The events in Beslan have haunted me (as I'm sure they have most of us). As typical for me, though, I can't seem to get enough information about how, in this day and age, it got to this...how humans (or what must at one time have been humans) could sink into the monsterous mentality that leads them to this sort of horror. David Brooks offers a customarily ill-considered take on this---it can be summarized as "It's time to get serious about hating them back folks," but that doesn't strike me as a task worthy of our best minds, so I'll leave it to him.
Here's some of what I've been able to learn in my quest for useful information. It's anything but black-and-white:
Shamil Bassajev is widely suspected of masterminding this attack:
The one-legged, black-bearded Bassajev, by now referred to as "Terrorist Number One" in the language of the Russian intelligence service, serves as an example of the mistakes and confusion that characterize the relationship between the Russian state and Chechen rebels.Bassajev, trained by Russian military intelligence, of all things, disappeared, allegedly after having lost eleven relatives during the war with Moscow, and developed into the most-feared "Bojevik," or rebel leader, in Chechnya.
Bassajev has a list of similar attacks credited to him, including "a bloody hostage crisis in which 1100 people were taken hostage at the district hospital in Budjonovsk in 1995" that looks very much like this most recent attack.
My partner, who grew up in the Soviet Union, tells me Chechnyans* hold a place in the Russian consciousness similar to that the Sicilians used to in ours. They are considered the most ruthless of organized criminals, the worst of the worst, scaring even other Russian mafia bosses into submission. About 10 years ago, he believes, this was the muscle behind the separatist movement in Chechnya...a turf battle by criminals to wrestle the region's resources away from Moscow. (The separatists claim Russia wants to control the Caucasus oilfields and pipeline routes, seemingly unaware that this rationale answers the same question to at least some degree of why they were spurred to fight so desperately and unpreparedly for independence.)
Nationalism plays into it as well, clearly. The Soviet Union had scattered the original Caucasian inhabitants throughout central Asia throughout the 1920-1940's, but many returned in the late 1950s (here's a good timeline). Then Chechnya tasted independence in the mid 1990's until the Russians rolled back in, presumedly for the oil, even after the Chechnyan's had held elections of their own. That taste of independence arguably made them all the more desperate and apparently made various players think they should rule an independent Chechnya.
Here, however, is where huge mistakes were made by both sides:
When the peace treaty of Chassavjurt temporarily brought the violence to a halt in 1996, Bassajev, together with Jordanian national Chattab, devoted himself to the training of Islamist fighters. Although there was no fighting during the truce period, in which the Chechen republic, Itchkeria, was governed by its lawfully elected president, Aslan Mashadov, the Russian government failed to honor the commitments it had made in 1997. Chechnya, which had been devastated during the war, was left without funding from Moscow and began to flounder under the dominance of rival warlords.
I think it's safe to assume that Bassajev wasn't soliciting help from the Islamists to help Mashadov run his legitimate government. He either suspected Moscow wouldn't leave them alone, or he was planning a coup at that point. Once Pandora's Box was opened, however:
Members of the global Islamist rebel movement began to appear in Chechnya. They brought along money, weapons and a religion foreign to the Chechens - Wahhabism, a rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam that is particularly widespread in Saudi Arabia.Bin Laden's current second-in-command, Egyptian al-Zawahiri, was arrested on Chechen territory in 1997 and later released. His arrival, as well as that of other Sunni brothers in Chechnya, produces an effect similar to that of a new bacterial culture interacting with a weakened organism. The influence of Al Qaeda and Wahhabites in Chechnya was not the beginning of the conflict with the central authorities in Moscow, but rather its consequence.
So what began as a very secular conflict mutated into a more complex one, with funding provided by sources that will not only expect an Islamic state should Chechnya earn its independence, but may possibly offer a haven to al Qaeda.
Moscow had promised funding for Chechnya as part of the peace treaty of Chassavjurt. Moscow instead redeployed its troops. Moscow pushed Chechnya into the very willing arms of the Islamists:
"Religious fundamentalism was irrelevant at the beginning of the conflict," says Professor Valery Tishkov, a member of the Academy of Sciences. His colleague, Professor Alexander Ignatenko, an expert on Islamic radicalism at Moscow's Lomonossov University, believes that this has now changed. According to Ignatenko, the global alliance of religious extremists and the associated globalization of the terrorist strategy are facts that Russia must face.
No discussion of the Chechnyan terrorists attacks misses a chance to discuss the desperation evidenced by the "black widows" (considered responsible for the recent explosions that took down the two airplanes out of Moscow) either, nor the uncountable numbers of Chechnyan's killed by Russia's military over the years. But tactics like the murders of hundreds of school children are most likely an Islamist introduction.
I know there are those for whom Chechnya represents a Gordian Knot. The only solution is to take a sword and decisively slice it open (I heard little else all weekend as folks discussed it). But who would Putin strike? Bassajev? Would that end the violence? (It should probably be done regardless, if possible.) Should Putin cave and grant Chechnya its independence other Caucasian states would flare up in response with a similar goal.
Now before anyone (you know who you are) jumps to say "See, see, first we must strengthen our resolve against the Islamists...it's that simple," keep this in mind:
Russians are once again asking themselves: How sincere are the many condolence telegrams from overseas? When the "foreign minister" of the Chechen underground government enjoys political asylum in the United States, the "minister of culture" in England, the "minister of health" in France, and the "social minister," provided with a grant from the Heinrich Böll Foundation, in Germany? Is this what the international fight against terrorism looks like?
Should Putin call Bush, Blair, Chirac, etc. and demand the government in exile be returned to Russia? Are we unwittingly harboring terrorists? The Russians seem to think we are. (Anyone know why we granted Akhamdov asylum?)
I don't have any answers. But a little research reveals that this mess is not a simple case of Islamists who hate our way of life doing unspeakable things because they belong to a cult of death. As usual, there's money, greed, and political ambition behind the brutality.
*That's how my partner pronounces "Chechens" (although admittedly it may be a re-translation through what he thinks should be the English...I'll ask tonight).
UPDATE: WTF? Is Bush serious about the War on Terror or not?
U.S. Calls for Diplomacy With Chechens
Boucher, the State Department spokesman, said Tuesday that "our view on the overall situation has not changed." That is, he said, ultimately "there must be a political settlement" over Chechnya.
He said U.S. officials had met with Chechens with a variety of views in the past, although "we do not meet with terrorists." There may be additional meetings in the future, though none are planned, he said.
Apparently not.
I said this on another thread but it bears repeating: Brooks wants us to believe that the debate is between those who want to kill people like Baseyev, and those who want reason with him. It is not. The issues are:
1) How many innocent civilians are we willing to kill to kill or imprison or torture to destroy the Basayevs and Bin Ladens of the world?
Note that I don't think the answer is zero (except when it comes to torture). But I also don't think the answer is "as many as it takes."
2) Would the war in Iraq prevent more and worse attacks from people like Basayev, or lead to more and worse attacks from people like Basayev?
I thought, and always thought, it would lead to more.
3) Is the main threat from states or non-state actors?
Non-state actors. States come into it when they offer safe harbor (as Afghanistan did) and when they are potential sources of sophisticated biological or above all nuclear weapons. However, the states that posed the greatest danger of nuclear weapons did not include Iraq. They were, in approximate order, Russia, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and every place that has a reactor that uses highly enriched uranium. Except for Libya, we knew this very well before the war. We also knew that Iraq probably did not have the very lethal biological weapons that could properly be termed "Weapons of Mass Destruction." Even if you believed in preventive war, and I don't, there was no excuse for neglecting at least 4 more serious threats in favor of Iraq. And of course Iraq turned out to have no WMD at all.
But even here "state actor" is a stretch. Pakistan and Russia are the worst nuclear dangers, and a rogue Pakistani scientist selling nuclear secrets and technology and a poorly guarded Russian bomb or HEU stockpile are not state actors.
And the primary danger does not come from states at all. It comes from armed non-state terrorist groups. The most dangerous is Al Qaeda. The next most dangerous are the groups that Al Qaeda have thoroughly infiltrated--Islamists in Chechnya, Lashkar, etc. The next most dangerous are other Islamist groups that do not target the U.S., like Hezbollah.
4) Is unilateral military force sometimes justified? Is it the best or only way to fight this war?
A resounding yes to the first question; a resounding no to the second. Some of the most important things we needed to do were not military, so the Bush administration was just bored with them. And when military action is needed, it is better to work with allies for the sake of both capacity (especially Arabic language skills) and legitimacy.
Posted by: marguerite | September 07, 2004 at 02:50 PM
I'm not sure why you say the Russians re-invaded for the oil -- there was a pretty clear pattern of terror emanating from Chechnya throughout the "interwar" period; that plus institutional wounded pride in the Russian leadership was casus belli enough. (By the bye, I don't include the infamous apartment bombings in that pattern of terror; it's one of the rare cases where I side with the conspiracy-minded in suspecting FSB involvement.)
While I agree that the Chechen war began as a nationalist conflict, was aggravated by what can only be described as stupendous Russian brutality, and consequently changed into an Islamist war of extermination, I have to wonder how useful this recognition is to decisionmaking in the present. There was a time when there existed a Chechen leadership that was not insane and could be reasoned with. That time is past. It is not unlike the situation with the Palestinians, or pre-1939 Germany: a case of legitimate grievances and wrongs done, yes, but still a case of a profoundly dangerous entity whose grievances have moved it well past the point of reason -- or coexistence.
Barring the emergence of a Gandhi or Mandela figure in Chechnya (and I'm not holding my breath), there are only two logical outcomes, here: Chechnya, with its civil society long since destroyed, will become a de facto, if not de jure, independent terror state; or Russia will subdue it with a murderous repression born of vengeful fury. Neither solution appeals to the sense of justice, but the latter at least appeals to the sense of self-preservation. Of the two parties to this fight, the Russians are the ones not out to kill me and mine these days, so I am forced, however detestable they are, to hope for their victory.
Posted by: Tacitus | September 07, 2004 at 02:54 PM
NB: That Pakistani scientist, Marguerite, was anything but "rogue."
Posted by: Tacitus | September 07, 2004 at 02:58 PM
question #1 should read: How many innocent civilians are we willing to kill or imprison or torture, to destroy the Basayevs and Bin Ladens of the world?
It's not only a moral question, either. The hard line approach often fails in the long run unless you are willing to commit ethnic cleansing or genocide or stop being a free society.
In Chechnya, I would be quite willing for the U.S. to give Russia more active support, if we could use that influence to lessen atrocities against civilians.
We need to drive a wedge between Chechens civilians, including Chechen nationalists, and the Islamist terrorists. But I have no idea if it is possible, and even if it were possible I have my doubts about whether Putin could do it or would even want to.
England learned an awful lot in Northern Ireland, and we have an awful lot to learn from them.
Posted by: marguerite | September 07, 2004 at 02:59 PM
Excellent comment Tacitus...I agree about the Ghandi figure, and likewise don't think it's something to hold one's breath for.
While I agree that the Chechen war began as a nationalist conflict, was aggravated by what can only be described as stupendous Russian brutality, and consequently changed into an Islamist war of extermination, I have to wonder how useful this recognition is to decisionmaking in the present.
It highlights that Moscow helped fuel the problem through faithlessly withholding promised funding. It shows that money can be a useful tool in combatting the spread of Islamism and that where there's a void, the terrorists are more than willing to fill it. And people are happy to think kindly of those who help them survive.
Lesson? Don't promise funding if you don't intend to follow through. This is a lesson for Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. The reconstruction moneys in limbo in Iraq should be sending off alarm bells in DC...someone will help local warlords rebuild if we don't.
Posted by: Edward | September 07, 2004 at 03:11 PM
Tacitus is totally right about that Pakistani scientists. I don't know how I made that error, because few things strike fear in my heart and cause smoke coming out of my ears like the story of AQ Khan.
Any Pakistani scientist to give nuclear weapons to bin Laden would be a rogue scientist, though, I think.
Note that I could make a cheap shot here about Republicans not caring about innocent Chechens' deaths because they're "just foreigners". It's tempting but clearly you do care, and it's really an impossible situation. But I don't think we should resign ourselves to either of the two horrible alternatives you name yet, even if I agree that they are the most likely outcomes.
Posted by: marguerite | September 07, 2004 at 03:12 PM
"Lesson? Don't promise funding if you don't intend to follow through. This is a lesson for Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere."
This is a bit more complicated than you suggest, since you seem to be saying that the Chechen crisis was only initially resolved through promises of funding. The problems with paying ransoms are well known....
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | September 07, 2004 at 03:39 PM
This is a bit more complicated than you suggest, since you seem to be saying that the Chechen crisis was only initially resolved through promises of funding.
Not at all. I'm suggesting that the void created by the lack of funding made it easier for the Islamists to offer their money. At the very least Moscow left Mashadov without the resources to keep the Islamists out.
Foolish mistake on Moscow's part.
Posted by: Edward | September 07, 2004 at 03:47 PM
Pay now or pay later...
Posted by: Edward | September 07, 2004 at 03:54 PM
Perhaps they didn't have much money. They have been in financial crisis for almost a decade.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | September 07, 2004 at 03:54 PM
Pay now or pay later...
stupid timestamp ordering...
Posted by: Edward | September 07, 2004 at 03:58 PM
"We need to drive a wedge between Chechens civilians, including Chechen nationalists, and the Islamist terrorists. But I have no idea if it is possible, and even if it were possible I have my doubts about whether Putin could do it or would even want to.
England learned an awful lot in Northern Ireland, and we have an awful lot to learn from them"
Yes, but in Northern Ireland, the wedge was driven into the Unionist [Protestant] community (between the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party), not into the (separatist Nationalist/Republican [Catholic] community. There was an opportunity in the mid-1980s, with the New Ireland Forum, to drive a wedge between the moderate SDLP and Sinn Fein/the IRA, but Thatcher rejected the potential solutions that the New Ireland Forum proposed.
Posted by: Tom | September 07, 2004 at 04:56 PM
I didn't so much mean to actively assert Northern Ireland as an example of successful wedge-driving...I vaguely had the shunning of the Omagh bombers in mind, but not really. Here's what someone told me about Northern Ireland though: for a while the British pursued policies there that were both repressive and inept, like imprisoning people as suspected terrorist without charge and often abusing them in prison, on as little basis as one tip from an anonymous caller. The IRA knew this, and would call up and report people who were completely innocent, and as sympathetic as possible. So they played right into the IRA's hands with this "get tough" policy.
England seems to have slowly learned that the question is not tough or soft on terrorism as much as it smart or stupid on terrorism. And I wish we could learn the same thing.
You obviously know way, way more about this than me so please correct inaccuracies in that account. (any books you'd recommend?)
Posted by: marguerite | September 07, 2004 at 05:16 PM
Dan Darling has an excellent history. Chechnya rebels had increasingly infiltrated by al Qaeda and Wahabi types. Basayev is Wahabi. Russia wouldn't have stomped on Chechnya in 1999 if the Chechnyans hadn't invaded Russian-held Dagestan in order to expand their sharia fiefdom. Stan at Logic and Sanity has been all over Beslan and the slaughter that took place. Some guy at Tacitus has been writing about Beslan here and here.
Posted by: Bird Dog | September 07, 2004 at 07:50 PM
Marg,
We need to drive a wedge between Chechens civilians, including Chechen nationalists, and the Islamist terrorists. But I have no idea if it is possible...
They (Islamists) are making it possible themselves by killing Chechens (teachers, cops, gov't officials and whoever gets in their way) who are facilitating the return to normalcy.
Edward,
I'm suggesting that the void created by the lack of funding made it easier for the Islamists to offer their money.
Actually, Moscow was sending plenty of money to Chechnya. The problem was that it never reached the people and things it was intended for. Money was embezzled by the Chechen officials (and their Russian cohorts), hence salaries and pensions weren't paid, etc.
Posted by: Stan LS | September 09, 2004 at 02:20 PM
Money was embezzled by the Chechen officials (and their Russian cohorts), hence salaries and pensions weren't paid, etc.
That's precisely why what I've advocated is more micro- than macro-solutions. Think MicroLoans. But for some reason Russia has always been quite fond of macro-solutions.
Posted by: Dave Schuler | September 09, 2004 at 02:28 PM