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March 30, 2004

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Well I always argued that the only issue was national security, that is from Tripoli to Western Pakistan, you had nations providing safe harbor as well as funding for asymetrical terrorist groups opposed to our exsistence, so you needed to both kill the terrorists as well as change the landscape; a constitutional federalist Iragi republic is not a bad place to start on the landscape part.

I even have a bet on it.

Your bet involves goal posts on a very specifc promise, Timmy...no fair lobbying the judges who may be reading with your Patriotic razzle dazzle.

Yes or No to #3?

Not, as I've previously testified.

Edward, please reread what I wrote; there is no mention of patriotism anywhere. I clearly answered your question about my position on the Iraqi conflict, it is there in black and white, no shades of gray.

But if I must, it was Saddam's failure to abide by 1441, his last chance as clearly stated by the UN. Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice...

Do I have to fully accept #3 in its entirety?

Cause I would rather have kept the troops in Saudi Arabia, with additions as needed or useful.

:)

Regarding your supposition that Wolfowitz would have invaded anyway: again, we'll never know. And in any case, he was never in a position to do anything about it. So...irrelevant.

It's still gray to me, though Timmy.

You're arguing that we needed to change the landscape which would suggest you do subscribe to #3, but then you emphasize, when you feel pressed, that it was #2, Hussein's refusal to prove abide by 1441.

I'm not saying it can't be both, just that there is a caveat in #3 that neither #1 or #2 would have mattered either way to its subscribers.

Cause I would rather have kept the troops in Saudi Arabia, with additions as needed or useful.

And not have any in Iraq?

Edward wrote:

Those who believed there was a direct threat to the US from Iraqi WMD and that, in and of itself, warranted the invasion (although, granted this includes those who have since reconsidered this in light of the evidence).

Keeping in mind that prior to the liberation of Iraq, the bipartisan and global consensus was that Iraq still had some chemical and biological weapons which it had not accounted for and was trying to figure out how to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.
Those who believed there were multiple reasons that warranted the invasion including possible WMD, noncompliance with UN Resolution 1441, and human rights violations.

Also include that Iraq was a known sponsor and harborer of terrorist groups, that it was more costly in lives and treasure to try to keep the Baathist regime contained than it was to remove the regime, and that with the political pressure to life the sanctions, it seemed unlikely that we were going to try to contain the Baathist regime indefinitely which made it likely that they would try to resume their WMD program (as the evidence we’ve uncovered suggest). All of these reasons were part of the multiple reasons for going into Iraq.
Those who may or may not have believed in either 1 or 2 but to whom non-invasion solutions to either would not have really mattered, as they believed we needed to occupy a Middle Eastern country in order to pull our troops from Saudi Arabia, as well as to send shockwaves through the Middle East, as part of a longer-term plan in the War on Terror.

Which has to include the strategic value in being in Iraq versus Saudi Arabia, being able to draw terrorists out to have to fight our troops in Baghdad versus civilians on our soil, that taking out a comparatively stronger regime in Iraq versus the weaker regime in Afghanistan with a fraction of our force sends a stronger message to the other regimes, and that with a relatively more secular and cosmopolitan culture, Iraq seems a more likely candidate for a stable Arab republic.

I’d say “all of the above.”

I'm not implying they are in any way mutually exclusive Thorley, just that if you subscribe to #3, numbers 1 and 2 become irrelevant.

They may help justify the choice of Iraq over Syria or wherever, but that's it.

Regarding your supposition that Wolfowitz would have invaded anyway: again, we'll never know. And in any case, he was never in a position to do anything about it. So...irrelevant.

Slart, I disagree, it's relevant to the Administration's focus before 9/11. If they were sure that Wolfowitz's plan deserved a chance, it could be the explanation for the behavior Clarke criticizes them for. To suggest Wolfowitz was not in a position to do anything about it is misleading...he's clearly the architect of the whole thing and the strongest advocate for it and he's in the Administration. He's not some theorists off in a university somewhere they flew to DC on 9/12. It's totally relevant what he believed.

The Admin focus on Iraq before 9/11 was twofold:

change the fly over engagement rules (more agressive) and clean up the UN Oil for Food Program (too many children dying in Iraq, as funding flowed to Saddam as compared to his people).

"And not have any in Iraq?"

Oh, Iraq too. Although I am pretty near a full Wolfowitzian PNAC kinda guy, and since there were other apparent reasons to choose Iraq, some of them counter-productive to our "shockwave" objective, a different target might have been more impressive. I don't think Saddam was an imminent danger.

We really did not have significant military opposition in the ME. A landing in Lebanon, answering the humiliating pullout of the Reagan administration, followed by a march into Syria (and a full military partnership with Israel), followed by Iraq, might have more impressive, and achieved more immediate results.

Or just grabbing the Saudi oil fields and saying, "We just don't give a **** anymore."

Again, don't know how much you're kidding Bob, but most of what you write strikes me as much more honest that what I'm hearing from the White House or Pentagon.

Timmy, I can't believe that's where their focus was, sorry.

"I'm not implying they are in any way mutually exclusive Thorley, just that if you subscribe to #3, numbers 1 and 2 become irrelevant."

That is vastly overstating the case. 1 and 2 are part of the reason why Iraq and not Iran or Saudi Arabia or Syria or Pakistan. There are other reasons, like the fact that Saudi Arabia styles itself as the Defenders of Mecca and Medina. Like the fact that Pakistan has nukes already. Like the fact that Iran has a democracy movement which might be seriously injured by direct intervention there. I also note that you most specifically have not included the fact that Iraq was one of the more brutal regimes in the area.

Just because Wolfowitz thought the Middle East needed reshaping before 9-11 doesn't mean he had the ability to do much about it before 9-11. And since I don't think you are arguing that he should have, I'm going to have to ask you to define your position. Was Wolfowitz's focus on the Middle East (pre 9-11) wrong? I suspect that you won't argue it was. So you are just back to arguing that the situation in Iraq isn't that big of a deal in the Middle East. That is great I suppose, but you haven't gotten anywhere in the 'dead horse' discussion that way because you are operating under the assumption the Iraq is not a big deal.

Timmy, I can't believe that's where their focus was, sorry.

Well no surprise there.

Sebastian:

I also note that you most specifically have not included the fact that Iraq was one of the more brutal regimes in the area.

Not true, it's included under "human rights violations."

I'm going to have to ask you to define your position.

I didn't support the invasion so it's none of the three options above. My position is the invasion was a dangerous gamble that very likely will cost us much more than it pays out. With regards to the three options above, my position is nestled in the belief that this shell game of rationales and justifications for the invasion require that the shells keep moving. That if you stop and look under all three at the same time you realize 1) there was no threat and we've permanently changed the precedent for a justified invasion of another country (something we may regret); 2) we've set ourselves up as hypocrites for not invading other countries that have brutal dictatorships; and 3) if Wolfowitz's exeripment fails, we've actually made matters worse and there are no do-overs.

No, I'm well aware of your position on the war. I was noting your shifting positions on Wolfowitz and his focus on Iraq. You seem to simultaneously want to attack him for focusing on the Middle East, and not caring enough about terrorism. You ignore the fact that he believes that dealing with terrorism requires dealing with many of the deeper systemic problems of the Middle East. Your post poses as one that wants to look why we invaded Iraq. But it doesn't look at that because it assumes that dealing with Iraq has nothing to do with terrorism.

You'll have to help me out here Sebastian. I've re-read that post several times and still don't see where you're getting that I am attacking Wolfowitz for focussing on the Middle East.

I assume that's his job.

I'm not actually doing it in this post (but, as you note, you're aware of my position on Iraq, so it's fair to assume you're aware of this too), but I do fault Bush for focussing on Iraq, when from all indications he had plenty of warning that there was a greater threat from al Qaida.

Your post poses as one that wants to look why we invaded Iraq. But it doesn't look at that because it assumes that dealing with Iraq has nothing to do with terrorism.

I've heard all the arguments for why Iraq is connected to terrorism, but none of them convince. No al Qaida connection of note, no state-sponsorer support of radical Islam of note, no WMD of note.

Only by guessing that the invasion might have long-term benefits can you connect the invasion to the War on Terror. There's certainly nothing retaliatory or directly preventive about it.

I've heard all the arguments for why Iraq is connected to terrorism, but none of them convince.

But what about Hussein's support of Hamas? One of Tacitus' tormenters, Collounsbury, noted in his own blog a few weeks ago that the real problem in the ME is Israel and the US's support of her. Wouldn't taking out Hussein, thereby eliminating his financial support of the suicide bombers that plague our friend Israel making Hamas easier to deal with = a blow to terrorism?

But what about Hussein's support of Hamas? One of Tacitus' tormenters, Collounsbury, noted in his own blog a few weeks ago that the real problem in the ME is Israel and the US's support of her. Wouldn't taking out Hussein, thereby eliminating his financial support of the suicide bombers that plague our friend Israel making Hamas easier to deal with = a blow to terrorism?

Crionna, I'm not sure how to answer that.

My first attempt was

I'm not sure Bush would have tried to rationalize the invasion of another country on that. I should have clarified that I meant the War against al Qaida, which blurs nicely with the war on terror in general until you ask why we're not invading Israel to root out Hamas...

But that seems to miss the point. Hussein was supporting a terrorist group that is actively attacking our ally. We owe that ally all the support we can give them in their fight. I'm not sure whether that help should include invading another country that's supporting them or not just to stop the support. In general, I'd say it doesn't. At least it doesn't seem like a sustainable position to take on its own.

I think the talk of justifications is somewhat misguided. The question is not whether there was any cause whatsoever to invade Iraq. . that's a pretty low bar. The question is, given some measurable benefit and some measurable cost, is the benefit worth the cost?

The costs as I see them are
a) the loss of goodwill of American people who did not support this action
b) the loss of goodwill of nations and foreign populaces that did not support this action (you can pooh-pooh friendliness all you like, but it has a practical impact on America's standing and role in world politics)
c) the death and dismemberment of American servicemen and -women.
d) the financial cost
e) the reduction of the American military's flexibility and ability to respond to other threats
f) the choice between continued long-term investment required for stability (and concomitant increases in costs c), d), and e)) and the instability and danger of a total pullout
g) the availability of a Middle East invasion as a rallying cry for terrorist recruitment
h) the danger of the precedent of pre-emptive military action based on your chosen justification

So. . now the task is not to come up with any justification whatsoever, but to determine a) whether your justification is worth these costs, and b) whether the costs and benefits were truthfully communicated to the American people when we decided to go to war. . and maybe c) whether you think anything like this analysis went on in good faith behind closed doors.

Well, I was a skeptic on the war in Iraq. Pre-war the only argument that I found convincing was #3. But that was only convincing if it was the first step towards changing the region. I don't think time is on our side. I still believe that if we wait for Iraq to become a prosperous, moderate, democratic state and reform the region by example (or contagion) we will either a) lose the WoT or b) the WoT will be enormously more expensive both in domestic casualties and in Middle Eastern casualties than otherwise.

Left out one of the most important ones. .
i) American complicity in the death and maiming of innocent Iraqis

Chagrined at leaving it out, but I swear it was a failure of my mental list-making ability, not my empathy.

American complicity in the death and maiming of innocent Iraqis

Number 1 on my list.

Maiming of innocent Iraqis. Understood, but as I've said every time I read this type of statement, UNICEF estimated the monthly deaths of Iraqis under the age of 2 during Hussein's reign to be at 10,000. That's per month.

Learning that had a big affect on me supporting the war.

Joshua wrote:

a) the loss of goodwill of American people who did not support this action

Chances are that any “goodwill” which is being attributed to having been “lost” because of the liberation of Iraq was not “goodwill” that we would have had otherwise.

b) the loss of goodwill of nations and foreign populaces that did not support this action (you can pooh-pooh friendliness all you like, but it has a practical impact on America's standing and role in world politics)

See answer to a

c) the death and dismemberment of American servicemen and -women.

Which while regrettable is relatively minor compared to other engagements and again this is assuming that we would not have had to go in there in the future.

d) the financial cost

Which is quite a bit less than the cost of containment even assuming that we would not have had to go in later. In either case, this is still a net savings particularly when one considers the lives saved because the sanctions have been lifted.

e) the reduction of the American military's flexibility and ability to respond to other threats

Which has not happened and should be weighed against the deterrence of the leaders of other regimes weaker than Iraq who are now cooperating with the United States for fear of being dragged out of a spider hole.

f) the choice between continued long-term investment required for stability (and concomitant increases in costs c), d), and e)) and the instability and danger of a total pullout

Which is really just a restatement of d). See answer above.

g) the availability of a Middle East invasion as a rallying cry for terrorist recruitment

Who will now have at least one less regime that was willing and able to sponsor their recruitment and possibly more (see answer to
e). Who will no longer have the UN sanctions on Iraq and the US presence in Saudi Arabia as their rallying cry. In turn we also have a counter “rallying cry” in the form of American servicemen and women who are seen defending and helping innocent Muslim and Arab civilians from attacks by terrorists who are murdering other Arabs and Muslims as well as the sight of Saddam Hussein surrendering rather than going down fighting as his sons did.

h) the danger of the precedent of pre-emptive military action based on your chosen justification

Which is actually an asset per e) as it provides an added incentive for other rogue States to start cooperating when they saw that we were willing and able to topple the strongest regime in the ME with a fraction of our military might.

Thorley, thanks for wading through the list.

crionna,
"Maiming of innocent Iraqis. Understood, but as I've said every time I read this type of statement..."

I see you had to elide 'American complicity in'. Except I think that's a very important part. Part of the calculus of humanitarian intervention is certainly a comparison of lives lost. But another is whether you're willing to become a murderer to stop murders.

It reminds me of an online morality survey that Harvard was conducting. I can't find the URL. One of the situations went something like this:

You see five people trapped on a train track. The train is about to move past you, the conductor unaware of the danger. If you push the car in front of you onto the tracks, you will surely kill the single passenger but stop the train and save the five. What do you do?

I could not even conceive of making the decision to end someone else's life, regardless of the sum total of life involved. I'm sure there are people who can, in good conscience. Maybe it's just one of those unbridgable differences.

you know I've never understood the logic behind that cost of containment argument.

I'll be the first to admit all those numbers make my head spin, but

Even if the liberation of Iraq costs the United States $200 billion, it will be cheaper in blood and money than the previous "containment" policy, a University of Chicago business professor said Wednesday.

Professor Steven J. Davis, of the university’s Graduate Business School, says containment, including the patroling of no-fly zones, the interdicting of ships at sea and the stationing of 30,000 troops in that region, would cost the United States $380 billion over the next 20 years.

So if you take the invasion, which is more or less complete in 1.5 years and divide the cost it comes out to $133 billion per year. However, if you take this containment estimate and calculate the per year estimate it equals only $19 billion per year.

So even if this assumes that the US will not have any additional Iraq-realted costs after (damn, where's that calculator) 7 years, which is unlikely, we're still talking about more money spent until then.

Am I misunderstanding this?

Found it

Worthwhile if you have the time.

Thanks for that link Sidereal...it was much more stressful than I imagined.

In the end I'm satisfied with my choices though; they were confirmed for me by the essay question.

Late, haven't read the thread,

But I supported the war on several grounds, none of which really fits into your calculus (though maybe #2.)

1. He had violated the cease fire ending GWI many times. An act of war. For this alone he should have been taken out years ago.

2. He had shown a willingness to invade neighboring countries (twice), had used WMD's previously, had attempted to acquire nuclear weapons. He probably had WMD's now (I believed he did, but that there presence wasnn't necessary to take him out).

3. Our options narrowed to two in the final analysis. With the sanctions crumbling and no internal threat to Hussein, all options (more inspections, coercive inspections etc.) led to circumstances in which we ultimately were faced with either taking him out, or withdrawing completely and leaving him unmonitored and in charge of Iraq.

4. In the latter case, where once again American resolve in the ME would have been shown to be weak, I had no doubt Hussein would re-arm his military and threaten his neighbors, and/or renew his efforts (if he didn't have them already) to acquire WMD's, and further that others wishing to threaten the US would have even more evidence we were a paper tiger and therefore would be more likely to become aggressive towards us. Neither of those implications were acceptable to me.

5. The Human rights violations/ draining the swamp etc. are all fine arguments but were further down the list for me.

Sidereal, took the test. Interesting. However, I see the difference between your train scenario and Iraq as twofold. First, you're not ostensibly putting yourself in danger by pushing the car on the tracks. In Iraq we are (through our designates, the military, of whose sacrifice I cannot be more appreciative). Second, your scenario guarantees the deaths of those in the car. In Iraq there were surely estimates of accidental deaths due to the fighting, but no one was guaranteed to die.

Wouldn't a closer question be: You see 12 people tied to the tracks in front of a train. You are driving a cab with a single passenger and could save the 12 by pulling your cab onto the tracks with a REALLY HIGH probability of killing yourself and/or your passenger. What do you do?

For me, I pull the cab onto the tracks and hope the passenger and God forgives me.

Must be different questions for different people Crionna...there were no cabs in my questions.

If they were sure that Wolfowitz's plan deserved a chance, it could be the explanation for the behavior Clarke criticizes them for.

A really big "if" to rest your argument on, Edward. Evidence?

To suggest Wolfowitz was not in a position to do anything about it is misleading...he's clearly the architect of the whole thing and the strongest advocate for it and he's in the Administration.

Which places him in some sort of position to command an invasion? Come on. This is hardly compelling.

He's not some theorists off in a university somewhere they flew to DC on 9/12. It's totally relevant what he believed.

Relevant to what? I'm not arguing what he does or doesn't believe; I'm questioning whether what he believes has any bearing at all on our invasion of Iraq. And it's you that needs to produce the evidence to support this claim, Edward.

Not that I'm criticising this notion. Just that I think you're putting a great deal more faith in it than is warranted by anything resembling evidence.

A really big "if" to rest your argument on, Edward. Evidence?

Not so big an "if"...

Reading from everyone's favorite road map: Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century (a pdf file), written for Cheney, Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, etc. (why not George?), so even if Wolfie didn't meet with W. everyday, clearly he was surrounded by folks who advocated that:

The Air Force presence in the Gulf region is a vital one for U.S. military strategy, and the United States should consider it a de facto permanent presence, even as it seeks ways to lessen Saudi, Kuwaiti and regional concerns about U.S. presence.

I submit that Bush believed, well before 9/11, that we needed to ensure a permanent presence in the Gulf area while also pulling out of Saudia Arabia and perhaps Kuwait...this required a new airforce base. It's not such a big "if" Slarti.

Let's be a bit more clear, Edward. I'm not disputing that Wolfowitz et al might have thought troop presence in Iraq might be a good idea for its own sake. I'm disputing the apparently foregone conclusion that they'd be able to sell it to Congress on that basis. That's the bif "if" I'm referring to, Edward.

Besides, we already have a permanent presence in the Persian Gulf region, so it's not exactly a straightforward extrapolation to arrive at the conclusion that Wolfowitz was pushing for yet another installation, now is it? But don't take my word for it:

Likewise, the Clinton administration has continued the fiction that the operations of American forces in the Persian Gulf are merely temporary duties. Nearly a decade after the Gulf War, U.S. air, ground, and naval forces continue to protect enduring American interests in the region. In addition to rotational naval interests, the army maintains what amounts to an armored brigade in Kuwait for nine months out of every year...

Source: the PNAC document you linked to.

I'm disputing the apparently foregone conclusion that they'd be able to sell it to Congress on that basis.

hmmm...walks like goalpost moving, talks like goalpost moving...I thought the foregone conclusion we were debating was whether Bush was focussed on Iraq and why.

I'm stunned, Edward. You make a post purporting to gather information about what people's interest in invading Iraq, I argue some of your comments along those lines, and all of a sudden it's me that's moving the goalposts? This line of questioning had nothing at all (at least overtly) to do with Bush's focus on Iraq.

Maybe I just misunderstood, but "Bush" wasn't even mentioned until your last update.

Slarti, sorry if you've gotten confused here, but in response to my statement

If they were sure that Wolfowitz's plan deserved a chance, it could be the explanation for the behavior Clarke criticizes them for.

You replied A really big "if" to rest your argument on, Edward. Evidence?

Certainly you can see how my follow-up adresses your question and why I assumed your follow up was also addressing it and not referencing back to the original post.

You threw me a curve, Edward. We were discussing Wolfowitz and why his opinion matters more than, say, that of Congress in the matter of the invasion of Iraq, and all of a sudden you brought Bush into the exchange. I think we're not communicating, here.

My whole point is that Wolfowitz's opinions (or, more widely, that of PNAC) are pretty irrelevant, unless they're sufficiently compelling enough reasons for the American public and Congress to sign on.

And as a side note, that the PNAC document you referenced says outright that we already have an ongoing military presence in the Gulf, which pretty much undercuts the theory that we invaded Iraq in order to establish one.

Are we clear, now? What was the underlying purpose of your post, anyway?

ahhh...clinging to the Congress angle.

Ask the members of Congress if they think Bush complied with what they signed on to.

I think you'll find some discrepancies there.

ahhh...clinging to the Congress angle.

Again, you accuse me of underhandedness where none exists. But if you think you've got a point where Congress is concerned, by all means do go ahead and make it.

Not underhandedness Slarti. I think I know you better than that. Just that we're, as you noted, not communicating here...it was a poorly phrased "eureka" moment. I hadn't realized we had expanded the discussion to include the role Congress played in this, and then when it hit me, it seemed your argument was it doesn't matter how focussed the administration may have been on Iraq, they had Congress sign on, so there's blame to go around or something like that...not sure I still follow actually.

...so there's blame to go around or something like that...

Not really...just that it's really not all that important what Wolfowitz believes, personally, if he (or those who follow the PNAC line) can't get Congress (and inevitably the voting constituency) to sign on. And if establishing a(nother) U.S. presence in the region was something Congress signed onto, then it's something that needs to be taken up with them; it's not even on the list of reasons we were given for the invasion. And without the OK of Congress, Bush couldn't (or at least, I think he couldn't) have orchestrated events on such a scale.

Glad to know you hadn't expected the worst of me, Edward. I was beginning to suspect otherwise.

it's not even on the list of reasons we were given for the invasion.

Guess I should have clarified in the beginning that it's the reason many people on the blogs I read think we went through so many hoops to conduct the invasion anyway. That's kind of the point of this whole exercise, to see who would say that given the chance to with such clarity (it's usually hinted at, but rarely stated definitively).

Glad to know you hadn't expected the worst of me, Edward. I was beginning to suspect otherwise.

Don't let my grouchier moments ever lead you to believe that.

You've got those too? Reminds me of something Heinlein said, and I'm paraphrasing:

Period: that time of the month when women behave the way men do all the time.

I hope it's not true. I really, really do.

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