Iraqi Civil War More Likely Than We've Been Led to Believe

In an article comissioned by the Association of Alternative Newsweeklies, Jason Vest, Senior Correspondent for The American Prospect reveals the partially redacted details of a rather depressing Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) memo from early March 2004. He reportedly received this memo from a "Western intelligence official" whose motivation for passing it along goes unnoted, but the intelligence officer does note that it's a significant critique of the CPA's performance and assessment of the situation because its author is a true believer in transforming the Middle East, right down to the choice of Iraq as the place to start.

Very matter-of-fact, the memo is a summation of field reporting for a senior CPA director. And while optimistic about our eventual success, the memo's details make it hard to believe that Democracy is coming any time soon to Iraq and makes it much easier to believe civil war is likely to break out long before then.

“Baghdadis have an uneasy sense that they are heading towards civil war,” the memo states. “Sunnis, Shias, and Kurd professionals say that they themselves, friends, and associates are buying weapons fearing for the future.”

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The memo goes on to argue that "the trigger for a civil war" is not likely be an isolated incident of violence, but the result of "deeper conflicts that revolve around patronage and absolutism" reaching a flashpoint.

One highly disturing detail takes on new significance in light of our new deal with Fallujah insurgents, whereby all they need to do is hand in their "heavy weapons" to stop the Marines from further actions. See Tacitus for a good analysis of that arrangement. As Tacitus notes, "We will accept a weapon from some -- certainly not all -- of these fighters; they will swiftly re-equip; and they will shortly kill ours and our allies again. "

This CPA memo removes all doubt about that:

The memo also notes that while Iraqi police "remain too fearful to enforce regulations," they are making a pretty penny as small arms dealers, with the CPA as an unwitting partner. "CPA is ironically driving the weapons market," it reveals. "Iraqi police sell their US-supplied weapons on the black market; they are promptly re-supplied. Interior ministry weapons buy-backs keep the price of arms high."

The memo also details why the CPA is not trusted, making Brahimi's plan to disband it all the more urgent:

[T]he memo asserts that the US "share[s] culpability in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis" for engendering Iraq’s currently cronyistic state; since "we appointed the Governing Council members ... their corruption is our corruption." The author then notes that two individuals — names again redacted — have successfully worked to exclude certain strains of Shia from obtaining ministerial-level positions, and that for this "Iraqis blame Bremer, especially because the [CPA] Governance Group had assured Iraqis that exclusion from the Governing Council did not mean an exclusion from the process. As it turns out, we lied. People from Kut [a city south of Baghdad recently besieged by Shiite forces loyal to Muqtada al Sadr], for example, see that they have no representation on the Governing Council, and many predict civil war since they doubt that the Governing Council will really allow elections."

And perhaps most incompetent among the CPA/Pentagon's failures has been their approach to border integrity. The memo calls their attempts "completely irrelevant" and notes that the border security is so dysfunctional it "is undeniable that a crumbling Baathist regime did better than we have." With security for Iraq the CPA/Pentagon's Job #1, this is inexcusable.

The security issue is more of a disaster within Iraq than has been widely reported as well. The article explains,

According to a Washington, DC–based senior military official whose responsibilities include Iraq, CPA now estimates there are at least 30 separate militias active in Iraq, and "essentially, [CPA] doesn’t know what to do with regard to them — which is frightening, because CPA’s authority essentially ends on June 30, and any Iraqi incentive to get rid of the militias is likely to go away after that date, as sending US troops around Iraq against Iraqis isn’t likely to endear the new Iraqi government to its citizens."

Of course a civil war will take money too, which is why this is alarming:

And then there is the problems of Iran. According to the memo, "Iranian money is pouring in" to occupied Iraq — particularly the area under British control — and it asserts it is "a mistake" to stick to a policy of "not rock[ing] the boat" with the Iranians, as "the Iranian actors with which the State Department likes to do business . . . lack the power to deliver on promises" to exercise restraint in Iraq. According to senior US intelligence and military officials queried on this point, the Iranian influence in Iraq is both real and formidable, and the US is, as one put it, at best "catching up" in the battle for influence. But the officials also added that pushing the point with Iran too hard — either through diplomatic channels or on the ground in Iraq — would likely be more troubled than the current course of action, possibly resulting in armed conflict with Iran or a proxy war in Iraq that the US isn’t ready to fight.

Read the article yourself. The Village Voice is one of the alternative papers carrying it. It's the sort of assessment we should have received during the President's press conference last week...that's if its purpose was to paint a realistic picture of where we stand.

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From Kos

"Update: Rumor has it that the author is Michael Rubin, card-carryng neoconservative and "scholar" at the American Enterprise Institute. Working out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he is a staff adviser for Iran and Iraq and a member of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He is also an Iraq adviser for the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans."

Comments

[James Casey]

If it's likely, what's the considered opinion on keeping Coalition troops there? Kevin Drum was sort of discussing this the other day; I think he concluded that if there's a chance of avoiding civil war, that's a good argument for keeping troops in (although with increased resources, otherwise Drum suspects civil war will happen anyway).

If civil war is inevitable, what are we looking at as a result? How easy would it be to influence the result, and should we even be thinking about doing that (well, quite probably)? I think few people want a theocracy in Iraq, even a 'benign' one. Ayatollah Sistani seems to be wiser than most bloggers who've never met him or been to Iraq make him out to be, but even so...

I'd like to know how much civil war would be the 'inevitable' result of the invasion, or whether it could have been avoided by different management of the situation. It'd blow the only major reason for invading Iraq - humanitarian - out of the water if another bad regime were installed.

[Edward]

I'd like to know how much civil war would be the 'inevitable' result of the invasion

That's most likely impossible to assess...but it was certainly one of the cautions cited before the invasion, so there's no pretending it's a surprise or that steps shouldn't have been taken to avoid it. The CPA memo suggests they were not.

[bob mcmanus]

I haven't a clue as to what is going on Iraq. Or maybe I do, but don't want to believe my eyes.

"Civil War" I really can't see it, unless we allow it, and I can't see it even then. What, Muqtada Sadr gonna march his 5000 man militia up to Fallujah or Mosul and go to battle?

Low level terrorism and assassinations, maybe, something like Lebanon or Bosnia, but those were small countries. With 25 million people, 100 could die every day for a year, and most of the country would barely notice. To be brutal about it.

I would even like to think we are doing something very subtle and intelligent( even if evil), like creating conditions where Sistani would beg Chalabi to take charge as dictator. But the Kurds wouldn't stand for it, Chalabi couldn't beat the Kurds, and we aren't going to do it for him.

Maybe chaos is the goal.

[Anarch]

With 25 million people, 100 could die every day for a year, and most of the country would barely notice. To be brutal about it.

It depends on how they die. Otherwise one could argue that, with 280 million people, 3000 could die on one day and most of the US would barely have noticed 9/11.

[bob mcmanus]

Point taken.