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May 30, 2004

Comments

Edward:

Very distressing. There simply is no room for this kind of behavior in a free society.

I fear we'll see a lot more of it. There's certainly nothing wrong with dissent per se but the style of the dissent we've been seeing lately is IMO highly divisive. When even mainstream politicians e.g. Ted Kennedy, Al Gore engage in hyperbolic railing, it's not that far a step to actual violence especially for our fellow citizens who are less securely hinged.

Art is neither moral nor immoral, it is simply well made or poorly made.

Do you really mean this as a blanket statement? 'Cause I sure can think up more than a few examples of immoral art.

There are two issues here for me. The first of course being that punching someone because you don't appreciate the art they exhibit is barbaric.

Agreed - very strongly agreed.

Personally, this particular piece is not one I'd exhibit. Besides being too illustrative, how quickly it was produced after the scandal news broke tells me all I need to know about the artist's intentions.

Strong events produce strong feelings produce art. Not necessarily good art, nor automatically bad art: but art is one of the ways humans deal with strong feelings. (I am especially aware of this as I am a member of several online writing groups, and the sheer volume of stories produced post-September 11 dealing with the events of 9/11 would have to be read to be believed. Most of them were very short, and most of them were bad, and - though one purpose of all these groups was feedback - I ended up ignoring most of them because the writers would get very emotional in their defense of those stories.)

On the whole, I agree with you: but that's not a moral position, it's an aesthetic judgement. Which is, I assume, what you mean by your quasi-quote from Oscar Wilde that Tacitus affects not to understand. (Is it in Dorian Gray that Wilde has one of his characters make the comment about art being neither immoral nor moral, only well-made or badly-made?)

Second, art can (and is sometimes calculated to) push people's buttons. There's no way to discuss this as "right" or "wrong" because there's no point in judging art based on this objective. Art is neither moral nor immoral, it is simply well made or poorly made.

The last assertion is not entirely in harmony with the second -- if you're saying that what is "art" is the form and not the content (or rather, the interplay of form and content, but in any case not the content itself), then artists who produce works with intentionally incendiary content (and the gallery owners, producers, etc., who show them) can hardly hide behind the mantle of Art when the inevitable (though often contemptible) reactions occur.

IMHO, "art" whose primary purpose is to shock or offend hardly qualifies as art -- it is simply, as you suggest, punditry or pamphleteering that employs artistic elements (just like [for you Jakobson fans] "I like Ike" doesn't qualify as poetry despite the paranomastic elements). That kind of work can be judged immoral to the same extent that a more prosaic presentation of the same content could be.

So, I have to ask: what are people's opinions on "The Triumph of the Will"?

So, I have to ask: what are people's opinions on "The Triumph of the Will"?

No opinion: never seen it.

I think there is nothing wrong with a discussion about how "publically available" exposure of some kind of arts should be. As you said: art can (and is sometimes calculated to) push people's buttons. There's no way to discuss this as "right" or "wrong" because there's no point in judging art based on this objective..

I don't believe in discussions about wether some kind of public artwork is beautifull enough, or worthy enough, or stylish enough. But sometimes it can be rather shocking, usually because it wants to be, and than you might want to make being exposed to it a voluntary choice. For instance; a few years back we had an exposition with work from Andres Serrano and the billboard poster on the street to promote it was rather explicit. Quit a lot of people felt that they did not want to walk into one of those, or explain them to their kids. So there was a discussion and the museum decided to choose another promotion poster for the exposition.

In this case indeed I was shocked at the violence in the reaction. Throwing garbage, sending threats, fysical attacks - that is a personal attack not a conveying of disagreement.

I think there is nothing wrong with a discussion about how "publically available" exposure of some kind of arts should be. As you said: art can (and is sometimes calculated to) push people's buttons. There's no way to discuss this as "right" or "wrong" because there's no point in judging art based on this objective..

I don't believe in discussions about wether some kind of public artwork is beautifull enough, or worthy enough, or stylish enough. But sometimes it can be rather shocking, usually because it wants to be, and than you might want to make being exposed to it a voluntary choice. For instance; a few years back we had an exposition with work from Andres Serrano and the billboard poster on the street to promote it was rather explicit. Quit a lot of people felt that they did not want to walk into one of those, or explain them to their kids. So there was a discussion and the museum decided to choose another promotion poster for the exposition.

In this case indeed I was shocked at the violence in the reaction. Throwing garbage, sending threats, fysical attacks - that is a personal attack not a conveying of disagreement.

Oops, sorry for the double posting.

kenb has articulated my own opinion on this better than I could have.

Moe

PS: For the record, I think that we should assume that people deplore the idea of using violence as a response to art unless they actually come out and say differently. Not that I think that anybody here so far is assuming anything otherwise, but it never hurts to set ground rules. :)

I love the caption to the linked AP Photo: . . . Lori Haigh, a North Beach district gallery owner, bears a painful reminder of the nation's unresolved anguish over the incidents at Abu Ghraib . . .

"The nation's unresolved anguish?" Yeah, come on people -- that was a whole month ago -- get over it! I don't think they should let ironic Gen X-ers write the captions anymore. Perhaps Edward -- who appears to understand this a lot better than whoever wrote that caption -- can give them a call.

As for art being neither moral nor immoral, that's hooey. In fact, to answer Anarch, I consider "Triumph" to be a piece of beautifully-executed but profoundly immoral cinema. "The Turner Diaries," on the other hand, is both profoundly immoral and shabbily written.

Edward, do you really feel that, say, "Guernica" or any random work by Goya or, I don't know, Titian, has no moral dimension whatsoever?

Do you really mean this as a blanket statement? 'Cause I sure can think up more than a few examples of immoral art.

I don't believe you can, Tac. I'm curious what your examples would be though.

The last assertion is not entirely in harmony with the second -- if you're saying that what is "art" is the form and not the content (or rather, the interplay of form and content, but in any case not the content itself), then artists who produce works with intentionally incendiary content (and the gallery owners, producers, etc., who show them) can hardly hide behind the mantle of Art when the inevitable (though often contemptible) reactions occur.

I actually thought about that long after I posted this (realizing I had been unclear), but then a social obligation prevented me from getting back here to address it (bad blogger).

I think we agree here more than disagree KenB, because what I didn't say (not wanting to do so without actually seeing the painting in person) is that I don't consider this piece "well-made art." Conceptually it's lame.

However, I stop short of agreeing with your last statement: That kind of work can be judged immoral to the same extent that a more prosaic presentation of the same content could be.

It can be judged to be "poorly made." That is all. The creator may have immoral intentions in creating it. The gallerist may have immoral intentions in exhibiting it. The viewer may have an immoral response after viewing it. But the work itself is simply a work of art. Don't personify it. It's the humans in this drama who are acting morally or immorally. The work is simply either well made or poorly made.

Now, this leads to the question of whether a viewer can determine (because of their reaction to a piece) if the artist or gallerist had immoral intentions. I think you can debate that honestly (without punching...and yes, Moe's right, that should certainly go without saying...but in these turbulent times...), but it's more complicated than the average viewer may realize. The artist knows what he/she intended, and while the gallerist acts as editor, often there's no amount of discussion that can reveal an immoral intention on the part of the artist. The gallerist has to trust the artist. It's possible they are in cahoots (to mischieviously get some free publicity), but that's beyond the pale of professionalism, and the gallery shouldn't be in business.

Dutchmarbel, I saw the most recent Serrano show. It's clearly controversial, but the work's sheer beauty makes it good art. Content can be anything. It's the treatment of that content that elevates it (and folks I mean conceptually and aesthetically, so spare me the time-worn example of a beautifully photographed turd that lurks like an urban myth just waiting be be tossed into this discussion each time it comes along).

And yes, Jes, that sentiment is from Dorian Gray, and the exact quote is "There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books are well written or badly written. That is all".

I paraphrase it constantly, and I have yet to see it even remotely disproved.


Edward, do you really feel that, say, "Guernica" or any random work by Goya or, I don't know, Titian, has no moral dimension whatsoever?

No. The artists' intentions and our reactions to them are the only aspects of morality involved here. We place all value on works of art. "Guernica" is oil, pigment, canvas (maybe linen, can't remember), stretchers, nails. That's it. Slashing a painting because it offends you is as sensible as smashing your television because of a program on it that outrages you. Actually, it's more like smashing your mirror because what you see in it offends you. It's about your reaction, and you're responsible for it.

Well, obviously, you've got more education and experience that you can rely on regarding this topic, but I disagree. The art is the artist's intention, or at least half of it is. It isn't self-assembling. And if art is, objectively considered, nothing more than the physical components involved in its construction, then who cares? Obviously, something distinguishes a random pile of canvas, oil, nails and brushes from "Guernica." The two are not morally or aesthetically equivalent.

By the way, do you ever read this blog? The writer often discusses exactly the kinds of things you're talking about here.

http://www.thetearsofthings.net/

Hadn't come across that blog, Phil...thanks for the link.

Obviously, something distinguishes a random pile of canvas, oil, nails and brushes from "Guernica." The two are not morally or aesthetically equivalent.

There are conceptual artists who've gone through great lengths to argue against that, but with that caveat, and within the context of how you mean that, I'll agree with you with regards to aesthetics (liking "Guernica" extremely), but not with regards to morality.

The argument I'm making is that we bring "morality" to our viewing of a particular work, therefore we can't hold the work responsible.

Let's look at Mapplethorp. His planned exhibit at the Corcoran in DC (in 1990-91???) was cancelled because folks, including certain Congressmen, found his work morally offensive. What contributed to this assessment? Well, part of it, unquestionably, was their feelings about homosexual acts. In an era where sodomy laws were still "constitutional" they could defend their point of view with that particular detail ("what's being depicted is illegal...therefore it's clearly immoral"). Today, less than 15 years later, they could not make that exact argument. If the details that add up to our shared morality are so fleeting, it's not about the work of art (which if made well is timeless), but rather about our reaction (in a given social context) to that art. As the social context changes, but the art does not, the art is neither moral nor immoral.

OK, this next example is a bit weak, but there's a nugget of sense in it, so, please bear with me. Say Hitler had won WWII. We would potentially no longer be discussing whether "Triumph of the Will" was moral or immoral. It would be heralded as a great work of art without the morality question hanging over it. Why? Because the social context question would have been made mute (possibly, I do like to think there would be constant resistance to totalitarianism...but I hope the point is clear). Actually, since Hitler lost, the question is a bit mute. Triumph of the Will is a great film. Only its makers were immoral.

Hm. I remember making jokes about "punching artists" on tacitus.org a few months ago. *It was a joke!* It was a joke about my irritation with pretentious NYC social life.

That said, I have to disagree with the "amoral art" argument. It sounded lame when the modernists first brought it up, and it still sounds lame.

Sure, canvas & oil are neither moral nor immoral & only human intentions can be judged ethically. But there is no such thing as a painting divorced from human intentions. Ergo, morality is an intrinsic aspect of art. Perhaps special conditions apply, but art is not "amoral" any more than utterances in language or physical acts are "amoral."

I think there's a lot of this going on right now. From a loon of a blogger that I read occasionally:

For today only, if you hear anyone holding forth about the awfulness of the "tortures" in Abu Ghraib Prison, deck him. Don't roar a challenge. Don't remonstrate with him in any fashion. Knock him down without a word.
Sure, the guy's a self-important twit that talks big, but this kind of intolerance of dissenting views seems to be becoming far more common in certain quarters. I'm not surprised that it's going beyond the bounds of blogger chest-thumping displays and into beatings in the real world.

Dutchmarbel, I saw the most recent Serrano show. It's clearly controversial, but the work's sheer beauty makes it good art. Content can be anything. It's the treatment of that content that elevates it (and folks I mean conceptually and aesthetically, so spare me the time-worn example of a beautifully photographed turd that lurks like an urban myth just waiting be be tossed into this discussion each time it comes along).

I am a great Erwin Olaf fan, I do not mind controversiality ;-). I absolutely agree that art can be beautiful apart from the content of the art piece and I have a strong dislike for censorship.
However, I can understand people who say that certain pieces should be available for the general public, but only for the people willing to see it. In my example: having posters all over the city with a female urinating in a mans mouth. The artist should not be censored, the exhibition should not be censored, but the promotional posters will be viewed by every citizen of a city and I can understand people not wanting to explain the poster to their kids. However beautifull the piece is.

It has often more to do with mores than with morality.

"bears a painful reminder of the nation's unresolved anguish"

Well, that's metaphorical. It seems to me she bears a painful reminder of some jerk's poor impulse control.

While the discussion on whether the artist imbues their intent into the physical piece is interesting, I think it's worth pointing out that the jerk in question didn't punch the painting here, so in this case the person punched did make moral decisions.

Sure, canvas & oil are neither moral nor immoral & only human intentions can be judged ethically. But there is no such thing as a painting divorced from human intentions. Ergo, morality is an intrinsic aspect of art. Perhaps special conditions apply, but art is not "amoral" any more than utterances in language or physical acts are "amoral."

Jordan,

We should probably define those "special conditions" here. To me there's a vast difference between art and "utterances."

We disagree about one key point here. I don't believe a work of art carries forward its maker's personal morality. It may express a believe about morality (even the maker's morality), but that's not the same thing as containing the creator's own morality, suggesting a human set of values is somehow imbued into an inanimate object or record of ideas (as if this happens via what? osmosis?).

Conceptually, aesthetically, formally, etc., a work of art exists on its own. It's shoved out there in the world, a self-contained expression, to fight for relevance or fall to obscurity on its individual merits. Its creator's morality is not transferable into it. It may stir debate, and it may even depict immoral acts, but our only valid question (with regard to the art itself) is whether it does so well or does so poorly.

I'm a little confused by this statement, Edward:

To me there's a vast difference between art and "utterances."

Are you attacking or defending the protection of art under the First Amendment? If there's a vast difference, then surely it would not be protected, no?

"Art is neither moral nor immoral, it is simply well made or poorly made."

This argument is made far better in Edward's expansion: "It can be judged to be "poorly made." That is all. The creator may have immoral intentions in creating it. The gallerist may have immoral intentions in exhibiting it. The viewer may have an immoral response after viewing it. But the work itself is simply a work of art. Don't personify it. It's the humans in this drama who are acting morally or immorally. The work is simply either well made or poorly made."

There's a clear thread of logic in arguing that objects do not possess moral quality, that only people do. But it insists that people cannot invest a moral quality into an object; I'm not entirely sure that is so.

The fictional Hannibal Lecter arguably considered his "creations" as art, or performance art. One can easily argue that the photographs we are all familiar with are works of art, and that, moreover, the acts photographed were both performance art and sculpture. The Nazis making lampshades of human skin were clearly making "art," were they not? If one made "art" out of a pile of concentration camp bodies, is that art neutral in moral quality? Does it matter if the people are only on the verge of death, but are still alive as they are "sculpted"?

I'm uneasy with arguments that invest "art" with special numinous powers; it seems uncomfortably close to giving something a special get-out-of-consideration-jail-free card by simply declaring it is "art."

If someone creates a special implement useful only for some particularly horrible form of torture (I need not be specific, and therefore won't be), is said implement lacking any moral quality? If not, would that change if exhibited in a gallery?

I'm not clear that the argument that there are no immoral creations, only immoral creators, is definitively inarguable and settled.

Now, this, however, I'm clear is a ridiculous line of argument:

As the social context changes, but the art does not, the art is neither moral nor immoral.

OK, this next example is a bit weak, but there's a nugget of sense in it, so, please bear with me. Say Hitler had won WWII. We would potentially no longer be discussing whether "Triumph of the Will" was moral or immoral. It would be heralded as a great work of art without the morality question hanging over it. Why? Because the social context question would have been made mute (possibly, I do like to think there would be constant resistance to totalitarianism...but I hope the point is clear).

What makes this argument fail utterly is that the same argument applies equally well to any act of the Nazis. Since the "social context" of the camps and ovens would have changed after the hypothetical triumph of Hitler, that means that "the morality question" would "no longer be hanging over" them? Of course not. Ridiculous. This is moral relativism of an indefensible sort. Morality is not created or judged solely by "social context." That's the view of a sociopath.

"But the work itself is simply a work of art. Don't personify it."

How does one reconcile this with performance art, Edward?

And yes, Jes, that sentiment is from Dorian Gray, and the exact quote is "There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books are well written or badly written. That is all".

I paraphrase it constantly, and I have yet to see it even remotely disproved.

You're on your home turf with art. I'm on home turf with books. I don't buy this argument for a single second.

Books are vehicles for conveying thought, and ideas. Ideas and thoughts can and often are, either moral or immoral. Mein Kampf advocated immoral things. It was therefore an immoral book. That is all.

To assert otherwise is to assert there is no such thing as immoral advocacy and no such thing as immoral thought. Else one is arguing that communicating immoral arguments suddenly whitewashes the immorality out via the cleansing use of a printing press, or printer, or computer screen. This simply makes no sense whatsoever.

To me there's a vast difference between art and "utterances."

Ah, so rhetoric is not an art, then? Writing is not an art, then? Acting is not an art, then?

Respectfully: bullpucky.

And where do you put singing and songwriting and poetry? Also non-art?

Conceptually, aesthetically, formally, etc., a work of art exists on its own. It's shoved out there in the world, a self-contained expression, to fight for relevance or fall to obscurity on its individual merits. Its creator's morality is not transferable into it. It may stir debate, and it may even depict immoral acts, but our only valid question (with regard to the art itself) is whether it does so well or does so poorly.

I understand your argument, but my proposed work of performance art is to shoot six six-month old babies in extremely artful and beautiful fashion. I am relieved to find that this work will only judged by how well it is executed.

Clearly the government should declare our justice system a work of massive performance art, with each trial and sentencing a smaller work of art, and executions a particularly exquisite form of performance art. Why not?

OK, this is the last I can write about this, but Gary brought up some good points, so I'd like to address them and then call it a day (happy to return another day, but there are other topics I'm wanting to read about).

The "shooting six babies" piece has now replaced the "turd on a platter" piece as my favorite urban legend, Gary. The difference, of course, is between the idea of shooting six babies and the execution of that idea in real life. Performance art deserves its own thread, as it contains two distinct dimensions: the concepts and their execution by living, breathing individuals who can make moral or immoral decisions as they execute a piece (and in here we find theater, dance, and other performing arts). We really need to discuss them separately. For this discussion, I'm arguing that a work of art that exists on its own, considered complete and on view for the public to see/read/watch and judge, cannot be considered "immoral."

I'm uneasy with arguments that invest "art" with special numinous powers; it seems uncomfortably close to giving something a special get-out-of-consideration-jail-free card by simply declaring it is "art."

You're talking about the artist here. No one wants to jail a work of art I hope.

But trying to meld the two into the place I think you're wanting to discuss this, I've totally failed here if that's what you think I'm saying. A work of art is not invested with any moral power whatsoever other than that we bring to it. It can illustrate things (but we can fail to see them); it can stir things that are already in us (but we can fail to be stirred for any number of reasons that have nothing to do with the work;) and it help us connect, that is, see more clearly things we already knew (and we can fail to make the connections), but it can't make us more or less moral than we were before we encountered it (unless you subscribe to the notion that the mere exposure to an idea can force someone to behave a certain way). Only we can do that ourselves. Our response to a work does that, not the work. It's the opposite of what you're protesting here Gary. The VIEWER/READER is the one who does not have a "get-out-of-consideration-jail-free" card. The viewer/reader must own their reaction. Rejecting an idea or embracing it, but in no way assuming that the vehicle for that idea is responsible for their moral dilemma. The man who punched that gallerist is not angry that the painting has US soldiers abusing prisoners depicted in it (it simply does), he's most likely angry about how seeing that image makes him feel. It's his response to the image, and he's responsible for it. The idea that the painting could be immoral in and of itself (i.e., it is doing something "wrong") is incomprehensible to me. It's inanimate.

Perhaps if we begin with a defintion here:

immoral adj. not adhering to ethical or moral principles

The creator of a work of art may not adhere to ethical or moral principles and may create work whose subject matter is the nonadherence to those principles, but the work itself is totally unable to adhere to moral principles. The principles to which it can adhere are formal, conceptual, aesthetic, etc (art principles). We introduce morality as part of our response to the work. The work itself is amoral.

Before anything else, this: "The 'shooting six babies' piece has now replaced the 'turd on a platter' piece as my favorite urban legend, Gary."

This is not at all an urban legend. An "urban legend" is a story believed to be true, and passed along as such ("I heard from my cousin who heard it from the sister of the guy it happened to!").

This is a "hypothetical." The two have nothing in common save for both being accounts of events not known to have truly happened. Which they have in common with "ghost stories," all fiction to some degree, superhero tales, lies, and many other sorts of things, all different varieties of "untrue."

You'll need to read further up thread to see why I chose the shorthand "urban legend" here Gary. Otherwise, point duly noted.

I'm uneasy with arguments that invest "art" with special numinous powers; it seems uncomfortably close to giving something a special get-out-of-consideration-jail-free card by simply declaring it is "art."

You're talking about the artist here. No one wants to jail a work of art I hope.

I was attempting to use a metaphor that obviously failed, and I blame society.

No, sorry, I blame my inadequate punctuation (see, there's my Maoist self-criticism; I'm going to go stand myself in a corner with a dunce cap now). The key hyphenation should be been "consideration-jail." As in, declaring something is "art" gives not just permission, but positive declaration that it must be considered in a different, magical, way than anything else. I don't believe that. I'm perfectly happy to listen to arguments as to why I am wrong.

"A work of art is not invested with any moral power whatsoever other than that we bring to it." This is the classic semiotic "it has no meaning save which we project upon it." I don't believe that's true. Not sufficiently true, anyway. It has a limited, but only a limited, degree of truth.

If I write "E=MC2," it's certainly true that innumerable people around the world will have no idea what I mean by those symbols, and they are free to project as they wish upon them. Nonetheless, the intended meaning, it turns out, can eventually -- a very long eventually -- be translated in something that turns the city of these projecting people into miles of burning hellfire. And all the discussion of their "equally valid other interpretations" won't do them much good.

"...but it can't make us more or less moral than we were before we encountered it (unless you subscribe to the notion that the mere exposure to an idea can force someone to behave a certain way)."

I don't, because that would be a gross exaggeration. But new ideas are, by definition, new to people, and they have actual meanings, and they can and often do result -- as mediated through people, yes -- in actual effects.

And, yes, the people who then act bear moral responsibility for their actions.

But different ideas will demonstrably, in some cases (preferably extreme, for ease of illustration and discussion), produce different forms of effects, some moral, some immoral. The idea "it is a good idea to go eat babies because..." is an immoral idea, in my worldview, and I brook little cultural relativism nor semiotic readings of it, whereas the idea "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is a moral idea, in my worldview. Where do I ground these views of morality? Not in God or religion, and a lengthy discussion of philosophy would be necessary to fully ground it, but the short version is: because I prefer to live in a society where one idea is deemed "moral" and the other is not, because I believe it results in a "better" local universe for me and others.

It's a complete error to divorce individual responsibility from judgment of moral acts, but I believe it's just as much an effor to divorce moral judgment from intellectual ideas themselves. People are responsible for the acts, but the ideas they are exposed to, will, indeed, affect them.

"The viewer/reader must own their reaction. Rejecting an idea or embracing it, but in no way assuming that the vehicle for that idea is responsible for their moral dilemma."

The viewer/reader must own their reaction, and the idea is not 'responsible," but it can, and often does have an effect. I don't see how this can, observationally, be denied. How could people act racistly if they hadn't been taught that there was such a thing as different human "races" (which is a relatively new idea, historically speaking, being a product of the 18th Century)? How could they be anti-Semitic without the idea of anti-Semitism? And so on.

"The idea that the painting could be immoral in and of itself (i.e., it is doing something 'wrong') is incomprehensible to me. It's inanimate."

I'm uninterested in discussing this painting and incident in this context because it is not a useful example. A painting, however, cannot be "immoral" in the sense that it is committing an act. Insofar as it conveys an idea, however (such as, somehow, baby-barbeque is good), it can convey an immoral idea.

I understand why this is a bothersome idea for you, but to deny it is to deny that art can communicate ideas. Y'know, just because I point this out doesn't mean I'm for banning books. Or art I don't like. It just means that art can communicate ideas.

"You'll need to read further up thread to see why I chose the shorthand urban legend' here Gary."

Perhaps you could be so kind as to direct me to the specific comment?

Here's my take: to the extent that a work of art has referential content, that content can be evaluated just as much as any other referential statement. The fact that the content may have an aesthetic function doesn't protect it from all other judgments.

Obviously a judgment of "morality" implies the presence of a standard by which to measure same. There's nothing special about works of art in this regard.

Also, a work of art cannot stand alone but must reside in a particular linguistic, social, and cultural context. I think it's fair to speak of the intrinsic meaning of a given work within that context. (Another way of looking at this is to say that a work "means" what a fully-competent contemporary audience would think it means).

(BTW, Gary: Stop dissing moral relativism -- you can be a relativist without thereby sacrificing your right to judge the morality of others.)

"You'll need to read further up thread to see why I chose the shorthand urban legend' here Gary."

Perhaps you could be so kind as to direct me to the specific comment?

It comes from this comment and the advance from similie to metaphor I mistakenly gave it. Again, your point is duly noted.

spare me the time-worn example of a beautifully photographed turd that lurks like an urban myth just waiting be be tossed into this discussion each time it comes along
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I understand why this is a bothersome idea for you, but to deny it is to deny that art can communicate ideas. Y'know, just because I point this out doesn't mean I'm for banning books. Or art I don't like.

Why not?

Let's be realistic about what insisting art can be judged as moral or immoral means. I seem to be in the minority on this issue anyway, so let me spill my guts and see where it leads.

Say a book is judged to be immoral. You don't want to burn it, you say. But what do you want? We've agreed that jailing the book is silly. Banning it perhaps strikes us as censorship and we know the slippery slope that can lead us down. Perhaps all we want is to label it? (Perhaps with warning labels like we have on CDs?) So we set up a committee that oversees such efforts and begins labelling our books. "Contents may be morally objectionable to certain members of society."

Is that sufficient?

You can't do nothing. To know that there's an immoral expression out there waiting to corrupt and do nothing about it is irresponsible, isn't it?

Perhaps we simply let the market take care of it. Immoral books won't sell, and their authors will have to start driving taxis.

Seriously, though. If the art work itself could be immoral, what would be an appropriate response to it? Jail it, ban it, burn it? Simply complain about it? What?

Let's take Lolita for example. Clearly some immoral actions are being described in that one. Does the aesthetic superiority of Nabokov's writing elevate it above a judgement of immorality? The book I mean, not the author. Does the fact that the book is a satire elevate it?

You can ask the same thing about A Modest Proposal, since the eating babies idea seems to have a life of its own here (too much Austin Powers, one wonders?). The book sits there on a shelf. No one makes you read it. If you do, no one makes you like it. If you do, no one makes you change your personal behavior because of it. Not the author, not the publisher, not the critics, no one. The book sits there. AND the book doesn't eat any babies. If that's the immoral issue here, how is the book "guilty"? Because within its pages is expressed the idea that eating babies is an option?

Oh, I know, satire is in a different category, we understand the author isn't really saying we should eat babies...but alas, the door is open, and now you need to question whether you really understand whether a painter is criticizing the US government or expressing sympathy with the prisoners or trying to communicate something more universal about man's inhumanity to man and all the while this cleverly arranged pigment on canvas is simply the vehicle for getting you to consider those things. That painting, although prompting the questions, is amoral even if the questions it raises invite us to bring our sense of morality to bear in our assessment of the ideas therein. It's not adhereing to any human principles in and of itself...it's 40" x 30", well-rendered and conceptually well-developed enough to prompt the dialog (and not simply be ignored). It's creator has particular views about the morality of its subject, and the viewer has particular views about the morality of its subject, but the painting has no views. It exists on its own to be judged by formal criteria. It has no designs toward action by a human being (I'll clue you in, it doesn't even know we exist...in fact, it doesn't "know" anything at all).

KenB writes: Obviously a judgment of "morality" implies the presence of a standard by which to measure same. There's nothing special about works of art in this regard.

I'll refer back to the definition of "immoral" I used above: "not adhering to ethical or moral principles." A work of art is not "above" the judgement, it's incapable of being judged by this measure. These are HUMAN principles. A work of art neither adheres to nor ignores any ethical or moral (or any other human) principle. It can only be judged by artistic principles. This constant urge to personify it baffles me.

If you want to burn the author at the stake, just say so, but to pretend that the book has some conscience or reasoning capacity with which to self-edit and therefore deserve to be judged on the human principles of morality strikes me as projecting.

A work of art is not "above" the judgement, it's incapable of being judged by this measure. These are HUMAN principles.

Just for clarification, is your statement limited to "a work of art", or would you say the same thing about any non-human thing? Is there such a thing as an immoral idea? An immoral essay? If not, then how would you describe a blog post that advocated a nuclear attack on the Middle East, or some other action that we would generally consider immoral?

All I've been arguing is that artistic expression shouldn't be privileged over non-artistic expression. If an essay can be immoral, then so can a novel or a painting. Granted that one has to be careful to consider the artistic context when making a judgment about a work of art; however, one has to consider the context of non-artistic statements as well, so that still doesn't argue for a special protection for artistic expression.

I understand why this is a bothersome idea for you, but to deny it is to deny that art can communicate ideas. Y'know, just because I point this out doesn't mean I'm for banning books. Or art I don't like.

Why not?

Because, nitpicking about copyright law, libel law, incitement to riot, and other exceptions, I believe extremely strongly in free speech and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. Have you not noticed?

Say a book is judged to be immoral. You don't want to burn it, you say. But what do you want?
To be honest about it. That's all.
You can't do nothing. To know that there's an immoral expression out there waiting to corrupt and do nothing about it is irresponsible, isn't it?

Of course I can. There are innumerable murderers out there; this implies no moral imperative for me to don a giant bat costume.

Where I feel so moved, I will exercise my own free speech about the speech (and art) of others. As I do. Is this supposed to have suddenly become a new question today? Am I suddenly supposed to be living my life differently than I always have, because you've encountered a different point of view?

This constant urge to personify it [works of art/speech] baffles me.
That's because no one is arguing for personification of inanimate objects; that's not the argument being made to you.

Edward, I can't say that you're not listening, and are continuing to respond to an argument made in your head, rather than the one being presented to you, but I can say that you are responding in a way indistinguishable from such a response. No one has said anything about personifying inanimate objects, save you; it would be more helpful if you responded to the words in front of you, rather than some past argument you're continuing to engage with, despite the fact that no one here is making that argument.

It has been pointed out to you that inanimate objects can and often do transmit abstract ideas; you continue to not engage with that, and to deny that it is possible to engage with that.

If you want to burn the author at the stake, just say so....
Oh, darn, you're on to me.

You're engaging in reasoning that "if you mean this, it must mean that you therefore mean that, because of motivation Y." However, this doesn't, in fact, mean anything other than this, and carries no implication of mandatory that whatsoever, let alone because of Motivation Y.

Irrelevantly, I posted a bunch more good stuff on my blog today; feel free to check it out before it disappears off the front page.

Edward,

There is something to the formalist argument for amorality of art objects, but it's a problematic argument. Consider only that your statement,

Conceptually, aesthetically, formally, etc., a work of art exists on its own. It's shoved out there in the world, a self-contained expression, to fight for relevance or fall to obscurity on its individual merits. Its creator's morality is not transferable into it.

applies equally well to a TV commercial as to a painting. If you can explain the difference, I'll be closer to understanding your point.

In reference to your second long entry, I think U.S. case law has it right to judge by "community standards of decency." Nobody is arguing (or nobody in their right mind should be arguing) canvas or photo paper can be intrinsically moral. The morality of a work of art is best judged by the reactions of the people who are going to see it. Which means exhibition and distribution are factors. Which *also* means the morality of a work of art is relative (hi, Gary F.!) to its audience at a particular time & place.

That at least leaves room to maneuver. Both the pure formalist exoneration of all art, and the conservative bless/burn good/evil dichotomies are way too rigid for my taste.

All I've been arguing is that artistic expression shouldn't be privileged over non-artistic expression.

Which is to say that KenB and I are making the same argument.

If I write "E=MC2," it's certainly true that innumerable people around the world will have no idea what I mean by those symbols, and they are free to project as they wish upon them. Nonetheless, the intended meaning, it turns out, can eventually -- a very long eventually -- be translated in something that turns the city of these projecting people into miles of burning hellfire. And all the discussion of their "equally valid other interpretations" won't do them much good.

The fact that Nature has a definite preference between scientific and non-scientific expression should probably not be used to bolster an argument on the way humans gauge the merits of artistic versus non-artistic expression.

Well, I understand you more, Edward, and I see why you think there's no such thing as "immoral" art.

I don't agree with a word you've written in support of that assertion, but I get the assertion.

Anyway, I'll let others fight this one.

Gary, I'm giving this one last try, and it's not because of your assertion that I'm not reading your posts but rehashing a former argument with someone else (really, that's a bit much, don't you think? even if you suspect it's true, nothing written here has warranted such a response), but rather because of your solidarity with KenB in the statement that "All I've been arguing is that artistic expression shouldn't be privileged over non-artistic expression." We might as well have been writing in Korean and Yiddish for all I appreciated that before. My fault totally though, you wrote what you meant.

I should have realized we were not communicating when you noted:

If someone creates a special implement useful only for some particularly horrible form of torture (I need not be specific, and therefore won't be), is said implement lacking any moral quality? (emphasis mine)

That in and of itself reveals the gulf, and I missed it. Really unforgivable mistake on my part, but let me try to explain.

To paraphrase again from Dorian Gray: All art is totally useless. If it has a "use," it's no longer only art. For example, if it becomes propaganda ("The Triumph of the Will"), it is no longer only art. You can judge whether propaganda is moral or immoral, but not art.

.......DAMN. My computer ate my example with David's Rape of the Sabine Women, and I must go to bed, but we'll cross this topic again I suspect.

I don't agree with a word you've written in support of that assertion

Not even one, Tacitus? But I've written so many... ;p

I appreciate any sincere effort to reach a meeting of the minds, Edward.

As someone who could be accused of being a performance artist (acting, specifically), I'd say, firstly, this has been very interesting reading.

Of course, wading into the whole 'separating the execution of a piece of art from the piece of art itself' discussion is tricky. Certainly I would say that contemplating a piece of art from any viewpoint other than an artistic one can, at the least, cause problems.

If art is used to communicate an idea, and it usually is, even if the artist couldn't always put that idea into words (often the reason for the creation of the art), then the idea and its communication can certainly be judged from such viewpoints as, to pick one entirely at random, morality. I'm not entirely sure I'd want to say that the idea and its communication are inseparable from the art itself.

The idea - may be immoral. The communication - may be poor. The art... is what? The medium?

James, I'm going to correct the mistake I made with Gary and try and stop you right here:

If art is used to communicate an idea, and it usually is,

Art is useless. If you attempt to "use" is to do anything, other than exist as art, you introduce another raison d'etre beyond the work's essence.

Certainly I would say that contemplating a piece of art from any viewpoint other than an artistic one can, at the least, cause problems.

Life is full of problems. The idea that something gets a special dispensation to be relieved of all consideration other than a singular one, once one calls it "art," is one such.

The art... is what? The medium?
Quite.

I'd like to emphasize, again, that there is no agenda behind this observation.

"If it has a "use," it's no longer only art."

It's exactly this sort of exceptionalism I don't believe in.

Everything in life is not an "only."

Nothing gets touched with a magic wand, and made an "only."

That's truly magical thinking, and precisely what I object to in the exceptionalist concept of "art."

Art is useless. If you attempt to "use" is to do anything, other than exist as art, you introduce another raison d'etre beyond the work's essence.

Oh, excuse my disagreeing with Mr. Wilde, but art can have a use. That doesn't mean that it need - or even should - be judged, of itself, in any terms other than artistic ones.

Dammit, Edward, I'm agreeing with you! Ish! I'm agreeing that the art, of itself, should not be judged in any terms other than artistic ones. It's the use that is to be judged; the intent.

I still disagree with Oscar. But I notice he's not coming back to me, so I guess that's told him.

Of course, 'art is useless' and 'art can have a use' are not necessarily conflicting statements. But I would say that the majority of art is intended to be communicative, and therefore a use (an use?) is attached to the art.

Note attached to.

Dammit, Edward, I'm agreeing with you! Ish! I'm agreeing that the art, of itself, should not be judged in any terms other than artistic ones. It's the use that is to be judged; the intent.

Sorry. I think overall we do agree James. But there's a rather complicated (for me) idea lurking here that makes me not quite sure about your last line (besides, I just LOVE to argue about art).

To explore this idea, unfortunately, it's best to leave Mr. Wilde to rest in peace. Rauschenberg's still with us (knock on wood). When Mr. R declared that a telegram was art if he said it was, he revealed a more subtle idea about the essence of the conceptual aspect of "art" (which is arguably the essence of what distinguishes "art" from "non-art"), something Wilde had not actually been forced to consider, per se.

The idea grew up in the 1960's that anything an artist designates as art becomes art. This notion was exemplified in an anecdote about the painter Robert Rauschenberg. In response to a commission to do a portrait for a group gallery show, Rauschenberg sent not a painting but a telegram reading: “This is a portrait . . . if I say so.” The gallery displayed the telegram on the wall with all the other “portraits.” The distinction between art and non-art in examples like this lies solely in the artist’s intention.

Duchamp had tried to express this same idea with his readymades I believe, but many folks were confused by his choices and too many thought he was arguing that art had to be controversial.

Now, if what makes an object "art" is simply that an artist says it is (and I challenge anyone to take Raschenberg on direclty on this particular concept, I hear he's ruthless in "proving" it), if the distinction between art and non-art is solely an artist's intention, is it still the intention itself and not the object that's either immoral or moral? Or, is the intention actually the art and then only subject to judgement in artistic terms?

My head starts to spin at this point, but it's why I'm so obstinate in my assertion that one cannot validly judge whether "art" is moral or immoral by falling back on intention. It's not that easy.

All art is totally useless. If it has a "use," it's no longer only art.

OK, now I think we're all basically in agreement, though our words continue to get in the way. Let's see if this can be agreed on:

Art qua art is not referential -- even when it incorporates elements from the "real" world, it recontextualizes them within the artwork itself. For the Art itself, only aesthetic judgments are valid.

However, a given work of art may have more than just an aesthetic function, and to the extent that it does, it's fair to apply other sorts of judgments. These judgments do not impinge on the aesthetic value of the art, and those of us with minds capacious enough to tolerate multiple judgments of the same item can say that a given work is simultaneously an artistic masterpiece and terribly offensive.

Rauschenberg is a smart boy. Whether he's right or not, that is a major problem.

Now, if what makes an object "art" is simply that an artist says it is . . .

How about if artists say it isn't (or resides in a grey area), but the audience/consumer says it is? (I'm thinking in the area of Velvet Elvises, or the Smithsonian's exhibit of paint-by-number paintings last year.)

Re Rauchenberg's telegram:

My thesis advisor suggested (this is from my shaky memory -- when I get home I'll try to find his article) that art requires the decontextualization of its elements from their "normal" environment and the recontextualization of them into an artistic environment. So the telegram is art to the extent that it and/or its parts are now performing an aesthetic function. Perhaps just the act of putting a telegram on a museum wall accomplishes this, though one could also say that the text of this particular telegram participates in the aesthetic.

In any case, if it's art, it's not particularly interesting art.

Art qua art is not referential -- even when it incorporates elements from the "real" world, it recontextualizes them within the artwork itself. For the Art itself, only aesthetic judgments are valid.

KenB that's a generous, clear and reasonable summary.

I see some differences we have in the shadows of your next paragraph, but at what point does nitpicking begin to strike folks as obsession? Probably about 10 comments earlier, I'd imagine.

Perhaps just the act of putting a telegram on a museum wall accomplishes this, though one could also say that the text of this particular telegram participates in the aesthetic.

Agreed. The text makes it good art. The exhibiting of it by an artist makes it art.

In any case, if it's art, it's not particularly interesting art.

IMHO, the fact that he had the balls to do it makes it interesting. I'd rather have one of John's earlier paintings, if given the choice though.

"The exhibiting of it by an artist makes it art."

If pointing to anything makes it art, and we can declare anyone an artist (we can't? by what rule?), than everything is art, and "art," again, is merely a way of considering anything and everying.

Which destroys exceptionalism.

Incidentally, this post is art.

I look forward to seeing it displayed in your gallery, Edward.

I hope someone pays muchly for it, and you enjoy the commission.

Gary, one is reminded of the episode of Murphy Brown in which she gets a painting by her four-year-old featured as a legitimate gallery work. A gaggle of art critics, at a loss to figure out what object in a room is supposed to be the featured artwork, points to a canvas dropcloth on the ceiling, and decides, "Don't you get it? It's us! We're the art!"

I look forward to seeing it displayed in your gallery, Edward.

I look forward to you visiting my gallery Gary, but I won't be splitting the commission. ; )

IMHO, the fact that he had the balls to do it makes it interesting.

Perhaps, but that's not an aesthetic judgment. :)

BTW, didn't some artist do something similar with a toilet seat?

Seems the argument moved from pure formalism into Kantian phenomenology. That's progress. In The Critique of Judgement, Kant defines the work of art as an example of

"purposiveness without purpose",

that is, a simulation of a utilitarian function in the world. In Lolita Nabokov simulates the utilitarian function of pederasty, a heinous crime. Abstract painting, like a Jackson Pollock piece, simulates pattern recognition and color symbology - functions of perception useful to us in "real" life, but bracketed conceptually here as a canvas and an artwork. The pleasure of such things, according to Kant, lies in the faculty of aesthetic judgement which perceives the fitness of the work to its subject - its "purposiveness." Kant finds a way to avoid a strict correspondence definition of art, but I'm not clever enough to reproduce it here. But the basic message is that the entire experience of art, even down to the judgement of whether something *is* a work of art or not, takes place in its reception. The eye of the beholder, indeed.

Which is why, as I said above, U.S. case law has very wisely avoided the direct question of the morality of artwork in favor of its reception in "community standards of decency." The important moral question is not *what* the artwork represents, but where it is distributed and who is going to see it. Location, location, location.

kenB,

toilet seat - Marcel Duchamp's "Fountain" might be what you have in mind. He signed a urinal "R. Mutt" and put it in one of his 1917 exhibitions.

It demonstrates the "purposiveness without purpose" idea because it represents the act of the artist deciding that something is a work of art. It's a comment (some might say parody) on aesthetic judgement made in the form of an aesthetic judgement.

Duchamp was postmodern before it was cool. I think he even coined the phrase "meta is betta." Well, if not, he should have.

kenB,

toilet seat - Marcel Duchamp's "Fountain" might be what you have in mind. He signed a urinal "R. Mutt" and put it in one of his 1917 exhibitions.

It demonstrates the "purposiveness without purpose" idea because it represents the act of the artist deciding that something is a work of art. It's a comment (some might say parody) on aesthetic judgement made in the form of an aesthetic judgement.

Duchamp was postmodern before it was cool. I think he even coined the phrase "meta is betta." Well, if not, he should have.

Duchamp was the beginning and end all of 20th century art...all roads intersect through him (ouch, flash memory of Chris Burden).

The pleasure of such things, according to Kant, lies in the faculty of aesthetic judgement which perceives the fitness of the work to its subject - its "purposiveness." Kant finds a way to avoid a strict correspondence definition of art, but I'm not clever enough to reproduce it here. But the basic message is that the entire experience of art, even down to the judgement of whether something *is* a work of art or not, takes place in its reception. The eye of the beholder, indeed.

Good Lord, they're breaking out Kant now. Oh well...{diving in}...Kant ignores the a key (and to me the best) part of art in this though Jordan. Transcendentalism. Clearly the faculty to judge the fitness of a work to its purposiveness cuts both ways, resulting in a Norman Rockwell moving one person to cry and another to snicker. But a transcendental response passes beyond the limits of one's intellect and strikes at the heart or, dare I say, soul. You can build up your resistance against such an attack with a solid diet of cynicism, but you're never immune.

Edward, Have you seen this from Chris Allbritton.

Hadn't seen that Crionna...thanks for the heads up. Oddly (because I don't generally prefer "political" art), my favorite among the works was the one described as "the only overtly political piece." Still, nothing is more encouraging to me than the idea that galleries can blossom in post-Saddam Iraq. What were your thoughts on the work?

Kant's terminology is way too friggin dry to handle the kind of spirituality you're talking about, Edward. It's All Reason, All the Time. But I think it gives you a way into talking about some of the more bizarre 20th century experiments in art. Duchamp for one. Mapplethorpe, Pollock for others. Luckily most really interesting artists manage to make the Kantian layer of thought, well, interesting.

One of the best blog post titles ever!

Jordan, that was indeed what I was thinking of, thanks.

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