by liberal japonicus
I don't know if the commentariat here has a lot of military experience, my impression is no. (I don't, but there is one person here who I think does have some experience/insight, but I leave it to them to speak) And I realize there are a lot of things that, if you are a civilian, are hard to understand. But I find this pretty astonishing.
It's impossible to keep up with all the opinions here, and there were some excellent twitter threads, one of which suggested that the problem was both sides were right and Crozier did what he did knowing that he was going to be fired. What I cite is going to reflect what I sought out, so there is a bias, but this, via LGM, seems important.
Modly argued that his problem with Crozier’s actions was not the contents of the letter, but rather the way in which Crozier bypassed the chain of command. This argument, too, suffers from a lack of transparency. Modly’s prepared remarks emphasized the importance of the chain of command and included a statement that Crozier’s boss, an admiral embarked aboard the carrier, did not see the letter until it was sent to him by Crozier. In other words, the problem wasn’t that Crozier didn’t inform his boss (he did), but that he didn’t informally tell his boss he was going to do so, in advance of formally telling him.During questions, a reporter asked if the other people in Crozier’s chain of command were included on the letter, and Modly admitted that they were, but added that many others were included as well, though he declined to say who the objectionable additional recipients were. Incredulous, a reporter asked, “Is he being relieved because he cc’d too many people?” Modly replied that he was being relieved because, “to me, that demonstrated exceptionally poor judgment.” This pattern was frequently repeated in the press conference: Modly would make a strong initial statement that could be misleading. When pressed on the specifics, he would backtrack to a less-categorical position. The overall impression was that the acting secretary of the Navy was attempting to portray Crozier’s actions more negatively than the facts warranted — he was trying to “fog one by” the reporters, the public, and the sailors he leads.
Regarding the competence of the Navy’s response, Modly stated that nearly 3000 appropriate off-ship accommodations had been made available for crewmembers and that sailors were being tested for COVID-19, the ship was being cleaned, and a skeleton crew was remaining aboard to safeguard the ship — essentially the plan recommended by Crozier in his letter. When asked if these actions would have been taken without Crozier’s letter, the acting secretary mentioned that many of the actions required lead-times longer than would have been possible if they had begun only with receipt of the letter.
While plausible, this raises a question: Why would Crozier have sent the letter if he had known that these actions were underway and that he was receiving the support he needed? After all, he had little to gain if he knew the actions were already underway, and much to lose. At best, this suggests that senior Navy leaders hadn’t communicated effectively to Crozier the full scope of response measures underway. But, given the lack of candor and transparency in Modly’s other responses, this also raises questions as to whether the letter may indeed have been the impetus for the Navy’s actions. And the delayed pace of the Navy’s response since Crozier’s relief suggests that Modly may have exaggerated the resources available to care for the crew.
Finally, Modly’s performance did not convey a commitment to some of his most important people: commanding officers confronted with the extraordinary challenge of leading and maintaining readiness during a global pandemic. It is highly unusual for a secretary of the Navy to personally order the commanding officer of a deployed warship fired — normally this action, if required, would be taken by uniformed leaders in the chain of command. It is even more unusual for him to hold a press conference about it. And it is unprecedented for the reasons for a firing to be so thin. The standard of “loss of confidence” in a commanding officer is broad, but it is highly unusual to lose confidence just because an e-mail had many recipients in addition to those required. It seems more likely that Crozier was fired for embarrassing the Navy, because his letter pointing out the ways in which he felt the Navy was not acting sufficiently to care for his crew became a public news story.
This impression is strengthened by reports that Modly pushed for the firing against the advice of senior uniformed leaders, who wanted to conduct an investigation of the leak, and that President Trump was upset with the media coverage surrounding the letter. According to David Ignatius, Modly reportedly told a colleague a day before the firing, “Breaking news: Trump wants him fired.” Yet, when asked at the press conference, Modly stated, “I’ve received absolutely no pressure. I’ve had no communication with the White House about this.”
In reporting published late Sunday April 5, Igantius relayed a conversation in which Modly told him, “I didn’t want to get into a decision where the president would feel that he had to intervene because the Navy couldn’t be decisive.” Adding that his predecessor Richard Spencer had, “lost his job because the Navy Department got crossways with the president,” Modly also reiterated that he had not communicated with Trump on the decision prior to firing Crozier.
Ironically, two days before Crozier was relieved, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Robert P. Burke sent a message to the fleet regarding COVID-19 response, which stated:
There are times that you will need to push back on operational requirements. There are times that you may need to go to an installation commander for places to house your Sailors because you cannot effectively isolate your personnel. There are times when they may not be able to help. We want these decisions to be fact-based, and not emotionally-driven. If you’re not getting what you need, don’t suffer in silence, get the word up the chain. Above all, and I want you to hear this from me and the CNO, WE HAVE YOUR BACK. When in doubt, lean forward and lead.
This is a far cry from Modly’s statement at the press conference: “[Crozier] created the impression that the Navy was not reacting … that displayed poor judgment … [and] created a firestorm.”
Thoughts?
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