by hilzoy
The NYT has gotten a copy of John McCain's thesis at the National War College. It's quite interesting. I think the NYT's account of it is somewhat misleading in its focus:
"About a year after his release from a North Vietnamese prison camp, Cmdr. John S. McCain III sat down to address one of the most vexing questions confronting his fellow prisoners: Why did some choose to collaborate with the North Vietnamese?
Mr. McCain blamed American politics.
“The biggest factor in a man’s ability to perform credibly as a prisoner of war is a strong belief in the correctness of his nation’s foreign policy,” Mr. McCain wrote in a 1974 essay submitted to the National War College and never released to the public. Prisoners who questioned “the legality of the war” were “extremely easy marks for Communist propaganda,” he wrote."
The topic of McCain's thesis is whether the military's Code of Conduct needed to be revised in light of the experiences of POWs in Vietnam. Most of the thesis is concerned with questions like: should the word 'reasonable' be added to the requirement that POWs make "every effort to escape"? (McCain seems to think so: the probability of successful attempts was nearly nil, and there were serious reprisals against other prisoners.) Should the requirement that POWs give only their name, rank, and serial number be relaxed? (McCain says no, for various reasons, most importantly that it gives prisoners a very clear standard to hold onto, and if necessary to return to once one has failed, and having this to hold onto matters a lot given the enormous disorientation of interrogation under torture.) He emphasizes the enormous psychological importance of managing to communicate with one's fellow prisoners even when one's captors forbid it, the difficulties of exercising leadership under conditions like the ones he and his fellow prisoners endured, and the importance of maintaining something like a chain of command despite that fact.
The parts the New York Times focusses on are not central to McCain's argument. His main point seems to be that it is important that people who are asked to fight for our government have some idea what they are fighting for, and that this will help them under captivity. This is not a nutty thing to think.
Moreover, the Times' focus seems to me to get the whole thrust of the thesis wrong. One of its most impressive features is that McCain does not seem to be at all interested in ascribing blame, going over the horrors he experienced, or anything like that. I think it would have been perfectly understandable if he were, but he isn't. The whole tone of the thesis is matter-of-fact: what useful lessons can we learn from this? And how should we go about implementing them, so that we improve the odds that the next group of prisoners do better? And while he doesn't talk about it, I think that the idea that debate in this country ought to be in any way limited because of its effects on POWs would have been at odds with other things he does say. He thinks that America's Vietnam policy was distorted by an excessive focus on POWs:
"It should also be explained to the American people that in all wars men become prisoners, and although it is the duty of our country to do everything possible to bring about the return of these prisoners; by no means should the existence of prisoners of war substantially influence or effect national policy." (p. 34)
If the existence of prisoners of war should not lead us to alter our policy, it stands to reason that it should not lead us to alter our view of our own basic freedoms.
McCain does think that those prisoners who were captured later, and who had therefore been "exposed to the divisive forces which had come into focus as a result of the anti-war movement in the United States" (p. 30), were less likely to hold up during captivity, but his answer to that is not to limit debate or to blame the anti-war movement, but to suggest that the armed forces "inform them as to the nature of the foreign policy and goals of the United States of America." (p. 30)
All in all, I think it's an impressive thesis, less for its actual conclusions or for the depth of its arguments than for its tone: no dwelling on what happened, no recriminations, no self-congratulation, just a determination to learn as much as possible so that we can all do better next time.
***
There is, however, one part of the thesis that is quite interesting and relevant to contemporary discussions. McCain writes (p. 9):
"One of the standard methods to wear down a prisoner's resistance to their demands was the use of what can be described as "self-induced punishment." That is to say, prisoners being ordered to sit, kneel, or stand for long periods of time deprived of rest or sleep. This form of torture, without laying a hand on a prisoner, was sometimes very successful in breaking his will."
McCain is talking about what we now call 'stress positions' and sleep deprivation. Back in 1974, McCain not only had no problem calling these things torture, he did not think that that point needed any kind of defense or elaboration. Back then, before the definition of torture had become a political issue, it was just obvious.
Compare that to his position today, as described by Marty Lederman:
"Senator McCain rightly insists that the U.S. may not (i) torture; (ii) engage in cruel treatment prohibited by Common Article 3; or (iii) engage in conduct that shocks the conscience, under the McCain Amendment. He also insists that waterboarding violates each of these legal restrictions, that the Bush Administration's legal analysis has been dishonest and flatly wrong, and that we need "a good faith interpretation of the statutes that guide what is permissible in the CIA program."
The Feinstein Amendment would have accomplished all of these objectives, but Senator McCain voted against it, presumably because he wishes that the CIA be permitted to continue the use of other of its enhanced techniques, apart from waterboarding. Those techniques are reported to include stress positions, hypothermia, threats to the detainee and his family, severe sleep deprivation, and severe sensory deprivation. Senator McCain has not explained which of these he thinks are not torture and cruel treatment, nor which he would wish to preserve for use by the CIA. But if the President does as he has promised and follows Senator McCain's lead by vetoing this bill, the CIA will continue to assert the right to use all of these techniques -- and possibly waterboarding, as well."
Back in 1974, McCain doesn't seem to have been in doubt about whether sleep deprivation and stress techniques were torture. These are not the worst techniques on the list. (For my money, that dubious honor would go to hypothermia if it were extreme enough, and severe sensory deprivation if not.) Why does he now think that these techniques are OK?
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