by Charles
[Upate at the end.]
There are clearer signs that Iraq is becoming less violent, perhaps sustainably so. Civilian casualties are one measure for gauging the success or failure of a counterinsurgency operation, and they have dropped for the third consecutive month.
(Hat tip to Engram for the graphs.) The three-month moving average shows a similar trend.
The source for the above is the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, which takes its data from independent media reports. Al Qaeda will still get away with spectacular suicide bombings, but the above doesn't look like statistical noise to me. It's a noticeable trend, and it doesn't take the willing suspension of disbelief to see it. For one thing, al Qaeda is losing its gambit. Here's what Strategypage says:
Al Qaeda appears to be moving its main effort to Afghanistan, after operations in Iraq, North Africa, Somalia and Europe (not to mention North America) have all largely failed. But continued Taliban activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan has provided al Qaeda with one area where they might be able to have a little success. But that will require a change in methods. In the rest of the world, al Qaeda has caused itself lots of problems by using terror tactics against Moslems (who refused to support the terrorists). This approach worked, for a while, but eventually the Moslem victims had enough and turned on al Qaeda. There have already been some clashes in Pakistan, between angry tribesmen, and al Qaeda groups that tried to use force to get what they wanted. To many of the Pushtun tribes along the Pakistani-Afghan frontier, the al Qaeda gunmen are seen as haughty foreigners, who look down on Pushtuns, and are quick to use force on anyone who gets in their way.
To take advantage of this, U.S. forces are talking to Afghan tribes about opposing al Qaeda, and letting the Americans help them do it. The news of what al Qaeda did in Iraq gets around, as does the eventual angry reaction of Iraqis. The U.S. is offering the potentially anti-al Qaeda tribes weapons, equipment and other aid. This might work, as the Afghan tribes are amenable to gifts, especially from someone they have shared interests with.
When 40 senior al Qaeda members are killed or captured in one month, it's time to leave. Al Qaeda has irretrievably lost, in my opinion. For another, Muqtada al Sadr have made threatening noises, but he and his Mahdi militias are still on the sidelines. The violence on the Shiite side has lessened considerably, and Sunni insurgent groups are working with the coalition (for the most part). Looking ahead, it's easy to foresee increased tensions between Sunni tribes as well as intraparty squabbles between Shiite groups (as well as lots of other squabbles), but for the last several months, there are few signs of a civil war, intractable or otherwise. In concert with fewer civilian casualties, U.S. troop casualties are also lower despite relatively high troop numbers and despite continuing kinetic operations and despite the fact that more soldiers are on the streets instead of parked in forward operating bases.
More below the fold...
I don't have other graphs because Engram doesn't, and I'm shamelessly cutting and pasting from his work. The fewer numbers of troop casualties are also meaningful because they're an indicator of lessening violence and that our forces are gathering better intelligence. For example, when there was a terrorist blast at a Baghdad pet market a couple of weeks ago, the Iranian-backed militants were caught quickly.
Speaking of Iran, the threat of their developing atomic bombs has lessened, but the threat of their meddling in Iraqi affairs has not. Bill Roggio:
The Long War Journal has spoken to several mid-level and senior US military and intelligence officers, all of whom have declined to go on the record due to the sensitive nature of the Iranian issue. Based on these conversations as well as other information, The Long War Journal has learned the nature of the Qods Force operations in Iraq and how they move resources into the country.
Iran began to extend its influence in Iraq immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003. Through the Qods Force, Iran's external wing of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, Iran immediately moved money, weapons, and operatives inside Iraq to influence the various fractured Shia political parties and militias.
Iran worked through various militias such as the Mahdi Army, the Badr Corps, the Qazali Network, the Shebaini Network, and a host of other surrogates to attack Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and rival political leaders. When groups like the Badr Corps and its political backer the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq broke from the Iranian sphere of influence and integrated with the government, the Iranian-backed militias, which have since been designated the Special Groups, began attacking them as well.
To streamline operations in Iraq, the Qods Force established a unified command, called the Ramazan Corps, and split Iraq into three roughly geographical regions.
The picture of Qods Force's command structure and operations in Iraq became clearer since US forces began heavily targeting the Iranian networks in late December 2006. Several high-level Qods Force officers – including Qais Qazali, Azhar al Dulaimi, Ali Mussa Daqduq, and Mahmud Farhadi – have been captured in Irbil, Baghdad, and several unnamed locations.
During these raids, Coalition forces seized computers and computer drives, documentation, journals, and other evidence that reinforced information obtained through the interrogations of the Qods Force officers. While military and intelligence sources would not discuss other methods, communications intercepts and satellite imagery are also likely to play a key role in understanding the Qods Force's activities in Iraq.
Critical information about the structure of the Ramazan Corps comes from the Iranian operatives captured in Iraq. Qais Qazali was the leader of the Qazali Network, which was responsible for several high-profile attacks on US and Iraqi forces. Qais, along with his brother Laith Qazali, and several other members of the Qazali Network were captured in early 2007. Azhar al Dulaimi, also a member of the Qazali network, was the tactical commander behind the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, which resulted in the kidnapping and subsequent murder of five US soldiers. Ali Mussa Daqduq, who served as the chief of guard to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and was the commander of Hezbollah's special forces, was tasked by Iran to organize the Special Groups and "rogue" Mahdi Army cells along the lines of Lebanese Hezbollah. Mahmud Farhadi was the Qods Force officer in charge of the Zafr Command, one of the three units subordinate to the Ramazan Corps.
Multinational Forces Iraq learned that Iran set up the Ramazan Corps as a sophisticated command structure to coordinate military, intelligence, terrorist, diplomatic, religious, ideological, propaganda, and economic operations. "This Corps is responsible for most of the Qods Force operations in Iraq," said Major General Kevin Bergner, the spokesman for Multinational Forces Iraq, during a briefing in Baghdad on October 3.
The Ramazan Corps is based out of the Ramazan Command Center in Tehran, but information obtained by The Long War Journal indicates significant elements have forward deployed to Mehran on the border to coordinate activities.
The Ramazan Corps is split into three separate commands – Nasr, Zafar, and Fajr – each covering a roughly geographical area in Iraq.
The Long War Journal confirmed this information with a spokesman at Multinational Forces Iraq, which was hesitant to provide additional information on the Ramazan Corps. "At this particular time MNF-I is only prepared to confirm the names of the three commands that are subordinate to Ramazan Corps and that [Mahmudi] Farhadi is the Commander of the Zafr Command," said Lieutenant Commander Kevin S. Anderson.
The Nasr Command is based in Marivan in the Iranian north and deals with operations in the Kurdish regions and portions of Diyala province. The Zafar Command is based in Mehran in central Iran, and deals with operations in central Iraq, including Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Babil, Wasit, and portions of Diyala province.
The Fajr Command is based in Ahvaz in the south, although information obtained by The Long War Journal indicated command elements have moved forward to bases in Khorramshahr and Shalamcheh to direct operations. The Fajr Command directs operations in Basrah, Dhi Qhar, Maysan, and Muthanna.
Inside Iraq, the city of Amarah in Maysan province serves as a Qods Force / Ramazan Corps command and control center as well as one of the major distribution points for weapons in southern Iraq.
The Ramazan Corps' operations begin inside Iran and flow through several points of entry along the border to destinations inside Iraq. Once inside Iraq, weapons are stockpiled and then distributed to local cells to conduct attacks on the primary and secondary targets of opportunity. The Long War Journal has obtained detailed information on the Qods Force ratlines in the central and southern regions.
Inside Iran, Qods Force manufactures and distributes weapons, provides training for Iraqi recruits, then facilitates the movement of weapons and fighters inside Iraq. Iraqi recruits, largely radicalized Shia from Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army, are sent to Iran for what one US military officer described as "basic jihadi training." The recruits receive several weeks of training with small arms and, depending on the units assigned, mortars and the use of explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs.
Several US military sources stated the EFPs are indeed "manufactured" inside Iran at "production lines" in the Iranian hubs of Ahvaz and Mehran. One officer stated the EFPs should not be considered IEDs, as they are professionally manufactured landmines.
"The EFP is not an IED, in that there is nothing improvised about them. They are manufactured in factories, mostly I believe in Iran," said the US military officer who is familiar with both the Sunni and Shia variants of IEDs used in Iraq. "The true IED can be put together by small insurgent cells with little or no support. The EFP indicates a large logistical network."
In the south and center, recruits and weapons are smuggled through four points of entry. In the central regions, the Mehran point of entry in the central province of Wasit is controlled by the Zafar Command. This is the primary conduit of Iranian weapons into Baghdad. The Al Sheeb entry at Maysan province and the Majnun and Shalamcheh entry points at Basrah province are fed by the Fajar Command based out of Ahvaz.
After being smuggled through the border crossings, Iranian weapons are moved to what are described as "strategic distribution hubs" in the cities of Badrah, Al Kut, Amarah, Qurnah, and Basrah. From these distribution hubs, weapons stocks are then moved forward to "tactical distribution hubs" in Hillah, Diwaniyah, Al Fajr, Samawah, and Nasiriyah.
After the weapons are moved to the strategic distribution hubs, they are warehoused for later use. From strategic hubs, the weapons are distributed to the tactical distribution hubs. From these tactical hubs, the weapons are then distributed to local cells for attacks on US troops, Iraqi Security Forces, and rival political and militia leaders as needed.
Baghdad is considered strategic center of gravity for EFP and mortar strikes. The Iranians believe they can influence events decisively by attacking Coalition and Iraqi targets in and around Baghdad. Iranian-made mortars and larger rockets are fired regularly at the massive Victory complex south of Baghdad where the US military maintains a large presence. US and Iraqi military patrols are targeted by EFPs inside Baghdad.
Iraqi and Coalition forces and rival political groups are targets for the Iranian-backed terror groups. The Ramazan Corps views the south as a means to shape and influence operations in and around Baghdad.
The cities of Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, and Basrah are the primary target locations in the south. Diwaniyah is fed by caches in Al Fajr; Nasiriyah is fed by the caches in Amarah, Qurnah, and Basrah.
I excerpted quite a bit of the post because it's new information and it looks newsworthy.
Iraqis are seeing the improved security situation and are voting with their feet. There are more telltale signs that more Iraqis are returning home than leaving, and the government is now becoming concerned that a large influx will have destabilizing effects:
Iraq's government acknowledged Tuesday that it cannot handle a massive return of refugees, as the U.N. announced a $11 million relief package to help the most vulnerable Iraqi families trickling back to their war-ravaged homeland.
Captain Ed has a fair take. Hundreds per day are returning, but the numbers are still small compared to the total displaced. Politically, there are small signs of movement:
Sunni Arabs ended a yearlong political boycott Tuesday in Kirkuk — the hub of Iraq's northern oil fields — under a cooperation pact that marked a bold attempt at unity before a planned referendum on control of the strategic region.
The Sunni-Kurdish deal — urged by U.S. diplomats — could also move ahead other reconciliation bids demanded by Washington but stalled by disputes that include sharing oil wealth and compromising with Sunnis who backed Saddam Hussein's Baath party.
Nationally, the impasse in the Iraqi government is not much more gridlocked than our own national government. It'll take time to hammer out de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing and power sharing, and it's clear that the earlier political benchmarks were too ambitious timingwise.
In terms of our own politics, Republicans shouldn't get too triumphant because the situation is still fragile. But many Democrats are seeing the improved situation and are changing tack. Too bad Harry Reid didn't get the memo.
As I see it, the Nevada Senator is invested in American defeat in Iraq. A quagmire there will win him more Democratic seats in the Senate, which explains why he said three weeks ago that "it's not getting better; it's getting worse." It explains why he said last April that "as long as we follow the President's path in Iraq, the war is lost," demanding a "change of course" barely two months after Bush changed course. As Media Matters also noted, Reid also said the following in a press conference: "This war is lost, and that the surge is not accomplishing anything, as indicated by the extreme violence in Iraq yesterday." What was that "extreme violence"? It was a series of four suicide bombings in Baghdad that killed at least 183. Harry Reid was so influenced by these events that he declared the war "lost", surrendering to al Qaeda without even apparently being aware of it. Liberals may like him, but to me, he is a detestable politician. Am I accusing him of being unpatriotic? No. I'm convinced that he believes we've already lost and I'm convinced that he believes that what's best for America is more Democrats in Congress.
To cap off an already long post, Michael O'Hanlon has some observations:
Rarely in U.S. history has a political party diagnosed a major failure in the country's approach to a crucial issue of the day, led a national referendum on the failing policy, forced a change in that policy that led to major substantive benefits for the nation — and then categorically refused to take any credit whatsoever for doing so.
This is, of course, the story of the Democrats and the Iraq war over the past 13 months. Without a Democratic takeover of the Congress in 2006, there is little chance that President Bush would have acknowledged his Iraq policy to be failing, and that Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker would have been accorded the resources and the policy latitude needed to radically improve the situation on the ground.
Democrats were not the authors of the surge and in fact generally opposed it. But without their pressure, it probably never would have happened. We now have a realistic chance, not of victory, but of what my fellow Brookings scholar Ken Pollack and I call sustainable stability. Violence rates have dropped by half to two-thirds in the course of 2007, the lowest level in years. Iraq is still very unstable, but it has a chance.
[...]
Democrats should change course. Rather than demand an end to the operation no matter what, they should continue to keep up the pressure for positive results in Iraq. They can retain their anti-war stance, emphasizing that their default position is that U.S. troops should soon come home absent continued major progress. The surge was never designed as just a military operation; it was intended to create political space for Iraqis to forge reconciliation with each other across sectarian lines. Since that is for the most part not yet happening, it is perfectly reasonable for the Democrats to demand more as a condition for continued funding.
The way to do this is to tie funding for Iraq operations to further progress by Iraqi leaders on their nation's political front. Release of our money should be partly contingent on progress on the so-called benchmarks in this year's funding bill — reforming the de-Baathification process to allow amnesty for lower-level former Baathists, expunging extremist and militia leaders from key government jobs and the security forces, passing a hydrocarbon law, moving to provincial elections and creating a provincial powers act. But we should add other stipulations to the list as well, some already raised by the Iraq Study Group in 2006.
O'Hanlon has a punchlist in his USA Today article, and I would add another item: that enough Iraqi security forces are sufficiently trained so that required U.S. troop reductions can take place without adversely affecting security. We're scheduled to have 30,000 come home by next spring, and Iraqis (reinforced by U.S. embeds) will need to step up.
Disclaimers: I don't think we are winning or that we have "turned the corner" in Iraq, but nor am I convinced that Iraq is "irretrievably lost". I believe the current surge strategy is the best plan available. It appears to be bearing fruit, but a lot needs to happen politically. The COIN plan may well have been implemented too late, and it's likely that our manpower levels are too low, but I'm giving the plan 'til year end before I make a judgment on whether we should stick with the current strategy or opt for Plan B (orderly, phased withdrawal of American troops). As it is, I'm leaning toward sticking with the current strategy. In their September testimony before Congress, the Petraeus-Crocker team bought themselves a Friedman unit, so it looks like the current strategy is going to last at least through March 2008.
Update: The Washington Post piece by Gen. John Bastiste and Lt. Pete Hegseth is relevant:
We believe America can and must rally around five fundamental tenets: First, the United States must be successful in the fight against worldwide Islamic extremism. We have seen this ruthless enemy firsthand, and its global ambitions are undeniable. This struggle, the Long War, will probably take decades to prosecute. Failure is not an option.
Second, whether or not we like it, Iraq is central to that fight. We cannot walk away from our strategic interests in the region. Iraq cannot become a staging ground for Islamic extremism or be dominated by other powers in the region, such as Iran and Syria. A premature or precipitous withdrawal from Iraq, without the requisite stability and security, is likely to cause the violence there -- which has decreased substantially but is still present -- to cascade into an even larger humanitarian crisis.
Third, the counterinsurgency campaign led by Gen. David Petraeus is the correct approach in Iraq. It is showing promise of success and, if continued, will provide the Iraqi government the opportunities it desperately needs to stabilize its country. Ultimately, however, these military gains must be cemented with regional and global diplomacy, political reconciliation, and economic recovery -- tools yet sufficiently utilized. Today's tactical gains in Iraq -- while a necessary pre-condition for political reconciliation -- will crumble without a deliberate and comprehensive strategy.
Fourth, our strategy in fighting the Long War must address Iran. Much has been made this week of the intelligence judgments that Iran has stopped its weapons program. No matter what, Iran must not be permitted to become a nuclear power. All options should be exhausted before we use military force, but force, nonetheless, should never be off the table. Diplomatic efforts -- from a position of strength, both regionally and globally -- must be used to engage our friends and coerce our enemies to apply pressure on the Iranian regime.
Fifth, our military capabilities need to match our national strategy. Our military is stretched thin and will be hard-pressed to maintain its current cycle of deployments. At this critical juncture, we cannot afford to be weak. Numbers and capacity matter.
Batiste is one of the six generals whose career was cut short by Donald Rumsfeld, and he has been a longtime critic of Bush and our venture in Iraq. Hegseth is on the other side of the ledger. When two ex-soldiers such as these can find this much common ground, it's worth taking notice.
People do not live in a vacuum. History is not a blank slate, to be written and rewritten and erased and forgotten.
I agree, Anarch. Like with bobby, you're free to graph civilian casualties all the back to whenever and do a least squares regression. I won't.
You don't get to choose whether it's a fact or not, Charles.
So you're telling me I have no choice? Sorry, but I do. The person who claimed one million civilian deaths didn't support such a claim, and I won't accept it at face value. I've already written that the best data source for this statistic is the IBC, and their estimate of civilian deaths from violence is 78,280 to 85,289. Those are big numbers, to be sure, and it's regretful that so many died, but it's not one million. I also choose not to answer your other questions. I've put out some facts and made some assessments, and you can either them dismiss or not. That is your choice.
Really? Where?
Here, girsch. If it'll make you happy for me to say it more, then I will.
I seriously doubt you're unaware of the connotations that words bring with them. In fact, accoding to your own link, defeatism isn't just "acceptance of defeat"
I said dictionary definition for a reason, girsh. But just to be clear, this is exactly what I meant: "Acceptance of or resignation to the prospect of defeat." If I meant the the wiki reference, I would have said so. I used the dictionary definition of the word as explicitly linked. If there's a factual or logical issue with how I used it, please let me know, but your emotional responses to the term are your own.
Start here.
Ah, yes. PNAC.
Posted by: Charles Bird | December 12, 2007 at 10:35 PM
Ah, yes. PNAC.
May they, to a man, rot in hell.
Thanks -
Posted by: russell | December 12, 2007 at 10:44 PM
Charles,
You probably didn't see it amidst all the other comments you responded to, but upthread I pointed you to an NYT article that claims the military is arming sunni insurgents. I asked you if you thought the NYT article was false since you seem most insistent that the military is not arming them. Can you explain if and why you believe the article is false?
Thanks.
Posted by: Turbulence | December 12, 2007 at 10:53 PM
fleinn:
Which individual or individuals are you addressing?And do you generally find that not addressing people by name, when you're in an open forum, lends you clarity?
Presumably you know whomever you're addressing fairly well, to know these things.
I assume that, because otherwise you'd be engaging in the behavior of a schmuck and a troll, and there'd be no reason anyone would have to bother reading you again.
Charles, I'll get back to you later, as this isn't an opportune evening for much writing from me.
Posted by: Gary Farber | December 13, 2007 at 12:48 AM
Ok, this much:
My question goes to what the Iraqi government thinks, Charles.Not to what the U.S. government thinks.
Why is it that I've now asked three times what the Iraqi government thinks of something, and you've each time responded explaining what the U.S. government thinks, instead?
One could get the impression that you think that what the Iraqi government thinks of developments in Iraq is so unimportant that you can't even conceive someone would find it relevant to discussion of, you know, Iraq.
But assuming it isn't that, could you just please answer the question? I'd like to discuss issues as regards the Iraqi government, and it's difficult to do that when I can't, somehow, get you to answer the simplest opening question on the topic, which is kinda amazing, frankly.
I'll take that as a qualified "yes," unless you you wish to say it isn't. That's a "yes," that you believe "looking at Iraqi statistics, and comparing them from month to month or year to year" is "helpful," right? Is that correct?So when you wrote "I'll pass, bobby, because I don't have expertise in statistics,"
you meant that you don't have expertise in performing a least squares regression, or something of that level of math, but you feel up to reading a graph? Is that about it? Please let me know if that's an adequate summary of what you meant.
I'm still confused trying to reconcile:
With yes, that you believe "looking at Iraqi statistics, and comparing them from month to month or year to year" is "helpful."Is there some rule for when looking at Iraqi statistics is and isn't helpful?
I'm assuming that your rule isn't "when it helps my argument and not when it doesn't." So what is your rule?
Thanks!
Posted by: Gary Farber | December 13, 2007 at 01:12 AM
Charles, please consider Gary's points on statistics. He has a point. To use a sports analogy, it sometimes seems like you're using batting averages, RBIs and errors, when other analysts are using OPS and zone ratings.
Posted by: gwangung | December 13, 2007 at 01:47 AM
Missed this: Charles:
Ah! So when you wrote this: What you actually meant then was that the the U.S. did make a choice to engage in violence to regain Iraq in 2003? Right?Posted by: Gary Farber | December 13, 2007 at 03:32 AM
Somehow, Gary, I expect that the explanation will come down to some form of American exceptionalism, which IIRC and am too lazy to look up, Charles once explicitly proferred as one of his cornerstone beliefs. (Apologies in advance if I'm misremembering.) We are allowed to choose violence as a means to political ends, but nobody else -- or at least certainly no non-Western democracy, and definitely not a bunch of backwards-ass Ay-rabs -- is.
Posted by: Phil | December 13, 2007 at 06:50 AM
"Yes, we did have a choice" has a limited set of matches with "no, we did not have a choice," to be sure.
Charle has now stated that "Yes, we did have a choice," Phil.
I don't know if he's noticed that he's contradicted his previous statement, and flatly declared that it was false, and that he's corrected himself, but he's clearly done that, notice it or not.
Posted by: Gary Farber | December 13, 2007 at 07:25 AM
Ah, yes. PNAC.
This deserves a little more than my drive-by upthread.
Take a look at the list of members and contributors at the PNAC site, and compare to the list of folks who drove the decision to invade Iraq.
Read the research papers, position papers, and articles written by these folks over the last fifteen or more years and compare to the foreign policies and initiatives of the Bush administration.
The paper cited above by tgirsch is actually quite relevant to this discussion. The role and responsibility of folks at "think tanks" like PNAC in our current situation, likewise.
Your reply was a total non-response, and a dismissive one. Bad form, brother.
If you'd like to take another swing at it, I'd be interested in your thoughts. If not, then, really, not, because you're refusing to engage a pretty important issue.
Thanks -
Posted by: russell | December 13, 2007 at 08:27 AM
Here, girsch.
Mea culpa. You did say you would hypothetically apply the term to yourself, even if it was only after you were directly challenged on that point. My bad that I missed it.
I said dictionary definition for a reason, girsh.
And like I said, I don't buy it. But if you insist on using a technically-correct definition that differs in connotation from the commonly-understood definition, I don't see why it upsets you when people understand you to mean the latter.
If I meant the the wiki reference, I would have said so.
Then why did you link that one, if it's not what you meant?
If there's a factual or logical issue with how I used it, please let me know, but your emotional responses to the term are your own.
Obviously it's far from being just me. You can choose to ignore the commonly-understood connotations of words all you want, but don't pretend it's someone else's problem that nobody wants to play along.
And, for the record, it's not an "emotional" response. It's a purely rational one. What's "emotional" or "irrational" about understanding a term in the way it's used the vast majority of the time in the vernacular? (Vernacular def. 1c, since you're so fond of the dictionary.)
Frankly, it denies credulity to believe that when you applied the terms "surrender" and "defeatist" to Reid and the Democrats, you intended no derogatory meaning in those terms.
Ah, yes. PNAC.
Yes, them. You know, the guys whose names showed up in prominent positions all throughout the Bush Administration at the time this war was started. Those guys. Of course, I'm sure that's all just a big coincidence...
russell:
The paper cited above by tgirsch is actually quite relevant to this discussion. ... Your reply was a total non-response, and a dismissive one.
Thanks. I'm glad I'm not the only one who thought so.
Posted by: tgirsch | December 13, 2007 at 12:55 PM
Take a look at the list of members and contributors at the PNAC site, and compare to the list of folks who drove the decision to invade Iraq.
Heck, forget even that. Have a look at the signatories of the letter I linked. Armitage, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle. Not exactly obscure names. And even going outside the formal administration of the time, plenty of people who obviously have the respect of (and influence within) the administration: Kristol, Bolton, Bennett, Zoellick.
Posted by: tgirsch | December 13, 2007 at 01:00 PM
A potpourri:
Charles: I agree, Anarch. Like with bobby, you're free to graph civilian casualties all the back to whenever and do a least squares regression. I won't.
On the one hand, fair enough; on the other hand, when you say this...
No it's not, but Jes -- who was the person you were responding to, although other people raised similar statistics upthread -- never claimed that the number of civilian deaths directly attributable violence was one million; rather, that the number of civilian dead was one million. Apples to slaughterhouses, Charles, and it's deeply disingenuous to pretend otherwise.
[As to the number itself... at this point, do you really need a citation? As in, are you genuinely unaware of the standard source for this statistic/these statistics? There's a context here which I can't imagine you are unaware of, but one never knows.]
In which vein, when you say this:
A) What does the line on the graphs mean?
B) Why does the time-series begin in May 2005, as opposed to another date (e.g. July 2003), and why is this date optimal for drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of the surge?
C) Why are the only political events marked upon the graph the bombing of the mosque and the beginning of the surge? Are no other political events relevant to the data?
If you can't answer those questions then no, you don't have enough expertise to understand those graphs -- and fair enough, because I don't either -- so please don't pretend otherwise.
Yes, we did have a choice. We were also in a state of ceasefire at that time, and had been for at least a dozen years. That's why I said the Gulf War never ended.
Do you believe the Korean War has ended?
I said dictionary definition for a reason, girsh.
This is what's known as a dictionary flame, and for good reason. It's puerile to insist that words have no greater meaning than what's found in Merriam-Webster (or wherever); dictionaries are summations but they can't cover all the connotations. Connotations, I might add, to which you obviously subscribe even as you protest you don't.
[And in response to your inevitable "mind-reading" foul: it ain't mind-reading when it's on the page. tgirsch et al. have documented it pretty damn thoroughly in this thread, and it's been pointed out innumerable times elsewhere.]
Ah, yes. PNAC.
Oh for the love of Christ. This is exactly the kind of childish amnesia I was talking.
I've put out some facts and made some assessments, and you can either them dismiss or not. That is your choice.
Sometimes my predictive capacity amazes even myself. This is not one of those times, I'm sad to say.
Posted by: Anarch | December 13, 2007 at 07:37 PM
I've already written that the best data source for this statistic is the IBC
The IBC is the "best" data source if you know you want to make sure you only count the people who were killed where two media sources could report: which would be good either if for some reason you wanted a known minimum that nobody could dispute, or if you wanted to minimize the level of casualties to make it look as if Iraq was less dangerous a place than it actually is.
If you want to look at how many people are actually being killed because you want to make an accurate measurement of the violence in Iraq, you need something like the Lancet report's sampling method, which will also provide an underestimate, but a closer one than the IBC method.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | December 13, 2007 at 07:54 PM
Urk. I thought you wanted to be take seriously on stats.
By their own standards, they know they're performing an undercount. And methodologically, they can hardly avoid it.
All it provides is a FLOOR...it is by no means the best source.
Posted by: gwangung | December 13, 2007 at 08:27 PM
Oh for the love of Christ.
I love that expression... ;)
Posted by: tgirsch | December 13, 2007 at 09:19 PM
Can you explain if and why you believe the article is false?
Here's what it says in the body of the article, Turb:
There's also this:So I stand corrected in the sense that earlier this year they were giving arms directly to erstwhile insurgents of the Sunni variety. My understanding from what I've read via Roggio's site over the months is that Sunnis are to join IA or IP units, and arms are supplied to those units. Al Maliki is OK with arming Sunnis as long as the requisite controls are in place.
My question goes to what the Iraqi government thinks, Charles.
Since I disputed your premise, Gary, that as far as my answer goes, but to humor you, in the above Roggio link, he references to this article, which appears to answer your concerns. Also see the second link in my response to Turb.
you meant that you don't have expertise in performing a least squares regression, or something of that level of math, but you feel up to reading a graph? Is that about it?
It means that I choose not to take the time to undertake the task of researching, compiling and charting the data all the way back to 2003, Gary, and it's not directly germane to the main topic of this post anyway. I'm more interested in the current strategy and the trendlines since the Golden Mosque bombing.
What you actually meant then was that the the U.S. did make a choice to engage in violence to regain Iraq in 2003? Right?
What I said was that Gulf War never ended. I view it in phases: Operation Desert Storm, the low-level war during the ceasefire (such as the targeting of our planes in the no-fly zones), and the Saddam-removal phase. Saddam started the violence by invading Kuwait and continued the violence throughout, and we the chose the time and manner to end this war, and only after Bush decided that all other ways of getting Saddam into compliance were exhausted. Many, if not the majority, of people would disagree with Bush's judgment, especially given that his primary casus belli blew up in his face.
But if you insist on using a technically-correct definition that differs in connotation from the commonly-understood definition...
girsch, I used one definition and it's a commonly accepted one. Your reactions to commonly accepted definitions of words remain your own.
Your reply was a total non-response, and a dismissive one.
I've read quite a few of PNAC's documents, russell. Their primary focus was for the U.S. to have a strong national defense, capable of defending our interests in a post-Soviet world. Iraq was one piece of it, and it's nowhere near as sinister as the Left portrays it. They urged regime change for Saddam, and Clinton adopted regime change as our stated policy. Yes, several members of PNAC came into the Bush administration, and several were in the Reagan and Bush 41 administrations. They were basically a group of Republicans who challenged the defense policy of a Democratic administration. That's why my initial response was no minimal.
No it's not, but Jes -- who was the person you were responding to, although other people raised similar statistics upthread...
I don't respond to Jes, Anarch. The person who raised the issue of 1 million dead was Codpiecewatch, who said: "How about the fact that 1 million are already dead?" That's who I was responding to. Without anything further than that, I don't accept his claim as a fact. I recall the Lancet folks publishing such a number, but that's a statistical projection, an estimate, not a fact. What's more, it's a disputed estimate, and one of the disputers is IBC.
Do you believe the Korean War has ended?
It's in ceasefire. And communist China is still next door.
Posted by: Charles Bird | December 15, 2007 at 02:00 AM
I recall the Lancet folks publishing such a number, but that's a statistical projection, an estimate, not a fact.
I'm certain that Charles won't read this article on the methodology of the first Lancet report (remember when the controversy was that it said about 100 000 Iraqis had been killed?) or this interview with one of the co-authors of the Lancet reports, or this response to the various standard bloggish attacks on the Lancet report.
But I include the links in case anyone is confused by Charles' claim that data provided by standard epidemiological techniques is "not fact, only estimate". This is a regurgitation of the Bush administration's attack on the Lancet reports, and need be taken about as seriously as any other blogurgitation of material supplied by the White House.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | December 15, 2007 at 04:03 AM
I'd at least have some respect for a critic of the studies published in Lancet who was consistent about it, rejecting the methodology and therefore insisting that we have no idea what the body count of any conflict in recent decades is. As it is, the critics seem to have no idea that what they're attacking is very representative work, and that if it's flawed in the ways they claim, so's the entire field of casualty statistics.
Including, of course, the ones they like to use about the sins of their enemies.
Posted by: Bruce Baugh | December 15, 2007 at 10:38 AM
Their primary focus was for the U.S. to have a strong national defense, capable of defending our interests in a post-Soviet world.
I'd state it somewhat differently.
Their primary focus was seizing the opportunity offered by the demise of the Soviet Union to establish and ensure the political and military dominance of the US, both globally and regionally in any area we have any interest in.
The general doctrine goes back to the Defense Policy Guidance, authored by Khalilizad and Wolfowitz in 1992. It continues in PNAC's "Rebuilding America's Defenses", and in various other writings of folks associated with PNAC.
Notable in all of this is the idea that the US can and should act unilaterally as it wishes to prevent the emergence of any rival nation, friendly or not, even at a regional level.
It's the abandonment of the idea of American leadership as a "first among equals" in a community of nations, and the explicit embracing of the idea of America as a global hegemon.
I agree that the goal is the protection of American interests. "Interests" here, however, is construed so broadly as to require that this nation dominate the rest of the world, as a matter of national policy.
Regarding Iraq, specifically, I'll offer this, from "Rebuilding America's Defenses", written in 2000:
Indeed, the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
I'm not really interested in kicking off a series of "dueling cite" posts here, but after more than five years of listening to and participating in the debate about Iraq, the bald and self-evident facts of the matter lead me here:
Bush, Cheney, and their like-minded colleagues knowingly and deliberately took us to war with a country that posed no credible threat to us, in the interest of projecting American power into the middle east. To do this, they knowingly and deliberately misrepresented the threat presented by Hussein, and knowingly and deliberately drew associations between Hussein and the folks that actually did attack us on 9/11.
There was likely enough legal justification for invading Iraq that they'll never hang for it, but what I've described above is an act of aggressive war.
No doubt, from now to the end of time, you'll be on your side of it and I'll be on mine. But, that's the side of it that I'm on, and I didn't get their casually.
These guys are bloody-minded, power hungry SOBs.
Thanks -
Posted by: russell | December 15, 2007 at 11:09 AM
russell: I love the way that you can calmly and civilly take someone apart. And then end unfailingly with “Thanks”. ;)
(Not snark, a true compliment.)
Posted by: OCSteve | December 15, 2007 at 02:08 PM
Oh, Charles, I wish you wouldn't have said this...because this totally undermines your arguments concerning statistics. You're not digging into the methodology, you DON'T care about the numbers, you DON'T have an idea about the statistics and you don't know why IBC is critiquing and where it's strong and where it isn't and you haven't bothered to watch the follow up on this--you just took the early reaction and ran with it.
That methodology is very much standard in epidemiological studies---you can argue with the execution (but I would go with the more journal based arguments), but not with the projection.
Sorry, but you just don't have any credibility now. You dont know what you're talking about and you're explicitly saying you don't care to know what you're talking about.
Posted by: gwangung | December 15, 2007 at 04:45 PM
Even IBC admits that their high number is an undercount--I've seen IBC representatives argue and they think they're undercounting by, at most, a factor of two, though Sloboda once admitted the remote possibility of a factor of 4 understimate.
There is one other poll besides the ORB and the Lancet survey that suggest higher death tolls than IBC's, but I don't have time to talk about it.
Posted by: Donald Johnson | December 15, 2007 at 07:13 PM
Is it too late for me to me-too on the nice, smooth curve put on top of the bar graph? I tend to disregard such things automatically when looking at data, particularly when what the curve represents is left undefined.
Possibly such things are a sine of the times, though. In my experience, even moving averages don't do that good a job of smoothing all of the unsmooth bits out of data, so I'm guessing this is either sketched by hand or some kind of function fit. Either way, completely disregardable as an indicator of trend.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | December 16, 2007 at 09:08 AM
I guess, shorter me: show me the spreadsheet.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | December 16, 2007 at 09:11 AM
Charles: I asked you "you meant that you don't have expertise in performing a least squares regression, or something of that level of math, but you feel up to reading a graph?"
Didn't get an answer: was that a "yes," or a "no"? Or is one of those statements incorrect?
Hmm? I don't recall stating any premise for you to dispute, Charles.Is there some reason we can't discuss Iraqi governmental policy, Charles?
Why is it that I've now asked four times what the Iraqi government thinks of something, and you've each time responded explaining what the U.S. government thinks, instead?
Could you just please answer the question about what the Iraqi government thinks?
Or are you actually saying that the Iraqi government is an irrelevant topic to Iraq?
Thanks!
I'm still confused trying to reconcile:
With yes, that you believe "looking at Iraqi statistics, and comparing them from month to month or year to year" is "helpful."Is there some rule for when looking at Iraqi statistics is and isn't helpful?
I'm assuming that your rule isn't "when it helps my argument and not when it doesn't." So what is your rule?
Thanks!
Posted by: Gary Farber | December 16, 2007 at 12:08 PM
Oh! The snark.
Let's try to look at this in a way that does not /only/ attempt to target Charles' inconsistent and curious interpretation of statistical data (and then prove nothing useful). And instead attempt to say something about what these graphs actually say. And what sort of methodology we're actually making use of, if we actually wanted to claim it says something useful. Ok?
As I mentioned, the statistics are taken from morgues, and through some unknown extrapolation is said to be general enough to illustrate a predictable result nationwide on how intense the violence is.
Already at that point, the alarms should go off. So does anyone want to check or examine that - what sort of numbers you're likely to get when taking numbers from the morgues, and extrapolating those to be the actual body- count in the regions? Is it possible, for example, that the only times bodies tend to turn up at a seriously high frequency like this, is when the fighting is more intense than usual, and people cannot bury their dead on their own?
Which evidently means that once the intense fighting - and then we're talking about bodies in the streets - abate, the "bodycount" will fall down to the "normal"?
Somehow, going after the person who evidently suck worse than a ten- year old at statistics, was more important. And it even proved *something*: and it was so illustrative, that any other point that may have been hidden - for example about PNAC - simply had to be mentioned to prove how /these/ statistics were bonk.
Honestly, people, this is weak. No speech, no obvious point - this is just horrendously bad.
Posted by: fleinn | December 17, 2007 at 10:26 AM
Um, this doesn't make sense. In most urbanized areas in the world, people DON'T bury the dead on their own, either in calm times or in chaotic times.
Posted by: gwangung | December 17, 2007 at 10:32 AM
we may never know (majestic pause) whether the justification for war was as contrived as some say
I thought I was pretty clear that the reasons given for the war were bullsh*t. If not, here we go:
The reasons given for the war were bullsh*t. Not necessarily false, because "bullsh*t" and "false" aren't the same thing. Just bullsh*t.
That's about as clear as I can be. Hope that does it for you.
Honestly, people, this is weak. No speech, no obvious point - this is just horrendously bad.
Well, the floor is yours. Let's see how you do.
And, you know, if it's going to exceed the expectations you place on others' comments, it had better be pretty damned good.
Good luck.
Thanks -
Posted by: russell | December 17, 2007 at 10:55 AM
I was just thinking about how Professor Marc Herold, who counted civilian deaths in Afghanistan by the method Iraqi Body Count use - two independent media reports - and came up with the figure of 3,000 - 3,400 civilians killed by the US aerial attack. We can guess that this was in fact a major undercount (since we know by the Lancet reports that the same method in Iraq was a major undercount) but am I the only one who remembers how Herold was vilified by the pro-war side for providing this information? (Not least because, by the time it was available, it was clearly established that the total number killed in the al-Qaeda attacks on America, civilian and military alike, were 2,993. For more Afghan civilians to have been killed by the US revenge on Afghanistan than the total number killed in the US was not a fact that those who approved the attack on Afghanistan cared for.)
Now that it seems any other method of figuring out how many people have been killed will produce higher results, the Herold method is embraced with relief.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | December 17, 2007 at 10:59 AM
More charts and graphs here.
Posted by: DaveC | December 17, 2007 at 01:14 PM
JFTR: the pretty pictures DaveC links to are based on trends provided by CounterInsurgency Information Command (CIOC) and SIGACTS stands for Iraq Significant Activities: it includes "known attacks on Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, the civilian population, and infrastructure". It does not include any violence that is defined as "criminal activity", and, even more significantly, it does not include "attacks initiated by Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces".
So if you were wondering what graphs could be less useful than the ones Charles has provided, DaveC's are a good example.
Posted by: Jesurgislac | December 17, 2007 at 01:27 PM
Charles:
girsch, I used one definition and it's a commonly accepted one.
Bull. The definition you chose is not the commonly-understood one, irrespective of what the dictionary says, as I and others have pointed out. It seems clear, however, that you will simply never acknowledge this.
It's also clear that your interest in the graph you posted is only superficial at best, and that you have little or no regard for the underlying methodology or what any of it means. The carefully-chosen trend line seems to support a point you've been trying to make, so who cares if the data actually bears that out?
Posted by: tgirsch | December 17, 2007 at 02:59 PM