More Bad News (Special Isfahan Edition)

by hilzoy

From the NYTimes:

"Iran removed United Nations seals on uranium processing equipment at its Isfahan nuclear site on Wednesday, making the plant fully operational, as envoys to the United Nations nuclear agency in Vienna continued to pursue consensus on the wording of a resolution calling for the suspension of Iran's nuclear program. The removal of the seals took place under the supervision of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear watchdog, after the agency had installed surveillance cameras intended to ensure that no uranium would be diverted.

The Iranians' move was criticized by the United States, which with Britain, France and Germany is pressing Iran to resume its voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment. The nuclear agency, based in Vienna, confirmed that Iran had removed the seals at the Isfahan plant, where a first phase of uranium conversion had begun on Monday. (...)

Signers of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have the right to process and enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. The European Union and the United States say they are suspicious of Iran's nuclear activities because Iran hid its nuclear program for 18 years, in violation of international law. Its existence was disclosed by an Iranian opposition group in 2002. Since then, Iran has remained in compliance with the treaty and has worked in full cooperation with United Nations inspectors, who have installed cameras in its nuclear plants and make regular visits and reports.

But the nuclear agency's board adopted a resolution in September 2004 saying that it "considers it necessary to promote confidence that Iran immediately suspend all enrichment related activities." The removal of the United Nations seals allows Iran to resume the second phase of the uranium conversion process, which Iran says it is pursuing for its civilian nuclear program. Production remains suspended on the more sensitive part of its nuclear fuel program, the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz. (...)

The removal of the seals was part of Iran's tough stance on its nuclear program under the conservative new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who took office this week. The daily newspaper Keyhan warned Wednesday in its lead editorial that Iran would withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty if its case was sent to the United Nations Security Council. The newspaper is close to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. European leaders have threatened to take Iran to the Security Council, but such a move is not on the table at the Vienna talks. Mr. Ahmadinejad has defended the resumption of work but said Iran wanted to maintain its negotiations with Europe. He also said his government would make its own proposal to end the standoff."

Great. First North Korea, now Iran. And at this very moment, the Bush administration has notified Congress that it plans to eliminate most State Department arms control offices. Maybe they're just thinking ahead: if things keep going the way they're going now, by the time Bush leaves office, dozens of countries will have nuclear weapons, and we'll be left with the much more tractable task of keeping them out of the hands of Sierra Leone.

At various points, some conservatives have talked about bombing or invading Iran. Just about a week ago, the Weekly Standard had an article that concluded: "None of this means that the U.S. should be planning an attack tomorrow. There are numerous practical problems we would confront in carrying out that decision, even if that were in theory the right one to make. But it does mean that we have no reason to relax, nor can we postpone difficult decisions indefinitely." Michael Ledeen is always telling us to "move faster" against Iran. Max Boot has written:

"Thus, to avoid a visit from the 3rd Infantry Division, Iran and Syria do not have to democratize. They simply must refrain from crossing certain red lines laid out in the National Security Strategy: They must stop trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and stop supporting international terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and al Qaeda. Two dangers loom especially large: that Iran and Syria will try to turn Iraq into Lebanon redux by staging terrorist attacks on U.S. forces; and that Iran will develop nuclear weapons in a couple of years. Neither eventuality is one that an American president could tolerate. Either action should be regarded as a casus belli."

And then there's this ominous report.

Leave aside all the other problems with military action against Iran (moral, strategic, etc.), and focus on the practical ones. The war in Iraq is already in the process of breaking our army apart. We do not have the troops to fight another war, let alone a war against a much larger and better armed country. One might say: "who said anything about troops? We could just bomb their nuclear facilities!" But by invading Iraq, we have made it much easier for Iran retaliate against us. Iran wouldn't have to go all the way to Philadelphia or Topeka or Cleveland; it could just cross the Iraqi border, where we have ever so helpfully positioned lots of tempting targets, in the form of our men and women in uniform. By invading Iraq, that is, we have ceded to Iran the decision whether or not to engage our troops. I see no reason to think that it wouldn't.

As it happens, the New Republic recently published an article by Michael J. Mazarr on possible Iranian responses to a strike against their nuclear facilities. Since it's behind a subscription wall, some excerpts. First, Iranian leaders have pledged to retaliate to any such strike:

"One reason to believe that Tehran might respond violently, it turns out, is that they have said as much--again and again, in fairly unambiguous terms. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recently promised to "wear battle fatigues and be ready to sacrifice myself at the head of the nation." Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammad Zolqadr has threatened destruction of Gulf oil production in response to U.S. strikes; Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said, in August of 2004, that Iran would "consider any strike against our nuclear installations as an attack on Iran as a whole, and we will retaliate with all our strength." Ahmadinejad has fumed about Iranian nuclear concessions and boasted that "a popular and fundamentalist government will quickly change that," confident that "no country, no matter how powerful they are, can attack Iran.""

And why would they do this?

"Begin with two assumptions that an Iranian strategist might well make. First, Iran's nuclear program must continue--slowly, perhaps covertly, but continue nonetheless. Second, the United States (in league with Israel) is determined both to end that nuclear program and to dominate the greater Middle East. Typical were the comments of Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who, in 2002, said that the United States was planning to invade Iraq to impose its "hegemony on the whole region and its resources." The Stanley Foundation recently concluded that, after five years of interviews with Iranian officials and scholars, many in Iran today fear that the United States "has never accepted the idea of an Islamic Republic and never will."

Given such views--and also given the intense pride, regional ambitions, and sense of cultural superiority characteristic of the Iranian mindset--hard-liners in Tehran continue to see their two leading responsibilities as defending the Islamic Republic and thwarting U.S. ambitions. A sense of fatalism broods deep within both Iranian culture and radical Islam--the fear that world forces, led by evil cabals, are conspiring to destroy Iranians and Muslims. For hard-line Iranian strategists, then, the question is not whether to choose a war with the United States. A conflict is all but inevitable. The question, instead, is whether Iran picks the battles or allows the Americans to do so. And choosing the battle on Iran's terms could mean choosing it now: It makes far more sense to fight an overextended, exhausted, nearly bankrupt, internationally unpopular United States today than a possibly rested, rejuvenated, more militarily flexible enemy in the future. If Iranian leaders are indeed thinking along these lines, a limited U.S. air strike would simply invite them to manufacture a decisive engagement. The longer Iran waits, on the other hand, the worse its position might become.

We need to keep in mind, too, what we mean when we talk about "Iranian reactions." Iran's government has been a crazy quilt of competing factions and power centers, with hard-line groups like the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and conservatives in the parliament owning most elements of state power. To imagine an intemperate response to U.S. strikes, we don't need to presume that all Iranian leaders would endorse it--only that the most radical ones would. On their own, they have the ability to stage a sweeping retaliation, regardless of what pragmatic conservatives or reformers might want.

The election of Ahmadinejad has now delivered the last major state organ to the conservatives--and, even among hard-liners, Ahmadinejad stands out. One of the original student revolutionaries in 1979 and later a senior Revolutionary Guards officer, he has promised to oppose Western "decadence." His supporters have a specific agenda. As one of them told The Washington Post, "I picked Ahmadinejad to slap America in the face." "

What could they do?

"Informed by such thinking, Iran's leaders could decide to respond to U.S. air strikes with an elaborate, ferocious, global provocation designed to draw the United States into a protracted conflict. Iran could expand financial and other support to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups and encourage new attacks on Israel designed to wreck the fragile momentum toward peace with the Palestinians. It could activate agents and cells it has been developing inside Iraq to destabilize the country, tie down U.S. forces, and disrupt the supply lines necessary to enter Iran from the west in the event of a ground war. "If Iran wanted," Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister Hamid Al Bayati said in February, "it could make Iraq a hell for the United States."

Meanwhile, with its limited air and naval assets, Iran could strike at U.S. military forces throughout the region. Tehran's regular military has aging equipment--but, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies' military expert Anthony Cordesman pointed out in a December 2004 analysis, the Revolutionary Guards represent a more skilled military-within-a-military, with ground forces, naval units, missiles, and other forces under its command; a leadership composed of die-hard conservatives; and a mission to protect the Islamic Revolution at all costs. The Guards could flood thousands of troops in small units across the porous border with Iraq with orders to link up with Iranian cells or insurgent groups and assault U.S. bases and forces. Meanwhile, Iran could launch as many of its missiles as possible at Iraqi cities, U.S. air bases, and U.S. allies on the Arabian peninsula.

Iran could also strike boldly at world oil supplies, disrupting traffic in the Strait of Hormuz--through which 15 million barrels of oil flow daily--with air and naval attacks. According to Cordesman, for example, Iran is believed to have more than 2,000 naval mines, some of them very modern, and the potential to deploy them from either large mine-laying ships or hundreds of smaller craft. Iran could hit Saudi Arabia, and its oil production, directly--including the huge export terminals at Ras Tanura and Ras Juaymah. Combined with an end to Iran's own oil exports (of three to four million barrels a day), these attacks would send the world economy into a tailspin.

Iran could then trigger the special international units of the Revolutionary Guards--the so-called "Quds" forces. They reportedly have a large secret budget, officers working out of many Iranian embassies, and strong links with organizations in areas ranging from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to Turkey, Europe, and North America. This organization could generate a wave of terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies, military bases, companies, and allies all over the globe. "

How might Iranians think that the reasons to retaliate against us stack up against the reasons not to?

"To be sure, lashing out carries major risks for Iran: It would place the physical security of the country and regime in danger. But many Iranian leaders may believe that their power is already at risk and might see U.S. air strikes as confirmation that a final reckoning is at hand.

If, on the other hand, Iran sits back and absorbs an attack, tough-minded thinkers in Tehran are likely to argue, Washington will believe that it can assault Iran at will. Many Iranians (not just hard-liners) would see a passive response as weak, cowardly, and unbefitting a proud people. Persian culture has a strong tradition of glorious defeat in service of a sacred cause. If we offer the hard-liners a chance to martyr themselves in the name of cultural heroism, they might just take us up on it.

Comparing the Iranian and North Korean cases is instructive. The reason the military option seems nonsensical in Korea is not because it wouldn't work (though that might be true). It's because of the North's presumed reaction, which would be to destroy Seoul. In the Iranian case, the opposite assumption seems to be in play--that Iran has no similarly catastrophic responses available to it. But that assumption is based as much on hope and wishful thinking as on any form of analysis. "

The whole point of diplomacy is precisely to use every means at our disposal to avoid finding ourselves in predicaments like this one and the one we're in with North Korea, in which all of our options are bad. Some conservatives are fond of pointing out that diplomacy alone won't solve all the world's problems. (Personally, I have always wondered who they thought believed that it did.) But we have now had five years of an administration whose most powerful figures seem to believe that diplomacy is of no use at all, and is therefore not worth bothering about. (See here for the latest example: apparently, we're thinking of denying Ahmedinejad the visa he needs to address the UN.) I hope they like the results. I certainly don't.

Comments

[Ugh]

Happy thoughts.

Good thing we don't have to worry about China invading Taiwan, North Korea invading South Korea and India and Pakistan fighting it out again, oh wait...

[Tim]

I don't think that the Iranians work from the assumption that they will lose in a war with the U.S., especially if we're attacking them over there. I'd say the onus is on the people claiming Iran would lay down and die rather than fight back to give some evidence of this. It's not strictly suicide if you have a decent chance of winning.

[dmbeaster]

The whole point of diplomacy is precisely to use every means at our disposal to avoid finding ourselves in predicaments like this one and the one we're in with North Korea, in which all of our options are bad.

And if you are warmongers like the current Republicans in charge, the whole point is to create an environment in which war is the only option.

Funny how if you are constantly carrying a big stick while waving it and shouting loudly (i.e, Bolton -- the symbol of this administration's idea of diplomacy), everyone else gets warlike also. Too bad there are no more Teddy Roosevelt Republicans around -- just the jingoists.

What the morons in charge don't get is that even though we have the biggest stick, it is profoundly not in our interests to go around using it. Countries like North Korea and Iran have far less to lose from the global chaos that is the natural product of a policy based on violence. And you can't credibly wave the stick constantly without using it -- what's your next trick when waving the magic war wand does not work? (shock and awe! -- shock and awe!)

It is not hyperbole to call Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, etc. warmongers -- that is their clear record as well as the clear import of their actions. Their apologists (i.e., Charles, et al.) can dress them up as fighting for freedom or democracy, but when will those people figure out that spreading influence through the threat of and use of violence never spreads freedom or democracy, no matter what the alleged intentions are.

[geoduck]

We'll try and stay serene and calm
when Alabama gets the bomb...

-Tom Lehrer

[alex]

Y'know, I can see (if I squint hard enough) why some powerful men think starting a war would be a good idea--it's not likely they or their children will have to sacrifice anything, particularly their lives, and the potential exists to get your name in the history books or make a tidy profit. Maybe both!

But our current crop is planning on going nuclear. What the hell are they planning on breathing and eating? This is more hubris, it is delusion.

[alex]

Arrg!

..more than hubris...

[NeoDude]

But Iran is evil and HITLEResque and we don't want to be wimpy Chamberlains!

[GaijinBiker]

I'm not sure Bush deserves the blame for other countries wanting nukes.

We have seen that better diplomatic relations with North Korea mean Kim Jong-Il builds his nukes discreetly, without his trademark brand of paranoid violent rhetoric. But he still builds them.

And close, friendly diplomatic relations with Iran have been elusive even under Democratic presidents. Like Carter.

[WonderWhy]

And if you are warmongers like the current Republicans in charge, the whole point is to create an environment in which war is the only option.

It really seems more like they are seizing on the weakness that is present in our society.

Funny how if you are constantly carrying a big stick while waving it and shouting loudly (i.e, Bolton -- the symbol of this administration's idea of diplomacy), everyone else gets warlike also.

That's ripe. I guess you never heard of a place called Kuwait. It was invaded by Iraq. For some reason, I feel it is important to point out that invasion happened before the first Persian Gulf War. Maybe, you have heard of a country called Iran. Guess what? Invaded by Iraq. Maybe you are not familiar with Iraq's support of suicide bombers?

Also, an event took place on 9/11/2001 that may have affected the situation. Nothing like waiting to get hit in the face with a big stick before responding against Islamic countries that lash out against others.

[Anarch]

Nothing like waiting to get hit in the face with a big stick before responding against Islamic countries that lash out against others.

Except, of course, for the part where Iraq wasn't an "Islamic country".

[WonderWhy]

No, but it has close ties with Islamic terrorist. In my mind that counts for something. It justifies including it with other Islamic countries and taking out its leadership post 9/11.

[Carleton Wu]

Wonder,
That's an excellent point. In fact, my research indicates that the Iraqis have been provoking us with their warlike activity for some time.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sargon_of_Akkad

One can see from this behavior that we had no choice but to invade.

Wu

[hilzoy]

And all those close links with terrorists, none of whom posed any threat to us -- why, an invasion was the only course available!

[Carleton Wu]

In some alternate history, we acutally took out the Saudi and Pakistani governments (those being the closest to the enemy that attacked us on 9-11). However, in this timeline, we satisfied ourselves with a tangential target. Not a nice guy, but not exactly OBL's best buddy.

Of course, in this timeline Ronald Reagan also had ties with Islamic terrorists...

Wu

[hilzoy]

Immediately after my last comment, I tried to say: Oops, I'm echoing Carleton ;( -- but it wouldn't let me. It thought I was spam.