by hilzoy
This is the second part of my response to Mona's post on Libertarians and Democrats at QandO. (First part here.) As before, the following caveats apply:
(1) I am not an expert on libertarianism. I will try to depict it accurately, but I have not done a huge amount of research on the foundations of libertarianism before writing this. If I misrepresent libertarianism, it's unintentional, and I hope people will correct me. (2) In this post, contrary to my usual practice, I will use 'Democrats' and 'Republicans' to refer not to all registered members of those parties, but to those who presently hold power within them. Mona's post is, after all, about which party to support, and this presumably depends a lot more on the nature and views of the people in power than on whether, e.g., some members of a given party are reasonable and nice.
In this post, I want to lay out some fundamental points about justice and property rights. This will involve noting one point at which libertarians might, but do not have to, disagree with me. In my next post (and yes, this post does keep splitting apart), I will get to what I take to be the main difference, to which this is all background.
Rules
Once upon a time, Robert Nozick (following Hayek) made an argument against what he called "patterned" views of justice: views according to which a society is just insofar as its distribution of stuff approaches to some supposedly ideal pattern. One example is egalitarianism: the pattern is an equal distribution of everything, and the most just society would realize this pattern. But patterns don't have to be particularly leftist. Thus, the "everything to hilzoy" view of justice, according to which a just society is one in which I own everything, is also a patterned view.
Nozick's objection was this. Suppose that the allegedly ideal distribution exists, and everything is perfectly just. And suppose that you want to give me a present. You go out and buy it, wrap it up, and give it to me. This seems nice, right? Not according to patterned views: according to them, you've just upset the pattern, and if society cares about justice, someone will have to return the present to its original owner, and your money to you. I don't even get to keep the wrapping paper. And this seems completely nutty.
In addition, Nozick and Hayek argue that patterned views deprive us of freedom. In such a society, I wouldn't have the freedom to give my property away. Moreover, I wouldn't have the freedom to enter into contracts in which I pay someone to do something, or she pays me to. For if the government were perennially swooping in and taking away the money people are paid in order to restore the just pattern, then no one would enter into those contracts. This would not only make everyone worse off; it would deprive us of the freedom to voluntarily contract to buy and sell things, and generally to adjust the existing distribution of stuff in ways that all parties find advantageous.
Nozick concludes that "patterned views" are wrong, and so far I agree with him. Justice should not be about the state constantly swooping in to produce some preferred outcome. Nozick and Hayek think that if patterned views are wrong, then the justice of a given distribution of stuff depends not on what that distribution looks like (what its pattern is), but on its history. Suppose we all start from a fair starting point, whatever that is, and we then engage in transactions that conform to some set of just rules, whatever they are: then the resulting outcome is fair, and the participants are entitled to whatever they end up owning. (For those of you who are mathematically inclined: fair starting point + transactions according to fair rules = fair outcome.)
This means that you cannot assess the fairness of a situation just by looking at the distribution that it leads to. You have to look at the history that led to that distribution. Suppose that everyone on earth voluntarily decides to give me all their earthly goods: in that case, the resulting distribution, in which I own everything on earth, is fair. Suppose, instead, that I go out and steal everything. In this case, the same distribution results, but because it doesn't have the right history (being the result of theft, not voluntary gifts), it's unfair. I agree with that as well.
Thus far, I've said that justice requires rules. This rather obviously leads to the next question, namely:
Which Rules?
Nozick seems to have identified 'a historical conception of justice' with one specific set of rules: you can own pretty much anything; you can give or sell what you own at will; you are entitled to all the proceeds of any voluntary transaction you enter into. But this is wrong. There are all sorts of sets of rules. You might not be allowed to own certain things: your children, say, or all the water that flows through your property. You might not be allowed to do anything you like with your property: e.g., pump poisons into the groundwater. You might not be allowed to sell certain things that are yours: e.g., your liberty or your kidneys. And you might not be entitled to all the proceeds of voluntary transactions you enter into. They might, for instance, be subject to taxation.
Varying these (and other) things yields different sets of rules, none of which will be vulnerable to Nozick's objection to "patterned" principles. If, say, voluntary transactions are subject to a 5% sales tax, that does not deprive me of the ability to give things away, or to enter into voluntary transactions; nor does it interfere with my freedom in any of the ways Nozick objects to. A 5% sales tax might be vulnerable to other objections, but it is not vulnerable to that one.
One might think that any set of rules other than one in which I can do whatever I like with my property and transfer it without being subject to taxes would violate my freedom. After all, one might think, it's my property, and I am entitled to do whatever I want with it. And any constraints on what I can do, or taxes placed on ownership or transactions, are violations of that right.
This argument assumes that we should take a system in which I am entitled to do whatever I want with whatever I own, and to all the proceeds of any transaction I enter into, as a sort of baseline. This system is presumed to be legitimate, and any deviation from it has to be justified as a constraint imposed on me, or a taking of my property.
I don't think that this argument works. This is not because I don't think that there can be any objections to the justice of various constraints and/or taxes. It's just that I don't think that this particular argument against them works. Unrestricted property rights are not a neutral baseline that we can start from. They are one among the many forms that a system of private property might take, and have no privileged status.
Property is a social construct. By this I don't mean that we can make it any old way we want without criticism. (For what it's worth, I am inclined to think that math is a human construct, but that obviously does not mean that I think that in math, anything goes.) The whole point of asking what rules should govern a just society is to try to figure out the right answer to the question: how should rules like those governing property be constructed? This would be pointless if I thought that any old answer was as good as any other. When I say that property is a social construct, all I mean is: it is an institution constructed by human beings in society, and it does not exist apart from the rules those human beings set up.
So, for instance, suppose that Mona and I are wandering about the savannah, separately, in the state of nature, and I kill an antelope. What is my relation to my antelope carcass? In the state of nature, I might have my antelope carcass under my (physical) control. I might guard it, or hide it, or make threatening noises at anyone who tries to take it. But I do not own it in the absence of the sorts of rules that define a system of private property.
Suppose I am preparing for a nice antelope dinner, when Mona (who is, let's suppose, bigger and stronger than me) comes and takes my antelope carcass away. What can we say about her? She might be mean. She might be selfish. But in the absence of the sorts of rules that define a system of private property, she is not a thief. She has taken my antelope away from me, but she has not stolen it. I am not entitled to compensation from her, or to anyone's assistance in recovering my antelope carcass; she is not in possession of stolen property; and anyone she chooses to give the antelope to stands in exactly the same relation to it that I did. Namely: that person can guard it, or hide it, or make threatening noises at people who try to take it away; but he or she will not own it.
Now suppose that Mona, I, and a bunch of other people get together and try to work out rules for a system of property. We might prefer one set. or we might prefer another. But there is no obvious reason that I can see to think that we would have to start with unrestricted property rights as our default position, and justify any deviation from it as a form of coercion or theft. At this point, unrestricted property rights are just one among the many sets of rules that we might adopt.
Suppose, for instance, that we decide that we can all own land, but that owning a piece of land does not entitle the owner to the entire flow of any river or stream that flows through that land. After all, that would make all the people who live downstream, and rely on that river or stream for water, irrigation, etc., hostage to their upstream neighbors. In adopting this set of rules, we need to think that it's a better system of property than its alternatives. But we do not have to justify it as a collective theft of water from people who have rivers flowing through their property, using unrestricted property rights as a baseline; any more than we have to justify unrestricted property rights as a theft of water from the people downstream, as though some other system were our baseline and any departure from it involved coercion or theft. Different systems of property are, at this point, on a par, and none of them has a privileged status.
It's important to note that this does not mean that society or the government really owns, or is entitled to seize, private property. There are, I think, two different things we might mean by 'entitled' here. On the one hand, we might mean that society is entitled to my property under our current rules. In this sense, the owner of my property is not society or the government, but me. It is just false to say, for instance, that the government can just up and take my property, absent special circumstances like eminent domain or a court order for the seizure of my assets.
On the other, we might use the claim that the government owns or is entitled to my property to mean: under whatever system of rules turns out to be just, the government will end up owning it. If true, this obviously requires a specific answer to the question: which set of rules is just?, and this is a question we have not answered yet. However, I think it's extremely unlikely that any answer according to which the government actually owns everything will turn out to be the right answer.
What I think the right answer is, and how I think my answer differs from libertarians' answer, is the subject of the next post. In this post, I have only tried to argue for two points: first, justice requires a set of rules governing (among other things) property, rather than ad hoc interventions to bring about some favored outcome; and second, no specific set of rules is the presumptively legitimate baseline from which we have to start. Property is a social construct, and when we construct it, all the different sets of rules that would define different systems of property are logically on a par.
"I can think of one really good one. The abolitionist movement went from sidenote to sparking the Civil War in less than 100 years. A similar movement went from pathetic to getting the British Empire to crack down on the slave trade all over the world in less time."
So you're saying that the only way to be moral is to appeal to God? That's your example? Any others?
"You brought it up as if their lack of argument meant they saw some force to our argument. They don't. They dismiss it as ridiculous and continue."
That's simply not true. They deny engaging in genocide because they would be ashamed to admit to it. Instead they claim that what's gone on is merely the act of isolated bandits. What they think is another matter, but they clearly know that they can't stand up and defend genocide.
"They merely do what is acceptable in their culture. And you have left yourself absolutely no basis to assail that."
Stop calling me immoral, or amoral, please.
Your basis for assailing them, is, God? Or? What, exactly, do you cite, Sebastian? I've already explained what I cite.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 06:54 PM
"When you engage in this 'thinking' what criterea does your 'brain' use to sort the consequences that you want to favor from the consequences that you disfavor?"
This is becoming tedious, as I already answered that:
And And, lastly: If we're just going to repeat ourselves, we might as well agree to disagree, and move on.What do you think of my post about Hudson v. Michigan?
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 06:59 PM
"Stop calling me immoral, or amoral, please."
I'm not. I happen to think you are highly moral. I don't, however believe that you ground it as 'logically' as you think.
"Why? Because it offends our sense of justice."
Is that a rational set of criterea or, how did you put it, (some inexplicable reason inherent to the universe)?
What happens when other people's sense of justice is offended by women showing their ankles in public?
"We fight for our construed rights because they're in the foundation for how we wish to live our lives, and because we believe they are the best principles for the lives of people in the future."
What criterea does your brain use in the thinking process to determine "best principles for the lives of people in the future"? How does it sort those from "horrific priniciples for the lives of people in the future"?
When thinking you have to sort and weigh consequences. How do you know which ones to put in the good consequences section and which ones go in the bad?
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 16, 2006 at 07:08 PM
Gary, I'm a little surprised by some of your views in this thread and trying to get a better grasp on them. So,
Can moral statements be true or false? You've answered no, I take it.
Can logic be applied to moral statements (If A, then B. A. IA and B are both moral statements, B?)
If someone says to you, "the only reason I have to be moral is societal and/or legal censure," do you simply tell them that living according to that quote doesn't appeal to you, or something more than that?
Posted by: washerdreyer | June 16, 2006 at 07:08 PM
Oh, the question I started reading this thread in order to ask was: Hilzoy, have you read this book? If yes, is it any good?
I was being taught contract law by one of the authors a year and a half ago, meant to read it, and then forgot about it until I was reading this thread.
Posted by: washerdreyer | June 16, 2006 at 07:11 PM
moral objectivism has been pretty much discredited not because suddenly some frivolous cultural relativists turned up, but because it's pretty hard to defend this position against the rigour of modern philosophy
This appears to suggest either that contractarianism isn't an objective moral theory or that there aren't a good number of modern philosophers who defend it. Having only been a lazy undergrad in philosophy, I'm open to the idea that it is not in fact widely supported, but I'd surprised to hear it.
Posted by: washerdreyer | June 16, 2006 at 07:17 PM
I just saw that I was really unclear about this question:
"What happens when other people's sense of justice is offended by women showing their ankles in public?"
I don't mean "Do they herd them back into a burning building until they get dressed properly." I mean to ask: if other people's sense of justice is offended by women showing their ankles in public, can they be wrong about that?
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 16, 2006 at 07:17 PM
If I'd been refuting what you said rather than simply adding to it, this might be something I'd want to look into.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 16, 2006 at 07:17 PM
Actually I'd like to revise this. I still happen to think you are highly moral. And I believe you ground it logically, but not in the manner that you think. You observe morality and immorality and are able to identify it.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 16, 2006 at 07:19 PM
"What happens when other people's sense of justice is offended by women showing their ankles in public?"
"I don't mean 'Do they herd them back into a burning building until they get dressed properly.' I mean to ask: if other people's sense of justice is offended by women showing their ankles in public, can they be wrong about that?"
That, I think, actually is more of a question of culture. I don't actually oppose the right (in my view) of people
to have such a culture, or to have a country with such a culture, or even to pass laws in their country to punish violation of such cultural taboos.
I do, however, believe that such countries should allow free emigration (and in practice, as well as in theory), for anyone, particularly any woman, who disagrees with such laws and customs, and who wishes to emigrate so as to escape them.
And I believe such laws should exist without having been produced by a real democracy.
And I believe people inside and outside such a country should have legally protected rights to protest such laws and taboos, and to engage in boycotts and such.
And lastly, I would not want to live in such a country myself, and would certaintly oppose any enforcement of such customs or laws in my own country if such customs were to be attempted to be enforced by any use of force or coercion against anyone who disagreed or objected.
There's a hierarchy, in short, I'd make of things that violate my sense of morality absolutely, and that I desire to have be illegal, and have the world make universally illgeal: slavery, genocide, cliterectomy, etc.
And things that I disagree with and don't recommend, but believe people have a right to choose for themselves, if it's truly a free choice, and so long as they don't cross certain lines into coercion or force, and that I would oppose being put into law in my own country, and grant a right to other countries to enact into law, but with the caveats I previously gave: believing all women must wear a chador, attempting to demand everyone to engage in sex-segregated worship, being a bigot, insisting that everyone must believe Ayn Rand is the greatest writer in the history of the world, insisting that Marx is the greatest thinker in the history of the world, etc.
And things I merely disapprove of and dislike on a purely personal basis, and desire nothing more than that society should join me in frowning on it: chewing gum loudly, misusing ellipses, shouting into cell phones in public, believing Ayn Rand is the greatest writer in the history of the world, etc.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 07:51 PM
Sebastian,
You seem to be stuck on something that I want to clear up for you... Those of us, like Gary, who do not believe that morals are somehow stitched into the fabric of spacetime, still have internal criteria by which we judge RIGHT from WRONG. You want to know what some of these criteria are? Fair enough. I'll try and elucidate, but please keep in mind that my thought process in this matter is complicated.
First, I have (or like to think I have) a sense of fairness. This sense is probably genetic in part, but it also erupts from many life experiences wherein I've felt compassion and empathy for other living beings. Compassion and empathy are two emotions that most people are gifted with and they serve as an excellent tutor in principles of fairness.
So, for a given moral precept, one criteria I use is to ask: is this fair.
Another important quality I find important in developing my own morals is if they inspire. Jesus moral statement to love one another as you would yourself... well, I find it incredibly beautiful. It fills my heart.
Conversely, certain immoral acts (in my own estimation) I find disgusting, tragic, sad... This is a deeply felt belief. Take for instance dog fighting. I grew up on a farm where I always had a dog. Dogs were my companions. They were my friends. I see something beautiful in the personality of a puppy. So, I don't like see them tortured for sport.
These are just a few examples. I hope you get a sense of how things go for me. In fact, I trust that if you examine your own thought process when it comes to moral decisions, I think you'll find something similar.
******************
Now, notice I did not ONCE invoke God or appeal to an independent authority. And yet, I was able to reason my way into a diagnosis of RIGHT and WRONG.
Now, will you say that my moral reasoning is baseless because no infallible authority figure COMMANDS my beliefs?
Posted by: manyoso | June 16, 2006 at 07:53 PM
"You observe morality and immorality and are able to identify it."
Thanks. Isn't that enough? Well, and to act on said beliefs, of course?
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 07:53 PM
"And I believe such laws should exist without having been produced by a real democracy."
"Should not exist," of course.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 08:00 PM
Manyoso,
Who said anything about an authority figure? Certainly not me.
Why should we value fairness? Why should you allow your moral decisions to be guided by the emotions of compassion and empathy instead of anger and sadism?
Gary,
Why do you value freedom, justice, and fairness? Why do you devalue slavery, injustice and arbitrariness. What is justice anyway? What are you saying when you say "A is just, B is unjust"? If someone said "Oh no, B is just and A is unjust" can you both be right?
I'm not sure you understand what I'm saying. You see morality and immorality and you recognize it. You look for the moral dimensions of a problem or situation and discover them, like a mathematician looks at a problem and discovers the answer. You use your mind in an attempt to discover truth. Or at least that is what I think we do.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 16, 2006 at 08:11 PM
Sebastian,
Probably because through hundreds of thousands of years of evolution my genes were formulated to value fairness otherwise I would not be able to survive very well in a human society. That's the biological evolutionists answer anyway.
Another way to say it is because I'm a likeable guy whose predilection is for fairness. It wins me friends and respect. Those are pretty good things to have when living with other humans.
Now here is a question for you Sebastian... Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that RIGHT and WRONG are indeed written into the fabric of the universe. How do you go about judging that RIGHT is better than WRONG?
Your appeals to an independent justification are exactly that. You believe RIGHT and WRONG are "right" and "wrong" because it is written into the fabric of the universe, ostensibly because you fear that these terms lose all meaning unless something outside of yourself reassures you they have meaning.
One cause of so much confusion in this thread appears to be that some seem to believe that morals can be derived through pure logic. This is absurd.
Our morals are part of who we are because of our genetics; because of our experiences; because of our emotions; because of our conscious. This is not a process of pure logic.
Posted by: manyoso | June 16, 2006 at 08:28 PM
"Our morals are part of who we are because of our genetics; because of our experiences; because of our emotions; because of our conscious. This is not a process of pure logic."
Isn't that true of people who value sadism and hatred over compassion and empathy? Other than personal selfishness about the values you experience, why would you devalue their values?
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 16, 2006 at 08:36 PM
Because sadism and hatred are selfish? And I would not be devaluing them just by holding opposite values.
If you are still being serious, then yes, of course it is true that sadistic and angry people arrive at their morals through genetics, experiences, emotions, and personal conscious (or lack thereof).
Now, will you awnser my question?
Posted by: manyoso | June 16, 2006 at 08:50 PM
"...why would you devalue their values?"
THE WILL TO POWER My values are the bestest values, and a world in which the Miami Heat won the Finals would be a teleogical and ontological impossibility. I will a Maverick victory.
...
I prefer the appellation "Immoralist" even the book really sucked. "Faux Monneyers"(sic, too lazy to google) was pretty good. If you think "immoralist" pretentious, "nihilist" or "clown" are ok.
...
In honor of Bloomsday, I am trying to think of a pertinent Joyce quote:
"Why did you not become a Protestant?" Joyce:"I could not renounce a coherent logical system simply to take up one incoherent and illogical." ...capable of extension
Or, better suiting my mood, when Joyce was told of a dire Hitler speech, he said:"I don't care about the politics, tell me about the man's style".
Posted by: bob mcmanus | June 16, 2006 at 09:02 PM
"You see morality and immorality and you recognize it. You look for the moral dimensions of a problem or situation and discover them, like a mathematician looks at a problem and discovers the answer. You use your mind in an attempt to discover truth. Or at least that is what I think we do."
I don't know if I discover it or create it, and I don't care. I don't see why I should. I don't see the relevance. It's not something that worries me.
That's one difference between us.
I observe moral distinctions, and apply them. To rephrase my question: is it unsatisfactory to you that people do that? Do you believe it's morally, or otherwise, insufficient?
"Who said anything about an authority figure? Certainly not me."
You cited the abolitionists as being inspired by God. That was you.
I asked you about that: "So you're saying that the only way to be moral is to appeal to God? That's your example? Any others?"
Also:
washerdreyer: "Gary, I'm a little surprised by some of your views in this thread and trying to get a better grasp on them. So,Can moral statements be true or false? You've answered no, I take it."
Wrong, I'm afraid.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 09:12 PM
"There's a hierarchy, in short, I'd make of things that violate my sense of morality absolutely"...GF
There is a reason that I don't like to use the word "morality" here, made obvious in this thread, in that there seem to be so many darn personal meanings to the word. If I substitute "sense of aesthetics" purt near everyone understands what I mean, and it seems to work in much the same way, and as well. And, I think, is more honest.
I and a conservative debate tax policy. There is maybe a "moral" dimension at the extremes, and perhaps a small moral component pervading the discussion, but mostly we are talking aesthetics:what we personally value, find pleasing, what kind of world gives the least emotional pain. We do quite well, summon arguments, joke or yell and scream, all without invoking universals or demanding independent backup.
I don't like "honor killings". I don't like them a lot, enough that my dislike of them contributed to my support for the Iraq invasion. (Boy, was my support hoping for an improvement in that area that a mistake.) Are they wrong according to my system of justice and morality? Back me into a corner, I will say sure, they're wrong. Why not? Are they wrong according to Jordanian traditions ands culture. I couldn't care less, I don't like them. Will "I don't like them" be an effective argument to change the practices of some Jordanians? Well to the extent any argument works, a rephrase as "Honor killings are really ugly." or some such variant will likely be as effective as any other.
The rhetorical strategies most commonly and effectively used in arguing against third-trimester abortions are not appeals to a universal morality but pictures and descriptions. Abu Ghraib pictures were effective. No arguments or appeals based on logic, ethics, or law have helped the Gitmo residents much.
People are first of all (and IMO, only) aesthetic critters.
Pleasure, pain, beauty.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | June 16, 2006 at 09:59 PM
Jes wrote--
"Slavery tends to exist where it is economically profitable. It tends to disappear where it is no longer highly profitable."
I think there's some debate about this. Some historians, for instance, argue that slavery was highly profitable in the American South--it ended because the Northerners forced it to end.
On the Seb-Gary (and KenB and maybe others) debate, this is one of those rare cases where I'm on Sebastian's side. I think we're both Christians and so it's in these philosophical sorts of threads where this agreement comes out. But I don't have the background or ability to argue about these kinds of things--someone mentioned Richard Rorty and his "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" has been sitting on my shelves unread for years now. But it makes me feel smarter knowing it's there.
C.S. Lewis took the position that I think Sebastian is defending in his "The Abolition of Man". I suppose there are probably more philosophically rigorous defenses written up somewhere (I'm guessing by Catholic philosophers), but I can't give references.
Posted by: Donald Johnson | June 16, 2006 at 10:00 PM
Bob,
Exactly!
Posted by: manyoso | June 16, 2006 at 10:03 PM
I have to run out the door, but Nietzsche's "Nihilism Of Strength" seems apropos to this discussion...
Posted by: Anarch | June 16, 2006 at 10:21 PM
In fact, "Honor killings are really ugly" is likely a more effective argument than "Honor killings are really wrong". Maybe the Koran says honor killings are not wrong. But according to what I have read, even those who commit honor killings think they are ugly or distasteful.
Similarly, trying to grant "personhood" to a fetus based on science or morality has been a mess, because the logic leads to places the pro-choice crowd does not want to go. But a 8 month fetus looks like a kid to me, and the procedure is horrible. Hasn't worked so far, but has better chances for a compromise. Maybe not with me, but I'm evil.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | June 16, 2006 at 10:21 PM
Gary quoting me:Gary, I'm a little surprised by some of your views in this thread and trying to get a better grasp on them. So, Can (sic, my typo in original)moral statements be true or false? You've answered no, I take it.
Gary: Wrong, I'm afraid.
Me, now: I'm glad to be wrong about that, unless you mean either that moral statements are true insofar as the person saying them believes them, or insofar as they're correct statements of the morals of the culture the speaker is a member of, or insofar as the person hearing agrees with them. But if you mean they can be true or false in the same way that many other every-day propositions can be, I don't know how that's consistent with many of your previous statements in this thread. E.g.,
+a number of the statements in your 8:28 and 8:44 comments.If I were to make a statement about the universal moral truths under discussion (e.g., "Killing infants purely for pleasure is extraordinarily wrong") I'd believe, with some degree of confidence, that I'm making a true statement about the world. I don't read you as thinking this, and remain confused.
Posted by: washerdreyer | June 16, 2006 at 11:45 PM
"If I were to make a statement about the universal moral truths under discussion (e.g., 'Killing infants purely for pleasure is extraordinarily wrong') I'd believe, with some degree of confidence, that I'm making a true statement about the world. I don't read you as thinking this, and remain confused."
No, I think that. I must have been unclear that you read me as somehow saying otherwise, and I don't understand how you read what you quoted as saying otherwise.
In my view, and understanding of my own views and words, there's nothing at all contradictory in saying that things "that I think we would all be best off if we all maintained everyone should agree to live by," can be, and often are, things that I think are right, and things that are otherwise may be, and sometimes are, entirely wrong.
You seem to be projecting some sort of excessive cultural relativism claims into what I've been saying that aren't there. (At least, the author didn't put them there.)
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 16, 2006 at 11:55 PM
Washerdreyer: The Myth of Ownership is an excellent book. I mean, it's really, really good. If you happen to be interested in tax policy and its philosophical underpinnings, I can't think of a better one.
Everyone else: there is a difference -- a large one -- between moral claims being objectively justifiable (meaning: right or wrong for everyone, not just for me, and capable of being shown to be so) and being 'an inherent part of the universe', let alone 'inexplicably', which comes up a bunch in Gary's version of Seb.
One way to see why is this. Moral reasoning is primarily about what we should do, or what sorts of lives we should live. The 'should' is essential: morality is not about what actually exists, but about what should be: e.g., what our conduct should be like, what kinds of people we should be, etc.
Something that's "written into the universe", or whatever, would seem instead to be something that we'd have to observe in order to know about it; and it would be something that exists 'in the universe'. To get from such a thing to a moral value, you'd have to move from a claim about what is the case, with respect to some observable property/object, to a claim about what should be the case*.
Or to put it another way: what discovery about the universe would justify our concluding that we ought to do something? Suppose we discover some new (observable, detectable) property that some actions have. How would we get from the claim that some actions have that property, whatever it is, to the claim that those are the actions we ought to perform?
That's what discovering observable values written into the universe would be like. Whence I conclude that if moral reasoning yields objectively justifiable conclusions, it won't do so in that way. Figuring out what other way is available is not easy, but it seems to me that looking for moral properties in the observable universe is a non-starter.
* For philosophy types: I think you can move from 'is' to 'ought' when the 'is' claim is already morally loaded. (E.g., "that is wrong" implies "I ought not to do that.) And I also think that if you want to say that any property or object that figures in justifiable claims exists, then if moral claims are justifiable, then some moral objects or properties exist; so I'm not denying that possible move. The 'observable' in the para. this is a footnote to is meant to ensure that we're talking about what Kant would call theoretical (=descriptions and/or explanations of the objects of our observation and experience), rather than practical (=concerning what we should do), claims.
Posted by: hilzoy | June 17, 2006 at 12:04 AM
"Something that's "written into the universe", or whatever, would seem instead to be something that we'd have to observe in order to know about it; and it would be something that exists 'in the universe'."
I'd be satisfied by a mathematical proof. That is, write down the class of metrics on (human) societies and show it has certain properties.
Posted by: rilkefan | June 17, 2006 at 12:28 AM
I think I agree with rilkefan.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 17, 2006 at 12:34 AM
I'm heading for the claim that those properties tell us nothing of interest, though - that when arbitrary factors are removed there's nothing to a priori distinguish the metrics, or (equivalently) societies.
If someone gets me a MacArthur or similar, I think I can come up with a disproof of morality.
Posted by: rilkefan | June 17, 2006 at 12:52 AM
Moving from Is to Ought...or even further. An amateurs reading of Kant, backwards, and likely upside down.
3rd Critique:Only a comprehensible world could be pleasing, and the world pleases. Therefore the world is comprehensible.
2nd Critique:In order for the world to be comprehensible and pleasing, it must be just. This requires the necessary postulates of God, immortality, and free will, which we use to order the world without understanding them. The postulates implicate the categorical imperative(close to Golden Rule, as a test).
1st Critique:In order to postulate those postulates, knowledge must both be possible and limited. "Limited" implies some thing that exists but not knowable. Demonstrating that knowledge is possible and limited confirms the 2nd Crit postulates.
These steps are necessary, sufficient, and mutually dependent. Dostoevsky has a physics:Without God, water flows uphill and apples return to the tree. Everything is possible, except knowledge, reason, structure.
The logical order in Kant is aesthetics => ethics => epistemology. It can be considered a proof.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | June 17, 2006 at 12:58 AM
I think that by the end of our last thread on moral relativism I admitted the theoretical possibility of "objective" moral precepts, in the sense that perhaps we could come up with a minimum set of assumptions without which it would make no sense to talk about morality *at all*, and if we could reason our way from those assumptions to a given precept. At the same time, I voiced my skepticism that we would really be able to generate any "interesting" objective moral precepts from that project.
However, regardless of its prospects, when Sebastian and others argue for objective moral truths, they don't seem to be thinking about a philosophical project such as the above. It seems to me that they want to assert the existence of moral truths just because they feel that without such, no one would ever be justified in telling anyone else how to act, and the result would be a world of either moral anarchy or moral tyranny.
The response to that is simply that in the absence of any proof that a given moral precept is universal, we're already living in such a world. The assertion that a given moral precept is "objective truth" is merely one more weapon that the subscriber to that precept can use to either try to convince a disagreeing other or justify his own moral tyranny.
I think Gary made an important point above that our moral values assume a hierarchy, and it's the ones at the top that we're most inclined to force on others. For non-philosophers, saying "X is an objective truth" is really just a charged way of saying "X is really important to me, way up there in my hierarchy, and it's also really important to a whole bunch of other people, so I'm willing to impose it on those who don't accept it".
Posted by: kenB | June 17, 2006 at 01:03 AM
"...let alone 'inexplicably', which comes up a bunch in Gary's version of Seb."
Well, I've asked Sebastian to explain a dozen times or so, and he appears unable to explain. So clearly it's inexplicable, at least for him.
As for "my version of Seb," it was he who brought the universe into it, which is why it's been thrown back at him.
He goes on further here about the universe and then back to the antelope.Here he again claims that we are "discovering things" about the universe about social relationships:
Then again the denial of construction being involved: And thus to: And finally to: Hilzoy: "Figuring out what other way is available is not easy, but it seems to me that looking for moral properties in the observable universe is a non-starter."I agree; thus one of my points of disagreement with Sebastian.
Sebastian maintains that rights that are socially constructed are meaningless and can't be argued for or defended:
I disagree; my understanding is that so do you, Hilzoy.Most of all, Sebastian insists that rights not only aren't social constructs, but inherently "true," and that we merely discover them.
Perhaps this is correct; I make no bones that, as I've said, my grasp of formal philosophy is next to nil, and that's why I typically stay out of these sorts of discussions. But herein I've been discussing nothing other than that which I believe; I'm happy to learn from those who know more.Posted by: Gary Farber | June 17, 2006 at 01:10 AM
hilzoy, you draw a bright line where none, to my mind, is necessary.
Just because moral laws make claims on what the universe should be, rather than what it often is, does not absolve us of the question of whether they are a construction of the human mind or something humans merely observe with varying degrees of success.
The generalized principle of relativity, stated in one way, says that all inertial observers, anywhere in the universe, will experience the effects of the same laws of physics. We don't create the laws, we observe them.
The idea of a universal moral creed is similar. This would render the individual human mind as merely observing, regardless of location in space or time, immutable moral laws rather than playing a hand in constructing them.
Seb and others would seem to believe that the conscious is just another imperfect sense organ.
Posted by: manyoso | June 17, 2006 at 01:13 AM
"Seb and others would seem to believe that the conscious is just another imperfect sense organ."
Did you mean "consciousness" or "conscience"?
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 17, 2006 at 01:17 AM
conscience. sorry.
Posted by: manyoso | June 17, 2006 at 01:20 AM
Would I be out of line in noting here that I think oen of the real challenges is finding a way to run a civil society that doesn't require a shared agreement on what the answer to this kind of question is?
Posted by: Bruce Baugh | June 17, 2006 at 01:22 AM
Hilzoy: Thanks for the book advice.
On is/ought:, I've been convinced by Anscombe's (at least I think it was her's originally, but I could be wrong) account of "brute relative facts" and the ease of getting from an "is" to an "owes" with same that the problem is overstated.
Gary- Everything is now cleared up.
Posted by: washerdreyer | June 17, 2006 at 02:49 AM
washerdreyer: I think that 'no move from is to ought' is way too simple; thus the caveats above, which were themselves oversimplifications. On the other hand, I think that the distinction between theoretical and practical reason is crucial. (Nb: as before, theoretical reasoning attempts to describe and explain the objects of experience; practical reasoning attempts to figure out what we should do. There's no implicit claim that this distinction is exhaustive.) I also think that something like the following is true:
No practical claim can be justified without the use of practical reasoning. Theoretical claims can of course figure in the justification of practical claims, but you need practical reasoning to justify them.
Posted by: hilzoy | June 17, 2006 at 09:25 AM
Back on topic, that is, about libertarianism and Democrats, Jim Henley writes about Hudson. Sample:
So read the rest, why doncha?Posted by: Gary Farber | June 17, 2006 at 01:26 PM
I think there has been a lot of confusion about "in the universe" the way that Gary discusses it. I'm completely aware that morality doesn't exist unless you have creatures that make choices (it is actually more than just "make choices" as animals make choices and I don't think those choices have moral implications, but that is a long sidenote which I'm not going to get in to). So objecting that it isn't 'murder' when a meteor hits me or when a lion kills a lamb doesn't get at anything I'm talking about unless you believe that moral choices are wholly illusionary (that they are only 'choices' in the sense that we wrongly believe we have the will to change our choices but in reality we are 100% captive to our training and genetics. This 'morality as illusion' isn't what I think we are talking about).
I also think that 'justification' as used in the thread above is way to strong of a claim. I would never claim that moral observations are so obvious that every single person in the world would be convinced by even the relatively easy ones. But I don't think that is an objection to the logic and strength of moral observations in the real world because there are lots of real, physical things that you can't convince people of--sometimes even with demonstration. There are still flat-Earthers, there are still people who believe in astrology, there are still people who don't believe the moon is real rocky thing in the heavens. I also don't think the fact that many people just rely on (for routine use) whatever moral culture they grow up in--without much independent observation or reasoning--is an objection. People with no understanding of electricity use the discovery of their culture all the time.
This brings me to hilzoy's comment:
"No practical claim can be justified without the use of practical reasoning. Theoretical claims can of course figure in the justification of practical claims, but you need practical reasoning to justify them."
I think that this is true, but the most basic underpinnings of practical reasoning must be either considered morally observational or axiomatic. At the bottom level of them, Gary's objection of "where do you see that", "where does that come from", "how do you prove that" undermines the whole system of moral reasoning and reduces it to mere (and I really mean 'mere') personal preference. You cannot say "I value happiness" and think that is any more impervious to the "why" than anything else. You cannot say "I value the survival of the species" and think that is any more impervious to the "why" than anything else. You cannot justify, in the way that Gary is demanding, the basic moral principles. When you try to separate the good principles from the bad you must have a sorting mechanism.
At some level of the sorting mechanism you can either say that all sorting mechanisms are valid and they just come to different results depending on which you arbitrarily use or you can say that one or more of the sorting mechanisms is 'better' than one or more of the other ones. You can't avoid it. Starting from a point where sadism is a basic value is not going to get you a structure similar to one where general happiness is a basic value. If you can't distinguish between the two I'm not impressed with the logical structure of your moral reasoning.
And to be super-clear it is the stated logical structure that I'm not impressed with. I perfectly well believe that people here can distinguish between moral systems where sadism is a prime virtue and those where it is not. Which kind of encapsulates my whole point.
Posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw | June 17, 2006 at 02:06 PM
uh oh, I see an infinite regress raising its ugly head ...
Posted by: novakant | June 17, 2006 at 02:22 PM
Have we really gotten this far without raising the spectre of utilitarianism, or were the references to consequentialism supposed to have covered it?
Posted by: Phil | June 17, 2006 at 04:46 PM
Sebastian,
I've answered your questions, now will you please answer mine?
Posted by: manyoso | June 17, 2006 at 07:29 PM
"...spectre of utilitarianism, or were the references to consequentialism supposed to have covered it?"
I consider utilitarianism and consequentialism as much moral philosophies as I consider Unitarianism a religion, or Lego sets architecture, or GTA autoracing, or Civilization political science, or an inflatable doll a woman.
Or something. I am trying to find some analogy sufficiently emphatic.
No offense to unitarians or those with plastic friends. Just kidding.
Posted by: bob mcmanus | June 17, 2006 at 07:43 PM
I bounce her in the kitchen. I bounce her in the hall.
Posted by: Stewart Copeland | June 17, 2006 at 11:00 PM
My goodness, what a thinky bunch.
Jonas:
We are not merely on different pages, but seem to be reading from different books, so I'm not sure it's worth either of our times to try to understand each other better right now, especially given the stunning length of the comments here.
In general, as I think about this so very thought-provoking post and discussion, it emphasizes for me how absolutely critical it is to avoid leaping to postulates.
Nozick's postulates are deeply libertarian, so he's bound to come up with some pretty libertarian conclusions. He (and other libertarians) talk about radically individual humans, who enter only into voluntary associations, who mostly deal with strangers, for whom property is completely alienable in exchange for completely fungible money.
I'm arguing that none of these conditions are met by humans in a human state of nature (who are born into extended families, who encounter few strangers, who possess very little in the way of stuff, and who have no money at all). Because the human state of nature lasted far, far longer than our libertarian present day, thought experiments based on that state are likely to given results that fit our unconscious emotional needs, they will feel "right".
My gut reaction to Hilzoy's discussion of the "patterned view" of justice versus the "process view" is to go all Jewish-prophet-y and say, "Justice will come when you pay less attention to your damned stuff, and more to other people!"
Example: the story of Solomon and the two mothers with one baby (1 Kings 3:16-28). The evidence does not permit the King to judge which is the mother, so he says he'll do the "fair" thing and chop it in half. One mother says, "OK, that's fair", and the other says "No, give the baby to her, just don't hurt it!" By this Solomon knows that the protesting mother is the "real" one, and deserves the baby.
Solomon's threat is the threat of fairness; Solomon's justice is that he restores right human relationships. "Property justice" is not measured by a pattern -- of uniformity or otherwise -- *or* by a fair process which must logically produce fair results. "Property justice" occurs only when it supports just human relationships. It doesn't matter how fair the process, if a beggar starves while a rich man feasts *this is not justice*, because justice is about having the right human relationships.
Libertarians are extremely principled people, but my own philosophy is closer to "persons before principles" (quote from the works of Lois McMaster Bujold).
Posted by: Doctor Science | June 18, 2006 at 02:20 AM
Dr. Science,
Ha! I do appreciate the response. You're pessimistic about our disagreement - I'm pessimistic about this "what is morality" discussion. Different books, I suppose.
You do make a good point about how doctrinaire the libertarian philosophy can be. I'm not familiar at all with Nozick so I can't speak to it.
But, and this is very important - individual humans who enter into voluntary associations is the very definition of society, I'm afraid. The whole money and property being fungible is a whole other matter I'm not quite ready to deal with.
I'm merely arguing, that these property issues that those are defining as exclusively socially constructed are in fact rooted in the damn horrible issues one encountered in that state of nature - or to a lesser extent, today. Any further reform - and I'm not a conservative so I'm not for standing still necessarily - has to take this into consideration otherwise we've lost the plot.
I don't mean to be completely in opposition to what you say, but I don't think your "human relationship" theory helps the damn near intractable dilemmas that come about in morality. Valuing human relationships mean that the good of hiding Jews from the Gestapo by German friends occurs; it also means that people sign up for the Nazi party because they respect and love their friends and familiy who already have. I'm not seeing the way out, maybe you can help me.
Don't worry, I'm not hung up on process at all. I have no idea what the process should be. I've got some dumb hacks I'm partial to, but I can be persuaded. Property justice? Now there's a challenge. I'm merely saying that property is going to exist whether anyone likes it or not.
All I've been arguing is, if we're developing processes or if we're developing moral principles, we have to take into consideration the bare naked fact that human beings have big conflict problems with possession, property - whatever you want to call it. If we pretend it's a social construction we've conjured out of thin air for our own entertainment, I don't think we can approach a decent solution - whether it be purely process-based or relationship-based, or a combination.
Generally, when I sympathize or even wholesale adopt libertarian notions, it's because it seems that the principle protects the most people possible. For instance, something we'd consider non-controversial, like freedom of speech. I'm guessing that we share that, if I'm wrong, I'm sure we have a value in common that demonstrates my point.
Posted by: Jonas Cord | June 18, 2006 at 03:56 AM
"But, and this is very important - individual humans who enter into voluntary associations is the very definition of society, I'm afraid."
All societies, everywhere? Samoa, 1910? Northeastern U.S. 1310 A.D.? China, 1422? Wales, 100 A.D.? Etc.?
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 05:01 AM
Don't mean to take sides, but I did enjoy Dr. Science's comment. It reminded me of something my Greek teacher said about the Iliad, which is that both sides were right. Achilles was right to point out that he was scorned, while Agamemnon was correct that he was the high king and what he ordered was law. So many of the Greek classics depend on this tension between what is laid down in the law and what the characters heart's tell them. Of course, the Greeks weren't so big on worrying about babies split in half, so Solomon gets the call. But there is always going to be a tension, the Furies are turned into the Eumenides. Rather than seeing some sort of clear moral framework, it seems like it's the human condition not to have one.
Posted by: liberal japonicus | June 18, 2006 at 06:40 AM
Doctor Science, I have enjoyed reading your posts and I agree with much of what you write. I have to take issue with this, though:
In my view, Solomon's threat is simply a trick to expose the real mother, not in any sense fair. It cannot be fair to take the baby's life and divide its body. That process destroys the baby. Even regarding living beings as property, some of the value in such property is life. Of course, in disputes about property sometimes the legal process destroys part of the value (even just in the delay it imposes in coming to a decision), so you might call that "fair" since a fair process may require this delay. I think it is a stretch past the breaking point to describe Solomon's threat as that of fairness.
In ancient literature wars are fought over wronged individuals as liberal japonicus points out. The damage wrought seems to me way out of proportion to the crimes. Civilized societies, young though they are, and with all their many faults, have devised processes to deal with the conflict inherent in human nature that I think are an improvement. Civilization has also produced much greater capabilities for destruction, though, so the jury is out as to whether this was a net plus.
Posted by: ral | June 18, 2006 at 12:40 PM
Hmmm... I first wrote "modern" and changed to "civilized." Of course, the ancient Greeks were civilized, so ... oops.
Posted by: ral | June 18, 2006 at 12:46 PM
Gary,
Voluntary isn't necessarily the right word, it's more like individuals inherently have the free will to accept or reject associations with others. And yes, this would apply to all of your examples.
Posted by: Jonas Cord | June 18, 2006 at 02:11 PM
"Voluntary isn't necessarily the right word, it's more like individuals inherently have the free will to accept or reject associations with others. And yes, this would apply to all of your examples."
So you would say it's more important to recognize the right of a daughter or son in a society with a family-oriented idea of property to "voluntarily" give up property to their parents than to recognize the custom that property belongs to the family, or father, or mother?
And the same for a society where property is shared by the tribe, or regarded as owned by no one?
Isn't this projecting an alien concept, not held by such people at such times, into their heads, when they didn't, you know, actually believe that?
And if it's something they don't believe, and alien, how can it be "the very definition of [their] society," exactly?
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 02:19 PM
Gary,
Well, they did consent of their own free will to the family-oriented property structure, clearly. I'm not speaking to whether they should or shouldn't, merely that they did and that's the basis of their society actually existing and working.
And if an ideal system of property doesn't take into consideration that individuals can dissolve it at any time by no longer complying with it's rules if they find it unjust, it doesn't stand much of a chance of success.
A society where property is regarded as owned by no one is their way of dealing with the problems of possession.
They can believe whatever they want, and they'll probably make a society based around that belief. Without possession, there is no reason for these beliefs about property to emerge in any form.
Gary, societies are formed by individuals of their own free will. If they aren't, where did the societies come from?
Posted by: Jonas Cord | June 18, 2006 at 02:37 PM
Penal colonies, I'm guessing.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 03:04 PM
Penal colonies, I'm guessing.
No Australian jokes, please.
Posted by: Anarch | June 18, 2006 at 06:07 PM
"Gary, societies are formed by individuals of their own free will. If they aren't, where did the societies come from?"
You find that most tribal societies are formed "by individuals of their own free will," do you? And you, Slart?
Okay. I'm sure you can find cites describing such tribes in anthropology journals with great ease, then, this being so common. I look forward to seeing a few. It should be very interesting reading, indeed, reading about these libertarian tribes, undoubtedly found throughout South America, the Pacific, and Africa, that have come together out of "free will."
I'll just wait right here. I'm sure you'll both be right back with cites on these tribes, which probably make up the majority of tribal -- no, wait, they have to be all tribal cultures, don't they?
Cool.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 06:18 PM
"And if an ideal system of property doesn't take into consideration that individuals can dissolve it at any time by no longer complying with it's rules if they find it unjust, it doesn't stand much of a chance of success."
I'm not clear what you mean by "ideal" here. Do you mean the platonic version of a family or tribal oriented practice of property? Or what?
And, again, do you have any cites from an anthrological source on such societies on how it works "that individuals can dissolve it at any time by no longer complying with it's rules if they find it unjust"?
Or are you just projecting this belief that this is how all societies do and have worked out of, forgive me, dogma, rather than actual study of anthropolgy?
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 06:23 PM
Gary, you are at the point where your comments are nothing but questions. That give the impression, regardless of what your true intentions are, of badgering.
Posted by: liberal japonicus | June 18, 2006 at 06:27 PM
society n 1. A group of people joined together by a common purpose or by a common interest.
association n 2. A group of people joined together for some purpose; society.
I see two choices: a voluntary joining, or an involuntary joining. Which one are you choosing, Gary? Not saying this is the only line of division, but it's one. And no, no cite. This one is pretty much by definition.
Oh, source is Thorndike and Barnhart World Book Dictionary, 1968.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 06:47 PM
granfalloon n 3. A group of people who outwardly choose or claim to have a shared identity or purpose, but whose mutual association is actually meaningless.
Posted by: manyoso | June 18, 2006 at 07:00 PM
Slartibartfast & Jonas,
Ever hear the phrase, "You can't choose your family?" Because most societies are groups of families. Which society you are born into is involuntary. It is not a product of free will.
Tell it to the Mexican by birth that he is free to choose his society. It just doesn't work in the real world like you would have it in your ideal world.
Sure, there are asocial individuals who've opted out of society. However, this is not always the case. Can a man born as the heir to the British royal throne just choose his society? Society is not composed of individual adults who look at a menu and choose. For an adult human, yes, sometimes free will comes into play more or less, but this is far from the rule.
Posted by: manyoso | June 18, 2006 at 07:08 PM
But whether one continues to live in the society one is born into; that is entirely voluntary. One doesn't have to opt out of all societies to exercise one's free will.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 07:09 PM
Trying to make lemonade here, one of the points of a libertarian stance is that a lot of associations are only such because we think that we have to remain a member. All of the psychological studies of various group behavior. Frex, whether people will cross against a light. Here in Japan, if they see someone with a perceived higher status do it, they will, but someone with perceived lower status, they won't. The libertarian critique has us ask 'do we really need to be a part of this group'. But, like the semanticist who, on learning a new language, says 'well, you say that word means the same as dog, but what does it really mean?', this sort of thinking can put enough grit in the wheels that things start to fall apart. Given that so much in society is based on the health club paradigm (in that if all the members of a health club actually used the facilities, there would not be enough space for them), there is a point where this thinking becomes counter productive.
Posted by: liberal japonicus | June 18, 2006 at 07:17 PM
Not. True.
You can not choose your family. Yes, SOMETIMES, an adult is able to leave his family behind forever. Yes, SOMETIMES, an adult is able to leave his country behind forever. Yes, SOMETIMES, and adult is able to leave his society behind forever.
But, this is not ALWAYS the case. A man born as heir to the British throne does not have the same choices as you do. A Mexican national who is stuck in extreme poverty does not have the same choices as you do. Children of the former Soviet Union did not have the same choices as you do. A North Korean national does not have the same choices as you do!
I suppose that humans always have the choice of suicide. That's a pretty permanent way to leave society. However, having to choose between living under North Korean rule and suicide is not what I'd describe as free will.
Posted by: manyoso | June 18, 2006 at 07:18 PM
You can un-choose them. You can choose not to associate with them.
Sometimes an adult is not able to leave his country forever? Which times? East Germany, before the wall came down? USSR?
You mean, he cannot just leave? Who says?
Which is not the same thing as a refutation. No one, anywhere, said choices had to be the same everywhere. Certainly the notion that I cannot choose to be king doesn't in any way imply that I have no choices.
I guess we're now back to involuntary. Maybe not technically a penal colony, but arguably close enough.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 07:44 PM
"I see two choices: a voluntary joining, or an involuntary joining. Which one are you choosing, Gary?"
I'm quite sure I didn't join my biological family voluntarily. Few people do. (Other sorts of families, yes.)
I was unaware this was controversial.
Similarly, few people join tribal cultures voluntarily. I was equally unaware this was controversial or little-known.
Are the Hmong Hmong "voluntarily"? Or the Nukak-Makú? The Kubaisat? The Karabila? The Zagawa?">http://amygdalagf.blogspot.com/+tribe&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=8&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a">Zagawa? The Yupik?">http://amygdalagf.blogspot.com/+tribe&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a">Yupik?
But probably all these people don't exist, and neither do biological families, and neither do any tribes throughout history. Instead, we all live according to Hayek, and libertarian theory.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 07:46 PM
"But whether one continues to live in the society one is born into; that is entirely voluntary."
Sure. Plenty of 5 year-year-old and 8-year-olds divorce their families all the time. It's commonplace.
And in the 18th century and before, it was just common to leave your South Sea island.
Because, after all, the only society that has ever existed is modern society; it's what human history has mostly consisted of. When we describe it, we describe the entire history and circumstance of humankind.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 07:51 PM
Of course not. It'd have been silly of me to say so, if I had.
Same here.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 07:52 PM
No, you'll deny it. And deny you've been arguing with anything.
I'm tired of this game you play, Slart. When you want to get around to making a positive argument, do so.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 07:58 PM
Completely fabricated, Gary. I was just turning your own argument, such as it was, around on you. Which ought to have been obvious.
You can always choose not to, Gary. Whatever game you imagine I'm playing, that is.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 08:05 PM
Gary: The quote in this sentence here...
So you agree that claiming that "But, and this is very important - individual humans who enter into voluntary associations is the very definition of society, I'm afraid" is nonsense?
... is from Jonas Cord, not Slarti.
Posted by: Anarch | June 18, 2006 at 08:40 PM
"Whatever game you imagine I'm playing, that is."
The one where in response to other people writing lengthy exegeses of what their position is, you offer none, but only sit back and offer cryptic questions and statements.
I don't believe anyone will be apt to back up your belief that I'm imagining that.
But please refute me. Write up your position on the matters under discussion on this thread and post it, please.
I apologize somewhat for expressing myself with exasperation; it's not entirely fair to snap at you for a long-standing annoying technique/style/approach of yours in a given instance, but it's not entirely unfair, I think, either.
Notice, not incidentally, that in response to this:
You didn't respond. Typically. As I predicted.Try, instead of "turning around my argument," making one of your own. Please.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 08:46 PM
"Gary: The quote in this sentence here...... is from Jonas Cord, not Slarti."
Yes, I'm perfectly aware of that. It's the point I was responding to that Slarti was responding to.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 18, 2006 at 08:47 PM
Slartibartfast,
You said:
Fact is: a North Korean national can not voluntarily choose to leave his country.
You are wrong.
Posted by: manyoso | June 18, 2006 at 09:36 PM
Of course I didn't respond, Gary. If I'd thought it was nonsense, would I be making the point in the first place? Really, you're imagining that I'm doing all of this as a...really, I can't imagine what you're thinking.
Yes, typically. Just like every other time we've had this argument.
Ok, then. You're an ace prognosticator. Hope that's served you well in other areas of life.
Look, this is not difficult. I am not going to submit a friggin' thesis to you to back this up. Don't like it? Fine, don't have these discussions with me.
Now, anyone that's read past that point: consider that the fact that there are only unpleasant choices doesn't mean there are no choices.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 18, 2006 at 09:48 PM
Gary,
Do tribal societies consist of people? Yes. Do they all have free will? Yes.
The concept of free will does not mean you are free to do whatever you want at no cost and with no consequences. Free will does not make you God. Free will does mean you are free to try. Anyone in any culture can do that at any time. Period.
I'm not making any claims about "libertarian tribes," Gary. If people truly cannot bear their own culture they will either act to change it or leave. I cite "all of human history" as my anthropological source.
Upheaval, unrest, revolution, mass migration, war - these are my citations of human history that demonstrates the extremes of what happens when people choose to no longer comply with a culture.
If you have a problem with individuals existing and having free will, just say so. You've challenged the metaphysical beliefs of others, it's time for you to defend yours.
No one ever left a tribal culture? No one ever broke their rules? No culture ever changes when people no longer believed in it? I had no idea that anthropology had discovered cultures so omnipotent that people were the mere teeth of the gears that the machines of culture operate to serve it's own ends.
Societies are created by people, Gary. Your appeals to anthropological authority in no way changes that fact.
manyoso,
How did the North Koreans in China or South Korea get there?
Posted by: Jonas Cord | June 18, 2006 at 11:24 PM
Jonas,
Bullshit. The slaves that were brought from Africa to America did not have a choice. They were forcefully taken. You are defining 'free will' downward so as to take all meaning away from the term. I suppose you'll say the African slaves could have 'tried' to jump off the ships into the open ocean. That is a shamefully ludicrous definition of 'freedom' or free will.
And what will you tell the women born in Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia? What do you make of the women who don't 'try' and leave? I suppose all of them choose out of their own free will to stay and be subjected to the oppression.
How about the people in darfur? After all, don't you wonder why the rest of the world is getting all upset? I mean if the people of darfur don't like the genocide then why don't they exercise their free will and choose not to live in that society anymore!
And what will you say about the peoples of the American south? They exercised their free will and decided to secede from the union. Look how that worked out for them! Did they succeed at voluntarily leaving their society?
How about all the various American separatist groups... how many of them have been successful at informing the American government they won't be paying taxes any longer?
All the folks in Iraq? Are they also free to choose to leave Iraq? Could everyone that is dissatisfied with the political situation in Iraq just choose to exercise their free will and leave the country? How do you think that'd go over with the bordering countries.
And what do you make of the people born into India at the height of the caste system? You think they had a chance to exercise their free will?
The examples go on and on of human beings born into this world within societies with a decidedly antagonistic idea towards them just up and leaving. All throughout human history as you said... You act like a society voluntarily created and maintained is the rule rather than the exception!
No, your idea of voluntary societies is so vacuous and empty when applied to the real world that it is laughable that you'd say this is the default position in the human state of nature. It is not. People are born into this world and are often completely constrained by the society they live in from following their own inner predilections.
Just saying that everyone can at least 'try' to change their lot in life is callous in the extreme and arrogant. A choice between life and death is not a real choice. Maintaining otherwise is heartless.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 12:27 AM
Jonas,
Are you being serious? They were born there, Jonas.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 12:28 AM
I think you're getting a little overly worked up, manyoso.
The few hundred thousand NKs in China were born in China? What on earth can you possibly mean by that?
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 19, 2006 at 12:34 AM
Wow. Yet more thinking!
After Jonas said
various people talked about how important voluntary associations are, in the scheme of human life.
I was more taken aback by Jonas' restrictive usage because I as a biologist frequently speak of societies of many other animals, and we generally rank the insect societies as the most social of all. Bees, ants, and termites are complex & fascinating creatures, but they do not enter into voluntary associations IMHO, nor do they have whatever it takes mentally (spiritually?) to do so. Or at least so we hope -- though I for one welcome our new eusocial overlords.
Coming up from the evolutionary bottom as I do, it seems to me that the vast, vast majority of human associations from around 1700 back into the Cro-Magnon mists, at least, must be mostly unvoluntary or of limited volition. People associate with their blood relatives, their neighbors, their neighbors' relatives, and only rarely in life have a chance to make a true free-will choice of society -- and they tended to call such choices "duty", not "volition."
Posted by: Doctor Science | June 19, 2006 at 12:48 AM
Slartibartfast,
Yes, I am getting heated. Sorry, but the idea that societies on earth are by default voluntary associations where individuals can dissolve them at any time by just exercising their free will and opting out... well, it is insulting to the billions of people on earth who suffer through oppressive regimes.
Looking back, I find this is how this discussion on voluntary societies began.
Given all the examples, will you please concede, that while this romanticized ideal would sure be nice, it is not how the world, you know, actually works?
Sorry. Bad reading comprehension on my part.
However, just pointing out that some individuals are able to escape is a pitiful way to argue that North Korea is a voluntary society where everyone can just decide to up and leave thereby dissolving the country.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 12:53 AM
Who's romanticizing? I don't think either Jonas or I are glorifying disassociation from society via suicide, or putting pastel tones on the reality of escaping from Cuba by converting one's automobile to a boat. No, these are choices. Sometimes the choices are as brutal as cutting off your climbing buddy in order to survive, because otherwise you both die. Like it or not, real life can involve unpleasant choices. Like it or not, real life can involve unpleasant choices without any alternative pleasant ones.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 19, 2006 at 01:04 AM
Just as, y'know, it'd be objectionable to characterize the choice of whether to have an abortion as something one arrives at via a coin-flip, or on a whim.
Choice does not ever imply no consequences.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 19, 2006 at 01:16 AM
This just galls me so much I suppose because it is so far removed from human experience. Societies throughout all of history were not created, much less maintained, by the voluntary association of humans, unless you mean by voluntary, at the point of a sharp stick.
I don't know what history books everyone else is reading from, but Rome was not built upon voluntary cooperation amongst differing peoples. It was conquest where the conquered peoples were given no real choice.
Here is a short list, please pick the societies that were 'voluntarily' created:
The history of the world is society created through conquest. The history of the world is society created through familial and ethnic ties.
It is a utopian idea that societies are created by a bunch of humans getting together and voluntarily negotiating the set of rules, structure, and geography wherein they wish to live.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 01:25 AM
Slartibartfast,
And not everyone has such choices. Some people don't have automobiles to convert into boats. Some people have nothing!
Anyway, it is beside the point. This discussion began with an over emphasis beyond all degree and good taste the importance of freewill and voluntary associations when it comes to creating and maintaining human societies.
I don't see how defining the concept of freewill downwards to 'escape or die trying' helps you maintain that societies are, by and large, a voluntary thing.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 01:26 AM
Societies throughout all of history were not created, much less maintained, by the voluntary association of humans, unless you mean by voluntary, at the point of a sharp stick.
Hmmm...I don't believe I said anything at all about creation, although I might have. Nor did I insist that, as Farber would have you believe, one chooses one's parents or the society into which one is born. No, this is about ongoing participation in society. Certainly one cannot choose to participate in society that one is not part of; voluntary association provides for that others in the association may not want to associate with you.
So there's a whole lot of counterarguments being presented that simply don't apply, and the dressing-up of this argument in appeal-to-emotion drag that's based on nothing I've said.
But of course you and Gary are free to be angry about this. It's a free world, isn't it?
Again, missing the point. This is not, and never has beem, about equality of choice. I'm not sure how many times I have to say this, but it's not until you do understand that, that you're going to be able to even hear any of the responses I have to your various other statements. To me, it appears that you're repeatedly presenting a list of situations where the only choices are "bad" ones as refutation.
I don't see how that defines free will downward. The refusal to be coerced is, to me, the ultimate expression of free will.
That's all I have time for right now, sorry. I imagine hilzoy will show up in a bit and show how everything Jonas and I have said is not only incorrect but morally reprehensible, but do so without accusing me of making bad-faith or otherwise shoddy arguments, or sneering at the plight of the disadvantaged. Which would be a nice change.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 19, 2006 at 07:22 AM
Manyoso,
I don't want to gang up, but the point that Slarti and Jonas are trying to make is the same one that Victor Frankl made
"Everything can be taken from a man but ...the last of the human freedoms - to choose
one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way."
This page gives some more details. His book 'Man's Search for Meaning' (the English title is strangely much broader than the German original Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager or 'A Psychologist experiences the concentration Camp") I would highly recommend.
Posted by: liberal japonicus | June 19, 2006 at 08:16 AM
Why are you going back to some hypothetical state of nature in an African savannah in the distant past. Libertarians are so ridiculous because they pretend that property ownership is some natural right that has existed since man first descended from the trees. Nothing could be further from the truth. The concept that someone could own property free and clear of control of the government is a completely modern concept, even in the west.
It has only been a few hundred years since the entire island of England was owned by the King, and everybody who lived on it merely lessees. The King could take your land anytime he wanted.
Your example about the antelope is perfectly applicable today in the United States. You have no property interest in wild animals on your land, and the state tells you what animals you can or cannot kill, even on private property.
Posted by: Freder Frederson | June 19, 2006 at 10:04 AM
Thanks for that, LJ. I'd missed, somehow, that this was pretty much along the lines of what Frankl was saying; it has been quite a while since I read that last.
I had wanted to say some things, too, about how society and government (or even empire) are all different things, but this is a line of argumentation in which I am less sure of my own footing. Which, someone could get hurt. Certainly there are ways in which one's choices can be curtailed (even to severe extent), but I think that as those curtailments grow more severe, what one is living in is less like society and more like prison.
Which sounds like tautology, I know, but I did note upthread that society and voluntary association can (and do, I submit) have the same meaning. Of course, one can take Society as an exception, but that's not what we're talking about.
Posted by: Slartibartfast | June 19, 2006 at 10:42 AM
Manyoso,
I'm going to make an attempt to be more clear so we aren't talking past each other. I think our point of contention is that you are speaking of "voluntary," which I may have sloppily used at one point, but "free will" is not a matter of being voluntarily allowed to do something. I'm not defining free will downward - every time I've encountered it in philosophy it means you have the ultimate power of agency over your actions.
And I do not maintain that free will somehow diminishes the crimes of those who have committed egregious crimes against human freedom. Slave traders did not allow Slaves any liberty, but the slaves still did have free will. If they didn't, it is hard to explain slave rebellions, isn't it?
They do choose to stay, because the uncertainty, and danger, and personal loss involved in leaving or revolting does not seem like a better option. This does not in any way reflect poorly upon these women, in fact, it is at the core of why we should consider these injustices against them so immoral.
Yes, they did do that all right! Free will does not mean you exert your will and it will be successful.
I think I see exactly what you're saying, and it's not what I mean. Choosing between life and death is a real choice, one that people make every day, and that is part of free will.
I agree that It is heartless to say that people should merely choose to die to revolt against people who oppress them. I do not mean to imply that. The blame for these sorts of predicaments lies squarely at the feet of those who are doing the oppression.
Posted by: Jonas Cord | June 19, 2006 at 11:08 AM
Jonas, Slartibartfast,
You both seem to be backing away from what you original maintained. This entire discussion began with the following argument advanced by Jonas and subsequently seconded by Slartibartfast:
Link here.
Link here.
Link here.
This is the classicly naive libertarian notion of a society creation. No matter the countervailing examples I give of societies created at the end of the sharp stick you hang on arguing that you only meant some people voluntarily choose to live rather than die in the face of such pointy sticks.
All of the societies I've cited above were created by forced coercion which you would now redefine as voluntary association to suit your thesis. It's absurd and it flies in the face of your statement that societies are inherently prone to immediate dissolution where individuals disobey the rules.
LJ,
I understand they are repeatedly trying to make this argument when confronted with the examples of societies cited above.
However, it is not consistent with their original thesis that the very definition of society is voluntary associations that can be dissolved at anytime where individuals fail to comply with societies rules.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 12:09 PM
Ah think what we have hyuh is a failuah to communicate.
Posted by: Slart's Dictionary | June 19, 2006 at 12:43 PM
Manyoso,
I backed away from "voluntary," because that's sloppy terminology. See here:
But I stand by:
You go on to say:
In my last post, I tried to explain that we are having an argument because you have defined "free will" as being deprivable by force. It is not. Liberty is deprivable by force. I think everyone is conflating "free will" with what we generally call "freedom." Every statement you have made about "free will" I agree with if you replace "free will" with "freedom" or "liberty."
How has any society ever changed if that is the case?
Posted by: Jonas Cord | June 19, 2006 at 12:44 PM
Jonas,
They are formed by war. By conquest. By one group of people physically imposing their will upon another. The American Indian is not a part of our society as a result of free will. They are here and present because they were conquered.
Please explain how individuals form a society when they have no liberty or freedom. No, society is imposed upon them. And then children are born into it and the society maintained in the same way it was created: by forced coercion.
Jonas, you did not begin this argument by stating that societies are formed in spite of an individuals free will and yet that is what I've pointed out has happened time and again. You said a society doesn't stand a chance of success if individuals exercise their free will and choose to dissolve it. This is just not true. Our society still exists and the people of the south are still a part of it in spite of the fact that they tried to dissolve it.
By individuals forcefully imposing their will upon others. And many times it is the minority forcefully imposing their will upon the majority.
Look at the history of the current societies in central/south America. They underwent a huge change in society as a result of a small band of foreigners forcefully imposing their will upon the majority. And the society has been irreconcilably changed as a result.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 01:14 PM
Jonas,
It wasn't just terminology. You used the hypothesis of voluntary associations as the basis for setting up your claim about property VS possession. The example was of hilzoy capturing the antelope, thereby possessing the antelope, but nevertheless voluntarily giving it to Mona in accordance with their societies rules where the family jointly owns the antelope.
Posted by: manyoso | June 19, 2006 at 01:21 PM
I keep coming into this conversation after days away, so if it seems like my posts are disconnected and not really arguments for any position then well, it "seems" correctly.
Jonas,
I think the problem with Societies are formed by individuals of their own free will. is that it is meant to be the starting off point for a further argument about how we evaluate the consensus societies come to about values/property etc. If "with free will", as understood in a basic philosophical texts, is used here instead of "voluntary", it seems like the entire argument falls apart.
What do I care if societies are made up of people who have the free will to make choices that suck either way. The point is that such choices are coerced and, thus, that the property structure model might not be something we can take as agreed to. If the whole world is property structured, it is damned near impossible to opt out of that world if you still intend to have any social interactions at all.
As a last note, my studies have shown me how much of our selves and personalities are pretty strongly determined by our youth and our environment. While I think we have free will, certainly, I also think that it only rears its head in rare situations and that, as a general rule, we are literally creatures of habit. Most of this I take from extenxsive arguments and whatnot had in discussion with Robert Kane, both in and out of class, as well as various readings of his material. While I believe he has various points incorrect, this is one he seems to be right on. So when I hear people talk about how we are "free" to opt out of society, I always think of the limit of even that freedom and hear my father, a devout Methodist minister, telling me one day that "If I were born in the middle east, I would be an awefully good/devout Muslim."
Posted by: socratic_me | June 19, 2006 at 01:34 PM
Nobody is disagreeing on facts here as far as I can tell. It sounded to me (and to Gary and manyoso) that Jonas and Slarti were taking the silly position that all societies formed in some utopian voluntary contractual way, but as the rhetorical chairs and fists started to fly it became clear they don't really think that. I suppose we could argue about whose fault it is that some of us misunderstood their position, but if so, I think I'll just go back to spectating.
Posted by: Donald Johnson | June 19, 2006 at 01:46 PM
Somalia has been a libertarian paradise for decades. No government, no gun control, everyone "freely choosing" their associations and decisions. Now it's re-organized and people are still Freely Choosing. Just as North Koreans Freely Choose what to do, and whether to stay or go.
Posted by: Gary Farber | June 19, 2006 at 01:47 PM