Knowing Is Only Half the Battle

by Eric Martin

Gregg Carlstrom offered the following theories regarding the motivations behind the recent spate of arrests of Taliban figures by Pakistani security forces :

On the Taliban arrests, there are two major theories about Pakistan's motives. One says Pakistan rounded up "moderate" Taliban leaders, those who favored reconciliation talks, so they would be replaced by a more "extremist" faction loyal to the ISI. The other argues that Pakistan plans to use the detained "moderates" as conduits back to the Taliban. (I guess there's a sort-of third theory, that the arrests stem more partly from Obama's diplomacy, but there's still an element of Pakistani self-interest there.)

Both of these theories are good for Pakistan. One is good for the United States. Neither is good for Afghanistan: In both scenarios, Afghan interests will be subjugated to Pakistani interests during reconciliation talks.

Patrick Barry reacts to Carlstrom by preaching the virtues of awareness with respect to Pakistan's intentions/objectives:

One of the main critiquesof the previous administration’s Pakistan policy was that it paid little mind to understanding Pakistan’s motivations. This inattention allowed President Musharraf to play a double-game with the U.S., extending assurances that he was committed to routing the Taliban with one hand, while actively working against U.S. policy for the sake of Pakistan’s interests with the other.  It would be a shame if this administration forgot that lesson, all because Pakistan decided to arrest some militants for reasons that are a mystery to us.

While Barry is right to counsel that attention be paid to Pakistan's motives, vigilance alone is insufficient.  Our policymakers should take it one step further and actually seek to accommodate Pakistani interests (which center around maintaining its influence in Afghanistan as a regional counterbalance to India - whose influence in Afghanistan has increased at the expense of Pakistan's post-U.S. invasion). 

After all, awareness of motives only informs us of the reasons that Pakistan has played, and will play, spoiler.  But the double-game, as well as the patient game, of frustrating U.S. designs will persist in some form or another unless and until Pakistan is satisfied that their prior proxy/ally/strategic redoubt is not converted from an asset to a liability vis-a-vis India.  In seeking to broach a compromise acceptable to both the U.S. and Pakistan, the U.S. may be able to achieve some level of stability prior to departure, and ensure that Pakistan's influence manifests in some less pernicious form for the Afghan people and with respect to al-Qaeda's presence.  Without such an accord, the U.S. will either continue to spin its tires, or withdraw without exerting positive influence over Pakistan's reassertion of influence.

As Carlstrom points out, Afghanistan will likely suffer in the process, but there is little the U.S. can do from half a globe away to change that equation when Pakistan sits right next door, with much shared culture, history, religion and ideology.  Further, just as the U.S. has what it perceives as valid security interests in that region such that it demands other nations respect U.S. imperatives at the expense of their own, so too does Pakistan have its own perceived interests that it places above all others.  No matter how much we insist, Pakistan will not substitute our interests for their own.

Thus, the goal should be to not only appreciate Pakistani motives, but to strike a balance that goes as far as possible in terms of protecting the Afghan people while remaining realistic about Pakistan's vital interests.  While unsavory in some ways in the sense that this process accepts some level of foreign interference in Afghanistan, what options aren't unsavory or dependent on foreign patrons?  A 20 year occupation by NATO troops?  U.S. forces alone?

Besides, letting Pakistan attempt to cultivate influence in Afghanistan won't be cost-free for Pakistan, nor will Pakistan be able to easily dominate its less populous neighbor.  Alliances will depend on the realization of mutual interests on at least some level, and there are strong currents in Afghanistan that resent heavy-handed Pakistani interference - even within the Taliban movement.  In fact, in his memoir, Abdul Salam Zaeef seems to harbor more resentment and animosity toward the Pakistanis than he does toward the Americans (despite his being detained and tortured at Bagram and Gitmo for several years).

Perhaps it would be prudent to get out of the way.  There are few other feasible options regardless.

Comments

[Catsy]

GI Joooooooooe...

...sorry, I had to.

[John Spragge]

Does anyone have a link to a background that will explain to me

1) How Hindu India, of all countries, manages to increase its influence in Afghanistan, possibly the least Western, least tolerant (as in blowing up Buddhist art) of the Islamic countries?

2) Why Pakistan, a relatively modern country of over a hundred million people, need Afghanistan, one of the least developed and most war-damaged countries on Earth, with a population of 20 million, as a counterweight to India, a modern country with a population of over a billion.

I don't ask this to discredit the arguments; I really want to know.

[Sapient]

John Sptragge:

1) Money.

2) Antagonism towards India.

Just what seems likely to me.

[liberal japonicus]

I'd suggest that Afghanistan knows that they are simply a useful tool for Pakistan, and India is the obvious choice to turn to in trying to get some leverage. Furthermore, Iran would also prefer that Afghanistan weans itself from Pakistan, which is why the Delaram-Zaranj road was paid for by the US, built by the Indians, protected by the Afghanis and welcomed by the Iranians. Here is a google">http://www.registan.net/index.php/2007/08/20/central-asias-seaport-gwadar-or-chabahar/&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&client=firefox-a">google cache of a 2007 article discussing the matchup of Gwadar, the Pakistan port being built by the Chinese, and Chabahar, the Iranian port being built by India.

As for why Pakistan needs Afghanistan, my understanding is that Pakistan advocates a policy termed 'strategic depth', so that Afghanistan functions as a place for Pakinstan forces to retreat and regroup in the face of an Indian onslaught. I think I can only get 4 links, so this one discusses a Pakistan general announcing that it remains the strategy, while this ridicules the idea. But it is an idea that seems to have deep roots in Pakistan military thinking.

[Eric Martin]

JS:

1. The Taliban groups that blew up the Buddhist art are not the groups that India is ingratiating itself to.

2. India is much bigger (both in population and land mass) than Pakistan. Pakistan thus wants to expand is de facto measure of each in Afghanistan. Further, if India does so instead, Pakistan would be surrounded and even more outmanned.

Or so the thinking goes.

The phrase that's most frequently used is Pakistan's "strategic depth."

If you google "pakistan afghanistan strategic depth" you will get scores of links discussing this policy.

[Eric Martin]

Heh. Submitted my comment at the same time.

[Eric Martin]

I'd suggest that Afghanistan knows that they are simply a useful tool for Pakistan, and India is the obvious choice to turn to in trying to get some leverage.

I agree with this except to point out that "some" Afghans are turning to India while "some" Afghans retain their alliance with Pakistan.

There is no unanimity.

[kris]

"Hindu" India? Surely you know that India is a secular democracy, right? And it has more muslim citizens than Pakistan? And, that Deoband which is the original place where "deobandi" ideology espoused by many Pakistanis is in North India.

India has historically close links with Afghanistan, even from before independence and these relations, except for the period of Taliban rule, have been very good. India supported the Northern Alliance headed by Ahmed Shah Masood against the Taliban while the US was still trying to cut deals with them (in 2000 and before), and many afghan political leaders have studied in India. So the links are not simply because of money, they are also cultural and historical. Also, India has a long term interest in Afghan stability, since problems there tend to affect Indian security interests.