No Fortunate Sons?

by Eric Martin

This past April, when rumors of the return of the main Sunni political bloc (IAF) to the Maliki government were swirling, I preached caution - as similar stories had been reappearing regulary, to no avail, since August 2007 when the IAF withdrew.  Nevertheless, the prospect of the IAF re-upping with the Maliki government has never seemed like a bridge too far considering a few of the relevant factors.

For one, the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups have been forming political parties to challenge the IAF's stranglehold on Sunni politics at the national and local levels.  In fact, the demand by the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq for a share of the political pie has been, ostensibly, one of the major impetuses behind the Bush administration's call for regional elections in Iraq.  The IAF, however, lacks widespread support in the Sunni community due, in part, to being viewed as collaborators with the occupation/Maliki government, as well as the fact that many Sunnis (Sons of Iraq/Awakenings) boycotted the last rounds of elections so the IAF's legitimacy as representatives of Sunni Iraqis has always been dubious.

So in many ways, the IAF is facing a similar intra-sect challenge that Maliki/ISCI are facing from the Sadrists: factions that had boycotted recent regional elections, benefiting from outsider status and anti-occupation credibility, mobilizing to challenge unpopular incumbents tied to the Americans.  Given this common predicament, it's not entirely surprising to see reports (caution: still speculative) that the IAF might be looking to rejoin the Maliki government (again) if it can obtain an electoral advantage vis-a-vis its intra-sect rivals in the same ways that Maliki/ISCI have been attempting with respect to the Sadrists.  Marc Lynch:

The move to break up the Awakenings now is also, according to al-Khaleej, tied to a secret deal with the Islamic Party of Tareq al-Hashemi (which as part of the IAF has finally announced its return to the Maliki government ).  Maliki, reportedly, would move to weaken the Awakenings ahead of provincial and Parliamentary elections, breaking up their power and barring them from forming political parties (using the "no parties with militias" as the legal pretext, perhaps).   

Lynch, quite correctly, points out that the Maliki government has never been willing to integrate and embrace the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups and, thus, that it shares the goal of weakening them generally speaking.  So the IAF would have a willing ally in Maliki.  He goes on to suggest, however, that such a move by Maliki would likely run afoul of the Bush administration's designs.  But I'm not so sure. 

If the IAF is willing to offer the Bush administration the same level of cooperation with respect to long term bases and sweetheart oil agreements, the Bush team might be foolish enough to think that the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq are expendable.  Or better yet, that "they can be targeted, marginalized and/or dismissed."  After all, the Bush braintrust has - mistakenly - taken that position with respect to the Sadrists. 

Further, considering that the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq consist of former insurgents, and that many have been known to discuss the long term desire to unseat the Shiite government and reclaim Baghdad, it's not unreasonable to think that the Bush administration is wary of the Awakenings groups' commitment to long-term friendly relations with the US military/economic interests. I predicted as much back in April, but I would caution, as I did then, that this is still in the realm of the speculative: 

In addition, there could be some behind the scenes quid-pro-quo with Bush administration officials whereby the IAF is given preferential treatment with respect to the elections, or otherwise, in exchange for this PR gift that the Bush team will be touting as a sign of political progress on the reconciliation front.  That's purely speculative, but not exaclty outlandish or beyond the pale.

Speaking of that PR blitz, and the undemocratic machinations required to achieve it, the conclusion to that post remains applicable:

With respect to reconciliation, though, it's important to remember that the return of the IAF is not a new development, just a reset of the status quo ante in place before their withdrawal.  So, just as the Surge might have succeeded in returning violence to the already horrific 2005 levels, so this move might restore the Green Zone political apparatus to the dysfunctional dynamic in place prior to August 2007. 

Large scale reconciliation will only be possible (eventually) after truly representative elections that produce leaders that speak for, and address the concerns of, large majorities in the various segments Iraqi society.  Ironically, the return of the IAF could portend the opposite in terms of the Sunni electorate, just as Maliki's crackdown of the Sadrist current threatens to mute the electoral voice of large chunks of the Shiite population.

One step forward, two steps back.  The Iraq shuffle.

This won't end well.  Let's hope these are just unfounded rumors.

(*edited for clarity - or some approximation thereof)

Comments

[cw]

CCR?

[Kilo]

Back in April, when rumors of the return of the main Sunni political bloc (IAF) to the Maliki government were swirling, I preached caution - as similar stories had been reappearing regulary, to no avail, since August 2007 when the IAF withdrew.

What ? The news in April was that the Sunni blocs were saying they would return to political table, rather than it being a rumour. That wasn't something that had occurred since they withdrew.

[russell]

I'm curious about something.

Can anyone think of a case similar to Iraq, where there were lots and lots of feuding (with and without shots fired) local groups, and with lots of external pressures from nearby (and not so nearby) actors, and where some kind of viable, indigenous government was cobbled together?

How was it done?

I'd like to know, if anyone can think of examples.

Thanks -

[Eric Martin]

What ? The news in April was that the Sunni blocs were saying they would return to political table, rather than it being a rumour. That wasn't something that had occurred since they withdrew.

The news in April was that the Sunni bloc was returning to the Maliki government. The headline in the Times read:

"Sunnis Agree to End Boycott, Rejoin Iraq Government"

The opening paragraph read:

"Iraq’s largest Sunni bloc has agreed to return to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s cabinet after a boycott that lasted nearly a year, several Sunni leaders said on Thursday, citing a recently passed amnesty law and the Maliki government’s crackdown on Shiite militias as reasons for the move."

I preached caution at the time noting that the deal hadn't actually been finalized. And the deal, in fact, fell apart for the ostensible reason that Maliki refused to give the Sunni bloc the ministries they desired.

Rumors of the imminent return of the Sunni bloc had surfaced several times prior to April, and each time, the return failed to materialize.

Unless there's some other point that you're making that I'm not understanding?

[Eric Martin]

cw: yup.