Obsidian Wings

Just Wars and Detainees

by Robert Mackey

A post I did a few days ago on the argument for manned nuclear bombers, much like any freewheeling discussion on most blogs, soon turned to an interesting cul-de-sac of discussion on the nature of warfare, those whose job it is to both fight and conduct warfare (two quite different things), and what defined a combatant and non-combatant.  I'd like to address the latter and will discuss the former over the next few days.  Comments are always welcome!

The idea of just war, as most of you are well aware, began in the early Christian Era in the West, by old St. Augustine.  No need to ride that old pony for much, other than to note that the idea of war for something other than greed is a relatively new concept in human history.  Of course, like any other good idea, all it takes are a few greedy men to find the loop holes and discover new and interesting ways of making a pacifistic religion into a tool for conflict (see the Crusades and the Thirty Years War for details).

My doctoral work, along with my first book, The UnCivil War, focused several chapters on the outgrowth of the just war concept--the treatment of captured prisoners of war.  In my case studies, I found that officers in the Union Army ran into a very large, and very difficult problem at the beginning of the conflict:  What do you do with captured 'unlawful combatants?'  Federal troops were capturing guerrillas who ostensibly were part of the defense forces of the Confederacy, but did not possess uniforms, flags, and other accouterments of conventional armies, and tended to fight using the method of the irregular warrior--ambush, hit-and-run raids, and waylaying small groups of stragglers--all of which were anathema to the Union Army leadership.  If this sounds familiar to anyone who has happened to keep track of world events since 2001, good for you--it is literally the same problem and issue.  How do you define a combatant and a non-combatant?

The solution was found in Lieber's Code, published in the Union Army as General Orders Number 100, in 1863.  Francis Lieber was the most famous jurist of his time, and in a letter to General Henry W. Halleck, outlined the concepts of the legality of war, the status of combatants, and the responsibility of a capturing nation to provide for prisoners.  Lieber was a Unionist and saw that the Civil War was an illegal war, in the fact that that the Confederate States had no right to secede.  Yet, he did not allow that factor to determine the combatant status of the 'detainees.'  In fact, he pressured Halleck (and President Lincoln) to treat captured Confederate soldiers as prisoners of war, when under international law and practice of the time they could have been legally executed as rebels.  For those of you who dismiss such activities, I'd like to point out the punishments given out to Irish rebels in the uprisings of the same era, by the much more 'civilized' British government, not to mention the British reaction to the Indian Mutiny. 

General Orders 100 basically formed the basis of the law of land warfare, and later the Hague and Geneva Conventions.  It defined different categories of armed combatants--from legal combatants (uniformed soldiers), legal non-combatants, and a new category of irregular soldiers, the partisan.  For those of you who remember old newsreels (or watch the History Channel), you can see partisans operating under the Free French in during the liberation of Paris in 1944.  The wearing of an armband depicting the Cross of Loraine and the Tricolor, and the carrying of arms openly, meant that this person was a legal combatant, and eligible for treatment as a POW.  Strangely, even some German units recognized this (while others, such as the Waffen SS, would shoot anyone if given the chance, even uniformed Allied POWs, such as the hundreds of captured Americans executed at Malmedy in 1944) and treated them as POWs.  The result of Lieber's Code, the idea that a person captured on the battlefield has the right to be protected, brought to an end the ancient practice of enslaving or murdering your captives.  This, as much as the concept of Just War, brought  some semblance of sanity to the conduct of that most insane human activity, warfare.

Of course, the Bush Administration happily ignored nearly 200 years of jurisprudence on the subject and invented an new category, the "illegal combatant," to allow them to hold "detainees" at GTMO indefinitely.  As an aside, I was on the Joint Chiefs of Staff during that time, and gave a copy of my book to one of the Office of Secretary of Defense lawyers working the issue.  I don't think it did any good, but we all do what we can at times.

What does any of this do the concept of Just War? 

The idea of Just War was based on Christian theology, aimed at ending conflict between Christian states in Europe.  Fighting the unbeliever, the infidel, or the sectarian was quite all right under that concept.  The rise of liberalism, secularism and popular democracy brought into question the very idea of legal conflict.  Men, not gods or their priests, suddenly had the ability and the responsibility to make rational judgments on the idea of what is right or wrong in regards to warfare.  While nationalism and imperialism did (and still does) much to encourage conflict between states, rational human beings took a great step forward to maturity by saying "we will not execute those who surrender."

As Guantanamo Bay closes down, let us not forget that these 'detainees' are one of two things--they are either prisoners of war, combatants taken in arms against the United States and its allies, or they are criminals under international law, guilty of crimes against not only the Coalition Forces, but against the nation where they were captured or even against the international community as a whole.  If they are the former (POWs) then they must be protected under the Geneva Convention.  This means they cannot be tried for 'war crimes' conducted while under arms.  They cannot be paraded for public view and humiliation. They cannot be denied their religious practices. They cannot be interrogated after processing and internment. Lastly, they must have a process for repatriation back to their nation of origin.

If they are determined to be criminals--what has been the basic argument of both the Bush and Obama administrations--they must have their day in court.  If the crime was against US forces, they must be given the entire body of US laws to protect their individual rights. A right of trial by jury. The right to face their accusers. The responsibility of the government to present clear evidence.  The right to appeal and to have adequate counsel.  If the crime was committed against or in another country, then that country has the right to try them, just like we would do with any normal crime (e.g., extradition).  If the crime was against the international community, then use the Hague Court for the trial.

Regardless, the concept of Lieber's Code still holds true--the capturing nation must guarantee the safety and protection of the captured combatant at all costs.  It is the very basis of international law and treaty, and the release of a suspected 'terrorist' is nothing in comparison to the long term loss of one of the few successful safeguards against the horrors of war.

The Argument for Manned Nuclear Bombers

by Robert Mackey

When I was a kid, I remember watching Dr. Strangelove for the first time.  Being a male and having grown up in a household filled with World War I, World War II, Korea and (later) Vietnam veterans, I thought the coolest thing in the world were the scenes showing a thundering B-52 flying over the USSR and "Johnny Comes Marching Home" playing in the background [and for those of you who see this as some militaristic weirdness, rest assured, I was about 7...and I think nearly all seven year old boys think large objects that blow stuff up are pretty cool...].

When I read John Berry's Newsweek article "Bye-Bye Bomber", I was fairly shocked to see that members of the Air Force lobbying group (the Air Force Association) and Secretary of Defense Gates were both in favor of eliminating the nuclear role currently held by manned B-52 and B-2 bombers.  Why? Well, in two words:  Expense and "love of the Drone."

Bombers are expensive. The $2 billion or so spent on each B-2 is a LOT of money.  However, given that parts of the airplane are built in just about every congressional district, it isn't exactly like we are spending that same amount on cars built in Germany or Saudi oil.  No, the money goes to defense contractors, who in turn hire people to rivet the wings or whatever, who in turn buy tacos at the local taco stand, and so on.  But I digress.  I get the "bombers are expensive" argument--you have to build, maintain and buy the aircraft; you have to train, pay, care for, and ultimately retire the crews.  A lot of sunk in costs there, not to mention the costs associated with things like Air Force bases (which again are dearly beloved by the local congressmen, just ask Ike Skelton of Missouri). 

What is "the Love of the Drone."  Sounds somewhat like a bee porno movie.  No, this is what I call the love affair that the US is starting to have with unmanned drones.  They can kill terrorists! They will transform the battlefield! They can julienne fries from potatoes! They can teach your children Mozart! What can they not do?!!

Actually, there is a lot that drones cannot do. They cannot fly uninhibited into hostile territory like a manned bomber. Simply put, the nature of modern air warfare (jamming, counter jamming and so on) requires airframes that can carry a substantial load of electronic equipment.  Drones, as currently built, just aren't big enough.  Most are not even protected from small arms fire, from jamming, or from interference from their live-video feeds.  They may be cheap, but so are smoothbore cannon. I don't see anyone saying we should replace modern field artillery with a 12 pound Napoleon from the Civil War--cheap doesn't matter when the system simply cannot get the job done. Just remember what Momma taught you..."You can get cheap or you can get good."

My biggest argument for manned nuclear bombers isn't even their multi-role capability (e.g., they can drop conventional bombs, use cruise missiles, or even drop leaflets).  No, it is political.

Military planners often forget that nuclear weapons are not really "weapons" in the conventional sense. They are political tools, created and employed for political means. They are Clausewitz in concentrated form.  Consequently, you have to examine the political uses of nuclear weapons before any other consideration, to include cost and ease of employment.

A manned bomber can be prepped, armed, manned and sent off an airbase in a matter of hours.  In those hours, diplomats can let a potential adversary know that the US is serious, can attempt to find a solution and can do what they are meant to do.  An ICBM in a silo in the Midwest can be launched in minutes.  It can strike its target in less than 30 minutes.  A submarine-based missile can be sent on its merry way in an even shorter time, and strike targets in half the time of a land-based ICBM.

And neither land-based nor sea-based missiles can be recalled. Once launched, they are gone.  The nature of submarine warfare and the security of missile sites in the US mean that there will be no "warning" of attack to an adversary to make them negotiate.  No, the first time they know the US is serious is when a mushroom cloud appears. 

In short, it is the ICBM that is obsolete--it is a relic of the Cold War and Mutually Assured Destruction.  I'm all for a handful of failsafe missiles on Trident submarines; they would serve as a final deterrent. But put men and women in the airplanes, capable of making decisions, listening to orders, and able to be recalled to base when an unexpected peace breaks out.

Either that or just get rid of them all.  Short of full nuclear disarmament, however, I'd prefer Slim Pickens flying in a recallable bomber than two guys in a silo in Nebraska with funny keys around their necks.

Copenhagen: A Death Panel for Countries like Tuvalu

by Lindsay Beyerstein

 The tiny nation of Tuvalu has taken center stage in Copenhagen. 

"I woke up this morning crying, and that's not easy for a grown man to admit," Tuvalu's chief climate negotiator, Ian Fry, told hundreds of delegates in the Bella Center in Copenhagen on Saturday. "The fate of my country rests in your hands," he said, his voice breaking. Global warming is an existential issue for Tuvalu and other small island nations. If global warming goes unchecked, these countries will literally be wiped off the map. For countries like Tuvalu, COP15 is effectively referendum on their continued existence. Will the rest of the world step up, or will it write them off?

Tuvalu and its supporters want a treaty to protect island states. They also seek legally binding emissions targets for all countries geared to stop global warming at 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial temperatures. Last week, Tuvalu managed to get the negotiations suspended while delegates informally considered its proposal.

Obviously, it's not just in Tuvalu's interest to get serious about climate change. According to a report released last week, even if we check warming at 2 degrees, the rise could still acidify the oceans enough off most cold water coral, the bedrock food chains that help feed millions. The prospect of entire countries and low-lying regions being inundated raises the specter of mass migrations.

During the aftermath of the Iranian election, supporters sported green twitter icons to show their support for the protesters. In that spirit, I decided to change my twitter icon to an "I heart Tuvalu" button. The picture is from Tuvalu's official Cafe Press store. Join me!

The Sane Ones

by von

If it wasn't obvious from yesterday's post, my mood regarding Afghanistan has been a bit "Charge of the Light Brigade" recently.  "All in the valley of death rode the six hundred" and all that rot.  I'm not quite that pessimistic, of course.  I think that there is a chance that we'll succeed.  Maybe a good chance, if we define success low enough.  But the problem is that any success we get is unlikely to look like the kind of success that we want.

So my support for President Obama's strategy -- indeed, for an even greater commitment of troops than he authorized -- is not based on the thought that we might "win" this one.  I support the strategy because the alternatives are much, much worse. 

I see a lot of the same resigned support in Andrew Sullivan's post of this morning:

I think this strategy is doomed. But then I think any strategy that does not pledge to colonize Afghanistan, pour trillions of dollars into it and stay for a century is doomed. So why do I end up this morning feeling rather similar to my colleague, Jim Fallows, who simply sighs: 'Well, I hope he's right"?

Here's why. The sanest option - leave now - would leave allies high and dry, prompt domestic cries of surrender, demoralize the military, break a clear campaign pledge, and signal to Pakistan that the Taliban is their problem now. Everything but the latter are worth avoiding.

Sullivan is even more pessimistic than pessimistic me, but, then, he's a English Catholic.  That's a whole different order of pessimism:  He probably views the Charge of the Light Brigade as a delightful romp through a sun-filled valley of flowers.  It strikes me that his definition of sanity, however, is a little strange.  If the leaving Afghanistan now "would leave allies high and dry, prompt domestic cries of surrender, demoralize the military, break a clear campaign pledge, and signal to Pakistan that the Taliban is their problem now," that is not the "sanest option."  

Moreover, Sullivan hasn't even touched on the best reasons why we shouldn't "leave now".  Sullivan notes that "Al Qaeda is based in Pakistan, not Afghanistan."  What he doesn't note is why:  Al Qaeda is now based in Pakistan because we're in Afghanistan.  How long after we leave before they come back?  A lot of ink is spilled on how chaos Afghanistan might affect Pakistan.  That worry is justified.  But Afghanistan also sits near several key energy pipelines.  Even if Pakistan is unaffected by an imploding Afghanistan, the fires may light other vital interests.  And what of the Afghan people?  We can barely deliver social services or improvement dollars now; how are we going to do it when there are no foreign troops providing security?  We can barely find and kill al Qaeda with extensive, in-country support force.  It will be harder -- much harder -- to conduct the kind of special ops war that some on the left prefer without that support.  

True, Al Qaeda and the Taliban are unlikely to topple the Afghan government at the moment.  But the government is weak.  All bets are off should we leave.  We should not be willing to see the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies come back to power.  The danger of another attack is too great; the signal sent is all wrong; the price for 9/11 should be greater.

The situation is bad.  But the costs -- the blood and treasure, lives and lucre -- that got us to this point are sunk.  We can't get them back.  The choice now is between bad and worse.  President Obama leveled with you last night, and he chose bad.  That was the right move.  He deserves your support.

By the way:  A lot of Republicans support Obama's plan, but are pushing back against his deadline for withdrawal in 2011.  I understand the argument against the deadline, but I think these Republicans miss the bigger picture.  There is no popular support for an open-ended commitment, either in the US or abroad. Without a deadline, there is no surge and no chance to convince allies to aid us. Obama's surge does not exist without a deadline.

UPDATE:  What if Obama's surge doesn't work?  What if it gets worse, not better?  My tentative, working answer is:  we lost, then.  Completely.  Like the Russians before us.

And he sailed off through night and day and in and out of weeks and almost over a year

by von

After his listening tour, it's likely that President Obama will order more troops to Afghanistan.  Not as many as General McChrystal sought some months ago; yet, many enough for one of my compatriots to gnash is terrible teeth, roll his terrible eyes, and generally go Maurice Sendak on ya'll. 

Perhaps Eric Martin is right:  None of us is an expert in this field, a distinction shared with, well, the experts in this field.  Which is to say that there are no experts in the field of complete chaos; the subcontinent; the dispossessed.  There are only a few who know enough to be stupid, and many more willing to pretend (and thus be truly dangerous).   Obama, Biden, Clinton, McChrystal, and Patreaus. There's irony to come in this piece, but I'd add Eric Martin to that list without any: I frankly trust his judgement as much as any of the foregoing. 

But, really, who are we?  Dilettantes, who have no f_cking clue what we're doing. 

I mean that with the greatest respect.  A lot of these folks are smart and know a lot about a lot of things; foxes who are good enough to fake it when they meet hedgehogs.  Smarter, even, than me.  (Heaven forfend!) They're trying, but some problems are a little too hard.  The Brits of the East India Company hedgehogged more of the relevant ley-lines than we'll ever hope to, but still ended up with Midnight's Children.  Who are, sixty years on, still trying to get home.

Midnight's Children.  I've been rambling, but I'll stop here.  The partition of India and Pakistan is the problem that we are dealing with in Afghanistan. The British did the best they could when they beat their hasty retreat from the subcontinent. The Gandhis did the best that they could when they won and then ruled. We did the best we could in Charlie Wilson's War .... but, Wolverines! didn't translate well into Pashtun.

The partition is why Pakistan devotes unGodly sums to not-quite-match its much larger rival in arms.  The partition is the cause of Pakistan's military-industrial complex (correctly diagnosed by Eric, below).  The partition is why Pakistan makes deals with devils of varying kinds, including Talibani of both Afghani and Pakistani descent.  Unity would have been worse, but that don't mean that partition doesn't sweat the donkey balls.  (An old saw that Kierkegaard once invoked whilst reading a Tarot deck.) (I swear!)

You want candid?  I don't think that 34,000 more troops will be enough to fix this.  I think that the 40,000+ more troops requested by McChrystal months ago might have been better, but I still don't think that even this number would've fix this.  

Unlike Eric, however, I think that we have to try. 

Why?  Because the dilettantes -- the ones who agree with me, at least ;-) -- do know more than us.  Because there is still a chance.  Because no one has yet explained how withdrawing from Afghanistan makes Afghanistan stable.  (Where is that whitepaper?  I, and several hundred thousand Afghanistanis, are dying to read it.)  Because no one has yet explained how we fight the Taliban if the Afghani government turns against us (or disappears).  Because, like the partition in the subcontinent, there are fates worse than the status quo. Because there is still a chance. Because the Afghanis and Pakistanis who want us to leave Afghanistan -- who promise us that we'll be loved and admired for doing so -- don't necessarily have our best interests at heart.  Because this was always going to be slow.  Because there is still a chance.  And because we made a promise to the Afghanis, which doesn't get voided just because we'd like so much for it to be so. 

You remember that promise, right?  You probably made it, like I did, sometime in the winter of 2001.  When every day was colder than the last.  When every day was shorter than the last.  When winter climbed up the beaches and you smoked cigarettes in dive bars in Alphabet City and wrote dreadful poetry about winter climbing up on beaches.  (You know you were there, back when you could still smoke in New York.)  You resolved that, this time, we would not just destroy; we would rebuild.  We would try, at least.

Well:  Here's your chance to finally fulfill one of your resolutions.  It's probably the last one, at least for this war. 

Hey, Joe, Where You Going With That Gun In Your Hand? Pt. II

Guest post by Gary Farber.  Gary's home blog is Amygdala, and he invites you to read him there.

[Eric Martin: My friend Gary is going to be pitching in for a couple of days as I adjust to the enhanced parenting techniques that my son is submitting me too.  And yes, sleep deprivation is torture.]

Part I of this two-part post is here.

Pt. II:

First we have to distinguish between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Then we have to analyze what threat either actually presents. And then we have to do a cost-benefit analysis of what's the best course of action. The essential war with al Qaeda, both insofar as al Qaeda remains any kind of organization, and, more importantly, insofar as it remains an inspiration to jihadists, is an ideological war, not a military war. The Taliban now have tried a YouTube channel for propaganda. The best way to fight al Qaeda is to fight their ideology, and we're doing okay at that. From 2008:

[...] These new critics, in concert with mainstream Muslim leaders, have created a powerful coalition countering Al Qaeda's ideology. According to Pew polls, support for Al Qaeda has been dropping around the Muslim world in recent years. The numbers supporting suicide bombings in Indonesia, Lebanon, and Bangladesh, for instance, have dropped by half or more in the last five years. In Saudi Arabia, only 10 percent now have a favorable view of Al Qaeda, according to a December poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based think tank. Following a wave of suicide attacks in Pakistan in the past year, support for suicide operations amongst Pakistanis has dropped to 9 percent (it was 33 percent five years ago), while favorable views of bin Laden in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, around where he is believed to be hiding, have plummeted to 4 percent from 70 percent since August 2007.

We can continue presenting an alternative. Many play up contemporary al Qaeda-Taliban ties, but that's highly questionable, as Gareth Porter writes:

Hey, Joe, where you going with that gun in your hand? Pt. I.

Guest post by Gary Farber (thanks to Eric Martin, who understandably is busy!  And double congrats to Eric for all that family-makin' stuff he's been doin'!)

Gary's home blog is Amygdala, and he invites you to read him there.

[Eric Martin: My friend Gary is going to be pitching in for a couple of days as I adjust to the enhanced parenting techniques that my son is submitting me too.  And yes, sleep deprivation is torture.]

A post in two parts.  Part I:

On Friday night's PBS Newshour, Tom Bearden gave the following report from Fort Carson: 

 (Audio-only, if you have bandwidth issues.  Click the above link for a transcript.)

I was struck cold.

I've been to that chapel.

I've seen the upended rifle with the soldier's own helmet atop it, and boots beside it.

I've been there for the chilling sound and sight of the honor guards' rifle-shot salute.

I've listened to the bagpipes, and seen the faces of the family and friends, just as we see and hear in this video.

Then it was one soldier's boots and rifle. 

On Friday, it was six at once.

This is the cost of our Long War in Afghanistan.

This is the price our families, and sons and daughters, and parents, are paying.

It's been eight years and a week since American forces began combat in Afghanistan.

It's not easy not being Bush

By Lindsay Beyerstein

It's already a truism that Barack Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize for being not-George W. Bush. This talking point gets repeated as if it's a witty put down. It's supposed to trivialize the win. The implication is that Obama won just for showing up. On closer examination, winning for not being Bush is a pretty substantial distinction in its own right.

Most commentators implicitly assume Obama won just for what he's done as president or what he promises to do in office. In fact, Obama earned the prize for waging a successful campaign to unseat a ruling party that rejected the rule of law at home and abroad. Remember how hard that was?

Much has been made of the fact that nominations for the prize closed in February, just after Obama was sworn in. Obama did take some of his boldest steps towards peace to date during his earliest days in office. One of his first acts was to order the closure of prison at Guantanamo Bay. That was an courageous act of profound national and international significance. He also quickly repudiated the Bush administration's torture policies and shut down its secret prisons.

If the 2008 election happened in Africa or the Middle East it would seem obvious that an opposition leader who restored the rule of law and set about reintegrating his country into the family of nations would be racking up points towards a Nobel Peace Prize before he even took the oath of office.

Obama Nobel: But what will the wingnuts think?

By Lindsay Beyerstein

The president wins the Nobel Peace Prize and some Democrats are wondering if he should turn it down because it might upset the wingnuts. Marc Ambinder summarizes:

This tracks with one argument I'm hearing and reading from Democrats and others who are skeptical of the prize: it will turn the volume and enthusiasm level all the way to the extreme end of the dial for conservatives -- overmodulating at 110%; the resulting hyperpolarization will hurt Obama's agenda.  (Representative of this opinion: "I think it will feed not just conservative dislike but the growing concern of independents and elites, that he is a man of rhetoric, a work of imagination, but as of now an unaccomplished statesman. The smartest thing he could do is turn it down. It will backfire on him.'")

Sometimes I feel like I'm living in a parallel dimension where everything is inverted. Accepting the Nobel Prize makes you look bad? It's narcissistic to accept prizes from other people? 

I am gobsmacked that some Democrats want the president to turn down the prize for his own good. What message would that send to the rest of the world? Something along the lines of 'Thanks, guys, but I'm really all about war'?  

Of course the Republicans are going to freak out. Our guy wins a Nobel Peace Prize after 9 months in office, primarily for tinkering with the worst excesses of the wars their guy started. That's humiliating. Humiliated Republicans lash out, news at eleven.

Afghanistan's Fork In The Road

by publius

It's easy to understand why Obama is delaying a final decision on Afghanistan strategy.  He's come to a major fork in the road -- and each potential choice calls for radically different actions that can't be easily reversed.

Eric Martin can correct me if I'm wrong, but Obama seems to be faced with two rival strategy approaches.  The first is a counterterrorism approach focused on taking out bad guys.  The second is a counterinsurgency approach (COIN, etc.) that focuses on winning the population.

The problem, though, is that each strategy requires dramatically different tactics and resource levels.  A counterterrorism approach in a hostile country probably requires scaling down current troop levels.  Counterinsurgency, by contrast, requires a dramatic increase in troops to be done right.  Neither choice, once taken, can be easily undone.  So deliberation seems right to me.

All that said, one of my concerns with the counterinsurgency approach is simply that too many things have to go right for it to work.  I'm not saying it's impossible, or that it's a ridiculous argument.  It just strikes me as a strategy that carries a very low probability of success given all the good things that have to happen.

First, we have to assume that we can pull this off with less troops than counterinsurgency theory suggests we need.  Second, we have to assume that Karzai's government will not only get their act together, but will be perceived differently (and more favorably) by the actual population. 

Third, we have to assume that we are capable of pacifying the population centers.  Even if we are, though, it doesn't mean we've "won."  The current counterinsurgency approach still assumes that the Taliban will control much of the countryside for the foreseeable future.  The ultimate hope, then, is that our "ink spot" strategy will allow us to eventually expand control out into these areas. 

And we have to achieve all of this without creating new high-profile civilian deaths that inflame the population.  Plus, we have to stay there many, many years -- and spend a lot of money.

And even assuming all of that goes well, we're still not home.  Andrew Bacevich writes:

If we could wave our magic wand today and transform Afghanistan into whatever it is the COIN [counterinsurgency] advocates think they can achieve there, the threat posed by jihadism would still exist and would not even be appreciably diminished.

It just seems hard to adopt a strategy that requires so many things to go right, which even then isn't assured to help our national security.