12:38 PM
dmbeaster, i am with you (i would not want to send my husband or children off to die for bush's lies), but i don't know that it's just a "mess vs. bigger mess" issue. as hilzoy mentioned, the degree of mess can directly effect whether iraq becomes a home to future terrorists -- thus the "bigger mess" can mean an even larger loss of american lives (not to mention innocent iraqi lives).
thanks for the great post, hilzoy!
Posted by: moosk | August 22, 2005 at 12:44 PM
Jesurgislac,
Unlike you I can distinguish between a mistake and a lie.
Are you claiming that we didn't find vehicles that looked like mobile weapons labs?
Posted by: DDR | August 22, 2005 at 01:16 PM
Color me skeptical...
"Looked like" mobile weapons labs? They didn't look like mobile weapons labs to me (not that I got to look up close) and they certainly didn't look like "weapons of mass destruction," which is how they were actually described. They didn't even have proper doors fercryinoutloud. Are you saying is that W is so staggeringly incompetent and out of touch with reality that even with the best intelligence resources the world has ever known at his disposal he genuinely couldn't tell the difference between "weapons of mass distruction" and weather research stations?
Posted by: radish | August 22, 2005 at 01:35 PM
DDR, what part of "We found the weapons of mass destruction." is a mistake instead of a lie?
And yeah, we didn't find vehicles that looked like mobile weapons labs.
Posted by: Tim | August 22, 2005 at 01:42 PM
Smarter trolls, please.
Great post, hilzoy.
Posted by: Catsy | August 22, 2005 at 01:51 PM
I have a question for those who originally supported the Iraq war:
Knowing what we now know, should we have invaded Iraq in March 2003?
I'm interested in both the yes/no answer and the explanation. I have vague impressions about how most of y'all will answer, but I can't remember precisely who's said what.
Posted by: Katherine | August 22, 2005 at 02:08 PM
DDR: some Bush lies:
-- 9/11 linked to Saddam
-- any time in 2002 -- I have not made up my mind about attacking Iraq
-- any time in 2002 or 2003 -- I intend to go throught he UN before attacking
-- we know where the WMD are.
-- noted above by Jesurgislac -- we found WMD.
-- aluminum tubes
-- Iraq trying to acquire yellow cake for their nuclear program
-- in 2003, Saddam would not let inspectors into Iraq.
-- pre-invasion; we've exhausted all efforts and war cannot be avoided
-- 2003 pre-invasion, we have enough troops for the mission. The military has not said it needs more.
-- 2003 post-invasion, we have enough troops for the mission. The military has not said it needs more.
-- 2004, we have enough troops for hte mission. The military has not said it needs more.
-- pre-war; the CIA is not aggressive enough about Iraq and WMD
-- post-war: the CIA misled us about WMD in Iraq.
-- everything about the Plame affair.
-- everything about Abu Gharaib.
-- the US is against torture, and to the extent it has occurred, its just a few bad apples.
-- insurgency in its last throes.
-- the US has no present intention to install permanent bases in Iraq
How many "mistakes" does the Bush administration have to make before you draw some other inference as the reason for this behavior?
Posted by: dmbeaster | August 22, 2005 at 02:20 PM
Katherine said, I have a question for those who originally supported the Iraq war:
Knowing what we now know, should we have invaded Iraq in March 2003?
I'm interested in both the yes/no answer and the explanation. I have vague impressions about how most of y'all will answer, but I can't remember precisely who's said what.
You probably weren't thinking about me, since I wasn't posting here when the war began, but I'll give you my dos pesos anyway.
Knowing what we know now, my answer is "no", but the tipping point for me is not the lies and bad intelligence that got us into the war, but the inexcusable bungling of the occupation.
If the inspections had continued and shown, inevitably, that Saddam had no serious active WMD programs, the sanctions regime against Iraq would have broken down completely, and Saddam would no doubt have resumed normal trading relationships with the rest of the world. This would have been perfectly fine in the sterile theoretical world of international law, but in the real world it would have been seen (rightly) as a major triumph for Saddam. He would have successfully outlasted the evil hegemonistic Americans. And what, realistically, would have prevented him from resuming his WMD programs at the earliest possible date? What would have prevented him from rebuilding the military that allowed him to be a serial aggressor against his neighbors? And what lessons would other rogue regimes have taken away from this mostly successful defiance?
If we had conducted a successful occupation, then I would have forgiven Bush whatever lies he told to get rid of Saddam. But we screwed the pooch on this so badly that we have now placed ourselves in an even worse situation. One thing hilzoy said that I agree wholeheartedly with is never forgiving Bush for the incompetence his administration has displayed in the occupation.
Posted by: ThirdGorchBro | August 22, 2005 at 03:21 PM
Unfortunately, fafblog's latest solution for Iraq is pretty much as good as anyone else's.
Posted by: Andrew | August 22, 2005 at 04:38 PM
"I have a question for those who originally supported the Iraq war:
Knowing what we now know, should we have invaded Iraq in March 2003?"
Short answer:No.
Why does this matter, Bush/Cheney were going in amyway? My support or non-support wouldn't make any difference to whether or not the war happened, but might make a difference in how it was executed. And the reconstruction.
I never believed in the WMDs. Even had WMD's, or capability, or desire existed, I still consider Saddam less likely to hand WMDs, should he obtain them, to terrorists than Pakistan, SA, or what we will apparently end up with in Iraq. We were safer with Saddam.
I do not yet understand the Bush administration's covert goals or purposes so I cannot yet judge their competence.
They lie.
However, I fully expected them to install Chalabi and institute a long-term steady state financial rape of Iraq rather than this quick profit smash & grab. There are trillions to be made over decades that will be unavailable to Halliburton. I expected this commercialization of Iraq, as it is in say, Saudi Arabia, to be of net benefit to the Iraqi people and stable enough to increase American safety and spread thru the region. This is not the path they chose.
....
I underestimated Sistani & Iran. Lord have mercy, we have met some grandmasters. With the skill they are currently showing, it is hard to understand why so little headway was made by the Shia against Saddam. I can only presume Saddam had other Sunni support in the region (and he did, as e.g. Iran/Iraq war) and that that Sunni support is being withheld until we leave and will be forthcoming and will really screw the place up.
....
I repeat, I do not understand what is going on. There may be geniuses in Washington that have a 50-year plan involving a Sunni/Shia regional war. I think they are evil for other reasons, and they may well be both evil and incompetent in their execution of the war, but I am not yet ready to make that call.
But it currently looks like America is much less safe because of the war, and so I will withdraw my support.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | August 22, 2005 at 05:00 PM
Oh. And the story is far from over yet.
If we withdraw down to 50k troops before the summer of 2006, and then attack Iran then or after the midterms, everybody's calculations and analysis may require some slight adjustment.
Or we could get another 9/11 event in America.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | August 22, 2005 at 05:06 PM
"Knowing what we now know, should we have invaded Iraq in March 2003?
I'm interested in both the yes/no answer and the explanation."
Hmm. My short answer is no, but probably for dramatically different reasons than everyone else.
I definitely believe that ending Saddam's control of Iraq--and being seen as the country or a large part of the coalition ending his control--was in the best interest of US foreign policy for a huge number of reasons which I have outlined at length elsewhere.
But I believe that Rumsfeld's demonstration of force--showing that we could defeat the Iraqi army with a minimum of force was deeply misguided, because in hindsight the Iraqi army wasn't the big deal. The problem was what to do with the country after the Iraq army was done, and that required more troops.
My belief that more troops could be obtained (and should have been obtained, and should still be obtained) by large pay increases and authorizations to have a larger military have already been hashed out elsewhere.
The key problem is that Bush, and Congress, and indeed the military lost focus after the Iraqi army was defeated.
It is said that generals always plan for the last war. We quickly beat the Iraqi army, and acted as if that was the hardest part. And in some wars it was--often because so much death and destruction took place in that portion of the war that everyone was finished by the time the army gave up. That isn't so in the relatively quick engagements we have been seeing. In this the First Gulf War is instructive. Saddam was pushed back, his army was destroyed (except for the part of it that we should have destroyed while they were retreating back to Iraq but not surrendering). But because it was so quick, and because of interesting quirks in Arab culture, he was able to turn the defeat into a propaganda victory by positioning himself as the pan-Arab leader who stood up to the US and survived. You can't think that you won just because the army itself stopped fighting.
If I could have an increased army and a focus on the aftermath on par with a focus on the war, I would still say that invading was not only justifiable, but necessary to good foreign policy.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | August 22, 2005 at 05:34 PM
Thirdgorchbro:
He would have successfully outlasted the evil hegemonistic Americans. Having done this by caving into our every demand regarding his WMD program. And by having to prove it by opening up his country to thorough, effective inspections.
And what, realistically, would have prevented him from resuming his WMD programs at the earliest possible date?The same threat(s) and snap inspections that kept him from pursuing them in the first place
What would have prevented him from rebuilding the military that allowed him to be a serial aggressor against his neighbors?You mean the military that got the bum’s rush out of Kuwait? Or the one that we just finished proving was absolutely no threat to our military might (in a conventional war)? I guess the continued threat of a big stick.
And what lessons would other rogue regimes have taken away from this mostly successful defiance?You mean mostly successful after being impoverished, dominated and continuously humiliated and threatened? I’m no Karnak, but I presume they’d take it that we’re a bit unhinged when it comes to WMD, especially after 9/11, so don’t eff with us.
Other than that, I think you're spot on regarding the execution of the war.
Posted by: bobzilla | August 22, 2005 at 07:46 PM
"The same threat(s) and snap inspections that kept him from pursuing them in the first place"
Those sanctions weren't going to be continued and the snap inspections weren't lasting forever (or even very many more years). The international will on inspections was proven in 1998, and 1999, and 2000, and 2001, and 2002. The only reason the international community bothered with inspections in the end was to stave off the imminent US attack.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | August 22, 2005 at 08:04 PM
bobzilla, Sebastian took the words right out of my mouth. I seriously doubt any effective and thorough inspections would have continued much past the ending of the sanctions.
Posted by: ThirdGorchBro | August 22, 2005 at 08:23 PM
Those sanctions weren't going to be continued and the snap inspections weren't lasting forever (or even very many more years)
Who knows what deals could have been worked out if the Bush Admin. hadn't been so hellbent on wrecking our diplomatic relationships? Since we're looking back in the past and speculating on what might have been, I think some incentive laden negotiating with the U.N. and NATO might have extended the sanctions indefinitely. If I really wanted to be conspiracy minded, I'd say Kofi Annan might have ulterior motives resulting in the extension of the sanctions.
Posted by: bobzilla | August 22, 2005 at 08:38 PM
If I really wanted to be conspiracy minded, I'd say Kofi Annan might have ulterior motives resulting in the extension of the sanctions.
Careful there, bobzilla, you're starting to sound like a right-winger. ;) "One of us! One of us!"
Well, like I said earlier, knowing what I know now I have to admit this war has been a mistake. Counter-factuals aside, we are definitely neck-deep in a mess of our own making. I don't think the best solution is just to cut and run, but I freely admit I have little confidence that this administration will achieve any satisfactory results in the next three years.
Posted by: ThirdGorchBro | August 22, 2005 at 09:51 PM
The most likely result of this post will be to forever condemn the practice of starting a paragraph with the words "I think..."
-Hilzoy
I think we are long past the point where we can talk about "success" in Iraq. Whatever we do now, we have undone decades' worth of work containing Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, destroyed any air of invincibility that we had after the first Gulf War, bogged down our army, destroyed our moral authority both by allowing the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere to occur and then by not holding anyone high up in the military or civilian leadership accountable, done enormous damage to our alliances and interests, and on and on and on. I take all of this as a given.
I also think it is pointless to think about constructing any kind of model democracy for the Middle East. That was always a very long shot; to bring it off we would have had to plan meticulously, and then have everything break our way. We didn't; it didn't; as a result, I think this possibility has gone glimmering.
-blogbudsman
I think we are certainly at the point where we can talk about "success" in Iraq. Whatever we do now, we have rectified decades' worth of work pretending to contain Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, implanted all measures of invincibility that we had after the first Gulf War, effectively imployed our army, established our moral authority both by responding to the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere to occur and then holding everyone high up in the military or civilian leadership accountable, done enormous building of our alliances and interests, and on and on and on. I take all of this as a given.
I also think it is an incredible undertaking to think about constructing any kind of model democracy for the Middle East. That was always a very basic concept; to bring it off we will have maneuvered deftly, and then have some events break our way. We did; it will; as a result, I think this possibility has save mankind as we know it.
Posted by: blogbudsman | August 23, 2005 at 08:26 AM
blogbudsman: we have rectified decades' worth of work pretending to contain Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf
Rectified "pretending" to contain Iranian influence by making sure Iranian influence definitely extends into Iraq?
implanted all measures of invincibility that we had after the first Gulf War
By making clear what the limitations of the US military are - that the US military can invade and defeat the Iraqi army, but cannot successfully* occupy a hostile country?
*Before anyone calls me on this: I acknowledge that it's possible that the US military could have occupied Iraq successfully, but no one will ever know, thanks to the Bush administration's bungling.
effectively imployed our army,
...by demonstrating its limitations. See comment above.
established our moral authority both by responding to the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere to occur and then holding everyone high up in the military or civilian leadership accountable
You do realise that this is the exact reverse of what has happened?
done enormous building of our alliances and interests
Managed to offend most of the US's historic allies, and still doing enormous, ongoing damage, not merely in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere, but from the decision in the Mahar Arar case that any tourist entering the US - anyone at all - can legally be deprived of all rights and held indefinitely.
I take all of this as a given.
That is your problem. For those of us who live in the real world, your fantastic beliefs are part of the problem. You need to accept facts, Blogbuds: not just invent things to suit yourself.
I also think it is an incredible undertaking to think about constructing any kind of model democracy for the Middle East.
Indeed it is. But, as you'll know having read Hilzoy's posts, Bush & Co never had any intention like that at the start, and never tried to think about it at all.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 23, 2005 at 08:49 AM
"Knowing what we now know, should we have invaded Iraq in March 2003?
I'm interested in both the yes/no answer and the explanation."
That's a tough question. If he would have allowed complete and full unhindered inspections I would say no. But, if he continued to be evasive I would lean towards yes.
If we were going to keep the no-fly zones then I would say yes also. The guys who fly the planes were already in a war. We needed to support their mission better.
At the time it was my belief that we would have had to go to war eventually. Hussein hated us and wanted to harm us if he could figure out a way to accomplish it. Sooner better than later. For me it was always Chamberlain versus Churchill II, except with different characters.
That was my thought at the time.
bobzilla : Who knows what deals could have been worked out if the Bush Admin. hadn't been so hellbent on wrecking our diplomatic relationships?
I'm confused do you mean deals Hussein and the terrorists could have worked out?
Posted by: DDR | August 23, 2005 at 09:20 AM
DDR: If he would have allowed complete and full unhindered inspections I would say no.
And, as he did allow complete and full unhindered inspections, you were against the invasion from the very beginning?
When did you change your mind and become pro the invasion?
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 23, 2005 at 09:31 AM
If we are always going to accuse Bush of being a liar I would be a little more careful:
"And, as he did allow complete and full unhindered inspections, you were against the invasion from the very beginning?"
Someone might think you are as bad as Bush.
Posted by: DDR | August 23, 2005 at 09:36 AM
DDR: Ah, so you simply ignore the complete and unhindered investigations that were taking place before the UN inspectors had to withdraw because the US were planning to invade. I see. Understandable: Bush ignored (and lied about) them too.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 23, 2005 at 09:59 AM
I guess I was just making it all up:
"But it's a soft start," Robertson said. "The U.N. has been checking sites familiar to both sides. Contentious presidential palaces have so far been avoided."
By contentious he means Hussein wanted to give us access, but we just didn't want to go in. We wanted war.
Posted by: DDR | August 23, 2005 at 11:21 AM
DDR: I guess I was just making it all up
I guess you were.
By contentious he means Hussein wanted to give us access, but we just didn't want to go in. We wanted war.
Precisely.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 23, 2005 at 11:29 AM
Jesurgislac,
Read what you posted and you will see why Hussein couldn't be trusted.
UN weapons inspectors visited this presidential palace in Baghdad on 02 December 2002.
It marked the first unannounced inspection of a presidential site in Iraq.
From our man Hans:
It's not Bush's fault Hussein didn't allow unfettered access in the beginning and that he kicked out the inspectors. Also, Bush gave Hussein another way out of war. He said he would allow Hussein to leave Iraq.
You act as if WMD was the only reason the US did what it did. Regime change was an official policy of the US and that Blix claimed his actions were insufficient. By the time you cite inspections were meaningless. If Hussein would have allowed that type of access after Gulf War I, Gulf War II would most likely not have occurred.
Bush did everything he could to avoid a war. Your real issue should be with Hussein, but oddly enough it isn't.
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iraqchron.asp>http://www.armscontrol.org
Posted by: DDR | August 23, 2005 at 01:00 PM
jes - "Rectified "pretending" to contain Iranian influence by making sure Iranian influence definitely extends into Iraq?"
mwah - It's not clear that Iranian influence extends Iran, let alone Iraq.
jes - "By making clear what the limitations of the US military are - that the US military can invade and defeat the Iraqi army, but cannot successfully* occupy a hostile country?"
yo - The only limitation that is clear is how extraordinarily difficult it is to not occupy a non-hostile country after a virtual root canal of its government and armed forces. The reverse example would be turning Syria back into an unoccupiable desert, which we could do with frightening ease.
jes - "You do realise that this is the exact reverse of what has happened?"
me - What has happened, jes? Thankfully, the smear campaign has probably had little, if no affect on our true station in the world. Our money is still welcome.
jes - "Managed to offend most of the US's historic allies,..."
me again - Our true historic allies are still very much with us. Those who never were, never are.
lastly - Come on, jes, somehow your admonishments don't play well on my side of town. I respect your agenda, and your skill at presenting it. We are political creatures, are we not?
Posted by: blogbudsman | August 23, 2005 at 03:00 PM
DDR: It's not Bush's fault Hussein didn't allow unfettered access in the beginning
...right, I see the goalposts moving. Let me remind you when the US invaded Iraq: March 2003. Let me point out to you when the UN inspectors were permitted unfettered access to the Presidential palaces: December 2002. Let me remind you that that's exactly what you claimed would have got you to oppose invasion... and that's what actually happened, months before the invasion.
and that he kicked out the inspectors.
Ah, the old lie. No, Saddam Hussein did not kick out the UN inspectors. In 1998, the UN inspectors were forced to leave Iraq thanks to Desert Fox: in 2003, the UN inspectors were forced to leave Iraq thanks to the US invasion.
Bush did everything he could to avoid a war.
Good heavens. Well, if you still believe that after publication of the Downing Street Memos, which show that Bush determined to invade from 2002, clearly no facts will turn you from your faith.
Blogbudsman, if you're living in a fantasy world where all senior officers responsible for the torture of prisoners by US soldiers have been court-martialled, there is really no point in discussing anything from the real world with you. Let me know when you're ready to come out of your fantasy and face reality.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | August 23, 2005 at 06:17 PM
Jesurgislac,
I guess you couldn't read this the first time for some reason:
That seems clear enough to me. It doesn't seem to me that you should accuse anyone else of living in a fantasy world when you don't even believe Hans Blix. If we can't trust him who can we trust?
And since we are talking about fantasy:
An impression does not a fact make.
From the memo itself:
Jesurgislac: show that Bush determined to invade from 2002
Well now I am just confused. C reported on his recent talks. So the minutes come from a meeting where C reports about a meeting he had in Washington? Is that right?
Anyway, notice that he reported there was a shift to war being inevitable. That's not really warmongering talk.
I could say that it is inevitable that you will reject my comments. But then again you might not. I think I will plan for the inevitable. It would only make sense.
Sounds more to me like the tone was, "It looks like we are running out of valid alternatives and this is the only course we see left."
And of course Bush went back to the UN and got UNSCR 1441 adopted on November 8 after the meeting.
Yes, the memo does teach us a little. But, not necessarily what you think. I think that last point validates that the US was still trying to use diplomatic means to resolve the issue.
And it looks like Bush wasn't the only one who believed Iraq had WMD:
And a side note for you:
"The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities."
http://intelligence.senate.gov/>http://intelligence.senate.gov
Posted by: DDR | August 23, 2005 at 07:40 PM
Having been catching up on blogreading, and having only just read your excellent post, Hilzoy, I'll only mention that I gave my own policy prescription here, which is far less detailed than yours. But, hey, someone has to be a Big Picture Guy.
Posted by: Gary Farber | August 24, 2005 at 01:26 PM
Why does anyone care wheather or not Iraq finds a way to democracy. If they get there, it will take a lot more work and lives on their part then anything we've seen so far. I say let them bang it out by themselves. If they want to change their way of life and loose the religous dogma that's been intertwined with their government for 2000 years let them have at it with the tools they have now. My hunch is they can't. It's no fault of theirs, they don't know what that looks like because they've never had it. Our administration can't/ won't articulate what "success in Iraq" would look like or what has to happen for the US to "win the war" so how can you achieve it? "Winning the war on terror? what is winning? Everyone in Iraq taking their ball and going home? If Bush expects that the insurgents will stop fighting for their country back and just walk away from a religious based government that the've had for a couple of thoudand years, I'd do some homework if I were him. Or, have an expert do some homework, If you're too busy vacationing in Crawford. What would happen in the US if someone tried to change our country into a Muslim nation? Put in a new government here based on Muslim values. Would we stop fighting?
You can't just go plant the rose bush of democracy in Iraq and hope it blossoms into a rosy out come. Is this model of "democracy" that we've planted there via our asinine President something that you would sign on for if you were a neighboring country? Please....we look like fools to all of our potential allies.
We blew it. Did no homework on how to succede. Had no idea who our "enemy" was. Made no effort to find out what made them tick. We tried to put "Christian values" in place of Muslim values and still we apparently have no desire to learn more about Muslims and what might work the best for all. We refuse to compromise or re-adjust, so we loose. We'll be paying for this blunder for decacades. Anyone know of a democracy that's flowered out of an occupation of that country by the US army that's succeded?
Well, lets plant that rose bush in Iran next and try that for a while. Maybe we can bomb our way to peace there.
Posted by: Michael Alexander | September 30, 2006 at 12:45 PM